金融机构多层委托——代理关系的道德风险模型分析

道德风险问题是我国金融业普遍存在的问题,许多金融案件的发生无不与金融从业人员的职业道德水平有关.而目前金融系统实行的多层级委托代理经营管理模式存在制度缺陷和道德风险隐患.     

银企关系中的道德风险成因与防范——一个博弈分析框架

银企信贷关系中存在道德风险,给银行和社会造成了诸多危害。本文在银企之间博弈分析的基础上提出建立和完善破产清算机制,建立和健全社会信用保障体系,降低银行的监督成本,推进利率市场化建设,都有助于道德风险的防范。     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.     

An Equilibrium Model of Asset Pricing and Moral Hazard

This article develops an integrated model of asset pricing andmoral hazard. It is demonstrated that the expected dollar returnof a stock is independent of managerial incentives and idiosyncraticrisk, but the equilibrium price of the stock depends on them.Thus, the expected rate of return is affected by managerialincentives and idiosyncratic risk. It is shown, however, thatmanagerial incentives and idiosyncratic risk affect the expectedrate of return through their influence on systematic risk ratherthan serve as independent risk factors. It is also shown thatthe risk aversion of the principal in the model leads to lessemphasis on relative performance evaluation than in a modelwith a risk-neutral principal.     

存款保险制度诱发道德风险的理论解析

存款保险制度的设计必须考虑到对市场约束、银行稳定性、金融发展和解决金融危机的影响,还要因地制宜地考虑一国的制度和契约环境。在没有解决好信息与监管环境缺陷的条件下,仓促实施显性存款保险制度将会后患无穷。本文对西方近年来的相关研究成果作一管窥,以期有助于中国特色的存款保险制度的审慎设计与适时出台。     

医保起付线对医疗服务利用和医疗费用的影响

本文针对医保起付线政策的作用机制,采用起付线变化的外生政策实验,利用断点回归方法,评估了降低门诊起付线对医疗服务利用和医疗费用的影响.研究发现,降低起付线使患者面对的平均医疗价格下降,医保报销费用显著增加,对于本文涉及的特定政策和样本而言,起付线下降1％,患者平均的医保基金支出增加约为2％,说明医保基金支出对于起付线变化的弹性可能比较大.但起付线政策对于健康需求程度不同的参保人有不同的影响,降低起付线对医疗费用处于较低和较高水平患者的年度医疗支出影响不明显,对于医疗费用处于中间水平且数量占比较大的患者群体有显著影响.此外,研究结果还表明,起付线一方面具有很强的控费作用,另一方面也能促进健康需求较低的参保人选择基层医疗服务.本文的研究发现对于设计和完善门诊统筹报销政策具有一定的政策含义.     

道德风险与信用担保:博弈论视角的分析

在信息不对称前提下，中小企业融资的主要阻碍之一就是极其严重的道德风险问题。在信用担保机构的介入下，部分地解决了中小企业的融资难问题，但信用担保机构也将会面临中小企业的道德风险问题。信用担保机构可以通过设立负激励机制来对出现道德风险的中小企业处以重罚，增加其违约成本，使其违约行为无利可图，甚至得不偿失；也可以采用正激励机制，来引导中小企业进行符合信用担保机构期望的投资。     

问题银行危机过程中的道德风险分析

本文运用经济学中道德风险普遍存在的观点,分析了问题银行危机过程中道德风险存在的客观内部因素和外部因素。同时结合中国实际情况,指出中国问题银行危机过程中道德风险存在有其特殊性,并结合国外处理问题银行的经验,提出了相关政策建议。     

道德风险与金融危机

不可否认,当前的金融危机给政策的面貌带来了翻天覆地的冲击.在一个接一个的国家里,我们看到政府恐慌地做出膝跳反射似的反应,并把他们的政策手册扔到一边:前所未有的救助和国有化开始出现,审慎的财政政策灰飞烟灭,毫无保留的凯恩斯主义已经回归.很多人宣称,我们尝试的自由市场已经失败,现在应该进行更广泛的监管和更积极的宏观经济管理.     

