Are you a strategist or just a manager?

Perhaps the greatest strategist of all time was not a business executive but a general. Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian and German general staffs from 1858 to 1888, issued "directives" to his officers rather than specific commands. These guidelines for autonomous decision making encouraged Moltke's subordinates to show individual initiative. In this article, Hans Hinterhuber and Wolfgang Popp translate Moltke's example into business terms. According to Moltke, strategy is applied common sense and cannot be taught. The authors suggest that good entrepreneurs and managers--along with generals--are born with the qualities that make them successful. But even if managers have the potential to be good strategists, they must develop and hone their natural talents. And CEOs and top management can help by identifying and promoting such talents in their employees. Hinterhuber and Popp have created a questionnaire that helps measure strategic management competence. Managers and entrepreneurs take this test themselves, answering ten questions such as, "Do I have an entrepreneurial vision?", "Do I have a corporate philosophy?", and "Do I have competitive advantages?" Using the questionnaire, company management can evaluate managers being considered for a promotion. At the same time, those who take the test can use it to determine their own performance as strategists. Strategic managers provide subordinates with general guidelines, just as Helmuth von Moltke issued directives to his officers. And outstanding entrepreneurs create a corporate culture in which their vision, philosophy, and business strategies are implemented by employees who think independently.     

The weird rules of creativity

For at least the past decade, the holy grail for companies has been innovation. Managers have gone after it with all the zeal their training has instilled in them, using a full complement of tried and true management techniques. The problem is that none of these practices, well suited for cashing in on old, proven products and business models, works very well when it comes to innovation. Instead, managers should take most of what they know about management and stand it on its head. In this article, Robert Sutton outlines several ideas for managing creativity that are clearly odd but clearly effective: Place bets on ideas without much heed to their projected returns. Ignore what has worked before. Goad perfectly happy people into fights among themselves. Good creativity management means hiring the candidate you have a gut feeling against. And as for the people who stick their fingers in their ears and chant, "I'm not listening, I'm not listening," when customers make suggestions? Praise and promote them. Using vivid examples from more than a decade of academic research to illustrate his points, the author discusses new approaches to hiring, managing creative people, and dealing with risk and randomness in innovation. His conclusions? The practices in this article succeed because they increase the range of a company's knowledge, allow people to see old problems in new ways, and help companies break from the past.     

What really works

When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques to choose from. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a ground-breaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques as they were employed by 160 companies over ten years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. The 160 companies in their study--called the Evergreen Project--were divided into 40 quads, each comprising four companies in a narrowly defined industry. Based on its performance between 1986 and 1996, each company in each quad was classified as either a winner (for instance, Dollar General), a loser (Kmart), a climber (Target), or a tumbler (the Limited). Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

Leading by feel

Like it or not, leaders need to manage the mood of their organizations. The most gifted leaders accomplish that by using a mysterious blend of psychological abilities known as emotional intelligence. They are self-aware and empathetic. They can read and regulate their own emotions while intuitively grasping how others feel and gauging their organization's emotional state. But where does emotional intelligence come from, and how do leaders learn to use it? In this article, 18 leaders and scholars (including business executives, leadership researchers, psychologists, an autism expert, and a symphony conductor) explore the nature and management of emotional intelligence--its sources, uses, and abuses. Their responses varied, but some common themes emerged: the importance of consciously--and conscientiously--honing one's skills, the double-edged nature of self-awareness, and the danger of letting any one emotional intelligence skill dominate. Among their observations: Psychology professor John Mayer, who co-developed the concept of emotional intelligence, warns managers not to be confused by popular definitions of the term, which suggest that if you have a certain set of personality traits then you automatically possess emotional intelligence. Neuropsychologist Elkhonon Goldberg agrees with professors Daniel Goleman and Robert Goffee that emotional intelligence can be learned--but only by people who already show an aptitude for it. Cult expert Janja Lalich points out that leaders can use their emotional intelligence skills for ill in the same way they can for good. "Sometimes the only difference is [the leader's] intent," she says. And business leaders Carol Bartz, William George, Sidney Harman, and Andrea jung (of Autodesk, Medtronic, Harman International, and Avon respectively) describe situations in which emotional intelligence traits such as self-awareness and empathy have helped them and their companies perform at a higher level.     

Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

Competing on capabilities: the new rules of corporate strategy

In the 1980s, companies discovered time as a new source of competitive advantage. In the 1990s, they will discover that time is only one piece of a more far-reaching transformation in the logic of competition. Using examples from Wal-Mart and other highly successful companies, Stalk, Evans, and Shulman of the Boston Consulting Group provide managers with a guide to the new world of "capabilities-based competition." In today's dynamic business environment, strategy too must become dynamic. Competition is a "war of movement" in which success depends on anticipation of market trends and quick response to changing customer needs. In such an environment, the essence of strategy is not the structure of a company's products and markets but the dynamics of its behavior. To succeed, a company must weave its key business processes into hard-to-imitate strategic capabilities that distinguish it from its competitors in the eyes of customers. A capability is a set of business processes strategically understood--for example, Wal-Mart's expertise in inventory replenishment, Honda's skill at dealer management, or Banc One's ability to "out-local the national banks and out-national the local banks." Such capabilities are collective and cross-functional--a small part of many people's jobs, not a large part of a few. Finally, competing on capabilities requires strategic investments in support systems that span traditional SBUs and functions and go far beyond what traditional cost-benefit metrics can justify. A CEO's success in building and managing a company's capabilities will be the chief test of management skill in the 1990s. The prize: companies that combine scale and flexibility to outperform the competition.     

MANAGEMENT FADS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE

This article applies and extends the three-part organizational framework used in the preceding article to a broad range of management innovations. After furnishing some interesting evidence of the rise and fall of management techniques such as TQM, Reengineering, Just-in-Time Production, and Activity-Based Costing, the authors raise and then attempt to answer a number of questions: What explains the popularity of these management innovations? Why do they often fail to produce the expected benefits? How can managers tell if a particular technique is right for them? What can managers do to increase the likelihood that an adopted technique will be successful? The persistent, and at times seemingly insatiable, corporate demand for management innovations is viewed by the authors as a “rational” economic response by senior managers to major changes in the external business environment—changes that in turn dictate changes in business strategy. For example, when confronted with external changes such as deregulation or heightened global competition, companies often find it necessary to refocus their efforts on improving product quality and operating efficiency. And such changes in business strategy tend to require a revamping of the three critical components of organizational architecture: (1) assignment of decision rights, (2) performance evaluation systems, and (3) compensation systems. As the authors argue, innovations such as TQM, outsourcing, Re-engineering, and JIT typically involve major changes in just one or two of these critical elements of the organization, but not all three. The failure to coordinate organizational changes in such a way that these three elements are mutually consistent and reinforcing is one important reason why management innovations can fail to meet expectations. The framework described in this article is designed to help managers considering one potentially valuable set of organizational changes to identify other facets of the organization that also require attention and perhaps complementary adjustments.     

Introducing T-shaped managers. Knowledge management's next generation

Most companies do a poor job of capitalizing on the wealth of expertise scattered across their organizations. That's because they tend to rely on centralized knowledge-management systems and technologies. But such systems are really only good at distributing explicit knowledge, the kind that can be captured and codified for general use. They're not very good at transferring implicit knowledge, the kind needed to generate new insights and creative ways of tackling business problems or opportunities. The authors suggest another approach, something they call T-shaped management, which requires executives to share knowledge freely across their organization (the horizontal part of the "T"), while remaining fiercely committed to their individual business unit's performance (the vertical part). A few companies are starting to use this approach, and one--BP Amoco--has been especially successful. From BP's experience, the authors have gleaned five ways that T-shaped managers help companies capitalize on their inherent knowledge. They increase efficiency by transferring best practices. They improve the quality of decision making companywide. They grow revenues through shared expertise. They develop new business opportunities through the cross-pollination of ideas. And they make bold strategic moves possible by delivering well-coordinated implementation. All that takes time, and BP's managers have had to learn how to balance that time against the attention they must pay to their own units. The authors suggest, however, that it's worth the effort to find such a balance to more fully realize the immense value of the knowledge lying idle within so many companies.     

Everything I know about business I learned from monopoly

How do game designers approach their work? Perhaps in the same way that managers should. Here, the author, an expert in board-game design and the world's foremost authority on Monopoly, translates six tenets of game design into management principles. Three tenets focus on giving players the right level of structure. First, design simple and unambiguous rules: That also holds true in business; people engage most when responsibilities, objectives, and evaluation criteria are clear. Second, avoid frustrating the casual player. Just as not every game player aspires to be a grand master, not every employee wants to think like an executive. Third, establish a rhythm so that players know intuitively whether they are at the beginning, middle, or end of the game. Managers can also engineer such shifts of momentum and motivation for workers. Three more principles focus on providing entertainment. The most important is to tune into what's happening off the board. For many people, the real joy of a great game--or a great job--comes from the larger social experience surrounding it. Another key is to offer chances to come from behind. Even struggling employees want to believe, "The odds may be stacked against me, but just one great stroke and I'm right back in it." Finally, managers, like game designers, should provide outlets for latent talents. Games themselves can be useful in the workplace. For instance, an afternoon of game playing builds relationships and increases an organization's social capital. And simulation games can sharpen employees' business judgment. Managers may come to appreciate that games succeed depending on how well designed they are--and that many design challenges have their equivalents in the art of management.     

