Mixed oligopoly, foreign firms, and location choice

We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms which are all profit-maximizing. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign private firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among the foreign firms. Regardless of n and m, agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We provide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social welfare. We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public firms, inefficiency of the public firm, and entries by private firms. We obtain some additional implications of welfare and equilibrium locations.     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

Corporate Entrepreneurship Activities through Strategic Alliances: A Resource‐Based Approach toward Competitive Advantage*

abstract Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) activities may significantly benefit from interfirm strategic alliances, although such benefits have not been sufficiently examined in the literature. In this paper, a resource‐based framework is presented to examine how strategic alliances offer entrepreneurial firms needed resources that may not otherwise be available. We argue that CE activities are likely to lead to resource gaps. We compare various options to fill resource gaps, and identify the pros and cons of the alliance approach. We then discuss the resource conditions that provide competitive advantage for a firm, if alliances are properly used to help implement CE. Finally, we examine how different types of alliance (e.g. joint ventures, R&D alliances, and learning alliances) facilitate various CE activities, including innovation, corporate venturing, and strategic renewal.     

Managing low‐skill workers: a study of small UK food manufacturing firms

Low‐wage work is of growing significance in the UK. This article tests the model of the low‐skills equilibrium (LSE) through a study of 27 small firms in a sector, food manufacturing, widely identified as being in an LSE. Three hypotheses are tested. (1) There will be a single, fixed equilibrium. We find more variety, reflecting the specific circumstances of firms. (2) An equilibrium is sustained by weak support institutions and a product market dominated by low value‐added goods. The expectation about institutions is supported, but the product market permitted some, albeit weak, opportunities to escape the LSE. (3) Skills will be low, and workplace regimes will be characterised by work intensification. Some firms were developing employee skills. Work intensification was rare, reflecting the absence of Taylorisation and the importance of face‐to‐face relationships. Overall, some firms had the will to escape the LSE, but weak institutional support and a ready supply of labour substantially reduced the incentives to do so.     

The impact of lead time on capital investments

We study equilibrium investment strategies of firms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures: investment with significant lead time (or time-to-build) and investment without (or minor) lead time. We investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time-to-build versus when it is not. We characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum. We offer some new results. The model predicts that, controlling for demand, and production and investment costs, investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries (which often exhibit time-to-build) than in fast-paced industries (where time-to-build is insignificant). Furthermore, for both investment types (investment with or without time-to-build) we offer a novel equilibrium in which firms incrementally invest. This behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints. Also, expected outputs are lower than Cournot outputs as firms face uncertainty. Moreover, the amount of uncertainty has different effects over investment types.     

Crossing the Threshold from Founder Management to Professional Management: A Governance Perspective

ABSTRACT We argue that the challenges faced by threshold firms are deeply rooted in governance characteristics (i.e. the incentives, authority and legitimacy) which imbue them with characteristic capabilities, disabilities and path dependencies. Whereas Zahra and Filatotchev (2004 ) reason the principal problem facing threshold firms relates to organizational learning and knowledge management, we posit resource acquisition and utilization to be equally important. Moreover, we argue governance theory is more able than a knowledge‐based perspective to explain the root causes of the learning and resource issues faced by threshold firms as well as the complex set of processes involved in their effective management.     

Acquisitions in the biopharmaceutical IPO market: Collaboration,competition and co‐opetition

The present paper explores the little studied area concerning the acquisition of recent biopharmaceutical initial public offering firms. We examine the nature of the relationship between the acquiring firm and the acquired initial public offering firm prior to the acquisition and from the perspective of the resource‐based view. We find to some extent that firm specific‐resources affect the prospect that the firm will be acquired. Furthermore, our findings show that firms with more of these types of resources are likely to be acquired by firms engaged in co‐opetition rather than by firms engaged solely in collaboration, competition, or (to a limited extent) with no prior relationship.     

