Optimal trade policy with quality-differentiated goods

In this article we apply the model of vertically differentiated products to international trade. A foreign firm competes with a domestic firm in the latter's market, producing products of varying quality. We examine the nature of the equilibrium in this case, assuming the firms compete in prices. Contrary to the popular belief, we show that a protectionist policy of imposing a tariff on the foreign firm raises overall welfare in the domestic economy, as well as induces the domestic firm to upgrade the quality of its product, if it produces the lower quality product. Furthermore, if minimum quality standards are imposed on the foreign firm, the domestic firm upgrades quality, and overall welfare in the domestic economy is higher.     

Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?

This paper examines how the country-breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import-competing and foreign exporting firms. The contribution of the analysis is to show how firm-level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country-breadth. I show that a country-specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import-competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade. In contrast, a broadly-applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow-down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms. Because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm's adoption of new technology, the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed.     

The nonequivalence of tariffs,import quotas,and voluntary export restraints

This paper compares the equilibrium levels of prices, imports, production and consumption under a tariff, an import quota, and a voluntary export restraint when each trade restriction is set so as to lead to the same quantity of imports. Competitive, domestic production monopoly, import monopoly, and export monopoly cases are examined. Voluntary export restraints are shown to have different effects than import quotas or tariffs, especially when some potential exporters remain outside the agreements.     

Pareto-superior trade policy

Current literature shows the welfare superiority of ad valorem over specific tariffs or domestic governments facing foreign monopolists. This note establishes the stronger result that, for any given specific tariff imposed on a foreign monopoly, there exists an ad valorem tariff that Pareto dominates it - that produces larger profit for the foreign firm as well as larger tariff revenue and consumer surplus for the domestic economy. This Pareto ranking can be extended to the case of foreign Cournot oligopoly under certain market conditions.     

Price equivalent tariffs and quotas under a domestic monopoly

Price-equivalent import tariffs and quotas are compared when domestic production is controlled by a monopolist, say an agricultural marketing board with the power to restrict domestic supply, under endogenous terms of trade. Welfare comparisons boil down to sourcing costs comparisons. Quotas tend to dominate at high domestic prices, ad valorem tariffs at intermediate prices and specific tariffs at low domestic prices. Welfare maxima are achieved with more restrictive policies than under perfect competition. These results rationalize separate negotiations for sensitive products in the Doha Round and the setting of tariff-rate quotas that mimic import quotas for these products. Finally, in ascertaining the robustness of our policy ranking to the choice of variable anchoring the comparisons, we found that specific tariffs unambiguously dominate ad valorem tariffs and quotas when government revenue or imports anchor the comparisons. However, some quota revenues and import levels cannot be achieved with tariffs.     

STRATEGIC MANDATORY LABELING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALITY DIFFERENCE

This article examines the strategic use of mandatory labeling of biotechnology products, such as genetically modified food. A foreign dominant firm produces a biotechnology product and foreign competitive firms produce a conventional one. It is shown that if other trade measures such as tariffs are also available, the government of an importing country may impose mandatory labeling even in the case where there is no quality difference between biotechnology and conventional products. A combination of a discriminatory tariff on the biotechnology product and mandatory labeling shifts rents from the foreign dominant firm to the domestic economy.     

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges.     

Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?

This paper examines the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in a mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and foreign competition. Major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms?? move; secondly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and cost is symmetric, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the maximum-revenue tariff; thirdly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and the domestic firm is highly ineffective in production, under Stackelberg public leadership, the optimum-welfare tariff is low and then it is more possible that the optimum-welfare tariff is lower than the maximum-revenue one.     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.

     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.     

Ranking optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country under uncertainty

Optimal tariffs and quotas are compared for a large country under uncertainty. If the import supply schedule has constant elasticity and is subject to multiplicative uncertainty and domestic demand is random then the optimal policy is a fixed ad valorem tariff. If the supply schedule has constant elasticity but this elasticity is random then the optimal tariff is superior to the optimal quota. If the demand and supply schedules are linear then the optimal quota is superior to the optimal tariff if and only if the supply schedule is inelastic and the degree of uncertainty in the demand and supply schedules is small.     

Dumping in a Global World: Why Product Quality Matters

Anti‐dumping actions are now the trade policy of choice of developing and transition economies. To understand why these economies have increasingly applied anti‐dumping laws, we build a simple theoretical model of vertical intra‐industry trade and investigate the strategic incentives of exporting firms to undertake dumping. We show that the definition of dumping matters. Based on a comparison of low‐quality and high‐quality prices, only unilateral dumping by the low‐quality firm obtains. By contrast, the standard WTO definition leads to either reciprocal or unilateral dumping by the high‐quality firm, depending on cross‐country differences in incomes, the height of tariff protection and on exchange rate changes.     

