中国上市公司融资选择的市场时机效应——基于股票换手率和股票收益的实证检验

自从市场时机资本结构理论提出以来，国内外学者从理论的解释能力和实用性等方面对这一新兴融资决策理论进行了大量研究，并得出许多有意义的结论。然而目前的实证检验主要基于市值账面比（M／B）指标作为市场时机代理变量，这一指标引起学者们很大争议，研究结论缺乏可靠性。本文根据我国资本市场实际特征选择股票换手率作为市场时机代理变量，实证检验了市场时机与外部融资方式选择的关系，同时引入股票收益变量检验市场时机对资本结构动态变动的综合影响。研究结论显示，换手率在企业权益融资中具有重要作用，换手率较高时企业选择发行更多的股权融资，股票换手率和股票收益均对资本结构变动具有显著的负向影响。这表明我国上市公司确实存在着融资选择的市场时机效应。     

Equity market timing and capital structure: International evidence

We investigate the equity market timing hypothesis of capital structure in major industrialized (G-7) countries. As claimed by its proponents, we find that leverage of firms is negatively related to the historical market-to-book ratio in all G-7 countries. However, this negative relationship cannot be attributed to equity market timing. We find no association between equity issues and market-to-book ratios at the time of equity financing decisions by Japanese firms. Firms in all G-7 countries, except Japan, undo the effect of equity issuance and the impact of equity market timing attempts on leverage is short lived. This is inconsistent with the prediction of the equity market timing hypothesis and more in line with dynamic trade-off model.     

Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably Important?

This paper examines the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure decisions of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003. The most reliable factors for explaining market leverage are: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market-to-book assets ratio (−), tangibility (+), profits (−), log of assets (+), and expected inflation (+). In addition, we find that dividend-paying firms tend to have lower leverage. When considering book leverage, somewhat similar effects are found. However, for book leverage, the impact of firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the effect of inflation are not reliable. The empirical evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the trade-off theory of capital structure.     

The impact of culture on market timing in capital structure choices

This study uses Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions to investigate the impact of market reception on capital structure. We examine the interaction of these dimensions with stock returns, our proxy for market timing. Based on our market leverage results, we find evidence that firms do engage in market timing by reducing their leverage ratios when their share prices increase. Furthermore, we find that firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance and high power distance have lower market leverage ratios and that these cultural dimensions serve to reduce the impact of market timing. These results are consistent for developed markets but mixed for emerging markets. On a book leverage basis, the results are generally consistent but less conclusive. To the extent that culture impacts manager perception of risk and investor reception of newly issued shares, we conclude that cultural dimensions impact the degree to which a firm can modify its capital structure to take advantage of perceived market mispricings.     

Determinants of target capital structure: The case of dual debt and equity issues

We examine whether market and operating performance affect corporate financing behavior because they are related to target leverage. Our focus on firms that issue both debt and equity enhances our ability to draw inferences. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, dual issuers offset the deviation from the target resulting from accumulation of earnings and losses. Our results also imply that high market-to-book firms have low target debt ratios. On the other hand, consistent with market timing, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance but have no effect on target leverage.     

A comparative analysis of proxies for an optimal leverage ratio

Previous studies that test the tradeoff theory commonly use one of the following debt ratio measures to proxy for a firm's hypothesized optimal ratio: firm's time-series mean leverage, moving average leverage based on a firm's historical debt ratios, industry median leverage, and predicted leverage ratio based on cross-sectional regressions. We find that these alternative proxies yield results that are significantly different from each other. Further, regression results of models that use the optimum target leverage and the conclusions drawn from the findings are sensitive to the model's proxy. Of the proxies that are commonly used in the literature, the moving average debt measure exhibits characteristics that are most consistent with the theoretical optimal leverage ratio.     

市场时机对我国上市公司并购融资行为的影响

全流通格局开启了我国上市公司并购融资多元化的时代。在国内研究中,鲜有基于股权分置改革来研究市场时机对我国上市公司并购融资行为的影响。因此,本文以外部融资加权平均市账比作为市场时机的代理变量,通过建立Tobit模型进行实证检验与分析,发现在股票市场全流通的背景下,市场时机对上市公司并购融资行为具有显著的影响,但这种影响持续性很短,大约为3年。同时检验结果表明,市场时机、盈利能力对公司债务杠杆的影响在长期内会发生逆转。     

On the relation between the market-to-book ratio, growth opportunity, and leverage ratio

The negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is one of the most widely documented empirical regularities in the capital structure literature. Most related studies take this negative relation as given and debate about its economic interpretation. We show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios face lower debt financing costs and borrow more. The relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is not monotonic and is positive for most firms (more than 88% of COMPUSTAT firms and more than 95% of total market capitalization). The previously documented negative relation is driven by a subset of firms with high market-to-book ratios.     

