战略联盟与企业风险承担

基于风险承担视角,研究战略联盟合作的经济效果,发现参与战略联盟的公司其整体风险承担水平显著提升。机制检验表明,战略联盟通过降低企业代理成本和企业运营成本提高企业风险承担水平。异质性分析发现,对于非国有企业、高行业竞争度企业及处于市场化水平较低区域的企业,战略联盟对企业风险承担的提升效应更大。拓展性研究表明,股权式合作模式、双边契约形式,区域商业合作文化显著增加了战略联盟对企业风险承担的提升作用。战略联盟对企业风险承担的影响具体表现为债务融资规模的扩大、资本性支出水平的提升和研发投入的增加。鉴于此,企业应积极寻求建立有效的战略联盟,监管机构应激励和支持企业构建战略联盟,以提升企业的风险承担能力,增强企业竞争优势,助推企业高质量发展。     

基于产业价值链提升的稀土企业联盟合作创新演化博弈分析

中国是全球最大的稀土矿储国和生产国,稀土产业却处于世界稀土产业链的中低端。为提升中国稀土产业在全球稀土产业价值链中的地位,引导中国稀土产业链向高端化延伸和发展,必须推动中国稀土企业联盟合作创新。本文运用演化博弈理论,构建中国稀土企业联盟博弈矩阵,表明中国稀土企业联盟合作创新要取得成功,主要受到联盟企业合作创新的收益与成本、政府对联盟企业合作创新的支持以及联盟成员间的违约赔偿机制等因素的影响,其中最为关键的因素,是政府对联盟企业合作创新的支持和联盟成员间的违约赔偿机制。因此,在推动稀土企业联盟合作创新过程中,须强化政府对稀土企业联盟合作创新的规制、加强稀土企业联盟成员间信息沟通与交流、完善稀土企业联盟合作创新收益分配方式并建立稀土企业联盟合作创新违约赔偿机制。     

公平关切下考虑成本分担的绿色供应链决策研究

文章针对绿色产品研发的制造商和绿色营销活动的零售商组成的绿色供应链,在考虑制造商存在公平关切的情形下,分析无成本分担、制造商分担营销成本和零售商分担绿色研发成本行为对绿色供应链定价策略及利润的影响,并分析不同分担模式下决策结果的差异性。结论表明：制造商公平关切对供应链成员不利;零售商成本分担能够提高制造商和零售商的利润;两种分担模式都能刺激制造商的绿色研发投入。研究有助于供应链企业在契约合作方面作出更好的决策。     

供应链纵向合作研发道德风险及利益分配方式选择

文章通过构建供应链纵向合作研发博弈模型,研究了利益分配方式对供应链纵向研发联盟成员投资策略的影响,找出了供应链纵向合作研发的最优利益分配方式,以此防范联盟道德风险,提高成员研发投入。研究发现,供应链纵向合作研发中,平均分配不仅简单易行,而且能激励成员提高研发投入,因此,供应链纵向研发联盟应采用平均分配来促进合作研发成功。     

异质性厂商合作研发的最优投入水平及其成本分摊机制

在产品差异化的Betrand模型中引入具有需求创造效应的创新,构建一个异质性厂商进行合作研发和价格竞争的两阶段动态博弈模型,研究异质性厂商合作研发的最优研发投入以及研发成本的分摊机制.研究发现,异质性厂商间合作研发的最优研发投入水平和成本分摊比例主要取决于市场容量、自身价格效应、交叉价格效应及研发的需求创造效应;根据自身价格效应、交叉价格效应及研发的需求创造效应确定合作研发成本的分摊比例时,基于Betrand竞争的异质性厂商通过合作研发可以提高其均衡价格、产量和利润.     

对我国高等教育成本分担问题的分析与思考

近年来,伴随高等教育学生规模的大幅扩容,教育资金紧缺,我国财政对高等教育投入的增长远不能满足高等教育规模扩大的需要,导致受教育者个人及家庭教育成本分担比例过高,教育成本分担结构严重失衡。本文结合高等教育成本分担的原则及我国高等教育成本分担的现状,对目前我国高等教育成本分担方面存在的问题进行深入地剖析,旨在为我国建立合理的高等教育成本分担机制提供对策建议。     

两种农产品冷链物流联盟模式的比较

文章分析了农产品冷链物流联盟两种模式——非合作博弈联盟和合作博弈联盟成因和运作特点,并从合作机制、收益分配和农产品品种三个角度对两种模式进行比较,最后阐述了其共同存在的问题和提出促进两种模式发展建议。     

基于网络化制造企业联盟合作企业的选择

合作企业的选择是组建基于网络化制造企业联盟的关键,给出了基于网络化制造企业联盟合作企业选择的步骤及初选的评价指标体系,建立了以成本、质量、时间、风险等因素组成的综合评价指标体系,并将层次分析法和灰色评价方法结合起来,对基于网络化制造企业联盟合作企业进行综合评价,达到综合评价与选择合作伙伴的目的。     

校企合作战略联盟反馈控制机制研究

校企合作是经济发展和技术创新的必然要求。本文在对校企合作战略联盟内涵界定的基础上,构建了校企合作战略联盟反馈控制模式,高校和企业之间建立起密切的战略伙伴关系,通过实现资源共享,实现利益均沾"、互惠双赢"的目的。校企合作战略联盟系统是复杂反馈系统,通过反馈机制,不断调整系统,促进合作的顺利实施。校企合作战略联盟反馈控制机制需要强化控制意识、控制机制实施和构建信息系统三方面开展。     