IQ,trading behavior,and performance

We analyze whether IQ influences trading behavior, performance, and transaction costs. The analysis combines equity return, trade, and limit order book data with two decades of scores from an intelligence (IQ) test administered to nearly every Finnish male of draft age. Controlling for a variety of factors, we find that high-IQ investors are less subject to the disposition effect, more aggressive about tax-loss trading, and more likely to supply liquidity when stocks experience a one-month high. High-IQ investors also exhibit superior market timing, stock-picking skill, and trade execution.     

A new game plan for C players

It's a big driver of business success, but one that executives are loath to talk about: upgrading the talent pool by weeding out "C" players from management. These aren't the incompetent or unethical managers whom organizations dismiss without a backward glance; C performers deliver results that are acceptable--barely--but they fail to innovate or to inspire the people they lead. The authors of The War for Talent have studied what it takes to upgrade an organization's talent pool. In this article, they explore the hidden costs of tolerating under-performance and acknowledge the reasons why executives may shy away from dealing decisively with C players. They recommend that organizations take an "iron hand in a velvet glove" approach to managing subpar performers. That is, companies should establish rigorous, disciplined processes for assessing and dealing with low-performing managers but still treat them with respect. The authors outline three ironhanded steps. First, executives must identify C players by evaluating their talents and distributing employee performances along an assessment curve. Second, executives must agree on explicit action plans that articulate the improvements or changes that C performers must achieve within six to 12 months. And third, executives should hold managers accountable for carrying out the action plans. Without such discipline, procrastination, rationalization, and inaction will prevail. The authors also emphasize the need for the "velvet glove." Executives must ensure that low performers are treated with dignity, so they should offer candid feedback, instructive coaching, and generous severance packages and outplacement support. The authors' approach isn't about being tough on people; it's about being relentlessly focused on performance.     

Transaction cost, corporate governance and division of labor—A general equilibrium analysis of professional managers and its implication to China's practice

This paper develops a Walrasian general equilibrium model based on transaction cost and specialization to investigate the emergence and evolution of the role of management services in a competitive market with the general concern of corporate governance. It explains the reason why along the commercialization and modernization of human society, there is substantial increment of professional managers available for business world, and also becoming more affordable for more business companies. With the improvement of transaction efficiency, the market demand of professional managers are more preferred and profitable, which will also bring about new business structures and new economic institutional systems to improve the well-being to the overall members of society. Thereby, hiring professional managers in a competitive market can promote aggregate productivity by enlarging the scope for trading off network effects of the division of labor on aggregate productivity against transaction costs. To business practitioners, this model suggests hiring professional managers a key element of business viability during that a major transition took place in human society. China's recent practices in ownership transformation and corporate governance have also been examined, which further proves our argument that performance and effectiveness of interaction and interrelation between ownership and corporate governance are endogenously determined by different market conditions. It is impossible to achieve success ownership transformation and establish effective corporate governance without upgraded changes and consecutive adjustment and improvement of market conditions to facilitate the solid function of market mechanism.     

Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.     

Who's bringing you hot ideas and how are you responding?

There's an unsung hero in your organization. It's the person who's bringing in new ideas from the outside about how to manage better. These aren't your product and service innovators--those people are celebrated loudly and often. This is the manager who, for instance, first uttered the phrase "balance scorecard" in your hallways, or "real options," or "intellectual capital." Managerial innovation is an increasingly important source of competitive advantage--especially given the speed with which product innovations are copied--but it doesn't happen automatically. It takes a certain kind of person to welcome new management ideas and usher them into an organization. The authors recently studied 100 such people to find out how they translate new ideas into action in their organizations. They discovered that they are a distinct type of practitioner; that is to say, they resemble their counterparts in other organizations more than they resemble their own colleagues, and they share a common way of working. "Idea practitioners," as the authors call them, begin by scouting for ideas. All of them are avid readers of management literature and enthusiastic participants in business conferences; many are friendly with business gurus. Once they've identified an idea that seems to hold promise, they tailor it to fit their organizations' specific needs. Next, they actively sell the idea--to senior executives, to the rank and file, to middle managers. And finally, they get the ball rolling by participating in small-scale experiments. But when those take off, they get out of the way and let others execute. In this article, the authors identify the characteristics of idea practitioners and offer strategies for managing them wisely.     

