The role of credibility in the cyclical properties of macroeconomic policies in emerging economies

Optimal stabilization policy is countercyclical, aiming at keeping output close to its potential. However it has been traditionally argued that emerging countries are unable to adopt countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies. Here we argue that the cyclical properties of macroeconomic policies depend critically on policy credibility. We test this proposition by making use of recent panel data for eleven emerging market economies and time series data for Chile. The evidence supports that countries with higher credibility, as reflected by lower country risk levels, are able to conduct countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. Conversely, countries with less credible policies (and, therefore, with higher country risk spreads) contribute to larger cyclical fluctuations by applying procyclical policies. For Chile we find that both monetary and fiscal policies have been largely countercyclical after 1993. JEL no. E43, E52, E62     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

Optimal Exchange Intervention in an Inflation Targeting Regime: Some Cautionary Tales

Devaluations and fiscal retrenchments coming from developed countries are buffeting less developed countries. Many emerging market countries have adopted inflation targeting as “best practice,” but now they are being advised to enhance their inflation targeting regimes with foreign exchange intervention. Here we use a DSGE model to tell some cautionary tales about this advice. A Taylor rule guides interest rate setting, while foreign exchange interventions are used as a second tool of monetary policy. These interventions are effective in our model since domestic and key currency bonds are imperfect substitutes. We derive optimal (Ramsey) intervention policies in response to foreign devaluations and fiscal retrenchments, and find that they are rather complex. So, we compare the optimal responses to policies that simply smooth real or nominal exchange rate movements. Our results suggest that discretion may be the better part of valor: pure inflation targeting may come closer to the optimal policy than exchange rate smoothing. A secondary result may also be of some interest: foreign exchange interventions have a stronger impact on inflation and output in an inflation targeting regime than do sterilized interventions; the Taylor rule augments the effects of a given intervention.     

我国财政货币政策反经济周期作用实证研究

文章回顾了改革开放以来我国5轮经济周期和8次主要反经济周期的财政货币政策。通过构造实际经济增长率、广义货币增长率和财政赤字增长率三变量VAR模型对财政货币政策的反经济周期作用进行实证分析,发现货币政策的作用时效和强度均优于财政政策,同时二者存在双向联动倾向。另外,文章也分析了政策出现不同效果的原因,认为我国反经济周期应构建以货币政策为主、财政政策为辅的调控体系。     

Stock price targeting and fiscal deficit in Japan: Why did the fiscal deficit increase during Japan’s lost decades?

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Japan’s fiscal deficit increased so dramatically in the 1990s and the 2000s. We focus on the role of “stock price targeting” to explain why the fiscal expenditure increased so much. After presenting a simple model to describe government behavior with an optimistic view about stock price and output growth, the paper tests whether the model can explain Japan’s fiscal expenditure. The empirical results, using biannual and high-frequency data of the 1990s and the 2000s, show that the stock price targeting can track Japan’s fiscal expenditure reasonably well, especially in the 1990s. They imply that without the stock price targeting, the total amount of biannual fiscal stimulus from 1992 to 2000 would have been lower by 2.5 trillion yen on average.     

Political risk and the international bond market between the 1848 revolution and the outbreak of the First World War1

This article uses price data and editorial commentaries from the contemporary financial press to measure the impact of political events on investors’ expectations from the middle of the nineteenth century until the First World War. The main question addressed is why political events appeared to affect the world's biggest financial market, the London bond market, much less between 1881 and 1914 than they had between 1843 and 1880. In particular, I ask why the outbreak of the First World War, an event traditionally seen as having been heralded by a series of international crises, was not apparently anticipated by investors. The article considers how far the declining sensitivity of the bond market to political events was a result of the spread of the gold standard, increased international financial integration, or changes in the fiscal policies of the great powers. I suggest that the increasing national separation of bond markets offers a better explanation. However, even this structural change cannot explain why the London market was so slow to appreciate the risk of war in 1914. To investors, the First World War truly came as a bolt from the blue.     

