Insider Trading and Voluntary Disclosures

We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price. In addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than for those initiated by other executives. Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards. We do not find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher litigation concerns associated with insider sales. Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is sufficiently low.     

Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of accruals. Using Bushee;s (1998) classification of institutional investors, we show that firms with a high level of institutional ownership and a minimum threshold level of active institutional traders have stock prices that more accurately reflect the persistence of accruals. This result holds after controlling for differences in the persistence of accruals between firms with high and low institutional ownership, and after controlling for other characteristics that are correlated with institutional ownership and future returns. Additionally, firms with low institutional ownership are smaller, less profitable, and have lower share turnover, suggesting that limits to arbitrage impede institutional investors from exploiting the seemingly large abnormal returns for these firms.     

Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures

A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences due to their effects on the manager's willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures.     

Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures

We examine the influence of investor sentiment on managers’ discretionary disclosure of “pro forma” (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases. We find that managers’ propensity to disclose an adjusted earnings metric (especially one that exceeds the GAAP earnings number) increases with the level of investor sentiment. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that, as investor sentiment increases, managers: (1) exclude higher levels of both recurring and nonrecurring expenses in calculating the pro forma earnings number and (2) emphasize the pro forma figure by placing it more prominently within the earnings press release. Additional analyses indicate that the association between investor sentiment and managers’ pro forma disclosure decisions at least partly reflects opportunistic motives. Finally, we find that managers’ own sentiment‐driven expectations also play a role in their pro forma disclosure decisions.     

Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures: Dynamic Interactions

Firms sometimes obtain soft private information about growth prospects along with hard information about current or past performance. In this environment, we find that optimizing disclosures over multiple periods yields nonlinear stock price reactions following both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Further, we derive several predictions about distinct short‐run and long‐run effects of disclosures and nondisclosures on security prices. Under specified conditions, when the volatility of the firm's earnings increases, the average contemporaneous and prospective post‐mandatory‐disclosure market premia (for voluntary disclosures over nondisclosures) rise, while farther‐in‐future market discounts (for such voluntary disclosures) also become larger. Our analysis moreover predicts that both the disclosure probability and the information content of nondisclosures can increase in the persistence of earnings.     

Intertemporal Dynamics of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures

While empirical evidence alludes to the intertemporal nature of corporate voluntary disclosures, most of the existing theory analyzes firms' voluntary disclosure decisions within single‐period settings. Introducing a repeated, multiperiod, disclosure setting, we study the extent to which firms' strategic disclosure behavior in the past affects their prosperity to provide voluntary disclosures in the future. Our analysis demonstrates that by voluntarily disclosing private information firms make an implicit commitment to provide similar disclosures in the future, and therefore are less willing to voluntarily disclose information in the first place. This effect is expected to be of larger magnitude for firms (1) with a long history of absence of voluntary disclosures and an impressive past operating performance, or (2) that operate in a relatively stable and predictable business and information environment, or (3) whose managers have a long time horizon and a high degree of risk aversion.     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

自愿性信息披露:信息租金与管制

自愿性信息披露是解决信息问题的重要手段, 对间接信息租金的追逐是经营者自愿披露信息的核心动机。单纯受利益驱使的自愿性信息披露必然存在一些问题, 因而有必要对自愿性信息披露进行有效的管制。建立基于声誉的经理人市场和法律事后惩罚机制, 有助于保障自愿性信息披露的信息质量。     

Voluntary Environmental Disclosures by Large UK Companies

Abstract:  This paper examines the patterns in voluntary environmental disclosures made by a sample of large UK companies. The analysis distinguishes between the decision to make a voluntary environmental disclosure and decisions concerning the quality of such disclosures and examines how each type of decision is determined by firm and industry characteristics. We find that larger, less indebted companies with dispersed ownership characteristics are significantly more likely to make voluntary environmental disclosures, and that the quality of disclosures is positively associated with firm size and corporate environmental impact. We find significant cross-sector variation in the determinants of both the participation and quality decisions. Furthermore, the manner of this variation differs between the two.     

