Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?

For over 40 years, the gravity equation has been a workhorse for cross-country empirical analyses of international trade flows and — in particular — the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. However, the gravity equation is subject to the same econometric critique as earlier cross-industry studies of U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers and U.S. multilateral imports: trade policy is not an exogenous variable. We address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. Although instrumental-variable and control-function approaches do not adjust for endogeneity well, a panel approach does. Accounting econometrically for the FTA variable's endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.     

Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO

Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process.     

多边贸易体制互惠原则探析——兼论多边贸易体制对发展中和 “非市场经济 ”成员的差别待遇

互惠是人类合作关系的基石,国际贸易协定将之作为基本原则原因正在于此。在多边贸易体制中,互惠虽未得到明确界定,但却被公认与最惠国共同构成其两个基本原则,互惠是双边谈判的动因和策略,最惠国则是双边谈判成果多边化的实现机制。与最惠国的有条件性和无条件性相对应,互惠有特定和一般之分。由于一般互惠缺乏严格的减让对等和利益平衡,多边贸易体制始终是特定互惠和一般互惠的混合,并在对发达成员、发展中成员和"非市场经济"成员分别强调不同互惠待遇的基础上,形成了一个三层结构。     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations — some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.     

美国对外贸易政策的演进及对我国贸易政策制定的启示

本文分析了美国对外贸易的重要作用和对外贸易的发展情况，研究了美国对外贸易政策的演进过程，并从中得到如下启示：对外贸易政策必须根据国际和国内经济形势适时转变；顺应国际贸易制度发展需要，增强我国贸易政策的法律化；在致力于多边经济合作的同时，我国应加强区域和双边经济合作。     

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research shows that the GATT/WTO negotiating rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, if governments have political motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium. The reason is that, when members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes—and only then—we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. Regional integration can, however, harm outsiders.     

A Comparative Analysis of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations

Global environmental problems pose important diplomatic and legal challenges to the international community. The nature of these problems requires an unprecedented degree of international cooperation that is achieved through multilateral negotiation, which is often shaped by scientific uncertainty, the complexity of the issues, and the wide range of actors and interests. One way of analyzing and explaining this complicated process is through the use of comparative analysis. By breaking down the negotiating process into a series of phases and turning points, it becomes easier to analyze the roles of different actors, the management of issues, the formation of groups and coalitions, and the art of consensus building. This article uses comparative analysis to characterize, develop, and specify a model of the multilateral environmental negotiation process. The model is elaborated upon inductively through a comparative analysis of eleven cases of multilateral environmental negotiations. Statistical techniques are used to determine whether there is any relationship among attributes of the process (within the phases or at the turning points) and between these characteristics and outcomes.     

Reevaluating the role of trade agreements: Does investment globalization make the WTO obsolete?

International ownership alters the role of multilateral trade institutions by redefining pecuniary externalities among countries. Regardless of the underlying cause - whether foreign direct investment, international portfolio diversification, cross-country mergers, or multinational firms — international ownership can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs. At the same time, however, foreign ownership introduces the potential for expropriation by investment-host countries, which can extract rent from foreign owners by manipulating local prices. The basic principle of reciprocity continues to serve as an important guide to efficiency, though its application must account for the pattern of international ownership in addition to traditional measures of market access.     

Foreign influence and welfare

How do foreign interests influence policy? How are trade policies and the viability of trade agreements affected? What are the welfare implications of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the study of optimal tariffs. In a two-country voting model of electoral competition, we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically affect the electoral outcome in the other country. We show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare. Using this formulation we show that foreign influence increases aggregate world welfare when there are no other means of alleviating the externalities that arise from cross-border effects of policies. In contrast, when countries can engage in international agreements, foreign influence can prove harmful as powerful countries may refuse to offer concessions. We also show that power imbalances are particularly detrimental to cooperation when they are positively correlated with economic size.     

Does Trade Openness Promote Multilateral Environmental Cooperation?

This article puts forward a number of arguments why trade openness might promote multilateral environmental cooperation. Most of these arguments are grounded in the substantive self‐interest of the trading country. It tests the proposition using a range of proxy variables for general trade openness as well as specific export interests. The article examines whether countries open to trade are more likely to have signed three recent multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and are more likely to have ratified early on another three agreements with quasi‐universal membership. After controlling for income, political freedom and population size, the empirical estimations find some weak evidence in favour of a possible synergy between trade openness and multilateral environmental cooperation. World Trade Organisation membership as well as general export openness go hand in hand with greater willingness to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation in some cases. However, whether specific trade interests promote or hinder multilateral environmental cooperation depends on whether the relevant agreement is likely to threaten or accommodate the interests of exporting countries.     