Can good events lead to bad outcomes? Endogenous banking crises and fiscal policy responses

In this paper, we study the impact of changes in the urban labor force and foreign direct investment on the banking sector, using a dynamic general equilibrium model with a financial sector. Numerical simulations are performed using stylized Chinese data, and bank failures are generated through increases in the growth rate of the labor force, a revaluation of the exchange rate, or an increase in debt issue to finance the government deficit, as compared to a benchmark scenario in which banks remain solvent. Thus bank failures can result from what might seem to be either beneficial economic trends or correct monetary and fiscal policies. We introduce fiscal policies that modify relative factor prices by lowering the capital tax rate and increasing the tax rate on labor. Such policies can prevent banking failures by raising the return to capital. It is shown that such fiscal policies are, in the short run, welfare reducing.     

Tracking the causes of eurozone external imbalances: new evidence and some policy implications

The paper assesses the contribution of key drivers of external imbalances in the Eurozone through the estimation of a panel-data Vector Autoregressive model over 1975–2011. Growth fluctuations, initially associated with demand booms triggered by unusually low interest rates, and later with demand contractions resulting from the crisis and policy adjustments, have played an important role in current account balance fluctuations. Changes in real exchange rates or unit labor costs have played a less important role. Demand shocks have contributed more to current account balance dynamics in the Eurozone periphery than in the core, whereas competitiveness has been a less prominent factor in the periphery but relatively more important in the core. Some broad policy implications of the findings for demand management in a currency union are discussed, including for fiscal policy coordination and macroprudential policies when union members face asymmetric shocks. The role of internal devaluation policies as a means of correcting external imbalances is also reassessed.     

Fiscal policies in Eastern Europe

We focus on the role of fiscal policies in macroeconomic stabilizationin eastern Europe and assess the sustainability of fiscal policiesfor the central and eastern European economies in transition.We show the main causes of fiscal imbalances experienced atthe beginning of the transition process. Countries that adoptedtight fiscal policies were more successful with their inflationstabilization programmes, have experienced a faster recoveryof growth, and did not experience a steeper decline in output.Countries with unsustainable fiscal policies all floated theirexchange rate, but there are both floating and peg arrangementsamong the successful stabilizers. In all the successful cases,however, current account convertibility was established. Wealso discuss the experience of Poland and Romania - two polarcases in terms of fiscal policies and present lessons and policyrecommendations for other economies in transition.     

财政政策、会计信息可比性与企业投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

基于2007-2021年A股上市公司为研究样本，从宏微观交叉视角，考察不同财政政策下，会计信息可比性和企业投资之间的互动关系。研究发现：相比扩张的财政政策，紧缩的财政政策下的企业可能有更高的投资-现金流敏感性，降低企业投资水平，而会计信息可比性的提高能够有效改善紧缩财政政策下的企业投资水平。进一步分析表明，紧缩的财政政策下，提高非国有企业会计信息可比性更有助于企业投资水平的改善。对于提高宏观经济政策的调控效果和促进实体经济的健康发展都具有重要的现实意义。     

Inducing political action by workers

A firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders, such as workers. This article studies the behavior of such a firm, showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage. The firm may, therefore, profit from paying above‐market wages and from hiring what might appear to be an inefficiently large number of workers. And because unions may overcome free‐rider problems of uncoordinated political effort, a firm may favor unionization, or be less opposed to unionization than it would otherwise be. The results of this article can also explain why firms may little reduce wages in a recession, and why the higher wages paid by unionized firms do not reduce survival rates of these firms.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Viet Nam

Intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may play an important role in ameliorating poverty in many countries. Successful poverty alleviation generally requires both ‘capacity improving’ and ‘safety net’ policies, and both types of policies may, to some extent, be implemented through, or affected by, intergovernmental transfers. From this perspective, we analyse the efficacy of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in poverty alleviation in a transitional economy, Viet Nam. We argue that both general and specific transfers are needed for this purpose: the former to enable all provinces to provide a given basket of public services at a given tax-price by offsetting their revenue and cost disabilities and the latter to ensure that minimum levels of those public services provided by lower levels of government are targeted to the poor throughout the country.     

