Towards a holistic framework of MNE–state bargaining: A formal model and case-based analysis

In this paper, we develop a holistic framework for MNE–state bargaining based on power-dependence theory. We contribute to IB theory by moving beyond a static, bilateral conceptualization of MNE–state bargaining towards a dynamic, multi-party framework. MNEs can shift the power balance in their favor by (a) reducing sunk costs from the investment, (b) improving access to alternative investments, (c) increasing the host government’s sunk costs, or (d) impeding the host government’s access to alternative investors and buyers. Subsequently, we apply our framework to the Venezuelan oil industry, identifying 12 MNE micro-strategies to achieve a sustainable power balance.     

Household savings and present bias among Chinese couples: A household bargaining approach

Family savings is crucial to long-term wellbeing for all members in a household, particularly in a Chinese context where costs of living increasingly shift from government to individuals. Savings are typically examined as a balance of financial behaviors and spending preferences; however, this study highlights how savings in a family context is also a function of relationship status. Drawing on intra-household bargaining models, we analyze data from the 2014 China Family Panel Studies to examine the extent to which men's and women's relative power in the household explain variation in savings levels across families. Our findings indicate that women's greater bargaining positions (e.g., income and assets) correspond with greater savings for the family. However, such bargaining power constitutes a net negative for family savings when women have both greater relational power and higher spending preferences. We suggest that family savings can and should be understood as an outcome of dynamic bargaining conditions in addition to income factors.     

Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model

In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example.     

A Model of Bargaining over Hazardous Waste Cleanup

We put forward a formal model of a bargaining problem in which two parties suspected of contaminating the environment are responsible for clean-up costs. If the parties do not negotiate an agreement on a cost allocation, one will be imposed by the government. This process is commonly used in environmental cleanups performed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). Passed by the US Congress in 1980 and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CERCLA provides the U.S. government with authority to manage releases (or threatened releases) of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment. We conclude that potentially responsible parties will be induced to settle only in the face of specific allocations of clean-up and explicit threats. For example, at the Middlefield–Ellis–Whisman Superfund site in Mountain View, California, the responsibilities of the different parties for soil and groundwater contamination are understood by all, yet our negotiation model predicts that without the threat that additional costs will be imposed, agreement on the allocation of clean up costs will never be reached.     

Strategic trade policy and union-firm bargaining agenda

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between duopolistic firms and unions in an open economy with strategic trade policy. It is shown that, in contrast with the case of the absence of export tax/subsidy, a right-to-manage (RTM) arrangement always emerges endogenously as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in agreement between parties. Moreover, such an arrangement may be also Pareto-optimal in both exporting countries in the sense that profits, workers' welfare (provided that union's power is sufficiently high) and social welfare as a whole are higher than the efficient bargaining (EB) arrangement. Moreover, since the government of the country in which there is EB (while in the other country the alternative agenda RTM is used) levies a tax on export, then the conventional result that under quantity competition it is always optimal for exporting countries to subsidise exports may be reversed.     

International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size

This paper analyzes how changes in the structure and environment of trade agreements between a small and a large country affect the efficient frontier of those self-enforcing agreements and hence, negotiation outcomes. Using the autarky punishment instead of the interior Nash punishment may provide the small country with greater bargaining power. Negotiating direct transfers under free trade instead of reciprocal tariff reductions improves the worst possible negotiation outcome for the small country. The existence of irreversible investment may strengthen (weaken) the small country’s bargaining power under the interior Nash (autarky) punishment scheme.     

Corporate Taxation of Heterogeneous Firms and the Welfare Effects of Labour Unions

This paper examines the welfare effects of powerful labour unions when the government levies a uniform tax rate – as is currently the case in most OECD countries – and firms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity. I show that an increase in the bargaining power of labour unions can decrease the welfare loss generated by restriction of the tax policy and provide conditions under which powerful labour unions decrease the likelihood that firms will move abroad. I also reproduce the well‐known effect whereby powerful labour unions decrease corporate tax rates if firms are mobile.     

The bargaining relationship between foreign mnes and host governments in latin america

The relationship between international firms and national governments can usefully be understood in terms of bargaining theory. This article develops an explicit model of the bargaining relationship, using the level of regulation as a measure of bargaining power. The model is tested with data from a survey of multinational enterprise subsidiaries in seven Latin American countries. The evidence supports hypotheses that (1) firms are less regulated when they are technology-intensive, when they operate larger scale affiliates, and when they export more from the local affiliate; and (2) firms are more regulated when they operate in larger countries and when they have a larger local market share. These findings demonstrate the importance of the government—business relationship as a multidimensional process and offer support for the explicit framework employed here.     

