Market share inequality,the HHI,and other measures of the firm-composition of a market

Data for individual markets suggest that the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index does not fully account for the inequality of market shares and the number of firms in a market. An empirical investigation is conducted to determine whether share inequality, number of firms, and major firm presence affect market profit rates independent of the HHI. The analysis controls for efficiency, among other things. Test results based on 1,684 banking markets during 1990–1992 indicate that the HHI, market share inequality, and the importance of major firms are positively related and the number of firms is negatively related to profit rates. Results on several other variables also suggest that market imperfections exist in local banking markets.     

Measuring Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

Competitive balance in sports leagues is essentially concerned with inequality in match and championship outcomes. Measures of inequality or concentration from the income distribution and industrial organization literatures have, therefore, often been used to measure competitive balance. This paper focuses on the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) applied to wins. It is shown that variation in the number of teams in the league affects not only the lower bound but also the upper bound of the HHI. An expression is derived for the upper bound and a normalized measure of the HHI, applicable to wins, is proposed. The differences this can make in practice when tracking variations in competitive balance over time are illustrated by considering Depken’s (1999) application of the HHI to Major League Baseball.      

Do Deposit Rates Cause Mortgage Loan Rates?: The Evidence from Causality Tests

This paper applies two familiar causality detection techniques to the issue of whether it is costs that determine prices or vice versa in the mortgage loan market. The question is posed in terms of causal priority: Are savings and loan deposit rates causally prior to mortgage loan rates or is it the other way around? For the time period prior to the onset of deposit interest rate deregulation, the evidence that emerges is consistent with the view that lenders raised their loan rates in response to higher deposit rates of interest. However, for the more recent period of deregulation, the evidence is not consistent with this view.     

Alternative Lending Channels and the Crisis in U.S. Housing Markets

To what degree has the development of alternative mortgage funding channels promoted the recent boom and bust in U.S. housing markets? Past research examined whether Alt‐A and subprime market shares are correlated with the housing bubble. This article expands the analysis to include the share of specific “alternative” lending terms and finds that the shares of interest‐only and negative amortization loans are important factors in explaining the housing bubble. This result suggests that research on the housing market bubble should focus on the impacts of loan contract terms rather than loan channel.     

Search Cost and Price Dispersion in Vertically Related Markets: The Case of Bank Loans and Deposits

Using data on marginal interest rates of loan and deposit products by Spanish banks, we find that the level of interest rates on loans (deposits) across geographic markets decrease (increase) with the number of banks in each market, and that the level of interest rates on loans increases with the level of interest rates of deposits. We also find that the dispersion of interest rates of both loans and deposits increase with the number of banks. This evidence is interpreted as evidence of customer’s search costs in retail banking, consistent with predictions from the Carlson and McAfee (J Polit Econ 91:480–493, 1983) model of market competition with search costs.     

Structure and Profitability in Banking Markets

We use the structure-performance model and regression analysis to investigate a number of analytical issues that often arise in evaluating competition in connection with bank mergers and that are generally relevant to mergers in other industries. Perhaps our most consistent and strongest finding is that the local market HHI is positively and significantly related to profitability. We also find that the number of organizations and the level of recent deposit growth may provide some additional information on the level of competition. Finally, several variables including market size, the number of large banking firms, deposits per office, and resident migration rates exhibit similar relationships to profitability in the bivariate analysis, suggesting that there may be some characteristic associated with market size, density, or attractiveness that is important for competition.     

人民币存款利率市场化改革的制度性的障碍分析

我国利率市场化已经进入本币存贷款利率市场化的关键阶段。目前我国人民币存贷款利率市场化主要面临财政赤字、银行风险以及投资与消费需求不足等三大约束。如果在此情形下贸然进行人民币存贷款利率市场化改革,则会恶化财政赤字、加剧银行风险和需求不足,甚至会引发金融危机。因此,必须消除上述约束,夯实利率市场化所需要的经济基础,稳健地推进我国人民币存贷款改革。     

Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas

Cournot models of oligopolistic interaction in forward and spot markets have shown that firms may sell forward for risk-hedging reasons only, or for both risk-hedging and strategic considerations. Using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas where we observe the number of players, spot and forward sales, churn rates and prices, this paper presents evidence that strategic reasons play an important role at explaining the observed firms’ hedging activity. Our test for strategic behavior is based on the theoretical relationship between the number of sellers and the incentives to sell forward: if risk-hedging is the only motive behind firms’ decision to sell forward, then hedging activity ought to decrease in the number of firms; otherwise, if strategic reasons are relevant, then firms incentives to sell forward should increase in the number of competitors.     

