Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters

We consider the case where political advertising is targeted to a subset of uninformed voters and show how pressure groups, candidates, and uninformed voters interact to achieve an equilibrium outcome. The paper accomplishes the following: (1) It derives the optimal behavior of those uninformed voters who do not received targeted campaign advertising. (2) It suggests that previous results may have exaggerated the power of pressure groups and political advertising—even when there is directed advertising, any negative effect is mitigated by strategic behavior of the uninformed. (3) In the limit, pressure group donations move the outcome toward the median voter, contrary to what much of the literature on pressure groups claims.      

Voter turnout in a multidimensional policy space

Many factors influence the likelihood of citizens turning out to vote. In this paper we focus our attention on issue voting, that is, on the likelihood that different policies offered by politicians affect the probability of voting. If voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, rational voters will only vote when politicians offer differentiated policies. In a multidimensional policy space this implies that citizens only vote when they perceive enough difference on the issues they care about the most. We investigate the role of voter abstention due to indifference in a unidimensional and a multidimensional policy setting using data from the US National Election Studies for 1972–2000 and find support for our predictions: voters perceiving a small difference between the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties are less likely to vote; and voters who perceive the two parties as more different on a larger number of issues are significantly more likely to vote.     

A political economy model of road pricing

In this paper, we use a simple majority voting model to study the introduction of urban congestion tolls. The model allows for different types of uncertainty and considers different uses of the toll revenues. The following results are obtained. First, we show that individual uncertainty with respect to modal substitution costs may imply that a majority votes against road pricing ex ante, although a majority would have been in favor after its introduction ex post. Moreover, if a majority is against road pricing ex ante, there will also be no majority for organizing an experiment that would take away the individual uncertainty. Second, political uncertainty with respect to the use of the revenues corroborates the finding that ex ante more voters will be against the introduction of tolls. Third, both types of uncertainty suggest that fewer voters are against road pricing when toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are redistributed to all voters. Importantly, the results of this paper are consistent with a number of recent empirical observations on efforts to introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection of road pricing in referenda, the more favorable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its introduction, and tying the toll revenues to support public transport.     

Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality

What are the welfare effects of government debt? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of government debt reductions? We answer these questions with the help of an incomplete markets economy with production. Households are subject to uninsurable income shocks. We make several contributions. First, by targeting the skewed wealth and earnings distribution of the US economy in our calibration, we identify inequality as the major driver of the welfare effects of public debt/GDP changes. Second, we show that in order to fully gauge the welfare consequences and the political feasibility of government debt changes, it is crucial to consider the transitional dynamics between stationary equilibria. Our results therefore have important implications for the design of debt reduction policies. Since the skewed wealth distribution generates a large fraction of borrowing-constrained households, a public debt reduction should be non-linear, such that the tax burden is postponed into the future.     

Comparing the effectiveness of employment subsidies

This paper examines the implications of different types of employment subsidies for employment, welfare, and inequality. It investigates how these effects depend on what target groups the subsidies address. Our analysis focuses on policies that are “approximately welfare efficient” (AWE), i.e. policies that (a) improve employment and welfare, (b) do not raise earnings inequality and (c) are self-financing. We construct a microfounded, dynamic model of hiring and separations and calibrate it with German data. The calibration shows that hiring vouchers can be AWE, while low-wage subsidies are not AWE. Furthermore, hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are more effective than those targeted at low-ability workers.     

Federalism,distributive politics and representative democracy

We analyze federal systems of government in which local public policies are financed by general taxation. In a decentralized political system there is, in each region, a vote to elect a local representative while in a centralized political system a single representative is elected by a federal vote. It is shown that under decentralization, voters strategically elect liberal representatives so as to nullify any element of cooperation between representatives in the decision-making stage. Thus, there is a trade-off between the budgetary externality and a "policy closer to the people", but the democratic choice is biased towards decentralization.     

Who Will We Recruit? Targeting Deep‐ and Surface‐Level Diversity with Human Resource Policy Advertising

Research on targeted recruitment has focused on targeting applicants with surface‐level attributes such as underrepresented demographic groups. The present study extends targeted recruitment research by examining how advertising human resource policies might be useful for targeting both surface‐ and deep‐level attributes. Specifically, the current study uses an experimental design to examine the impact of work‐family, diversity, and employee development policies on the job‐pursuit intentions of working adults in the United States. We examined surface‐ (demographic characteristics; e.g., race) and deep‐level differences (attitudes or values; e.g., diversity values) as predictors of whether participants intend to pursue jobs with firms advertising these human resource (HR) policies. Deep‐level differences consistently predicted job‐pursuit intentions for all three HR policies, but only marginal support was obtained for surface‐level variables as predictors. Findings suggest that targeted recruitment based on deep‐level attributes may be more successful than targeted recruitment based on surface‐level factors.     

