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1.
We examine the impact of technological change on the stability of climate coalitions and explore how international cooperation on abatement affects the incentives of signatories to invest in R&D to reduce emissions. We compare the case of no technological change with exogenous technological change and induced technological change. In the latter case R&D investments are endogenous. We find that the highest equilibrium pay‐offs are achieved in the case of induced technological change. Furthermore, the formation of a climate coalition boosts R&D investments in carbon abatement technologies in signatory countries.  相似文献   

2.
Coalition of retailers is a nowadays phenomenon in retailing channels (RCs) that makes it possible for the retailers to enhance their business performance and respond to the consumers' needs more effectively. This paper discusses the retailers' coalition advantages and challenges in a two-echelon retailing channel consist of one wholesaler and two non-competing retailers who serve the consumers. The model is developed under a classic newsvendor problem where an all-unit quantity discount is offered by the wholesaler. Our investigations are conducted for both homogeneous/heterogeneous retailers under three different scenarios. In the developed models, the retailers start to make a coalition and make a joint order in order to gain more from the offered discount by the wholesaler, and then using a heuristic procedure they allocate the received order to serve their individual markets. The main objective of this study is to analyze and resolve challenges of the retailers' coalition when a quantity discount is offered in order to make them capable to meet consumers' needs in the best possible manner. Three models are developed: (1) no-coalition decentralized scheme, (2) decentralized coalition where the retailers coalesce, and (3) centralized coalition where not only the retailers but the wholesaler participate in the coalition scheme. Our paper contributes to the RC management literature by analyzing the benefits of the retail coalition in taking most advantage from an offered quantity discount. Results demonstrate that the optimal configuration of the retailers' coalition increases profits of both the retailers and the RC in comparison with the no-coalition scenario. Our findings help procurement managers to rethink their ordering policy toward forming coalition to gain more profits and enhance their service level to meet consumers’ needs.  相似文献   

3.
A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a first-mover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party’s flexibility can be (dis)advantageous in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, certain power sharing tactics appear not always to lead to an agreement that is in a party’s advantage. The main message put forward is that the procedure of forming a coalition plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.  相似文献   

4.
This paper provides background and history of economic sanctions on Iran. Particular attention is paid to the effectiveness of the sanctions and to factors that have mitigated their effectiveness. The United States and other countries have joined in a coalition to impose the sanctions, but it will be difficult to maintain the coalition and get cooperation of nonparticipant countries if there is a major oil price increase. Measures are recommended to reduce this risk and maintain the effectiveness of the sanctions.  相似文献   

5.
《Metroeconomica》2018,69(1):16-38
I develop a model analyzing common interests and conflict among four classes—capitalists, workers, landlords, and peasants in 19th‐century Europe—and show that strong class position, based on a high degree of organization and solidarity, may actually be detrimental to the economic and political advantage of that class. This occurs when a strong class is excluded from a major class coalition via coalition formation processes. The reason is that the weak class, if they enjoy bargaining power over even weaker classes within a coalition, may not want to form a coalition with the strong class. I apply the main results to coalition formation and political transitions in 19th‐century European society.  相似文献   

6.
Coalition formation procedures incorporate two properties that are not often found in other coalition formation models: the choice between different formation paths and constrained consensus positions. However, there are two aspects of coalition formation procedures that are often overlooked: issue saliences and consensus estimation. Issue saliences are a measure of the importance that parties can attribute to issue dimensions. Initially, we employ the classical application to implement issue saliences. The classical application combines the Euclidean distance with the center of gravity as a consensus estimate. Secondly, we introduce a consistent distance application where the coalition consensus position is determined by minimizing the sum of salience-weighted Euclidean distances. The impact of these aspects is examined with the help of both numerical and empirical applications. The results indicate that both the consensus estimation method and the inclusion of issue saliences do not only have an impact on the estimated consensus position. They also determine the individual parties’ preferences towards the potential coalition formation procedures.  相似文献   