Analysis and design of microfinance services: A case of ROSCA

Rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) is a well-known microfinance association widely used in many countries around the world with long histories. By considering extra profits that such a system can provide when compared to banking transactions, we develop optimization problems to achieve an optimal design of a ROSCA. We find that ROSCAs might attract investors when deposit and loan rates from formal banking systems are not favorable. Furthermore, optimal rates and optimal orders to maximize system outputs are reported.     

Global corporate competition: Who's winning,who's losing,and the R&D factor as one reason why

This study summarizes the major changes over the period 1960–86 in the shares of world markets of the world'S leading American, European and Asian corporations based in 15 major industries. It relates the differential sales growth rates of the gaining and losing firms to national trends in industrial competitiveness, to employment change and to long-term returns to shareholders. One principal determinant of firms' global growth rates, and thence gains and losses in ‘world market share’, corporate research and development (R&D) intensity, is examined and tested on an 83-firm, six-industry subset of the overall data base. The proportion of corporate sales revenues allocated to commercially oriented R&D emerges as a, perhaps the, principal indicator of subsequent sales growth performance relative to competition over 5–10-year periods. Insofar as many U.S. and U.K. firms have lost global market share relative to Asian and European competitors over the past two decades, a significant contributory factor would appear to have been negligence on the part of many U.S. and U.K. firms of investment in technology as a factor determining strategic, competitive advantage.     

Does Local Competition Impact Interest Rates Charged on Small Business Loans? Empirical Evidence from Canada

Using a unique survey database of Canadian small business loans,we find a negative and statistically significant relation between the number of localcompetitors and small business loan rates. This result is robust to the presence of a wide varietyof covariates intended to proxy the effects of both loan specific details and individualcharacteristics. These findings further suggest that the local markets definition applied to small businessloans is still relevant, despite recent technological innovation such as internet banking.     

Do ICTs drive wealth inequality? Evidence from a dynamic panel analysis

Surprisingly, little is known about the cross-country effect of information and communication technology (ICT) on wealth inequality. At the same time, there is some tentative evidence suggesting that information and communication technology is positively correlated with income inequality. However, whether and how ICT affects wealth inequality is less explored, particularly because of the lack of reliable data on wealth inequality. This paper, therefore, fills this gap and contributes to this new literature by investigating the effect of ICT on wealth inequality in a sample of 45 developed and developing countries over the period 2000–2017. ICT is measured with six different indicators (including internet penetration, mobile penetration, ICT service exports, the ICT index, ICT quality, and ICT quantity), while wealth inequality is measured with three different indicators (comprising billionaire wealth to GDP, the Top 1% wealth share, and the Top 10% wealth share). The empirical analysis is based on the Generalised Method of Moments, and the results show that ICT increases wealth inequality. Furthermore, we show that democracy mitigates the increasing effect of ICT on wealth inequality. This result suggests that improving democracy in both developed and developing countries is an effective mechanism for mitigating the effects of ICT on wealth inequality. Therefore, we encourage efforts to implement democratic institutions that ensure respect for citizens' freedoms, greater democratic accountability, and executive constraints that allow for a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.     

