A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity—known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).     

Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Summary. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable. Received: January 12, 1998; revised version: March 30, 2000     

完全信息条件下的技术标准转换

在开放标准竞争过程中,具有完全信息的消费者理性预期产品的网络规模,仍然可能产生过度惯性或者过度动量的现象,技术标准转换偏离了社会最优要求.在需求萎缩的有限使用寿命产品市场,承诺产品升级、提高产品使用寿命等研发方面的努力,有助于新技术标准实施性能表演战略,成功完成市场技术标准转换.     

Perfect Information and Potential Games

Games with perfect information giving rise to potential normal forms are described. For agent normal forms, a potential is defined such that a strategy profile is a maximizer for the potential if and only if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the normal form of any game with perfect information, every better reply path where the players do not change their choices at irrelevant nodes leads to an equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

对完善我国政策性金融体系的几点思考

政策性金融是以国家信用为基础的融资手段 ,与商业性金融相比 ,它不以盈利为目的 ,而是作为政府干预经济、推动国民经济协调发展的重要手段之一。它通过政策融资支持重点产业发展 ,加快基础产业和基础设施的建设 ,实现对经济的调节和管理。同时弥补商业性金融的不足 ,健全和优化金融体系的整体功能。从我国建立政策性金融的实践看 ,我国政策性金融的建立可以说是基本成功的。但是从几年的发展来看 ,随着市场经济体制在我国的确立 ,无论是理论界还是管理层均过分地强调了市场机制下商业性金融在资源配置中的作用 ,而对于政策性金融在资源配置…     

Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation

This paper considers whether a competitive economy will achieve an optimal allocation when firms produce differentiated products.In the model studied, firms market those products which maximize profit given the demand curves facing them. Markets are assumed to be open only for goods actually traded. Competitive conditions are achieved by replicating the consumer sector. It is shown that market equilibrium may be suboptimal if those products not being produced are highly complementary in consumption. Sufficient conditions on preferences and production sets for the market equilibrium to be optimal are given.     

Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games

It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8.     

Perfect Competition and Endogenous Comparitive Advantage

This paper analyzes a dynamic Ricardian model of international trade in which relative differences in technology are endogenously determined by investments in innovation by competitive firms. It considers the impact of these investments on trade patterns and the effect of trade patterns on rates of innovation and growth. The main result is that the dynamic effects of trade need not be positive when both countries specialize investments in the goods in which they have a comparitive advantage. In addition, trade can lead to an inefficient pattern of specialization in innovation and have negative welfare effects.     

Bayesian coalitional rationalizability

In this paper we extend Ambrus's [A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. We offer an alternative notion of Bayesian c-rationalizability suitable for such complex social interactions. We show that Bayesian c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability.     

Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing

This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, as long as uninformed experts do not learn the correct forecasts too quickly, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed experts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on some data-generating processes; however, the set of such processes is topologically small. These results contrast sharply with many negative results in the literature.     

Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all the other conditions found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.     

健全法律法规完善农民负担制度

农民负担管理制度,由人治、行政性文件规定转变为法制的过程,是市场经济的必然要求,也是加入WTO以后与国际经济惯例接轨的客观趋势。本文分析了现行农民负担法律法规的不合理性,指出了完善税费法律法规,改革不合理农民负担制度的对策和措施。     

完善知识产权保护制度的对策研究

建立知识产权保护制度是我国完善创新政策支持体系、促进创新活动的一项重要措施。但我国现有的知识产权保护制度还存在一些缺陷。因此,必须采取切实有效的措施,充实和完善保护知识产权的法律法规,提高执法力度,严肃查处知识产权违法侵权行为,增强保护知识产权各项政策的整体合力,进一步健全商标、专利和著作权的保护制度,并做好其他知识产权的保护工作。     

Perfect discrimination and the long-run national advantage

Murray Kemp, Peter Neary and an anonymous referee are thanked for helpful comments on earlier drafts on this paper. They are, of course, absolved from error.     

市场经济呼唤完善的信用体系

一信用是随着商品经济的发展而建立和不断完善的。经济意义上的信用是以还本和付息为条件的价值的单方面让渡行为，是一种借贷，体现了特定的经济关系，即商品或货币所有者以偿还和付息为条件，把一定数量的商品或货币出借给需要者的一种借贷行为。法律意义上的信用则要求当事人在民事活动中诚实、善意地行使权利、履行义务。信用还有信任、诚实、守信、遵守诺言等社会学的内容。现代市场经济不仅是法制经济，也是信用经济，市场的健康运行和发展靠的就是信用。诚实守信是中华民族的传统美德，中华传统伦理非常重视诚信的经世致用，强调处理…     

完善银行内部控制系统初探

外资银行在我国的组织机构和业务领域不断拓展，我国金融领域的开放逐步深入，同时面对世界经济金融一体化和国内金融业体制上深化改革与业务上创新发展的内外环境，我国银行必将面临诸多的经营和管理风险，这就要求我们必须建立健全既适应我国银行经营管理体制，又符合改革发展要求的银行内部控制系统，提高银行风险防范与自我控制能力，最大限度地降低加快改革与谋求发展过程中的各种风险。     

Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information

Standard structures of information, in particular partition structures, are inadequate for the modeling of strategic thinking. They fail to capture the inner structure of hypotheses players make about situations they know will not occur. An extension of the partition structure is proposed in which such hypotheses can be modeled in detail. Hypothetical knowledge operators are defined for extended structures and are axiomatically characterized. The use of extended structures to model games with complete information is demonstrated. A sufficient condition is derived for players to play the backward induction in such games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D81, D82.