TTIP – Probleme und Chancen

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is the most important trade policy decision that European leaders have faced in many years. The new generation of free trade agreements, including TTIP, aim at deep economic integration. Thus, they are essentially focused upon the removal or alignment of standards, regulations and administrative procedures that impede international trade and investment. Therefore, TTIP goes beyond the dimensions of traditional preferential trade agreements in the sense that it not only concerns tariffs and non tariff barriers to trade in goods, but it also concerns trade in services and the foreign investment environment. Regulatory cooperation under TTIP might thus well extend into core domains of public policy, including health and food safety or environmental regulation. Regulation, however, confers both benefits and costs to society. A proper assessment of TTIP must therefore also consider the benefits of regulation to society and must embed regulatory cooperation between the EU and US into a firm democratic framework. The potential of such an agreement is substantial, due to improved market access, regulatory cooperation and greater global reach, while the downside risk is limited. While some of the arguments critical of TTIP are justified, others seem rather excessive and seem intent on stirring up unnecessary anxiety among the population. An objective and constructive discussion is crucial to ensure that the needs of the population are heard during the negotiation process and that an agreement capable of achieving majority support can be concluded. The debate over TTIP has to consider not only the economic effects of increased trade but also the legal and political dimensions of the trade agreement.     

Do Trade Agreements Increase Food Trade?

In addition to multilateral trade agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO), the world has seen a remarkable proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the last two decades. This study investigates whether these multilateral and regional trade institutions increase food trade and bring the world into a freer flow of food. The gravity model of international trade is used for the empirical analysis. The model is developed in a large panel data setting and attempted to address some potential problems in the estimations including multilateral trade resistances, zero trade values and endogeneity. The results suggest that both the WTO and RTAs have delivered significant positive effects on trade among the participant countries, but not food. Only RTAs are found to have increased food trade among the participant countries. However, although on average the WTO is found to have negative implications on food trade, it facilitates the developing countries more than the developed countries.     

The Relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean

The EU is the second-largest trading partner (after the USA) of the Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC). The European Commission is presently in the process of negotiating association agreements with three Latin American regional trading associations, a result of the fact that the EU has traditionally preferred multilateral treaties to bilateral ones as a means of its international trade policy. These negotiations have proved to be very complex and progress is difficult. Will the two-yearly meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the EU and the LAC in Peru in May 2008 take place under the sign of a return to a policy with more emphasis on bilateral agreements? The recent agreement with Brazil seems to point in this direction.     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun: Reasons and Remedies

This paper first discusses four general developments in the world trading system that have made it increasingly difficult in recent years for nations to reach multilateral agreements aimed at further liberalising international trade, namely: (1) the increased technical complexity and disruptive domestic economic effects of the issues being negotiated; (2) the shift in relative bargaining power among the negotiating participants in favour of the developing countries; (3) the proliferation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements in contrast to multilateral agreements, and (4) the increased emphasis on achieving ‘fairness’ rather than reciprocity in trade liberalisation. Differences in negotiating positions of the participants on the major specific negotiating subjects of the Doha Round, such as new rules covering investment, competition policy, government procurement policy, and trade facilitation, agricultural liberalisation, changes in anti‐dumping and countervailing duty rules, the tariff‐cutting rule to increase access to non‐agricultural markets, and further liberalisation in the services sector, are then considered as well as the likelihood of reaching compromises on these matters. Finally, the possibilities of reaching acceptable balances of concessions and gains are considered for such key participants as the Group of 20 developing countries, the European Union, the United States and other industrial countries.     

Ethische Maßstäbe für gerechte Regeln des Welthandels

Transparent and fair trade agreements, supportive institutions, and greater political and civil participation are necessary to make sure that ongoing economic development – which is hugely accelerated by international trade – will not leave millions of people behind or ruin the planet. Multilateral trade agreements have the potential to strengthen cooperation between nations, to increase human wealth and well being, and to serve the global common good. In order to do so, they must be based on several principles of justice, such as procedural justice, transactional justice, needs based justice, equal opportunity justice and intergenerational justice. If these principles are successfully applied, multilateral trade agreements can be much more effective in serving the global common good than trade fragmentation, protectionism or mercantilism ever could.     

Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning

We analyze a three-country model of trade negotiations in which countries can form bilateral free trade areas, bilateral customs unions or a trilateral preferential trading arrangement, and can continue negotiating after reaching an agreement. In contrast to the literature on multilateral bargaining, the set of agreements can form a (nonpartitional) network, while in contrast to the network literature, players can reach multilateral agreements. Patient enough countries only reach bilateral agreements if insiders gain more than outsiders, which allows them to manipulate the status quo in subsequent negotiations. However, a hub and spoke pattern may then emerge, and insiders then dissipate the advantages of strategic positioning. We also use variants on the model to explain why a US commitment not to bargain bilaterally sustained progress at GATT negotiations, and the rarity of open access preferential trading arrangements.     

Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?

We analyze whether linking international cooperation in trade policy to environmental policy (or other issues with nonpecuniary externalities) promotes more cooperation in both policies, or whether cooperation in one is strengthened at the expense of the other. In the context of self-enforcing agreements, we show that if the policies are independent in the government's objective function, then linkage promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the policy that is easier to enforce under no-linkage. However, if the linked policies are not independent and if these policies are strategic complements, then linkage can sustain more cooperation in both issues than no-linkage. The policies are strategic complements only if (i) the production externality has cross-border effects; (ii) the weight on the externality cost is high; (iii) import competing lobbies are not “powerful”.