Voluntary Causal Disclosures: Tendencies and Capital Market Reaction

In this study, we provide empirical evidence on whether voluntarily disclosed causal attributions made in management earnings forecasts are credible by investigating the conditions under which such attributions are made and the extent to which security price responses are associated with attribution existence. We find that causal attributions are more likely to be made when forecast news is bad (relative to good), and that the type of attribution made is more likely to be external (internal) for bad (good) forecast news. Incorporating the existence and type of attribution into models that explain announcement period three-day cumulative abnormal returns yields significant effects for attribution incidence and type after controlling for unexpected earnings and forecast type (e.g., point, range, etc.). Consistent with the idea that attributions enhance the credibility or precision of management forecasts, attribution disclosure enhances price reactions per dollar of unexpected earnings conveyed in a management forecast.     

Discussion of “Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals”

Collins et al. (2003, this issue) empirically investigate the relation between accruals mispricing and institutional ownership (IO), a proxy for investor sophistication. Their results show that accruals mispricing and IO are negatively correlated; less IO, more accruals mispricing. The authors attribute this differential in accruals mispricing to institutions' superior ability to price accruals either due to superior analytical ability or due to greater access to private information. While the research question is intriguing, a number of methodological limitations may limit the reliability and generality of the findings. In this paper, I discuss these limitations and offer ways of overcoming them, as well as identify a future research avenue in the area of mispricing.     

The Nature of the Interaction between Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures

This paper demonstrates the crucial role that firms' mandatory disclosures play in determining their voluntary disclosure strategies. It also shows how a firm's propensity for providing voluntary disclosures relates to various features of the mandatory disclosure environment and disclosure regulation. The special case of choosing between aggregated and disaggregated disclosures serves as an illustration of the model's applicability.     

Do Investor Sophistication and Trading Experience Eliminate Behavioral Biases in Financial Markets?

This paper provides an in depth analysis of an investor’s reluctance to realize losses and his propensity to realize gains – a behavior known as the disposition effect. Together, sophistication (static differences across investors) and trading experience (evolving behavior of a single investor) eliminate the reluctance to realize losses. However, an asymmetry exists as sophistication and trading experience reduce the propensity to realize gains by 37% (but fail to eliminate this part of the behavior.) Our research design allows us to follow an individual’s behavior from the start of his investing life/career. This ability makes it possible to track the evolution of the disposition effect as it is reduced and/or disappears. Our results are robust to alternative explanations including feedback trading, calendar effects, and frequency of observation.     

How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time

Using a sample of eight large commercial banks from 1994 to 2000, Jorion (2002) finds that banks' VaR disclosures for their trading portfolios predict trading income variability. We extend Jorion's findings using a larger sample of 17 banks from 1997 to 2002 reporting trading VaRs under FRR No. 48 (1997). We find that banks' trading VaRs have predictive power for trading income variability that increases with bank technical sophistication and over time. We find that banks' trading VaRs have predictive power for a bank-wide measure of total risk, return variability, and for two bank-wide measures of priced risk, beta and realized returns.     

Accruals Management, Investor Sophistication, and Equity Valuation: Evidence from 10–Q Filings

The release of the full set of financial statements in Form 10–Q provides investors with the data necessary to estimate the discretionary portion of earnings, thereby allowing them to better assess the integrity of reported quarterly earnings. We thus expect a negative association between unexpected discretionary accruals estimated using 10–Q disclosures and stock returns around 10–Q filing dates. Consistent with our expectations, we document a negative association between unexpected discretionary accruals and cumulative abnormal returns over a short window around the 10–Q filing date. Furthermore, this association varies systematically with investor sophistication. Finally, results from portfolio tests indicate that this association is economically as well as statistically significant. One interpretation of our findings is that accruals management has substantial valuation consequences, which are quickly impounded into stock prices.     

