浅析会计师事务所审计风险的防范与控制

在现代经济活动当中,社会审计的作用日益突出,但是会计师事务所涉及法律诉讼的事件也频繁发生。为了更好地防范和控制会计师事务所的审计风险,本文分析了会计师事务所审计风险的主要形成原因,在此基础上提出了风险防范与控制的对策,旨在帮助会计师事务所树立风险意识,提高审计质量,降低审计风险。     

小型被审计单位风险导向审计初探

新审计准则体系自2007年1月1日起在境内会计师事务所全面执行,新准则区别与传统审计准则的一个重要方面就是“全面引入风险导向审计的理念,对重大错报风险进行识别、评估和应对”,风险导向审计要求我们首先要了解被审计单位及其环境,评估重大错报风险进而设计和实施进一步审计程序。国内小型会计师事务所面临的客户主要是小型被审计单位,     

注册会计师面对验资风险的思考

目前对验资风险的定义是：注册会计师会企业提供的但实际上不存在或并不为企业所拥有的实收资本提供不正确的验资意见的风险，也就是主观判断和客观实际上发生了误差，结合我国的国情和客观实际，以上定义了验资风险存在着不利性特征，中国注册会计师和会计师事务所因为某一验资业务而承担民事赔偿责任的现象时有发生，对验资风险的大小我们应该从发生不利清况的可能性大小和可能招致赔偿责任大小两方面加以分析考察，从我国目前验资报告的作用来看仅有两个作用，一是被验资单位据以向工商行政部门办理工商登记，被验单位据以向投资者出具的资证明，二是说明截至验资报告日这一时间内，注册会计师验证的被审验单位实体收资本（股本）及相关资产，负债的数额。     

会计师事务所财务审计风险成因及控制策略

会计师事务所财务审计是保障企业财务信息透明、准确、可靠的重要手段。然而,财务审计风险的存在给审计工作带来了一定的不确定性,增加了审计人员的工作难度,甚至可能对审计工作的准确性和客户企业的财务稳健性产生不良影响。本文对会计师事务所财务审计风险进行了一定论述,在此基础上,进一步分析了会计师事务所财务审计风险的成因,并结合会计师事务所财务审计风险特点,提出了具有一定针对性的控制策略,可以帮助审计机构和企业客户更好地认识审计过程中存在的潜在风险和挑战,有针对性地制定和完善相关的审计和风险管理制度和规范,为审计工作的顺利开展提供了有力的支撑。     

试论注册会计师对第三人的民事责任

一、问题引入 注册会计师的民事责任是指注册会计师及其所在会计师事务所接受委托人委托后,在为委托人提供职业服务的过程中由于违法执业,或者因其自身的过错给委托人或其他利害关系人造成损失,而应承担民事赔偿责任的法律责任。注册会计师由于违法执业或其自身的过错而给委托人造成损失的,需承担违约责任,这一点在会计理论界与实务界已基本达成共识,     

也谈验资及验资风险

验资是注册会计师的一项法定业务,但近年来,由于种种原因,使事务所卷入诉讼案件之中,一些事务所为了避免验资风险,不愿承接验资业务,严重地影响了注册会计师事业的健康发展,本从验资的意义入手,从内、外分析了验资风险形成的原因,并提出解决的对策。     

审计模式、客户经营风险与审计报告时滞效应研究--基于2003-2011年沪深两市的经验证据

以我国沪深两市A股上市公司2003-2011年的年报数据为样本,检验了我国2007年现代风险导向审计模式的实施以及审计客户经营风险的高低对审计报告时滞长短的影响。研究发现：自2003年以来,我国审计报告时滞总体上呈现不断增长趋势;2007年以后,现代风险导向审计模式的实施显著延长了审计报告时滞;审计客户经营风险越高,审计报告时滞越长;研究还发现,由于审计客户规模较大,使得国际四大的审计报告时滞明显高于国内事务所。研究发现为我们了解现代风险导向审计模式下审计资源的投入或审计效率提供了证据。     

客户关系对企业风险承担的影响

针对当前客户关系对企业风险承担影响机理的研究不足,用2009-2018 年沪深A 股上市公司数据,从客户异质性特征的视角研究客户关系对风险承担的影响。研究发现：客户集中度与客户稳定度均显著正向影响企业的风险承担;进一步考虑客户异质性特征时,发现：当客户中国有企业和上市公司的比例越高,以及客户处于市场化进程较高的地区时,客户关系对企业风险承担的正影响越显著。     

风险导向审计方法对中小企业审计的应用

从我国实行风险导向审计理念以来，在会计师事务所对中小企业审计中的发现的问题，阐述其发生原因，探究解决办法。根据目前我国现状，对中小企业审计的会计事务所多为中小会计师事务所，因此本文论及的会计师事务所也特指中小事务所。     

虚假验资如何承担民事责任

案例 某会计师事务所为A贸易公司出具虚假验资证明，证明中明确承诺“以上货币资金及固定资产业经逐项验证属实，如有虚假，由我单位负责承担证明金额内的赔偿责任。”A贸易公司注册成立后在经济活动中与B厂发生了纠纷，在双方的诉讼中，B厂发现A贸易公司的验资证明是虚假的，B厂要求追加会计师事务所为诉讼当事人，并要求其承担赔偿责任。     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.     