“撤县设区”如何影响财政收支?——基于激励视角的再研究

文章从激励差异视角重新考察"撤县设区"的财政收支效应。基于广东的区划改革和转移支付政策实践构造一个"准试验"样本，样本期内既有"撤县设区"案例，也涉及省财政对县区激励性转移支付政策的重大调整，因而能够区分二者对财政收支的影响。分析过程包括两步，首先，基于倾向得分匹配和双重差分（PSD-DID）方法，发现"撤县设区"降低了县区财政收支增速；其次，依据激励性转移支付政策变化构建三重差分（DIDID）考察"撤县设区"政策效应的产生机制，发现财政激励差异是导致"撤县设区"政策效应的原因。文章为检验"撤县设区"等行政区划调整如何影响当地发展提出一种识别机制，并发现激励落差是导致"撤县设区"影响财政收支的背后机制，而"撤县设区"本身的影响不显著。     

对西部地区财税问题的思考

本文认为,西部地区经济欠发达有财税政策方面的原因,如地区财政支出总量不足,结构欠佳,经济发展的财政基础较为薄弱;东西部地区投资的原有财税政策差异明显,严重阻碍了资本的西流;缺乏强有力的财政政策投融资体系与政策的支持等。因此,要开发西部,关键是财税政策的调整与改进。     

Provincial fiscal positions and business cylce synchronization across China

This paper examines to what extent Chinese provinces with similar fiscal policies have synchronous business cycles. Following Darvas, Rose, and Szapáry (2007), we create a measure of fiscal policy divergence between provinces i and j and see if it is associated with the correlation of output movements between i and j. To examine this relation, we use the correlation model of Frankel and Rose (1998). Since causation can run from both fiscal policy to output fluctuations and from output fluctuations to fiscal policy, we instrument for fiscal policy using government expenditure on cultural activities which remains steady across the business cycle. Results show that provinces with similar budgetary positions tend to have similar business cycle movements.     

户籍门槛、发展型政府与人口城镇化政策——基于大中城市面板数据的经验研究

文章从制度变迁视角分析了户籍改革难以突破的原因,在发展主义理念的指引下,如果户籍改革对地方经济增长或财政收支产生负面影响,地方政府可能会拖延或阻碍改革进程。基于大中城市面板数据的实证研究显示,特大城市提高门槛对地方人均产出有正面影响,户籍改革动力最弱。其他城市虽然可以通过降低户籍门槛提高人均产出水平,但率先放开户籍制度可能引发流动人口大量涌入抵消政策效果,地方政府的户籍改革动力随着城市人口规模增长逐步下降。同时,户籍人口增长会带来财政支出的显著增加,为避免户籍化政策对财政支出产生压力,地方政府会通过户籍门槛对流动人口进行筛选,将对财政收入贡献较低或产生明显财政支出的群体排斥在户籍门槛之外。本文认为中国大中城市的户籍制度存在刚性,可以通过收回地方制定落户政策的权力强制推动户籍制度改革,或利用财政政策降低户籍化成本,激励地方政府推动改革。     

Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union

In a two-country model, we consider the implications of monetary and fiscal policy coordination for macroeconomic stabilization. We show that the optimal regime is one of monetary and fiscal policy coordination under flexible exchange rates. In the context of the European Community, this suggests that the desire to fix exchange rates may not be costless. In addition, we show that fiscal coordination requires a relatively high degree of flexibility in fiscal policy. This result suggests that limits on the flexibility of fiscal policies, as suggested in the Delors Report, may hinder macroeconomic stabilization.     

