股票期权的经济实质分析

<正>在众多的激励和约束机制中,股票期权历来被认为是解决委托——代理问题的有效激励措施。股票期权始创于20世纪50年代的美国,70年代得到高科技企业的追捧,80年代风靡美国的企业界。我国于20世纪90年代引入这种激励机制,近年来,随着我国企业员工薪酬制度改革的不断深入,加上股权分置改革的不断深化,我国的企业尤其是上市公司,将迎来股票期权的大发展时期。     

再装期权定价及其在经理激励中的应用

期权及其定价理论是目前金融管理,金融工程研究的前沿与热点问题。在标的资产的价格服从指数O-U过程模型假设下,运用Girsanov定理获得了该过程的唯一等价鞅测度。借助期权定价的鞅方法,得出了再装期权定价模型的定价公式。同时,将此模型用于经理股票期权激励中并进行了分析。     

Pricing American Stock Options by Linear Programming

We investigate numerical solution of finite difference approximations to American option pricing problems, using a new direct numerical method: simplex solution of a linear programming formulation. This approach is based on an extension to the parabolic case of the equivalence between linear order complementarity problems and abstract linear programs known for certain elliptic operators. We test this method empirically, comparing simplex and interior point algorithms with the projected successive overrelaxation (PSOR) algorithm applied to the American vanilla and lookback puts. We conclude that simplex is roughly comparable with projected SOR on average (faster for fine discretizations, slower for coarse), but is more desirable for robustness of solution time under changes in parameters. Furthermore, significant speedups over the results given here have been achieved and will be published elsewhere.     

经理股票期权制在美、日的发展及对我国的启示

经理股票期权制是公司所有者赋予经理人的一项长期薪酬激励机制。美国是经理股票期权制的发源地 ,而日本的初始条件与我国相似之处。经理股票期权制在美国、日本的产生、发展的社会背景及现实条件对我国具有指导和借鉴意义     

风险企业股票期权类型选择机制研究

在风险企业的创业过程中,风险企业家和员工的人力资本在很大程度上决定着创业的成败,然而人力资本具有非共生性,需要用一定的激励机制来共化人力资本于风险企业的价值之中。定量分析体现股票期权激励效果的因素,以边际激励效果因子大小为选择股票期权类型的标准,来比较标准的股票期权计划和基于业绩要求的股票期权计划所产生的激励效果,为风险企业采用高激励效果的基于业绩要求的股票期权计划提供依据。     

Executive Stock Options and Manipulated Stock‐Price Performance

Previous studies have examined the manipulation of executive stock option awards and exercises, focusing on information timing by managers. In this paper, we investigate managerial manipulation of stock‐price performance motivated by stock options. To distinguish performance manipulation from information timing, we examine stock returns surrounding the departure of retiring CEOs, whose option holdings typically expire shortly after their departure and whose chances to manipulate option awards and exercises are minimized. Consistent with manipulated performance, we find significant abnormal stock returns in the months surrounding CEO departure for those with strong option incentives, which are reversed shortly after CEO departure.     

Corporate Governance, Ethics, and the Backdating of Stock Options

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders’ interests? To examine these issues, we first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e.g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become “part of the problem,” and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values.     

Corporate Governance,Ethics, and the Backdating of Stock Options

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders’ interests? To examine these issues, we first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e.g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become “part of the problem,” and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values.     

Regulatory Rules and Estimating Economic Growth: Two Perspectives on Expensing Employee Stock Options

Business Economics - Government economic statistics generally diverge from statistics based on private sector or regulatory agency data, and they are subject to being updated over time as more tax...     