为什么我国劳动收入占比不断下降——一个基于权力（资源）结构和地方政府竞争的视角

中国宏观经济运行中产生了两个重要现象：工资增速远低于GDP增速和劳动收入在国民收入初次分配中的占比不断下降。究其原因在于：政府掌权了大多数资源和绝对的权力,导致分配偏向于政府和垄断企业;并且在以GDP为导向的地方政府竞争下,各地在产业选择时都偏向于发展资本密集型产业,从而提高了资本在国民收入分配中的谈判能力,导致企业的收入占比不断提高。     

Reciprocal Tariff Reductions Under Asymmetric Bargaining Power

Increasing heterogeneity of participants that form the basis of WTO trade negotiations has raised concerns about unfair treatment of weak countries due to their lack of bargaining power. The WTO responds to these concerns by arguing that the institutional design with its specific rules such as the principle of reciprocity serves to reduce inequalities in bargaining power by giving smaller (weaker) countries more voice. A recent study has challenged this result for a particular type of reciprocity, namely the volume approach. Given the wide discretion of how reciprocal concessions are conducted, I give a more complete picture of how different kinds of reciprocity affect the bargaining outcome of asymmetric countries. It turns out that, while the volume approach amplifies the negative effects of power asymmetries, a tariff formula approach has the ability to reverse this effect. For low symmetries, the Swiss formula does the best job, whereas for larger power differences, a linear formula is best suited to reduce the impact of power asymmetries.     

The effects of a “no-haggle” channel on marketing strategies

As sellers increasingly turn to multi-channel retailing, the opportunity to implement different pricing policies has grown. With the advent of the internet, many traditionally bargained products such as automobiles, jewelry, watches, appliances and furniture are now being offered online at a fixed pre-determined price. We explore the strategy of simultaneously offering two pricing formats (fixed and bargained) via two different channels (online and brick and mortar) and find that in a market where there are two types of consumers—those with a high cost of haggling and others with a lower cost—a dual-pricing strategy is optimal only when there are enough high haggling-cost consumers, but not too many, and when the haggling costs between the two types of consumers are sufficiently different. We also find that it is optimal for the seller to specify a higher-than-cost minimum acceptable price as the price floor of bargaining. By doing so, the seller increases the bargained price by complementing the salesperson's bargaining ability, and also softens the internal competition between the two channels. Finally, we find that, surprisingly, the dual-pricing strategy may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single price structure. The implications for consumer surplus are also explored.     

Tarifpartnerschaft — ein altes,aber gefährdetes Bündnis?

100 years ago, in November 1918, the Stinnes Legien Agreement was drawn up between various employers’ associations and trade unions. It included collective bargaining autonomy and collective agreements, the eight-hour work day and work councils. It soon failed, but served as a model for the legal regulation of collective bargaining relations after the Second World War. In the meantime, however, collective bargaining has declined significantly. Many employers are members of their associations without a collective agreement. At the same time, union memberships are declining. In view of increasingly precarious forms of employment, the government apparently needs to implement stronger regulations on collective bargaining relations again, such as the Minimum Wage Act. Finally, a look back: In 1918, editorial member Alfred Schmidt-Essen commented on the agreement from a current perspective. We document the article.     

Friend or foe: Customer-supplier relationships and innovation

This study provides an empirical investigation of the impact of customer-supplier relationships on firm innovation in an interorganizational framework encompassing transaction cost economics, resource dependence theory, and the theory of incomplete contracts. Using a sample of U.S. firms for the period from 1980 to 2005, this study explores how customer concentration and customer bargaining power affect a supplier's process innovation and product innovation measured with R&D-to-assets ratio and patents (also citations), respectively. The findings imply that a concentrated customer base, which reflects a strong customer-supplier relationship as well as high switching costs, motivates suppliers to invest more in R&D and become more innovative. However, the evidence also suggests that strong customer bargaining power creates hold-up problems and forces suppliers to invest less in R&D and innovation. The results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques that control for endogeneity and suggest heterogeneous effects of business partnerships on firm innovation.     

The effect of the Internet on international trade

We find that the Internet stimulates trade. Evidence from time-series and cross-section regressions shows a significant effect of the Internet on trade in recent years. Our results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the growth of web hosts in a country leads to about a 0.2 percentage point increase in export growth. For the average country in our sample, the Internet contributed to about a 1 percentage point increase in annual export growth from 1997 to 1999. We also find evidence of proximity-biased trade growth, i.e. that trade growth is lower for more distant countries, but we do not find evidence that the Internet has directly affected this bias. The evidence is consistent with a model in which the Internet reduces market-specific fixed costs of trade. In particular, we show that an Internet-related reduction in fixed costs is likely to enhance export growth. The model also shows that the Internet does not directly affect the relationship between distance and trade; however, to the extent that competition is enhanced as a result of its development, the Internet will increase the overall effect of distance on trade.     