Stability and Growth Pact: issues and lessons from political economy

The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. Following a literature survey, the paper stresses the importance of appropriate incentives for rule compliance in an environment where national fiscal sovereignty precludes the option of centralised enforcement. In addition, the paper stresses the importance of clear and simple rules and in particular the 3% deficit limit in anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline and facilitating public and market monitoring of public finances. This, in turn, strengthens incentive for rule compliance. Moreover, the paper discusses the interests of the most important players in European fiscal rule formation and the importance of choosing the appropriate time for initiating a reform debate.Non-technical summary The EU fiscal framework as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, the Pact) aims to preserve fiscal sustainability while allowing room for automatic fiscal stabilisation. These two objectives are also at the heart of the ECB’s interest in the EU fiscal framework because their attainment facilitates monetary policy making in the short and long run.The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. The literature review of the first part reveals that fiscal rules can help solve deficit/debt biases and time inconsistency problems by constraining the behavior of policy makers. But rules can also mitigate biases if they facilitate financial market and public scrutiny of fiscal policies.Thereafter, the paper analyses the institutional environment in which EU fiscal rules are applied. It argues that EU rules reflect a “contract” amongst countries that retain sovereignty on fiscal policies. Enforcement, therefore, ultimately has to be undertaken by the contracting parties. Due to this constraint, the rules can also be characterised as “soft” law (with the 3% limit being nevertheless a much “harder” constraint than the other elements). But this does not necessarily imply that the rules are ineffective (or “dead”). Soft law reduces political transaction costs (by improving transparency and providing a forum for peer pressure). Moreover, if well-designed, such law can boost incentives towards making the rules “self-enforcing”. Evidence speaks in favour of this view: while EU fiscal rules were bent in a number of cases and compliance is undeniably of concern, major and rapid fiscal balance deteriorations have been largely prevented since the start of EMU.The paper also looks at potential trade-offs between “complex” rules where a “fine-tuned” economic rationale may boost acceptance of the rules versus simple and clear rules that allow easy monitoring. It is argued that clarity and simplicity of rules are important especially when formal enforcement is limited (“soft law”) and public monitoring becomes more important. By facilitating public and market monitoring of compliance, clear and simple rules are also more costly to breach.The benefits of “complexity”, and in particular the use of administrative discretion to fine tune the rules to country situations have limits, in particular when it comes to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). It is argued that the 3% deficit limit and the time frame for correcting excessive deficits already provide some room to accommodate economic circumstances. The 3% limit must be clear, simple and strictly implemented to anchor expectations of fiscal discipline and to facilitate public and market monitoring. Further discretion and relaxation would conflict with this need. From this angle, other risks (e.g., efforts not materializing, structural reforms producing surprise costs etc) are hard to justify as a reason for extending deadlines to correct excessive deficits.The preventive arm of the Pact with its requirement of close-to-balance-or-in-surplus budgetary positions defines sound medium term budget positions and adjustment paths. This may be appropriately fine-tuned to address concerns about the Pact’s underlying economic rationale. For example, a symmetric application in good and bad times and less time inconsistency would be desirable.Finally, the timing of a debate on fiscal rules needs to be carefully chosen. In the EU context (and perhaps in other contexts as well), there seems to be much inherent pressure to make the rules more “complex”. Moreover, for the debate initiated in summer 2004, there was also no willingness by countries to give up sovereignty nor was there a sense of urgency to strengthen public finances via tighter rule implementation and enforcement. In such an environment, it is likely that changes to fiscal rules make them more complicated, discretionary and, thereby, potentially less enforceable.The views expressed are those of the author and not of the ECB. Comments by Vitor Gaspar, Mark Hallerberg, Steven Keuning, Jose Marin, Richard Morris, Gilles Noblet, Hedwig Ongena, Luca Onorante, Rolf Strauch, Juergen von Hagen, an anonymous referee and valuable assistance by Anna Foden are much appreciated.     

Policy Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in a Two‐country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: Evidence from China*

In this paper, we construct a two‐country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to investigate the sources of business cycles in China and the contributions of policy shocks in economic fluctuations. The empirical results from Bayesian estimation show that, apart from the traditional supply and demand shocks, monetary and fiscal policy shocks also play important roles in determining China's economic fluctuations. In addition, we find significant feedback effects between monetary and fiscal policies in China, indicating that policy coordination is an important feature of China's monetary and fiscal policies. Overall, these results not only shed new light on the policy factors behind China's economic fluctuations, but also provide new evidence that is helpful for understanding the policy transmission mechanisms in China.     

Stable and enforceable: a new fiscal framework for the Euro area

Since the great financial crash, the need for new fiscal rules to prevent unsustainable fiscal policies is universally recognised. In practice such rules, including those in the Stability and Growth Pact, have proved to be impossible to enforce. Thus, to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies reappearing, and to prevent monetary policy from being undermined by undisciplined governments, there is a need for a framework capable of imposing fiscal discipline. This paper considers an intertemporal assignment, where fiscal policy focuses on long-term objectives and monetary policy on short-term stabilisation. We argue for public sector debt targets as a practical way to achieve such a set up, and an excess debt protocol is constructed to give enforceable form to those targets. The ideas of “fiscal space” and optimal debt levels are used to provide a mechanism for identifying a stable region within which the debt targeting regime should operate. Making these factors explicit would both improve the credibility of planned fiscal policies and reduce risk premia on borrowing costs. We finally show how Europe’s competitiveness pact, and debt restructuring operations, can be used to maximise the available fiscal space.