The Progression from Voluntary to Mandatory Derivative Instrument Disclosures – Look Who's Talking

The growth of derivative markets over the past decade suggests that many entities are using these instruments. The transparency of firms' exposures and their accounting treatment have become critical issues, particularly given the media attention to derivative-related losses by some high-profile corporations. This paper focuses on derivative instrument disclosures during a three-phase disclosure regime — pure voluntary disclosure (1992–94), coercive voluntary disclosure (1995–97) and mandatory disclosure (1998). The time frame provides an insight into firms' and regulators' responses to information demands by stakeholders. Increases in disclosure of information, even if incomplete, are particularly noticeable in 1995, the beginning of the coercive regime, and in 1998 when the disclosures became mandatory.     

Information Asymmetry and Voluntary SFAS 157 Fair Value Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies During the 2007 Financial Crisis

We hand‐collect SFAS 157 voluntary fair value disclosures of 18 bank holding companies. The SEC's Division of Corporate Finance likely targeted these entities in 2008 through their “Dear CFO” letters in which they requested specific, additional disclosure items. We collect disclosures that match the SEC recommendations and create eight common factor disclosure variables to examine the effect of such disclosures on information asymmetry. We find that disclosure variables about the use of broker quotes or prices from pricing services and the use of market indices and illiquidity adjustments are related to lower information asymmetry. However, disclosure variables about valuation techniques and asset‐backed securities are related to greater information asymmetry. We also document that disclosure complexity, and disclosure tone (uncertainty and litigious) is related to greater information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with criticism that corporate disclosures are voluminous; management may obfuscate unfavorable information which in turn increases market participants’ assessment of uncertainty associated with the fair value measures. We caveat that the setting of the financial crisis and a small sample size may limit the ability to generalize these inferences to other time periods or other financial firms.     

Discussion of “How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time”

Liu et al. (2004, this issue) show that technical sophistication and learning over time help improve the ability of bank trading portfolios' value-at-risk (VaR) disclosures to predict future trading income risk, and that trading VaRs predict bank-wide total risk and systematic risk. While the results suggest that VaRs are a reliable measure of risk for the sample firms, the study's incremental contribution is limited because of the nature of the sample firms and problems in variable measurement.     

When the Use of Positive Language Backfires: The Joint Effect of Tone,Readability, and Investor Sophistication on Earnings Judgments

Recent studies document that market participants react positively to the positive language sentiment or tone embedded in financial disclosures, and that investors’ reactions to negative news are more muted with poor disclosure readability. However, while language sentiment and readability co‐occur in practice, their joint effects remain largely unexplored. In an experiment with MBA students as participants, we investigate how the effect of language sentiment varies with readability and investor sophistication level. We find that language sentiment influences investors’ judgments when readability is low, but not when readability is high. Specifically, when readability is low, disclosures couched in positive language lead to higher earnings judgments for less sophisticated investors, but lower earnings judgments for more sophisticated investors. These findings show that the main effects of readability and language sentiment documented in prior studies have boundary effects, and may reverse when both variables are jointly considered along with investor sophistication.     

Voluntary Disclosures as a Mechanism for Defining Entity Status in Australian Not‐for‐Profit Organisations

This study examines managerial efforts to portray an entity's not‐for‐profit (NFP) status based on voluntary disclosure practices. The annual report text of 61 NFPs are analysed in accordance with Salamon and Anheier's (1997) NFP definitional framework. Results indicate a predominant application of the structural‐operational definition. Furthermore, the ‘organised’ attribute of this definition prevails over the ‘non‐profit‐distributing’ criterion that has been advocated by various parties. Standard‐setting bodies may want to consider: (1) NFP management perspectives in any revised NFP definition; and (2) greater clarity in conceptual framework and standard‐setting arrangements to improve overall transparency in NFP reporting practices.