The effect of the Uruguay round on the intensive and extensive margins of trade

Do tariffs inhibit trade flows by limiting the entry of exporters (‘firm extensive margin’) or by restricting the average volume exported by each firm (‘firm intensive margin’)? Using a gravity equation approach, we analyze how the decrease in tariffs promoted during the 90s by the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreement affected the trade margins of French firms for 57 sectors and 147 countries from 1993 to 2002. Our main contribution is to estimate the elasticity of trade on both margins, controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity of trade flows thanks to a three-dimensional panel and to time-varying tariffs as a measure of variable trade costs. Our results show that the number of firms exporting in a given sector to a given destination is related to the level of tariffs. But they also show that the decrease in tariffs induced by the implementation of the Uruguay Round did not lead more firms to export and that it only induced incumbent exporters to increase their shipments. We control for two problems that may affect our basic specification: tariff changes may be endogenous and zero flows are not included. Our results are confirmed — even when the extensive margin is significant, its magnitude is very small.     

The role of imports for exporter performance in Peru

Using highly disaggregated firm‐level customs data for imports and exports in Peru over the 2000–12 period, we explore the relationship between imports of intermediate inputs and firm export performance. The evidence shows that greater use, variety and quality of imported intermediate inputs are significantly correlated with higher export levels and growth, greater market diversification and higher export quality at the firm level, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Exporter–importers exposed to higher tariffs, and non‐tariff measures import less in total and exhibit lower import variety, whereas those using an advance customs clearance procedure designed to facilitate imports exhibit higher imports and a more diversified bundle of inputs.     

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

Skilled labor earnings differentials decreased during the trade liberalization implemented in Brazil from 1988 to 1995. This paper investigates the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements. We perform several independent empirical exercises that check the traditional trade transmission mechanism, using disaggregated data on tariffs, prices, earnings, employment and skill intensity. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill-intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was larger in skill-intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled earnings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade was even larger than the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization accounting for the observed relative earnings changes in Brazil. They also highlight the importance of considering the effects of differentiated pass-through from tariffs to prices.     

Codes of Ethics as Contractarian Constraints on the Abuse of Authority within Hierarchies: A Perspective from the Theory of the Firm

Abuse of authority is an unsolved problem in the new institutional theory of the firm. This paper attempts a double attack to this problem by developing a contractarian view of corporate codes of ethics. From the ex-ante standpoint the paper elaborates on the idea of a Social Contract based on Co-operative Bargaining Games and deduces from it the fair/efficient 'Constitution' of the firm endorsed by means of a well-devised corporate code of ethics. From the ex-post standpoint, codes of ethics are proved to be self-enforcing norms, by showing how they put at work the mechanism of a Repeated Game of Reputation within hierarchical transactions (firms) characterised by incomplete contracts and unforeseen events. To accomplish this task a theory of rationality in the face of unforeseen contingencies is sketched by working out the idea that the domain of a principle of ethics defines a fuzzy event, i.e. an event to which also the ex-ante unforeseen, unimaginable states of the world belong to a certain degree.     

Heterogeneous firm-level responses to trade liberalization: A test using stock price reactions

This paper presents novel empirical evidence on key predictions of heterogeneous firm models by examining stock market reactions to the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (CUSFTA). I derive testable predictions for a class of models based on Melitz (2003). Using the uncertainty surrounding CUSFTA's ratification, I show that the pattern of abnormal returns of Canadian manufacturing firms was strongly consistent with predictions related to export (U.S.) tariff reductions, but less so with predictions related to import (Canadian) tariff reductions. Lower Canadian tariffs did have an effect through the implied reduction in intermediate input tariffs, however.     

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition

A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.     

Absorptive capacity,learning and profiting from outward FDI: Evidence from Canadian firms

The extant literature highlights a threshold productivity level firms are required to attain ex-ante in order to successfully undertake FDI. The current paper extends this framework by modelling a threshold productivity range which is below the required threshold productivity level. Firms in this range can successfully venture abroad when learning allows these firms to rise above that threshold productivity level, ex-post. Theoretical models which predict negative profitability for firms which undertake FDI when below the required threshold productivity level are extended to incorporate learning, and negative profits during the transition path turn positive once productivity increases above the threshold productivity level. The hypotheses developed are tested using panel data on firms operating in Canada over the period 2000 to 2014. These firm-level data include measures of productivity, firm size, R&D intensity, and when firms undertake outward FDI. We demonstrate that firms which venture abroad while in the threshold productivity range and also have sufficiently high levels of absorptive capacity, proxied by R&D intensity, are able to learn from their foreign experience, and hence increase their productivity levels, ex-post.