On the Capital Structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

Much of the literature on capital structure excludes Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) due mainly to the unique regulatory environment of these firms. As such, the issue of how REITs choose among different financing options when they raise external capital is largely unexplored. In this paper, we explore two issues on the capital structure of REITs: is there a relationship between market-to-book and leverage ratios, and, is the relationship between market-to-book and leverage ratio temporary or persistent. Our results suggest that REITs with historically high market-to-book ratio tend to have persistently high leverage ratio. In essence, REITs with high growth opportunity and high market valuation raise funds through debt issues. This finding, which is robust to various specifications and econometric tests, is contrary to the financing decisions of non-regulated firms. We attribute it to the special regulatory environment of REITs where, despite no apparent benefits to debt financing, management issues debt. Comments from Robert Edelstein and others at the Maastricht–Cambridge 2005 Symposium, and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are our own.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

An Analysis of the Financing Decisions of REITs: The Role of Market Timing and Target Leverage

This paper examines the role of capital market conditions and target leverage on the marginal financing decisions of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which include both capital raising and capital reduction activities. We investigate the relevance of a hybrid hypothesis whereby REITs have target leverage, but they also choose and time their marginal financing decisions according to the capital market conditions. The empirical results suggest that target leverage behavior plays a secondary role to market timing behavior in the financing decisions of REITs. In particular, we find strong and consistent evidence that REITs exhibit market timing behavior in terms of when and what type of capital to issue or reduce. Such market timing practices, motivated by attempts to take advantage of capital market conditions, may shift the firms away from their target leverage. However, we observe that in the long run, most REITs do move their capital structure towards the target debt level.     

Can machines learn capital structure dynamics?

Yes, they can! Machine learning models predict leverage better than linear models and identify a broader set of leverage determinants. They boost the out-of-sample R² from 36% to 56% over OLS and LASSO. The best performing model (random forests) selects market-to-book, industry median leverage, cash and equivalents, Z-Score, profitability, stock returns, and firm size as reliable predictors of market leverage. More precise target estimation yields a 10%–33% faster speed of adjustment and improves prediction of financing actions relative to linear models. Machine learning identifies uncertainty, cash flow, and macroeconomic considerations among primary drivers of leverage adjustments.     

Cash flows and leverage adjustments

Recent research has emphasized the impact of transaction costs on firm leverage adjustments. We recognize that cashflow realizations can provide opportunities to adjust leverage at relatively low marginal cost. We find that a firm's cashflow features affect not only the leverage target, but also the speed of adjustment toward that target. Heterogeneity in adjustment speeds is driven by an economically meaningful concept: adjustment costs. Accounting for this fact produces adjustment speeds that are significantly faster than previously estimated in the literature. We also analyze how both financial constraints and market timing variables affect adjustments toward a leverage target.     

Risk tolerance and entrepreneurship

A theoretical tradition argues that more risk tolerant individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs but perform worse. We test and confirm these predictions with several risk tolerance proxies. Using investment data for 400,000 individuals, we find that common stock investors are around 50% more likely to subsequently start up a firm. Firms started up by common stock investors have about 25% lower sales and 15% lower return on assets. The results are similar using personal leverage and other risk-tolerance proxies. We do not find support for alternative explanations such as unobserved wealth or behavioral effects.     

Market Timing with Security Offering Regulations: Evidence from Private Placements of Chinese Listed Firms

In the context of China's strict security-offering regulations, we examine market timing by linking firms' decisions to withdraw private placement (PP) proposals to changes in market condition during the approval process. We reveal that timing based on the strictness of the security-offering regulations is as important a dimension of market timing as timing based on the issuers' market valuations is. A firm's probability of withdrawing its PP proposal is negatively related to changes in its market-to-book ratio and changes in the strictness of regulations, measured by changes in the issue market (hot/cold) occurring between proposal announcement and outcome day. PPs for investment financing have more pronounced timing effects than PPs for asset restructuring.     

Crisis-related shifts in the market valuation of banking activities

We examine changes in banks’ market-to-book ratios over the last decade, focusing on the dramatic and persistent declines witnessed during the financial crisis. The extent of the decline and its persistence cannot be explained by the delayed recognition of losses on existing financial instruments. Rather, it is declines in the values of intangibles – including customer relationships and other intangibles related to business opportunities – along with unrecognized contingent obligations that account for most of the persistent decline in market-to-book ratios. These shifts reflect a combination of changed economic circumstances (e.g., low interest rates reduce the value of core deposits; meager growth opportunities reduce the value of customer relationships) and changed regulatory policies. Together, these changes in the business environment since the financial crisis have led investors to associate little value with intangibles. For example, changing market perceptions of the consequences of leverage have affected the way investors value banks; prior to the crisis, higher leverage, ceteris paribus, was associated with greater value (reflecting the high relative cost of equity finance), but during and after the crisis, as default risk and regulatory concerns came to the fore, lower leverage was associated with greater value. Reflecting the rising importance of regulatory risks (e.g., the uncertain consequences of the Volcker Rule), after controlling for other influences, dividend payments (a signal of management and regulatory perceptions of the persistence of financial strength) matter for market prices much more after the crisis, while increases in recurring fee income matter less.     

Corporate governance and the dynamics of capital structure: New evidence

The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.     

Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Revisions of Loss Reserves by Property-Casualty Insurers: Differential Implications for Future Profitability, Risk and Market Value

We develop and estimate a PC-industry specific model in which proxies for both discretion and non-discretion are used to partition loss reserve revisions into discretionary and non-discretionary components. The use of such proxies enables us to test directional hypotheses about the relations between the revision components and future profitability, risk and market value. We predict and find that discretionary revisions are negatively associated with future profitability, positively associated with firm risk, and negatively associated with market-to-book ratios. We predict and find that non-discretionary revisions are positively associated with future profitability and risk but are not associated with market-to-book ratios.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

How Persistent Is the Impact of Market Timing on Capital Structure?

This paper examines the capital structure implications of market timing. I isolate timing attempts in a single major financing event, the initial public offering, by identifying market timers as firms that go public in hot issue markets. I find that hot‐market IPO firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios by more, than cold‐market firms do. However, immediately after going public, hot‐market firms increase their leverage ratios by issuing more debt and less equity relative to cold‐market firms. At the end of the second year following the IPO, the impact of market timing on leverage completely vanishes.