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1.
In this paper, we analyse cross‐sectional heterogeneity in the time‐series variation of liquidity in equity markets. Our analysis uses a broad time‐series and cross‐section of liquidity data. We find that average daily changes in liquidity exhibit significant heterogeneity in the cross‐section; the liquidity of small firms varies more on a daily basis than that of large firms. A steady increase in aggregate market liquidity over the past decade is more strongly manifest in large firms than in small firms. Absolute stock returns are an important determinant of liquidity. We investigate cross‐sectional differences in the resilience of a firm's liquidity to information shocks. We use the sensitivity of stock liquidity to absolute stock returns as an inverse measure of this resilience, and find that the measure exhibits considerable cross‐sectional variation. Firm size, return volatility, institutional holdings, and volume are all significant cross‐sectional determinants of this measure.
(J.E.L.: D82, G10, G14).  相似文献   

2.
Abstract.  This study develops a model of trade that highlights the effects of the interconnection of country‐specific communications networks as a driving force behind trade in high‐tech products with positive transport costs. By constructing a two‐country model of monopolistic competition with two production factors, it is shown that the locational decisions of firms may magnify the influence of interconnected networks. In a reversal of the standard home market effects, the abundance of unskilled labour in the developing countries can attract high‐tech firms from the developed countries. JEL classification: D43, F12, L13  相似文献   

3.
Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
Abstract.  Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity‐setting games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for non‐merging firms (outsiders). We take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another. In quantity‐setting games, with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders, unprofitable for outsiders, socially beneficial, and involve (in a non‐monopolizing merger) a small number of firms. Finally, we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices. JEL classification: L000  相似文献   

4.
The residential electricity market in Great Britain has recently been opened to competition and is served by 14 regional incumbents, and up to 15 entrants in each area. This study finds that the incumbents' regulated prices are discriminatory between consumers using different payment methods, and that firms are practising third‐degree price discrimination between areas. The authors discuss the implications for regulatory policy both in the UK and in other countries where electricity markets are being deregulated.  相似文献   

5.
This paper examines the impact of foreign entry deregulation in China on the export price and quality of manufacturing firms through input–output linkage. We create a unique dataset describing the extent of regulatory control over foreign entry across approximately 900 industries covering all primary, manufacturing and services sectors. Results suggest foreign entry deregulation encourages firms to improve product quality and increase export prices. Deregulation in the manufacturing sectors has more impact on downstream export price and quality, compared with services sectors. Moreover, firms having larger imported inputs benefit more from foreign entry deregulation. These effects are robust to alternative specifications. (JEL F1, D2, O2)  相似文献   

6.
We present a theory of entry through spinoffs where workers generate ideas and possess private information concerning their quality. Because quality is privately observed, adverse selection implies that the market can only offer a price that reflects the average quality of ideas sold. Only workers with good ideas decide to spin off, whereas workers with mediocre ideas sell them. Existing firms pay a price for ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected profits. Hence, firms’ project selection is independent of firm size, which can lead to scale‐independent growth. This mechanism results in invariant firm‐size distributions that resemble the data.  相似文献   

7.
We take today's mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third‐degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo‐location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality. We show that, depending on consumer heterogeneity, higher‐quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns. In equilibrium, both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality, while only one acquires data if the data quality is low. Firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and/or when data are precise. Although social welfare (weakly) improves, consumers can be harmed.  相似文献   

8.
Abstract.  This paper is concerned with the sustainability of free‐trade agreements (FTA). FTA sustainability is influenced by governments' valuations of political contributions, discount factors, the lobbying position of the specific‐interest groups in the intra‐industry trade sectors, and the sectoral coverage of the FTA. I find that (i) under certain conditions, the FTA under protectionist lobbying could be more sustainable than the FTA under no political pressure; (ii) the lobby‐supported FTA is more sustainable than the lobby‐opposed FTA and the FTA under no political pressure; and (iii) multisector trade enhances FTA sustainability. JEL Classification: F12, F13, F15.  相似文献   