7.
We provide a synthetic analysis of the different ways in which countries participate in the world economy. Classic trade questions are reconsidered by generalizing a factor-proportions model to multiple countries, multiple goods or multi-stage production, and country-specific trade costs. Each country's production specialization, trade and welfare is determined by the interaction between its relative endowment and its trade costs. We consider the effects of allowing one good to ‘fragment’ into component and assembly production. The volume of trade and welfare levels are higher with fragmentation for most countries, although for many countries these variables fall with fragmentation.  相似文献   

8.
This paper incorporates foreign direct investment (FDI) into the examination of trading bloc formation with endogenously determined coalition structures. In so doing, we build a three-country model, in which firms serve foreign markets either by exporting or undertaking FDI, and consider a coalition formation game with the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium as an equilibrium concept. We find that the equilibrium coalition structure varies upon firms characterization before and after the formation of a trading bloc. As in the literature, when all firms are exporters in the pre- and post-formation, bilateralism can be an equilibrium outcome. However, when trade barriers are not so high as to be trade-prohibitive and the environment is favorable to multinational activities in the pre- or post-formation, only global free trade will prevail as an equilibrium coalition structure.  相似文献   

9.
We present a model of tax competition for real investment and profits and show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenue of countries. In the first part of the paper, we argue that tax competition for profits is likely to be imperfect in the sense that the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate does not necessarily attract all shifted profits. Under this assumption, tax competition between a large number of identical countries may lead to either a symmetric equilibrium with no profit shifting or an asymmetric equilibrium where firms shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. In the second part of the paper, we introduce tax havens. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, tax havens unambiguously reduce the tax revenue of countries due to a ‘leakage effect’ — tax havens attract tax base from countries — and a ’competition effect’ — the optimal response to the increased tax sensitivity of tax bases involves a reduction of tax rates. Starting from an asymmetric equilibrium, however, tax havens also raise the tax revenue of countries through a ’crowding effect’ — tax havens make it less attractive to compete for profits and thus induce low-tax countries to become high-tax countries. We demonstrate that the latter effect may dominate the former effects so that countries, on balance, benefit from the presence of tax havens.  相似文献   

10.
This paper aims to understand the structural features of bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor considering general economics indicators, development levels, structure of agricultural sectors and trade policies. Bargaining coalitions are analysed by grouping countries using a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the identification of possible ‘defectors’, i.e. countries that, according to their economic conditions and policies, seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join. In addition, the ex‐post analysis of the counterfactual coalitions sheds light on the ‘distance’ between different coalitions as well as between individual countries and the best alternative group available. Empirical results confirm our research hypothesis: clusters of structurally homogeneous countries well represent existing bargaining coalitions. In particular, the G‐20 shows a high degree of internal coherence, which, in our framework, may provide a clue to the ‘sustainability’ of this coalition and to its relevance in the Doha Round negotiations.  相似文献   

11.
Political risk not only constitutes a threat for multinational enterprises but can also be a source of opportunities. Exposure to and accumulated experience dealing with political risk allows firms to better implement a wide set of political actions such as negotiation of entry conditions, lobbying, litigation, campaign contributions and coalition formation, leading to preferential conditions, reduced environmental uncertainty, reduced transaction costs and increased long-term sustainability to the firm. These advantages facilitate investments in countries with higher and more diverse levels of risk and make political risk to be positively associated with the firm's scope of internationalization. This effect is not homogeneous across firms. Drawing from a sample of 164 Spanish companies with investments in 119 countries, we find that the impact is greater for companies in industrial sectors that are the object of greater governmental regulation than it is for firms in non-regulated manufacturing or service sectors, with less frequent interactions with home and host-country institutions.  相似文献   