Human Resource Systems and Ethical Climates: A Resource‐Based Perspective

We know very little about how ethical climates are built and the potential role of a firm's HR system in facilitating the development of this resource. The resource‐based view (RBV) of the firm suggests that human resource systems directly influence a firm's performance through the development of resources that are deeply woven in a firm's history and culture. How this occurs though has not been thoroughly considered in the research literature. Drawing on the theoretical insights from the resource‐based view of the firm, this article explores how HR systems can foster the development and maintenance of five types of ethical climates. In so doing, this article improves our conceptual understanding of why ethical climates may be seen as having strategic value for firms and how HR systems may influence that value. In addition, it contributes to theory by extending the domain of the resource‐based view of the firm by exploring its integration with the varied types of ethical climates. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

A differential game in a duopoly with instantaneous incentives

In this paper, we study a differential game in which two competing firms exploit a public renewable resource that is relevant from a landscape point of view. We consider a policy maker that provides an instantaneous incentive to the firms in order to prevent the resource exhaustion during the whole extraction period, which coincides with the harvesting license period. We compute an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential game, showing that it coincides with a linear feedback Nash equilibrium. Finally, we compute the value of the incentive that leads to the maximization of social welfare considering the incentive both as a pure transfer and as a cost.     

HRM configurations in Korean venture firms: resource availability,institutional force and strategic choice perspectives

To examine various human resource management (HRM) configurations and their explanatory variables, we generated several hypotheses and tested them with data collected from Korean venture firms. For these purposes, we first suggested two ideal types of HRM configuration: a control-based human resource system (CBHRS) and a high-performing human resource system (HPHRS). Depending on contextual variables, firms are expected to make a choice between the two or among their variants. To generate hypotheses, we employed three theoretical perspectives: resource availability, institutional force, and strategic choice. To test the hypotheses, we collected data from 464 venture firms in Korea. From the data, we derived five different HRM configurations: Cost-minimizing type; Paternalistic type; Inducement type; Investment type; and Transitional type. Both the Cost-minimizing type and the Paternalistic type are classified as part of the CBHRS, the Inducement type and the Investment type are considered to be part of the HPHRS, and the Transitional type is taken to be mixed. We found that all three theoretical perspectives partly explained the selection of HRM configurations. Some related issues are raised and discussed in the final section.     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty

The implications of different information patterns for firms in oligopolistic resource markets are considered. The traditional open-loop Nash equilibrium with static information sets is one of many possible Nash equilibria and is not suitable for stochastic environments. When shocks to resource growth are serially uncorrelated, there are no gains from conditioning the harvest on past stock levels and the feedback or credible Nash equilibrium is the appropriate Nash equilibrium concept. This credible equilibrium assumes that firms have knowledge of current stocks of reserves, which typically leads to more rapid extraction of the resource and possibly extinction. Since the open-loop Nash equilibrium is efficient when demand is iso-elastic and extraction costs are zero, it is clear that an increase in information can be detrimental to firms in the industry.     

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm's marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has argued that vertical integration is harmful because it allows an upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will "over-sell," producing more in equilibrium. By contrast, we find that with incomplete information, high-cost firms will often "under-sell" in equilibrium, that is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to integrate downstream, but this is socially harmful only for low-cost types. For high-cost firms vertical integration can be Pareto-improving, resulting in higher output, profits, and consumer surplus.     

External and internal labour flexibility in Spain: a substitute or complementary effect on firm performance?

The contingent perspective in strategic human resource management maintains that it is necessary to observe the interaction between human resource practices by encouraging external and internal labour flexibility. An issue still to be resolved is whether this fit leads to a complementary or substitute effect on firm performance. In order to contribute to this debate, we examine how the relationship between external labour flexibility and firm performance is moderated by the degree of internal labour flexibility. To do this, we use the Survey on Business Strategies of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade on a sample of 1,403 Spanish industrial firms. The results show the existence of a substitute effect between the two types of labour flexibility. Using them simultaneously does not lead to greater benefits for firms.     