责任保险道德风险防范问题研究

本文主要研究责任保险的道德风险防范问题。首先,介绍责任保险的道德风险是如何产生的,以及该类风险的特点;其次,对责任保险中道德风险的常见表现进行分析;第三,指出主要责任保险险种的道德风险防范中所存在的问题;在上述分析的基础上,最后提出了包括强调损失补偿原则、完善侵权方面相关法律政策、甄别第三方索赔者的类型、提高法庭判决的公平性、提高业务员综合素质以抑制承保风险、合理设计责任保险合同条款等有关建议。     

基于次贷危机的金融道德风险探讨

本文以美国次贷危机为背景,通过分析危机中金融参与者各方的道德风险问题,得到金融体系的演进无法消除道德风险、监管部门要加强对道德风险的防范、完善制度是控制金融机构道德风险的关键、金融道德教育是消除金融从业人员道德风险的根本、建立新的国际货币体系是防范国家道德风险的必然要求等结论.     

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.     

金融资产处置中的道德风险

不可忽视的道德风险 经济学中的道德风险一般是指代理人为达到自己的目标而从事不利于委托人利益最大化的行为.比如企业的经营者不尽最大努力去实现企业的价值,或者虽然他们不做什么错事,但工作起来不十分卖力.这种行为既不构成法律和行政责任问题,股东又很难追究他们的责任,存在于这些经营者身上的是道德问题.道德风险存在于一切委托代理领域,代理人之所以能够背离委托人的目标,其主要原因是信息的不对称.     

Why Manufacture Offshore? An Empirical Analysis of Valuation Effects

In this study, announcements by U.S. firms of offshore joint venture manufacturing during the 1980s are used to provide more comprehensive evidence than past studies on the wealth effects of offshore joint ventures. Evidence shows that the target country's level of economic development and political stability, currency strength of the originating country (U.S. in this study) relative to that of the target country, U.S. firm's mode of entry, and the relative value of the U.S. firm's investment in the joint venture affect the wealth of U.S. firms which engage in offshore joint ventures. The target country's level of economic development, its political stability, and the currency strength of the originating country relative to the target country are shown to be the dominant economic factors. Of particular importance, evidence indicates that the target country's level of economic development is a more important determinant of excess returns than is its political stability.     

道德风险与监管缺失：美国金融危机深层透视

当前,美国遭遇"百年一遇"的金融危机,危机的中心华尔街危如累卵.五大投行中.贝尔斯登和美林证券相继被银行收购,雷曼兄弟申请破产保护,而剩下的高盛、大摩也因形势所迫转型为银行控股公司等一系列突如其来的"变故"使得世界各国都为美国金融危机而震惊.     

关于我国适当居民储蓄率的实证分析

近年来我国居民储蓄总额居高不下,且呈高速增长之势,而经济投资、生产却资金短缺,消费需求也严重不足,加剧了通货紧缩的局面。通过索洛模型和我国相关数据分析可以得出我国适当的居民储蓄率。     

On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard

This paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined.     

经济责任审计运行效果实证研究

经济责任审计以评价领导干部为主,在我国已经运行多年。根据经济控制论和免疫系统观,经济责任审计通过加强经济责任审计力量、强化经济责任审计执行力度和加大经济责任审计业务量,能够预防和惩治领导干部腐败,提高财政收支财务收支绩效。实证研究表明,经济责任审计力量越强,经济责任审计执行力度越大,越能够预防领导干部职务犯罪;审计人员数量越多,审计力量越强大,单位国内生产总值耗费的行政管理费越少。为了提高经济责任审计运行效果,应当构建经济责任审计监控体系。     

An Empirical Analysis on Log-Utility Asset Management

In this paper, we empirically verify the optimal portfolio schemes for the log-utility investor under incomplete information which converge to the optimal portfolio maximizing the expected log-utility under complete information. That is, our main interest lies in examining whether these schemes really attain the above desired properties, in the NYSE/AMEX stock market. With these properties regarded as performance measures, our empirical research is executed through a sensitivity analysis with transaction costs. Moreover, we show the interesting character of the U.S. stock market exhibited through the analysis.