12.
This article analyzes the issue of voluntary cooperation in terms of international financial supervision. A simple modeling framework is provided where financial supervision is an international public good and thus may be underprovided globally. The article asks a simple question: would national supervisors cooperate and increase the level of global supervision, and by how much? I use coalition formation game theory to address this question. The main results are the following. If the situation is completely symmetric (identical‐sized countries and symmetric externalities), the amount of cooperation is relatively high and full cooperation could be achieved for particular numbers of countries involved in the negotiations. However, in general, full cooperation would not be an equilibrium because countries have incentives to free ride on the cooperation of other countries. Introducing asymmetries in the size of the countries and/or in the externalities between countries reduces the scope for cooperation. However, higher asymmetries are not necessarily related to lower cooperation if the distribution of asymmetries has a particular shape, such that big countries are generating large externalities on small countries, as it might be the case in reality.  相似文献   

13.
This paper is a first attempt to empirically determine why countries choose to violate or adhere to GATT rules when making trade policy adjustments between negotiating rounds. We use a previously unexploited set of data in which countries implemented two ‘types’ of protection under the GATT system between 1973 and 1994: (i) ‘legal’ protection in which countries utilized the GATT’s safeguards provisions; and (ii) ‘illegal’ protection in which the protection was provided outside of the safeguards provisions, resulting in a formal trade dispute. We find substantial evidence that concerns for retaliation affect government policy decisions in ways which contribute to the explanation of the existence of trade disputes.  相似文献   

14.
When a firm chooses to enter or continue business in a foreign market, it becomes exposed to associated political risks which should be assessed and managed. Help is available for becoming aware of the level of macro political risk; that is, the political risk across industries or all businesses in entire countries or geographic regions. Yet, surprisingly little guidance exists by which to identify and assess firm-specific political risks, termed micro political risk. Herein, we offer some new perspectives on the nature of micro political risk within a host country, illustrating how it stems from economic, societal, and governmental forces. We have compiled a number of firm-specific variables which can affect the firm’s micro political risk profile, and advance an innovative methodology by which executives can address these variables and develop an assessment of their firm’s micro political risk. Examples of micro political risk situations are provided, along with discussion of implementing the proposed methodology.  相似文献   

15.
In this study, we propose that pooling resources would reduce both the carbon footprint and economic costsin the vehicle routing problem with time windows. A mathematical formulation for the vehicle routing problem considering the carbon footprint as a constraint is proposed. The model is approached with the scatter search metaheuristic and analyzed from the perspective of game theory to evaluate the stability of the coalition after pooling. We define a theoretical case for four suppliers on an instance partition from Solomon’s library using several scenarios from individual participation to a full coalition. For each of these scenarios, we realize a sweep of the objective space. The results show that the more resources are shared, the greater the benefit. The best savings and contributions are achieved by operating in complete cooperation. These savings were distributed as fairly as possible to maintain a stable coalition using the Shapley value.  相似文献   

16.
An elementary proposition concerning parallel imports   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper demonstrates that, when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports, a global Nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i.e. global uniform pricing. This result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff-setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government’s objective function (i.e. political economy considerations). We also show that when countries can prevent ‘parallel exports’ then any Nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination.  相似文献   

17.
Coalition loyalty programs are on the rise, yet few studies investigate the impact of service failures in such programs. Using data from a retail context, the authors show that a program partner deemed responsible for a service failure suffers negative customer responses. However, customers’ perceptions of the benefits of the coalition loyalty program buffer these consequences. Perhaps most importantly, when customers perceive the program's special treatment benefits as low, direct and indirect spillover effects occur, such that a service failure by one program partner has a negative effect on customer loyalty toward the program itself.  相似文献   

18.
Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent coalition formation methods present two limits: First, computation must be completely restarted when a change occurs. Second, utility functions of the agents are either global or aggregated. We present a new algorithm to cope with these limits. The first part of this paper presents a coalition formation method for multi-agent systems which finds a Pareto optimal solution without aggregating the preferences of the agents. This protocol is adapted to problems requiring coordination by coalition formation, where it is undesirable, or not possible, to aggregate the preferences of the agents. The second part of this paper proposes an extension of this method enabling dynamic restructuring of coalitions when changes occur in the system.  相似文献   

19.
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.  相似文献   

20.
In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example.  相似文献   

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