9.
Abstract.  The effects of preferential trade areas (PTAs) on the investments by multinational enterprises and their implications for the welfare of members and non‐members are studied in a model with two types of firms: national firms and multinational firms. In the presence of multinational activity PTAs can create new investment as well as divert investment from non‐members to members. Both affect the welfare of members positively. More interestingly, if the investment creation effect of a PTA is sufficiently strong, then the PTA could be welfare enhancing for non‐members as well. JEL classification: F2, L1  相似文献   

10.
Abstract.  In this paper, we explore the linkages between export‐market participation and productivity performance in Canadian manufacturing plants. We also examine differences in the relationship between exporting and productivity for foreign‐controlled as opposed to domestic‐controlled plants, and between younger and older plants. Export participation is associated with improved productivity. The effect is much stronger for domestic‐controlled plants than for foreign‐controlled plants and for younger businesses than for older businesses. We interpret this as evidence that there is a learning effect associated with export activity but that the potential for improving productivity with entry to export markets differs across firms. JEL Classification: F1, O4  相似文献   

11.
This paper investigates the profit effects of price discrimination when firms have partial information about consumer preferences. It shows that price discrimination can boost industry profit if firms have access to the right kind of information about consumer preferences while remaining ignorant of other relevant information.  相似文献   

12.
This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.  相似文献   

13.
We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.  相似文献   

14.
In this paper we study the problem of price competition and free entry in congested markets. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian Traffic Equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.  相似文献   

15.
This paper focuses on competition between an incumbent and an entrant when only the entrant's quality is unknown to (some) consumers. The incumbent may or may not know the entrant's quality. The model reveals a separating equilibrium where the entrant's high price signals its high quality when the proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate value. The case in which the incumbent knows the entrant's quality generates two additional equilibria. When the proportion of informed consumers is large enough, firms choose their prices as in the complete information case. The entrant's high price in combination with the incumbent's low price signals the entrant's high quality. When the proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate value, the incumbent's high price signals the entrant's low quality, while its low price signals the entrant's high quality. Interestingly, we find that entry may be facilitated with informational product differentiation.  相似文献   

16.
In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.  相似文献   

17.
We analyze firms’ location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters (flexibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer flexibility. We show that firms’ location choices depend on how strongly consumers differ in flexibility. Precisely, when consumers are relatively homogeneous, equilibrium locations are socially optimal regardless of the quality of customer flexibility data. However, when consumers are relatively differentiated, firms make socially optimal location choices only when customer flexibility data becomes perfect. These results are driven by the optimal strategy of a firm on its turf, monopolization or market-sharing, which in turn depends on consumer heterogeneity in flexibility. Our analysis is motivated by the availability of customer data, which allows firms to practice third-degree price discrimination based on both consumer characteristics relevant in spatial competition, addresses and transport cost parameters.  相似文献   

18.
Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12  相似文献   

19.
We present an asymmetric model with firm heterogeneity and foreign direct investment (FDI) from a developed country to a developing country. We found that the successful entry firms could be sorted from highest to lowest according to productivity as reimport firms, FDI firms, export firms, and domestic firms. We also found that FDI decreases (increases) the gross national income of the developed (developing) country, but it can either increase or decrease the world income according to the level of the relative propensity to spend. In addition, we demonstrated that FDI influences welfare through variations in average price, national income, and the number of types of goods.  相似文献   

20.
Abstract.  We study the profitability of horizontal mergers in a dynamic competition context with sticky prices. It is shown that, when firms use open‐loop strategies, a merger is profitable only if the share of the market that merges is significant enough. In the case where firms use closed‐loop strategies we provide a method to conduct analytically the study of the profitability of horizontal mergers. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium of the game when a subset of firms merges. When firms use feedback strategies, mergers are profitable even when the share of the market that merges is arbitrarily small. JEL Classification:D4, L13  相似文献   

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