THE ECONOMICS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT

This article summarizes the simple analytics of the macroeconomiceffects of government budget deficits. The presentation is organizedaround three key relationships: the national income accountsbudget deficit identity, the deficit financing identity, andthe dynamic equation for the evolution of the ratio of publicdebt to gross national product. The national income accountsidentity highlights the effect of the deficit on domestic savingand investment and the current account. Examining the financingof the deficit brings to light the different kinds of macroeconomicimbalance the deficit can cause—as a first approximation,printing money excessively shows up as inflation, excessiveuse of foreign reserves leads to crises in the balance of payments,high foreign borrowing leads to a debt crisis, and too muchdomestic borrowing leads to high real interest rates and crowdingout of private investment. The debt dynamics equation is usedto show the long-run constraints on fiscal policy.      

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.      

New Models for Old-Age Security: Experiments, Evidence, and Unanswered Questions

The escalating costs of traditional social security systemsare forcing countries to reevaluate the formal programs thatprovide income maintenance support to the aging. This articlesuggests a reform strategy built around three systems, or "pillars,"to provide old-age security—a public pillar with mandatoa private, mandatory savings plan, and a voluntary savings system.Three variations of this model are being implemented in differentcountries: the Latin American model, in which individual workerschoose an investment manager for their retirement finds; theOECD model, in which employers, union trustees, or both choosethe investment manager for an entire company or occupation;and the Swedish notional account model, a reformed pay-as-you-gofirst pillar that may be supplemented by a second, funded pillar.Preliminary empirical evidence on the efficiency and growtheffects of pension reform, mostly from Chile, indicates thatthe impact on national saving and financial market developmentand, through these, economic growth, has been positive and possiblylarge. Problems concerning high administrative costs and regulationsthat distort investment decisions remain to be resolved, however.      

Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s

Although the link between improved infrastructure services andeconomic growth is uncertain, it is clear that reforms aimedat creating competition and regulating natural monopolies establishan environment conducive to private sector participation, incentivesfor companies to strive for efficiency savings that can ultimatelybe passed on to consumers, and greater provision of services(such as faster roll-out of infrastructure or innovative solutionsto service delivery for customers not connected to an existingnetwork). In determining the form that infrastructure restructuringmight undertake or the design of a regulatory agency, policymakerscan generally benefit from a review of the experiences of othercountries. A key element of any decisionmaking process shouldbe a review of how the various types of reform will affect theefficiency of the sector and whether they will increase privatefinancing of its significant investment needs.      

Formal Water Markets: Why, When, and How to Introduce Tradable Water Rights

In most countries the state owns the water resources and thehydraulic infrastructure, and public officials decide who getsthe water, how it is to be used, and how much will be chargedfor it. But costly inefficiencies in the supply and use of watersupport a shift from government provision to a market-basedapproach that is more effective and less wasteful. Markets can allow rapid changes in allocation in response tochanging demands for water and can stimulate investment andemployment as investors are assured of access to secure suppliesof water. Because of water's unique characteristics, such marketsdo not work everywhere; nor do they resolve all water-relatedissues. By designing appropriate water laws and regulationsand by strengthening private and public institutions to administerthem, formal water markets can effectively address rising demandsfor groundwater and for water found in rivers, lakes, and canals.Lessons from Chile's experience demonstrate that formal watermarkets can improve the economic efficiency of water use andstimulate investment.      

VALUING AND ACCOUNTING FOR LOAN GUARANTEES

To achieve certain policy objectives, governments frequentlyprovide private borrowers with loan guarantees that cover someor all of the risk that the borrower will be unable to repaythe loan. Such guarantees are extremely valuable, and theirvalue increases with the riskiness of the underlying asset orcredit, the size of the investment, and the duration of theloan. The flip side of a guarantee's value to a lender is itscost to the government. Such a cost is not explicit but is realnevertheless. When providing guarantees, governments thereforemust establish accounting, valuation, and risk-sharing mechanisms.This article describes methods of valuing guarantees; reportsestimates of the value of guarantees in different settings;and summarizes new methods of accounting designed to anticipatelosses, create reserves, and channel funds through transparentaccounts to ensure that the costs of guarantees are evidentto government decisionmakers.      

FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LESSONS FROM THE RAILWAY AGE

In recent years suggestions for reforming the provision andfinancing of infrastructure services in developing countrieshave focused on private participation. This alternative to publicfinancing is seen as a way both to minimize the inefficienciesof public administration and to avoid the need for externalborrowing. In fact, for much of the nineteenth century, infrastructureprojects were privately financed and built. This approach, however,did not obviate the need for government intervention and foreigncapital. Because of the difficulties of assessing projects,investors were reluctant to commit their funds, and governmentsturned to subsidies and loan guarantees to encourage investment.Often, however, government intervention only replaced one setof problems with another. Investors with government-guaranteedloans had no incentive to monitor the firm's performance—alimitation that led to the diversion of funds and frustratedthe public interest. This article draws out the implicationsof this experience for policymakers in developing countriestoday.      

ACHIEVING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRIVATE TRANSFERS: A Review

Private interhousehold cash transfers are an important sourceof income in many developing countries. Among the countrieswhose experience is reviewed in the article, the proportionof all households receiving private transfers ranges from afifth to a half. The amounts received are large, particularlywhen compared with the incomes of the poorest households. Understanding more about these transfers is important for designingpolicy because, among other things, these remittances providesocial and economic benefits similar to those of public programs,such as unemployment insurance, pension support, educationalcredit, and health assistance. As such, private transfers maysupplement or overlap with public transfers, and, if privatedonors give less as public transfers increase, the effect ofpublic programs on beneficiaries would be less than originallyintended. Or the transfers may alter the distributional effectsof public programs: for again, if private donors give less aspublic transfers increase, they share in some of the benefitsof public programs.      

DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?

Governments the world over offer significant inducements toattract investment, motivated by the expectation of spilloverbenefits to augment the primary benefits of a boost to nationalincome from new investment. There are several possible sourcesof induced spillovers from foreign direct investment. This articleevaluates the empirical evidence on productivity, wage, andexport spillovers in developing, developed, and transition economies.Although theory can identify a range of possible spillover channels,robust empirical support for positive spillovers is at bestmixed. The article explores the reasons and concludes with areview of policy aspects.      

Walking up the Down Escalator: Public Investment and Fiscal Stability

When growth-promoting spending is cut so much that the presentvalue of future government revenues falls by more than the immediateimprovement in the cash deficit, fiscal adjustment becomes likewalking up the down escalator. Although short-term cash flowsmatter, too tight a focus on them encourages governments toinvest too little. Cash-flow targets also encourage governmentsto shift investment spending off budget by seeking private investmentin public projects, irrespective of its real fiscal or economicbenefits. To deal with this problem, some observers have suggestedexcluding certain investments (such as those undertaken by publicenterprises deemed commercial or financed by multilaterals)from cash-flow targets. These stopgap remedies may help protectsome investments, but they do not provide a satisfactory solutionto the underlying problem. Governments can more effectivelyreduce the biases created by the focus on short-term cash flowsby developing indicators of the long-term fiscal effects oftheir decisions, including accounting and economic measuresof net worth, and, where appropriate, including such measuresin fiscal targets or even fiscal rules. JEL codes: O23, E62, H60, H54     

AID IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

This article examines the economic effects of aid and the relationshipsamong private capital flows, official flows, and concessionalassistance. It considers whether official and concessional flowsimprove the welfare of both recipient and grantor, and it outlinesthe economic rationale for concessional assistance. The impactof aid on a recipient's growth performance is analyzed, andsome criticisms of aid are evaluated.      

THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Aside from revenue mobilization, one of the arguments for allowingthe private sector to assume a larger role in the provisionof education is that it would increase efficiency, as administratorsbecome more responsive to the needs of students and their parents.But what is the evidence? Based on case studies that compareprivate and public secondary education in Colombia, the DominicanRepublic, the Philippines, Tanzania, and Thailand, private schoolstudents generally outperform public school students on standardizedmath and language tests. This finding holds even after holdingconstant for the fact that, on average, private school studentsin these countries come from more advantaged backgrounds thantheir public. school counterparts. In addition, preliminaryevidence shows that the unit costs of private schools are lowerthan those of public schools. Although these results cannot,in themselves, be used as arguments for massive privatization,they indicate that governments should reconsider policies thatrestrain private sector participation in education. Furtherresearch is needed to determine whether some teaching and administrativepractices in private schools are applicable to public schools.      