Targeted advertising,platform competition,and privacy

Targeted advertising can benefit consumers through lower prices for access to web sites. Yet, if consumers dislike that web sites collect their personal information, their welfare may go down. We study competition for consumers between web sites that can show targeted advertisements. We find that more targeting increases competition and reduces the web sites' profits, but yet in equilibrium web sites choose maximum targeting as they cannot credibly commit to low targeting. A privacy protection policy can be beneficial for both consumers and web sites. If consumers are heterogeneous in their concerns for privacy, a policy that allows choice between two levels of privacy will be better. Optimal privacy protection takes into account that the more intense competition on the high‐targeting market segment also benefits consumers on the less competitive segment. Consumer surplus is maximized by allowing them a choice between a high‐targeting regime and a low‐targeting regime which affords more privacy.     

Public service restructuring in the UK: the case of the English National Health Service

This article overviews welfare state retrenchment in the UK under the Conservative‐led coalition government that formed in May 2010 and has centred its response to economic crisis on rapid public deficit reduction through public expenditure austerity targeted increasingly on the welfare benefits budget. It locates the coalition's reforms of public services and public sector employment relations in the long trajectory of public sector restructuring in the UK: the policies of New Right governments in the 1980s and New Labour from 1997 to 2010 that installed marketisation and privatisation in a permutation of forms, intensifying challenges for trade union organising. Focusing on the English NHS, the article identifies the respects in which the coalition's reforms continue and depart from New Labour's.     

Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: The case of ethanol

This paper reconsiders the analogy between competitive markets and the political process that is central to much of the literature on the efficiency of government transfers. The key problem is that property rights in politics are much less well defined than they are in competitive markets. As the paper outlines, obtaining accurate information about the benefits and costs of transfers is likely to be much more difficult than envisioned in the literature. Investigators, as well as general voters, often must rely on the government and competing parties for provision of information about underlying program parameters and functional relationships. We argue that politicians and the affected interest groups have incentives to limit and distort the information that is released to voters and that political competition is unlikely to be an effective counter. In developing the argument, a theoretical framework is provided and applied in a case study of the ethanol transfer. The documented efforts to disguise the actual costs and benefits of the program are important for gaining a broader understanding of the functioning and costs of government transfers in the economy.     

Voting between tax regimes to fund a public good

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between an income tax and a commodity tax to fund a public good. We implement conditions such that a rational and self-interested subject would prefer the commodity-tax regime. We find that voters overwhelmingly support the income-tax regime. We discuss and evaluate empirically alternative behavioral accounts to explain voting behavior. We find that inequality aversion and efficiency concerns matter for voting. We find no evidence for opportunism or for cognitive ability to affect voting.     

On the theory of optimal government behaviour

A small politico-economic model of the U.S. is presented. Optimal policies for a vote-maximising government and an ideology-maximising government are derived. Different assumptions concerning the expectation formation mechanism and the discount rates of voters and government are employed. Though the structure of the cycle depends on the specific assumptions, it turns out that in most cases it is advantageous for the government to produce a ‘political business cycle’. Therefore it is asked how voters can force government to choose the socially optimal policy.     

Homevoters vs. leasevoters: A spatial analysis of airport effects

We use a public referendum on a new aviation concept in Berlin, Germany, as a natural experiment to analyze how the interaction of tenure and capitalization effects influences the outcome of direct democracy processes. We distinguish between homevoters, i.e., voters who are homeowners, and leasevoters, i.e., voters who lease their homes. We expect that homevoters would be more likely to support initiatives that positively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood because some of the related benefits of leasevoters are neutralized by adjustments in market rents. Likewise, homevoters would be more likely to oppose initiatives that negatively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood. Our empirical results are consistent with these expectations, implying that public votes on local public goods do not necessarily reflect the spatial distribution of welfare effects in mixed-tenure environments.     

STABILISATION POLICY,RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND PRICE‐LEVEL VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING: A SURVEY

We survey literature comparing inflation targeting (IT) and price‐level targeting (PT) as macroeconomic stabilisation policies. Our focus is on New Keynesian models and areas that have seen significant developments since Ambler's (2009, Price‐level targeting and stabilisation policy: a survey. Journal of Economic Surveys 23(5): 974–997) survey: optimal monetary policy; the zero lower bound; financial frictions and transition costs of adopting a PT regime. Ambler's conclusion that PT improves social welfare in New Keynesian models is fairly robust, but we note an interesting split in the literature: PT consistently outperforms IT in models where policymakers commit to simple Taylor‐type rules, but results in favour of PT when policymakers minimise loss functions are overturned with small deviations from the baseline model. Since the beneficial effects of PT appear to hang on the joint assumption that agents are rational and the economy New Keynesian, we discuss survey and experimental evidence on rational expectations and the applied macro literature on the empirical performance of New Keynesian models. Overall, the evidence is not clear‐cut, but we note that New Keynesian models can pass formal statistical tests against macro data and that models with rational expectations outperform those with behavioural expectations (i.e. heuristics) in direct statistical tests. We therefore argue that policymakers should continue to pay attention to PT.     