To diversify or not to diversify

One of the most challenging decisions a company can confront is whether to diversify. The rewards and risks are extraordinary. Success stories such as General Electric, Disney, and 3M abound, but so do stories of failure-consider Quaker Oats' entry into the fruit juice business with Snapple. What makes diversification such an unpredictable, high-stakes game? First, companies usually face the decision in an atmosphere that is not conducive to thoughtful deliberation. For example, an attractive company comes into play, and a competitor is interested in buying it. Or the board of directors urges expanding into new markets. Suddenly, senior managers must synthesize mountains of data under intense time pressure. To complicate matters, diversification as a corporate strategy regularly goes in and out of vogue. In short, there is little conventional wisdom to guide managers as they consider a move that could greatly increase shareholder value or seriously damage it. But diversification doesn't need to be quite such a roll of the dice, argues the author. His research suggests that if managers consider six questions, they can reduce the gamble of diversification. Answering the questions will not lead to an easy go-no-go decision, but by helping managers weigh risks and opportunities, it can help them assess the likelihood of success. The issues that the questions raise, and the discussion they provoke, are meant to be coupled with the detailed financial analysis usually conducted before a diversification decision is made. Together, these tools can turn a complex and often pressured decision into a more structured and well-reasoned one.     

We don't need another hero

Everybody loves the stories of heroes like Martin Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa, and Gandhi. But the heroic model of moral leadership usually doesn't work in the corporate world. Modesty and restraint are largely responsible for the achievements of the most effective moral leaders in business. The author, a specialist in business ethics, says the quiet leaders he has studied follow four basic rules in meeting ethical challenges and making decisions. The rules constitute an important resource for executives who want to encourage the development of such leaders among their middle managers. The first rule is "Put things off till tomorrow." The passage of time allows turbulent waters to calm and lets leaders' moral instincts emerge. "Pick your battles" means that quiet leaders don't waste political capital on fights they can't win; they save it for occasions when they really want to fight. "Bend the rules, don't break them" sounds easier than it is--bending the rules in order to resolve a complicated situation requires imagination, discipline, restraint, flexibility, and entrepreneurship. The fourth rule, "Find a compromise," reflects the author's finding that quiet leaders try not to see situations as polarized tests of ethical principles. These individuals work hard to craft compromises that are "good enough"--responsible and workable enough--to satisfy themselves, their companies, and their customers. The vast majority of difficult problems are solved through the consistent striving of people working far from the limelight. Their quiet approach to leadership doesn't inspire, thrill, or provide story lines for uplifting TV shows. But the unglamorous efforts of quiet leaders make a tremendous difference every day in the corporate world.     

Talent management for the twenty-first century

Most firms have no formal programs for anticipating and fulfilling talent needs, relying on an increasingly expensive pool of outside candidates that has been shrinking since it was created from the white-collar layoffs of the 1980s. But the advice these companies are getting to solve the problem--institute large-scale internal development programs--is equally ineffective. Internal development was the norm back in the 1950s, and every management-development practice that seems novel today was routine in those years--from executive coaching to 360-degree feedback to job rotation to high-potential programs. However, the stable business environment and captive talent pipelines in which such practices were born no longer exist. It's time for a fundamentally new approach to talent management. Fortunately, companies already have such a model, one that has been well honed over decades to anticipate and meet demand in uncertain environments: supply chain management. Cappelli, a professor at the Wharton School, focuses on four practices in particular. First, companies should balance make-versus-buy decisions by using internal development programs to produce most--but not all--of the needed talent, filling in with outside hiring. Second, firms can reduce the risks in forecasting the demand for talent by sending smaller batches of candidates through more modularized training systems in much the same way manufacturers now employ components in just-in-time production lines. Third, companies can improve their returns on investment in development efforts by adopting novel cost-sharing programs. Fourth, they should seek to protect their investments by generating internal opportunities to encourage newly trained managers to stick with the firm. Taken together, these principles form the foundation for a new paradigm in talent management: a talent-on-demand system.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.