纳入品牌效应的纵向合作广告成本直接分担模型研究

本文研究了合作广告成本直接分担方式下的供应链纵向合作广告问题,考虑了制造商的全国性广告对品牌效应的影响,运用微分对策方法建立模型,根据最优控制理论的极值原理和Hanmilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程求得Stackelberg博弈和协同合作博弈下的最优广告策略,并对模型的最优解进行了比较分析。     

下游市场存在竞争的企业集团转移定价研究

基于企业集团面临下游竞争，研究了企业集团的中间产品的转移定价问题。研究结果表明，集团的中间产品的转移价格大干中间产品的边际成本。与Hirshkifer提出的边际成本转移定价策略相比，本文提出的转移定价策略为优。     

VMI环境下GAHP-灰色关联分析法在下游企业选择中的应用

本文提出了VMI环境中供应商选择下游企业的指标体系。运用GAHP集中多位专家的决策经验,确定各评价指标的相对重要性;然后,根据灰色关联分析法确定的定量和定性信息的参考次序,对下游企业进行比较;最终排出优劣次序,做出选择。     

The Role of Upstream‐Downstream Competition on Bundling Decisions: Should Regulators Force Firms to Unbundle?

We develop an upstream–downstream model to analyze downstream firms' incentives to bundle. In our framework, the upstream firms are content providers (such as television stations) and the downstream firms are system operators (such as cable/satellite operators). We show that an a la carte regulation (i.e., a regulation that forces downstream firms to unbundle) leads to higher consumer surplus, if the unregulated equilibrium exhibits pure bundling (PB). Hence, our model predicts that in the television industry, which is mainly characterized by PB, an a la carte regulation will be beneficial for the consumers. If, on the other hand, the unregulated equilibrium is characterized by mixed bundling, then an a la carte regulation will increase consumer welfare provided that demand for multiple purchases is strong.     

Explaining Downstream Integration

We examine the downstream integration decision by businesses, deriving hypotheses from the transaction cost literature which are empirically tested for a sample of 1392 businesses operating in a wide spectrum of industries. Our results provide corroboration for each dimension of the transaction cost framework in explaining why firms might integrate their downstream business activities. Given the large cross-sectional sample, our results provide some evidence of the general validity of the transaction cost framework within the context of downstream integration.     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

论企业的边界和规模

现代企业理论的重要缺陷之一是不能整合传统的厂商理论。这种缺陷来自于其理论的内在矛盾：一方面，这一理论认识到了合约的不完全性，从而认为企业有其存在的效率基础；另一方面，在分析企业的边界和规模问题时，又不自觉地把产品市场看成是完全竞争的，从而又否定了合约的不完全性。我们只有打破现代企业理论这一内在的理论悖论，才能有机地整合传统的厂商理论，从而解释各种丰富多彩的企业行为。     

进入权与会计师事务所收益分配

本文以会计师事务所的收入为基数，将收益分配分为四个层次，并着重阐述第二层次与第三层次的分配，主要是在进入权理论所设置的“三位一体”股权设置研究的基础上，运用“权利与利益相配比，同时在利益的分配中体现责任的承担”的原则，设计了收益分配模型，在模型中体现关键人力资源的作用，以激励会计师事务所关键人力资源拥有者。     

Information Technology and the Organization of Firms

This paper seeks to understand why improved information technology (IT) might strengthen the case for decentralization, as recent empirical work suggests. We study a firm with a headquarters and two managers, each of whom gathers information about her changing local environment. The firm earns a gross profit that depends on actions taken as well as the current local environments. More information permits better actions, and information‐gathering costs drop as IT improves. When the firm is centralized, information‐gathering expenditures are first best, but after the firm decentralizes, each manager becomes a self‐interested player of a “sharing game” in which she collects a share of gross profit and bears the cost of her chosen information‐gathering activities. The firm's actions are determined by the information gathered at the equilibria of the game. As a result, the firm experiences a decentralization penalty, namely the change in net profit (gross profit minus informational costs) after decentralizing. If the penalty is small, then it is outweighed by the advantages of decentralizing—the vanishing of monitoring costs and perhaps the improved motivation of a decentralized manager's staff. To gather information a manager chooses (once and for all) a partitioning of her possible local environments and then searches to find the set in which her current environment lies. Our main measure of a manager's information cost is a technology parameter, θ, times the number of sets in her chosen partitioning. A second measure is θ times the partitioning's “Shannon content,” which may be interpreted as average search time when search is efficient. We ask whether improved IT, i.e., a drop in θ, indeed lowers the decentralization penalty. We obtain a strongly affirmative answer to this question for both cost measures in a class of examples and a mixed answer when we generalize so as to preserve some of the key properties of those examples. In a parallel manner we explore another conjecture suggested in the empirical literature, namely that better IT raises the coordination benefit, which we define as the increase in net profit when the firm bases its actions on pooled information, rather than letting each action variable depend on the information gathered by just one manager.     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.     

Upstream Pricingand Advertising Signal Downstream Demand

This paper considers price and advertising decisions by a monopolist manufacturer who is privately informed about the strength of consumer demand. Consumers respond to advertising and to the retail price chosen by an uninformed retailer on the basis of his beliefs about demand. This signaling game has a unique intuitive equilibrium outcome in which a high-demand manufacturer chooses his full-information pair of wholesale price and advertising. When demand is low, the wholesale price is distorted downward from its full information level, whereas demand-enhancing advertising may be distorted in either direction. Dissipative advertising is not distorted because it is never used.