Elections and strategic positioning games

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe 1994) and apply Chwe's result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.Received: 18 May 2001, Accepted: 22 January 2002, JEL Classification: C7, D7, D8Myrna H. Wooders: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/wooders/An earlier version of this paper was completed while the first author was visiting the Department of Economics, University of Exeter. The first author gratefully acknowledges Exeter's support and hospitality. Similarly, the second author gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium and of the University of Cergy-Pontoise, France. Both authors are indebted to Amrita Dhillon, John Duggan and Gilat Levy for helpful comments about references. Both authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Endogenous party structure

This paper proposes a model of two-party representative democracy on a single-dimensional political space, in which voters choose their parties in order to influence the parties’ choices of representative. After two candidates are selected as the median of each party’s support group, Nature determines the candidates’ relative likability (valence). Based on the candidates’ political positions and relative likability, voters vote for the preferable candidate without being tied to their party’s choice. We show that (1) there exists a nontrivial equilibrium under natural conditions, and (2) the equilibrium party border and the ex ante probabilities of the two-party candidates winning are sensitive to the distribution of voters. In particular, we show that if a party has a more concentrated subgroup, then the party tends to alienate its centrally located voters, and the party’s probability of winning the final election is reduced. Even if voter distribution is symmetric, an extremist party (from either side) can emerge as voters become more politically divided.     

中美货币政策国际协调的福利收益——基于NOEM框架的分析

本文利用金融危机前后中美两国经济数据,描述了两国货币政策协调与经济周期协动之间的关系。同时,以新开放经济宏观经济学为理论分析框架,结合经济全球化及金融危机后中美两国现实背景,借鉴Canzoneri等对货币政策国际协调的福利收益的衡量和分析方法,考察了中美两国进行货币政策国际协调的福利收益函数及需要满足的条件。理论模型分析表明,当两国各部门受到冲击的不确定性不对称程度较低时,货币政策国际协调是双赢的选择。     

Policy consequences of direct legislation theory, empirical models and evidence

Most theoretical models predict that institutions allowing for direct legislation should lead, on average, to policies more closely reflecting the wishes of the voters. While some agreement exists at the theoretical level about the expected policy consequences of direct legislation, empirical evidence has been scant so far. In this paper I discuss the reasons for this scantiness of empirical evidence, namely the intricacies of the adequate empirical model to test the theoretical proposition, and suggest possible solutions to this problem. Re-analyzing a dataset with which some authors have found no evidence in support of the theoretical claim, I show that with a better adapted empirical model we find results in synch with our theoretical expectations. Thus, policies in states that allow for direct legislation reflect on average more closely the voters?? wishes. Using Monte-Carlo simulations I also demonstrate the properties of the proposed estimator and suggest that it could be used in other contexts, like when assessing the responsiveness of legislators.     

Social security and two-earner households

In the past decades, elimination of the pay-as-you-go system in U.S. has been extensively discussed and studied. Such an elimination would also eliminate the intragenerational redistribution done by the following policies of social security. Due to spousal and survivor׳s benefit provisions, US Social Security system redistributes (mostly) to single-earner married households. Since retirement benefits are a concave function of past mean earnings, the system redistributes from high earners to low earners. Finally, existence of a cap on social security taxable earnings makes the system regressive. This paper quantifies redistributive, labor supply, and welfare implications of these policies using a general equilibrium life-cycle model. Agents start out as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on labor supply of its member(s) and saving. Elimination of these policies results in a 5.5% rise in labor force participation of married females, while increasing aggregate welfare by 0.4%. A majority of households experience positive gains in welfare. Single-earner married households incur large welfare losses (as big as 1.1%), whereas two-earner households with high skilled spouses experience substantial welfare gains (as big as 1.9%).     

Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment

Abstract . An examination and critique of the functionalist literature on corruption in the political administration of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) indicate that its claims are without empirical foundation. Its theses with regard to the political, economic and administrative effects in most LDCs contrast with the facts. No benefits for development from corruption are found; market corruption, for example, does not appear to improve allocative efficiency. The erosion in a government's capacity to formulate and implement policies making for economic growth is an obstacle to economic progress.