小额贷款公司中小企业法人客户信用风险评估研究

论文选取我国商业性小额贷款公司面临的信用风险作为研究对象,集中研究针对中小企业法人客户的小额贷款信用风险的评估。文章结合小额贷款公司经营模式和放贷对象的具体特点,基于软硬信息框架设计出一套适合我国小额贷款公司中小企业法人客户的信用风险评估体系,并通过层次分析法和模糊综合评价方法确定各个指标的权重配置。案例试算表明,该模型对于小额信贷公司的信用风险具有良好的评估效果,能为小贷公司的信用风险防范和信贷决策提供有效指导。     

竞赛机制设计研究回顾与展望

竞赛是社会、政治和经济中的典型现象,在激励和资源配置方面发挥了非常重要的作用,竞赛机 制设计已成为竞赛研究的理论热点问题。本文介绍了竞赛理论基础知识,主要从竞赛奖励、竞赛结构及 竞赛成功函数三个方面,综述了有关竞赛机制设计研究。在回顾以往研究的基础上,探讨了竞赛机制设 计研究未来的可能发展方向。     

Auditor Experience and the Timeliness of Litigation Loss Contingency Disclosures*

This paper hypothesizes and finds that firms audited by city‐industry specialists have more timely disclosures of contingent losses from litigation when there is no news coverage relating to the legal case prior to management disclosures. A closer examination reveals that this result is explained by the specialist auditors’ prior experience auditing clients in the same office and industry who are involved with litigation. In our setting, disclosures of litigation‐related contingent losses, we identify two kinds of knowledge generated from experience: industry knowledge and litigation knowledge. Industry knowledge helps auditors detect and correct poor implementation of guidance for litigation loss contingency disclosures. Auditors gain litigation knowledge from auditing clients in a given office and industry with previous involvement as defendants. Thus, the two types of knowledge interact in their effects on reporting outcomes.     

Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

We analyze optimal protection when a benevolent government must maintain nonnegative domestic profits and when the domestic import-competing firm has private information about its costs. A costly audit mechanism can deter strategic manipulation of this private information. We show that a high penalty/low probability of investigation is optimal when the shadow price of the firm profit is low compared with the audit cost. A low penalty/high probability of investigation is optimal when there is a low investigation cost and a high shadow price of firm profit. In this latter case, the trade authority obtains truthful announcements by directly auditing the firm.     

风险管理报告的模式及内容研究

在世界范围内,企业风险管理报告还没有一个标准、规范的框架。本文探讨了内部控制报告在美国和英国的实践,对影响风险管理报告模式的各种要素进行了深入分析。最后,利用矩阵分析法,对风险管理报告的相关内容进行了较为系统地研究,提出了全球第一个风险报告的内容模本框架。     

Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Earnings Announcements: A Cross‐Country Analysis

Using firm‐level data from 23 developed markets, we document a positive association between overall firm‐level governance quality and the informativeness of earnings announcements measured by abnormal stock return variance. This finding is robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of firm‐level corporate governance. Further analyses reveal that firms with strong governance show little evidence of earnings management, appoint Big 4 auditing firms, and attract analyst following, implying a positive link between strong corporate governance and the information quality of earnings announcements. Finally, there is some evidence that the relation between firm‐level governance and market reactions around the announcements exists only in countries characterized by a transparent information environment and strong legal investor protection.     

基于现代审计风险模型的国企高管经济责任审计风险及其防范

随着中办、国办关于国企主要领导经济责任审计新规的发布,国企高管经济责任审计已经进入了新的阶段。由于经济责任审计固有的特征,在国企高管经济责任审计的过程中,必然存在各种不确定性所导致的审计风险。在对国企经济责任审计风险特征分析基础上,建立了国企高管经济责任审计风险的模型,指出了国企高管经济责任审计不但具有传统意义上的重大错报风险×检查风险,也存在其特有的评价风险和处理处罚风险。在对经济责任审计的各种风险进行分析的基础上,最后提出了防范国企高管经济责任审计风险的措施。     

我国独立审计存在的问题、成因及对策

我国独立审计存在审计法律责任的制度缺失、审计职业道德失范、审计风险意识缺乏、审计监督机制失效等问题。产生的原因有：独立审计不独立;审计失信成本低;审计舞弊难起诉;审计违规处罚轻;审计环境比较差;地方政府庇护。解决这些问题,应重构独立审计的法律责任制度,增强审计人员的法律意识;构筑独立审计职业道德体系,加强审计职业道德教育;建立政府监管机制,重塑独立审计的良好形象;完善行业自我监管机制,规范独立审计的执业行为。     

Audit‐Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financial Reports*

This study examines whether the length of the relationship between a company and an audit firm (audit‐firm tenure) is associated with financial‐reporting quality. Using two proxies for financial‐reporting quality and a sample of Big 6 clients matched on industry and size, we find that relative to medium audit‐firm tenures of four to eight years, short audit‐firm tenures of two to three years are associated with lower‐quality financial reports. In contrast, we find no evidence of reduced financial‐reporting quality for longer audit‐firm tenures of nine or more years. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence pertinent to the recurring debate regarding mandatory audit‐firm rotation — a debate that has, to date, relied on anecdotal evidence and isolated cases.