论我国股票期权激励制度的完善

多年来,理论界一直在探讨如何在公司建立对高级经营管理者及技术骨干实施有效激励一约束机制,使其经济利益与公司长远发展紧密联系起来,企业界也为此进行了多种尝试和探索,其中股票期权就是一种有益的尝试。本文对这种新型的激励机制在我国公司试行情况进行探讨,指出了问题,并在总结国际经验的基础上,提出了相应完善措施和政策建议,对规范我国股票期权制度具有重要的参考意义。     

论弱化我国股票期权制有效性的因素

起源于西方20世纪70年代的股票期权制,在解决公司高级管理阶层长期激励约束问题方面起了非常重要的作用。但这一制度若运用到我国将会遇到诸多不利因素的制约,其自身有效性将会被大大弱化。     

The Ethics of Managerial Compensation: The Case of Executive Stock Options

This paper examines the ethics of contemporary managerial compensation in the context of executive stock options. Economic considerations would dictate that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate the effect of overall stock market movements which are beyond the control of the executive. However, in practice, most executive stock options are not adjusted to control for these outside factors. Agency considerations are the most likely culprit. Adjusting for the influence of outside factors, such as a generally rising stock market, from executive stock options sets a higher bar for managers to reach. Furthermore, traditional accounting standards permitted firms that did not adjust options to avoid reporting options as expenses. This presents CEOs and boards of directors with a major ethical dilemma. On the one hand, their duty to their shareholders and stakeholders dictates that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate outside noise from unrelated movements in the overall stock market. However, financial statements are presented in the language of accounting. If the overwhelming majority of the users of a language define a particular item in one way, then to deviate from the norm implies that the recipient of such a deviant statement may not properly interpret the statement. Likewise, if the standard practice is for firms to use unadjusted options and thus under-report expenses, to deviate from this industry norm risks that users of financial statements would not properly interpret the financial statements, with perhaps negative consequences for the shareholders. In short, if “everyone else does it,” then it could be wrong for an individual firm to deviate from the norm as that would harm the shareholders. James J. Angel is an Associate Professor of Finance at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. He is a financial expert whose research focuses on the operation of financial markets in the United States and other countries. He currently serves on the OTCBB Advisory Board, and he has served as Chair of the Nasdaq Economic Advisory Council. He earned his undergraduate degree from the California Institute of Technology, his MBA from the Harvard Business School, and he earned his Ph.D. in Finance from the University of California at Berkeley. Douglas M. McCabe is a Professor of Management at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. He serves on the Editorial Boards of 20 scholarly journals, including Research on Ethical Issues in Organizations, JAI Press as well as the Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal. Considered by the media to be an expert in his field, he has appeared more than 200 times on international (CNN), national (ABC, NBC, and CBS), and local television and radio. He holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.     

太子奶的前世今生

<正>湖南省株洲市气势恢宏的体育中心,2010年12月4日聚集起了成群结队的生意人。他们胸前佩戴会议主办单位签发的证件,手持身份证,从多个通道在接受严格安检后缓缓步入会场。在现场,官方安排了大批警力和消防、医务等人员。     

股票期权在民营企业高管人员激励性薪酬体系中的应用研究

民营企业高层管理人员薪酬制度缺乏吸引力与激励性,是导致人才流失,企业竞争力下降的重要原因。因此,为企业量身订做一套公平合理并且具有激励性的薪酬体系,是摆在企业管理者面前的一个刻不容缓的问题。股票期权在民营企业高管人员激励性薪酬体系中的应用具有必要性和可行性,为此提出了一套民营企业高层管理人员激励性薪酬体系的具体设计方案。     

股权激励下双重声誉的国企经营者博弈合同分析

由于所有权与经营权的分离,国有企业委托人和代理人之间存在利益冲突。如何设计一个合理的激励合同来消除两者之间的利益冲突,是委托代理理论遇到的一个重要理论问题。本文结合国有企业经营者双重身份的特点,在经营者市场声誉和政治声誉的双重声誉下,以股权激励报酬为例对委托人与代理人之间的最优合同进行研究,认为最优激励程度与经理人风险规避系数、企业业绩波动性及各种努力的成本系数成反比,与努力之间的相关性成正比;随着短期努力对当期业绩的贡献系数和长期业绩对当期业绩的负效应系数的增大,最优激励水平不断弱化。     

试论我国股票权证市场的发展模式

我国发展股票权证市场已经势在必行,但是在市场发展模式的选择上仍存在争议.文章从全球视野出发,总结衍生权证与股票期权等市场模式的发展情况和优缺点,并在此基础上,提出了我国股票权证市场应当选择股票期权为主的发展模式等相关建议.