Costly external finance,reallocation, and aggregate productivity

Empirical studies document that resource reallocation across production units plays an important role in accounting for aggregate productivity growth in the US manufacturing. Financial market frictions could distort the reallocation process and hence may hinder aggregate productivity growth. This paper studies the quantitative impact of costly external finance on aggregate productivity through resource reallocation across firms with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. A partial equilibrium model calibrated to the US manufacturing data shows that costly external finance causes inefficient output reallocation from high productivity firms to low productivity firms and as a result leads to a 1 percent loss in aggregate TFP.     

Corporate governance and lesbian,gay, bisexual,and transgender‐supportive human resource policies from corporate social responsibility,resource‐based,and agency perspectives

Corporate boards are responsible for ensuring that managers enact policies that are in shareholders' best interests, and managers are responsible for implementing strategies that are not only profitable but also responsive to changing legal and societal demands and the resource needs of the firm. In this paper, we use the theoretical lenses of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the resource‐based view, and agency theory to investigate the relationship between corporate governance structure and the implementation of supportive lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) policies. We analyze 10,233 firm‐year observations and 1,594 unique firms, and our results demonstrate that LGBT‐supportive policies are positively associated with firm performance. We also offer new insight into why not all firms adopt such policies. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that increased board independence, and our difference‐in‐difference estimation shows that firms forced to raise board independence in 2002 were less likely to invest in LGBT‐supportive policies. Results suggest that human resource management (HRM) policies can be guided by CSR and resource‐based views in the pursuit of wealth maximization, but agency conflict may also be a concern for external majority boards. We discuss implications for HRM research practice and corporate governance regarding LGBT policies in organizations.     

Lost and Found in Translation: How Firms Use Anisomorphism to Manage the Institutional Complexity of CSR

Prior research on the internationalization of firms from emerging countries has fruitfully invoked institutional theory to emphasize the legitimacy benefits that firms that obtain from showing isomorphism with international norms such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Without denying the intuitive appeal for these firms to communicate acceptance of CSR, we suggest that firms face a legitimacy trade-off, where the hoped-for legitimacy benefits of isomorphism must be weighed against other home-country institutional considerations. We advance and test this notion that firms will navigate this institutional complexity by engaging in anisomorphism, i.e., espousing general acceptance with international values but with selective ‘translation’ based on home country differences. We test our predictions by analysing firms' communication of CSR, using a unique dataset comprised of 245 firms observed over the period from 2000 to 2018. Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms from countries more reliant on natural resource extraction (e.g., mining and fossil fuel industries) de-emphasize the environmental component of CSR, and firms from more autocratic countries de-emphasize the human rights component of CSR. Additionally, and consistent with our presumption of firms' weighing the international versus home-country legitimacy trade-off, we find that these main effects are sensitive to changes in firms' levels of internationalization.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

Do external diversity practices boost focal firm performance? The case of supplier diversity

Based on the resource-based view, we propose that external diversity practices such as supplier diversity may affect firm performance. We find that the relationship between supplier diversity and short-term performance (i.e. productivity) is moderated by context such that firms in declining industries experience positive productivity effects while firms in munificent industries witness negative effects. For longer-term profitability (i.e. Tobin's q), we do not find support for a positive relationship between supplier diversity and long-term performance. However, positive supplier diversity effects emerge in munificent environments. Overall, in support of the strategic human resource management approach, we conclude that the effect of external supplier diversity on firm performance is contingent upon environmental munificence, which documented the necessity to include supplier diversity as a relevant component of a comprehensive diversity and equality management system.     

Cross-ownership as a hostage exchange to support collaboration

The impossibility of writing complete contracts causes loss of profitable transactions among firms, since their managers cannot ex ante bind themselves to future actions. We show how a reallocation of ownership rights into a network of mutual shareholdings among a coalition of firms produces an efficient enforcement mechanism. Co-operation is achieved by exchanging control rights until a mutual threat of capture of control is established. By making control over their firms vulnerable to a takeover by the other members of the coalition, each firm is able to make a credible commitment to future efficient actions. In equilibrium no punishment is administered, so that the arrangement achieves the outcome under complete contracts. More generally, it is proved that a mutual hostage exchange may dominate the threat of loss of reputation as an enforcement mechanism.