Deregulating the Transfer of Agricultural Technology: Lessons from Bangladesh, India, Turkey, and Zimbabwe

Many transition and developing economies have reduced directpublic involvement in the production and trade of seed and otheragricultural inputs. This trend creates opportunities for farmersto realize improved access to inputs, including technology frominternational private research. Unfortunately, input regulationsoften derail these opportunities by blocking private entry andthe introduction of private technology. This study looks atthe experience in Bangladesh, India, Turkey, and Zimbabwe tosee whether regulations make a difference in agriculture andinput industries in developing economies. In all countries,companies and farmers responded to regulatory reforms by introducingand adopting more new technology and by expanding the production,trade, and use of inputs. The increased use of private technologyhas brought higher yields and incomes, allowing farmers andconsumers to reach higher levels of welfare. These results challengegovernments to open their regulatory systems to allow marketentry and the introduction of private technology through seedsand other inputs.      

EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A Review

The article reviews the evidence on the role of education ineconomic development, with emphasis on issues that have appearedin the literature in the past two decades: the contributionof education to economic growth, the screening hypothesis, thesegmentation of the labour market, the return to investmentin schooling, and the effects of education on unemployment andincome distribution. It concludes with an optimistic assessmentof the contribution of educational investment to the developmentprocess, especially when such investment is targeted to primaryschooling, general education, and improvements in the qualityof instruction and when it is accompanied by cost-recovery atthe higher levels of education.      

BEYOND RATE OF RETURN: REORIENTING PROJECT APPRAISAL

Traditional approaches to project appraisal fail in practiceto address two fundamental questions: whether a project belongsin the public or the private sector; and what effect any externalassistance associated with the project has on the country'sdevelopment. The first issue is of general interest to bothnational policymakers and international donors. If the governmentprovides a good or service that would otherwise have been providedby the private sector, the net contribution of the public projectcould be low. The second issue is of particular concern to donors.If financial resources are fungible, the project being appraisedmight well have been undertaken with out external financing.In this case, donor funds are actually financing some other,unappraised project. Both cases argue for a shift in the emphasisof project evaluation away from a concern with precise rate-of-returncalculations and toward broader sectoral analyses and publicexpenditure reviews. In this context, three areas critical forproper project appraisal include a consideration of the rationalefor public intervention, the fiscal impact of the project, andthe fungibility of external assistance.      

Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer: A Survey

What role does trade play in international technology transfer?Do technologies introduced by multinational firms diffuse tolocal firms? What kinds of policies have proved successful inencouraging technology absorption from abroad and why? Usingthese questions as motivation, this article surveys the recenttrade literature on international technology transfer, payingparticular attention to the role of foreign direct investment.The literature argues that trade necessarily encourages growthonly if knowledge spillovers are international in scope. Empiricalevidence on the scope of knowledge spillovers (national versusinternational) is ambiguous. Several recent empirical plant-levelstudies have questioned earlier studies that argued that foreigndirect investment has a positive impact on the productivityof local firms. Yet at the aggregate level, evidence supportsthe view that foreign direct investment has a positive effecton economic growth in the host country.      

Social Investment Funds: An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance

This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs)and explores the ways they affect agents' incentives to propose,select, and implement good projects. Compared with other formsof decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features ofadministratively delegated authority and deep political devolution.Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistanceto vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a usefuladministrative alternative. This article reviews several featuresthat provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiariesand concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraisingsocial investment funds.      

SAVING AND INVESTMENT: PARADIGMS, PUZZLES, POLICIES

The 1990s have seen a renewed interest in issues of capitalaccumulation and growth. New paradigms for saving, investment,and growth have been advanced to address theoretical and empiricalpuzzles and to guide the design of better policies. This paperprovides a policy-oriented review of recent theoretical andempirical work on the determinants of saving and investmentand on their links to growth. It takes stock of new findingsas well as still unresolved questions and gives particular attentionto empirical regularities and to the policy issues relevantto developing countries.