Firms' knowledge‐sharing strategies in the global innovation system: empirical evidence from the flat panel display industry

This paper explores the relationship between firms' strategies to share knowledge with their innovation system and innovative performance. The empirical analysis showed that many firms designed strategies to share technological knowledge with competitors, and those firms that shared knowledge with their innovation system earned higher innovative performance than firms that did not share knowledge. In addition, firms that interacted with their global innovation system earned higher innovative performance than firms that interacted with only their national innovation system. These results should help managers and researchers understand how to devise technology strategies in globally integrated industries. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Note on Equivalent Fixed Rate and Variable Rate Loans; Borrower's Perspective

A common situation is where a borrower is offered the choice of two types of loans—a fixed interest rate loan for a fixed period or a variable interest (floating interest) rate loan. Usual wisdom and advice is that the borrower opts for the fixed rate loan if interest rates are anticipated to rise in the future or opts for the variable rate loan if interest rates are anticipated to fall. However, depending on the magnitude of the rates offered, and the rate uncertainty in the market, such wisdom may not always be well founded. This note demonstrates why this might be. It derives a readily usable, low-mathematical-background expression showing, for borrowers, when fixed and variable rate loans are equivalent and when one rate type is better/worse than the other.     

Strategic Investment under Open Access: Theory and Evidence

We examine the incentives of access‐regulated firms to invest in infrastructure facilities they must share with competitors. We show that investment incentives can be decomposed into a non‐strategic and a strategic part. The non‐strategic part implies that investment depends positively on market size. The strategic incentives imply that investment also depends on market composition, namely, the market shares of the facility owner and its competitors. Using a dataset of regulated electric utilities in the United States, we find evidence that transmission investments are indeed made strategically. Ceteris paribus, utilities are less likely to invest, and investment levels are lower, when competitors occupy a larger share of the market.     

Cellular economies of scale and why disparities in spectrum holdings are detrimental

Now that traffic volumes are increasing rapidly, the cost of expanding capacity has become a large portion of expenditures for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). This paper uses an engineering-economic model to show that there are strong economies of scale when expanding capacity, because an MNO with more spectrum benefits more from every new cell tower, and an MNO with more towers benefits more from every new MHz of spectrum. While it is technically possible to expand capacity by increasing either towers or spectrum holdings, we find that the cost-effective approach is to increase both types of assets at a similar rate. In the absence of countervailing policies, the big MNOs are well positioned to get bigger, in terms of spectrum holdings, towers, and ultimately market share. For policymakers, this economy of scale creates a trade-off between two important objectives: reducing the cost of cellular capacity, and increasing competition. This paper derives the Pareto optimal division of spectrum with respect to these two competing objectives, and shows that any Pareto optimal assignment will split the spectrum fairly evenly among competing MNOs. This is not simply a method of ensuring that there are many competitors; spectrum should be divided fairly evenly regardless of whether the number of competitors is large or small. A large disparity in spectrum holdings may yield poor results with respect to both objectives, i.e. the lower cost-effectiveness of a larger number of MNOs, and the lower competitive pressure of a smaller number of MNOs. One effective way to achieve a division of spectrum that is close to Pareto optimal is a spectrum cap, provided that this cap is set at a level consistent with other policies and policy objectives, including antitrust policy.     

Return, Risk and Cost of Equity for Stock S&L Firms: Theory and Empirical Results

This study examines the current deregulated environment for and the financial position of savings and loan associations. It is argued that in a less regulated, more competitive environment managers of savings and loan associations will have to become more proficient in using financial management techniques to assure the survival and the return to profitability of their associations. One aspect of financial management is a more careful estimation of and use of the cost of equity capital, especially for the increasing number of associations that have converted from mutual to stock organizations. Different approaches to the estimation of the cost of equity capital are discussed and monthly stock prices of 35 stock savings and loan associations are used to estimate representative costs of equity capital.     

The Influence of Fannie and Freddie on Mortgage Loan Terms

This article uses a novel instrumental variables approach to quantify the effect that government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE) purchase eligibility had on equilibrium mortgage loan terms in the period from 2003 to 2007. The technique is designed to eliminate sources of bias that may have affected previous studies. GSE eligibility appears to have lowered interest rates by about ten basis points, encouraged fixed‐rate loans over ARMs and discouraged low documentation and brokered loans. There is no measurable effect on loan performance or on the prevalence of certain types of “exotic” mortgages. The overall picture suggests that GSE purchases had only a modest impact on loan terms during this period.     

Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study

This paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the Japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing. The empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements. This implies that commercial banks in Japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations. However, the evidence does not support the view that Japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of Fried and Howitt (1980). Furthermore, the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts. These empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.