中外银行竞争力实证分析

改革开放以来 ,我国银行业经历了渐进开放和探索的过程 ,己基本形成以中央银行为核心 ,国有商业银行为骨干 ,中小股份制银行并存的局面。加入WTO以来 ,银行业作为我国重点开放行业已经开始受到冲击 ,中外资银行展开了全方位的竞争。由于竞争优势的不同 ,我国银行业将面临巨大的压力和挑战。本文将从实证的角度分析我国商业银行的综合竞争能力并与国外同业加以合理比较 ,寻找差距 ,并提出相关政策建议。     

News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government

Central banks are often considered to be better informed about the present or future state of the economy than the government. A conservative central bank has an incentive to exploit this asymmetry by strategically managing its information policy. Strategic news management will keep the government uncertain about the state of the economy and increase the central bank's leeway for conducting a conservative monetary policy. We show that withholding information from the government is an equilibrium. However, there are also well-defined limits to strategic information policy as the central bank has to distort monetary policy to be in line with its news management. A simple extension of our findings is that, if the government on occasion learns about the bank's true information, it will then overrule the central bank's decision on monetary policy.     

银行规模与经理人激励——基于中国信息和不确定性环境的理论研究

本文基于委托代理激励理论,探讨不同规模银行中信息类别、不确定性信息与合同期限、政府行为等因素对经理人激励的影响.发现在中国这样的转型经济国家中,不确定性、非契约关系与政府行为使得银行规模与其竞争力和生存性的关系变得更加微妙.(1)相对大银行而言,小银行的发展面临更多的机会和风险;(2)长期合同下股权激励对于小银行经理人有着更为重要的意义;(3)客户经理的素质高低与一致性对于小银行激励效率的发挥至关重要;(4)我国小银行与地方政府天然密切的关系对其"软"信息获取作用很大,但同时也可能对其激励机制的长期有效性造成负面影响.     

Monetary institutions, budget deficits and inflation : Empirical results for eight countries

This study examines the implications of central bank independence using a three-equation model of monetary base growth, budget deficits and inflation that is estimated over an eight-country sample — of which Switzerland, the United States and West Germany are the countries considered to possess relatively autonomous central banks. A main finding is that central bank policy appears to be directed more toward price stability and less toward accommodation of government budget deficits in countries with a central bank that is independent of government. There is also some suggestion that the inflationary consequences of monetary expansion may be lessened under a more decentralised institutional setting.     

Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on lending rates: Theory and evidence

Policy makers who decide to liberalize foreign bank entry frequently put limitations on the mode of entry. We study how different entry modes affect the lending rates of foreign and domestic banks. In our model, the mode of entry determines whether a foreign bank inherits a customer base. This, in turn, affects how information is distributed between foreign and domestic banks. We show that this distribution of information about incumbent customers leads to stronger competition if foreign entry occurs through a greenfield investment. As a result, domestic bank lending rates are lower after greenfield entry. We find empirical support for this prediction for a sample of banks from 10 Eastern European countries for the period 1995–2003.     

Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly

I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.     

"小银行优势":基于成本节省的整合研究

小银行比大银行更加倾向于向中小企业提供贷款,由此产生了所谓的“小银行优势”。撇开大小银行竞争优势的争论,从两者互补的市场定位角度来界定“小银行优势”存在的范围,可揭示出“小银行优势”的内涵:信息成本优势和代理成本优势;由此明确了中小金融机构发挥比较优势的市场定位选择。     

提高银行资本能缓解小微企业融资难问题吗*——基于小微企业贷款风险权重降低改革的讨论

本文以银行资本为切入点,从银行提供小微企业贷款的角度,探讨解决小微企业融资难问题可能的路径。新资本监管降低了小微企业贷款的风险权重,改革前后可以视为“准自然实验”。通过构建双重差分模型,本文深入研究银行资本与小微企业贷款的关系,并对“小银行优势理论”进行再检验。结果表明：（1）小微企业贷款风险权重优惠政策显著促进了银行发放小微企业贷款,特别是对小银行来说,政策效果更好;（2）在优惠政策实施之前,资本水平较高的银行会紧缩小微企业贷款,而且这种惜贷行为在大银行中尤为突出;（3）在优惠政策实施之后,资本水平越高的银行对小微企业贷款的偏好反而越强,且这一促进作用的力度在大银行中更为显著。因此,应当继续执行小微企业贷款风险权重优惠,提高银行资本水平,构建多层次银行金融体系,以缓解小微企业融资难问题。     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets, i.e. by making it goal-independent     

CENTRAL BANK STRATEGIC FORECASTING

In most of the literature on transparency it has been standard to assume that central banks release truthful information when communicating with the public. However, the monetary policymaker may act strategically and misrepresent private information intending to reduce economic volatility by manipulating inflation expectations. We set up a simple model which includes misrepresentation as a possible action for the central bank and derive some testable implications. The empirical evidence from the analysis of inflation forecasts of six central banks (Brazil, Canada, England, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden) is consistent with the existence of strategic forecasting. (JEL E52, E58)     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

Inside the bank lending channel

This paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The results, derived from a comprehensive sample of Italian banks, suggest that heterogeneity in the monetary policy pass-through exists. After a monetary tightening the decrease in lending is lower for well-capitalized banks that are perceived as less risky by the market and are better able to raise uninsured deposits. Liquid banks can protect their loan portfolio against monetary tightening simply by drawing down cash and securities. The presence of internal capital markets in bank holding companies also contributes to insulate monetary shocks. Bank size is never relevant.     

Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective

By contrast to private banks, public monetary authorities – central banks and currency boards – have limited credibility in making redemption or fixed-exchange-rate commitments. Their sovereign immunity obviates legal penalties for devaluing, and their monopoly status weakens reputational penalties. The softness of central bank promises invites speculative attack and currency crises. Privatization and decentralization of exchange-rate commitments provides a more credible currency by making redemption commitments legally enforceable and reputable. This contrast sheds light on (1) the breakdown of the classical gold standard and (2) the costs and benefits of dollarization. JEL Classification: E42, H42.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Writing Clearly: The ECB's Monetary Policy Communication

The article presents a novel methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication using content analysis, illustrating the methodology with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). The analysis identifies the ECB's written communication as clear in about 85–95% of instances, which is comparable with, or better than, similar results available for other central banks. We also find that the additional information on risk to inflation and especially projection risk assessment contained in the ECB's Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB's press releases. In contrast, the bulletin's communication on monetary developments has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?

A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

MONETARY POLICY WITH A WIDER INFORMATION SET: A BAYESIAN MODEL AVERAGING APPROACH

Monetary policy has been usually analyzed in the context of small macroeconomic models where central banks are allowed to exploit a limited amount of information. Under these frameworks, researchers typically derive the optimality of aggressive monetary rules, contrasting with the observed policy conservatism and interest rate smoothing. This paper allows the central bank to exploit a wider information set, while taking into account the associated model uncertainty, by employing Bayesian model averaging with Markov chain model composition. In this enriched environment, we derive the optimality of smoother and more cautious policy rates, together with clear gains in macroeconomic efficiency.