Has Globalisation Affected Collective Bargaining? An Empirical Test, 1980–2009

We investigate whether globalisation has affected the nature of collective bargaining in OECD and emerging countries. The main innovations over the existing empirical literature are (i) the consideration of three distinct aspects of collective bargaining (union density, decentralised bargaining and the extent of government intervention), (ii) the reliance on a sample with a larger cross‐sectional and time dimension (44 countries from 1980 to 2009), and (iii) the application of a more appropriate empirical methodology (dynamic panel data models). We find that globalisation, on average, depresses unionisation but neither affects the degree of decentralisation nor government intervention in collective bargaining. We also uncover significant heterogeneity effects, both across countries and over time.     

Productivity, terms of trade and the ‘home market effect’

This paper analyzes the international transmission and welfare implications of productivity gains and changes in market size when macroeconomic adjustment occurs both along the intensive margin of trade (changes in the relative price of existing varieties of tradable goods) and the extensive margin (creation and destruction of varieties). We draw a distinction between productivity gains that enhance manufacturing efficiency and gains that lower the cost of firms' entry and of product differentiation. Countries with lower manufacturing costs have higher GDP but supply their products at lower international prices. Instead, countries with lower entry costs supply a larger array of goods at improved terms of trade. Output growth driven by demographic expansions, as well as government spending, is associated with an improvement in international relative prices and firms' entry. While trade liberalization may result in a smaller array of goods available to consumers, efficiency gains from deeper economic integration benefit consumers via lower goods prices. The international transmission mechanism and the welfare spillovers vary under different asset market structures, depending on trade costs, the elasticity of labor supply, and consumers' taste for varieties.     

贸易成本、异质性企业与扩大内需:理论框架与中国经验

扩大内需是现阶段稳定我国经济增长的关键因素之一。在现有异质性企业模型的基础上,本文通过建立一个异质性企业选择模型阐述了贸易成本对内部需求的影响机制。该模型表明贸易成本是影响企业国内外市场选择行为的关键因素,政府可以通过调节企业的相对贸易成本来实现扩大内部需求的目标。同时利用我国工业企业层面的数据,对模型进行了实证检验,检验结果符合理论模型的基本预测。     

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations — some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.     

Ownership Differences,Auditor Reputation,and Debt Financing: Evidence from China

This research examines whether “the paradox of auditor reputation” exists in China’s private debt market. Two types of hypotheses are developed to explain the “paradox” in terms of ownership differences. Our findings suggest: (1) by retaining big name auditors, non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) significantly reduce the cost of debt and lower financial constraints; (2) For the non-SOEs, the effect of auditor reputation on the cost of debt and financial constraints declines over time due to the accumulation of these firms’ own reputation; (3) SOEs are more sensitive to the interest rate of bank loans than their counterparts, implying their stronger bargaining power when negotiating with potential creditors than non-SOEs due to their government connections. However, SOEs’ government connections weaken the informational role of auditors and firm reputation on signaling debt market; and (4) Corporate governance is taken into consideration by creditors as an important indicator of solvency. Further investigation demonstrates that after controlling for firm size, operating cash flow, profitability and leverage ratio, the possibility of hiring big name auditors by the younger and median-aged group of non-SOEs is considerably higher than “elder” non-SOEs. Moreover, poor-performing SOEs have greater incentives to make use of their government connections in their bargaining for lower debt cost, as compared with their well-performing peers.     

Collaborative collective bargaining: Toward an ethically defensible approach to labor negotiations

In this paper I explain the present adversarial collective bargaining process (ACB) and then critique it on legal and ethical grounds. A new methodology, that I describe as the collaborative collective bargaining process (CCB), will then be explained and similarly critiqued. I argue that replacing the present ACB model with the CCB model will result in better long-term results for all parties concerned. This is because the ACB model is comparable, in many respects, to the adversarial process used in court litigation. It is a combat model based on power. ACB makes the battle lines clear, and it grants victory to the more convincing display of power, but it leaves casualties. Indeed it cannot operate except upon the casualties of the opposing party, and those casualties are the basis for ever-renewed combat. Tactics employed in ACB to achieve victory include deception, lying and the abandonment of truth as a moral value. I argue that, in sharp contrast, CCB can foster an environment which encourages candor and truthfulness. By following the CCB model, the parties can avoid the negative and self-defeating elements of ACB and can work together toward mutually beneficial goals by the use of an ethically defensible approach to labor negotiations. Frederick R. Post, J.D., M.B.A., is Assistant Professor of Business Law and Management at The University of Toledo. His research interests include business ethics and labor management relations. Professor Post teaches labor policy courses. Previously, he spent twelve years as a labor lawyer and has represented employers as chief negotiator in adversarial collective bargaining with many private sector international unions. He is the author of A Management Perspective on Collective Bargaining (1985) and Unionization Under the National Labor Relations Act: Organizing Through Collective Bargaining (1979).