Second‐Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs

This paper studies equilibria of second‐price auctions in independent private value environments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for submitting a bid, and nonmonotonic equilibria in which a lower participation cost results in a higher cutoff. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the monotonic equilibrium is unique for either concave distribution functions or strictly convex distribution functions with nonincreasing reverse hazard rates. There exist nonmonotonic equilibria when the distribution functions are strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limiting properties of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.     

A Comparison of Pay‐As‐Bid and Market‐Clearing Price Bidding Processes in Electric Utility Auctions

As the electric utility industry moves to Regional Transmission Organizations, there are more opportunities for merchant plants in selling wholesale energy to electric utilities. Two alternative bidding regimes are considered: (i) pay‐as‐bid and (ii) pay with market‐clearing bid. With stochastic price‐sensitive demand, we show that pay‐as‐bid has greater average price, but lower price variance than does market‐clearing price. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Signaling in Takeover Auctions with Flexible Reserve Price

This paper develops a model of takeover auctions with a two‐step information acquisition process. It shows that the threat of extra information acquisition allows the existence of the signaling jump‐bidding equilibrium even when the seller is able to change its reserve price on the basis of the bidding history. The paper shows that although a higher cost of the secondary information leads to a higher expected price, the precision of the preliminary information has an ambiguous effect on the target's expected profit and that such an effect depends on the number of potential acquirers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

A buyer needs to procure a good from one of two suppliers offering differentiated products and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and (ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a first score auction. Our main result is that the more significant is each supplier's private information on the own cost, the less information the buyer should reveal. We also examine the buyer's incentives to make untruthful announces.     

具有异质性非参数时间趋势的面板数据模型的估计

本文为一类具有异质性非参数时间趋势的面板数据模型提出了一种简单估计方法。基于局部多项式回归的思想,首先去除数据中的时间趋势成分,然后由最小二乘法来估计公共系数,同时得到时间趋势函数的非参数估计。在一些正则条件下,研究了这些估计量的渐近性质,即在时间维度T和横截面维度n同时趋向无穷时,建立了各个估计量的渐近相合性和渐近正态性。最后通过蒙特卡洛模拟,考查了这种估计方法的有限样本性质。     

First‐year donation behavior and risk of supporter lapse

• In this research, we explore supporter lapse behavior after making first‐year donations to a nonprofit organization. We argue that two observable variables — the monetary amount of first gift at sign‐up and the number of gifts given in the first year of the support relationship — can be used to approximate the level of commitment to supporting the organization and to predict likelihood of lapse in subsequent years. The reasoning is that the two variables are indications of the psychological resources as well as the financial resources expended in reaching donation decisions. The research hypotheses were tested using fundraising data extracted from the databases of two leading US‐based nonprofit organizations. Results indicate that both variables had significant effects. Interestingly, the number of gifts given in the first year of the support relationship had a much bigger effect than the dollar amount of the gift at sign‐up: In one organization, supporters who donated more than one gift in the first year were 39% less likely to lapse in subsequent years compared with their one‐gift counterparts, while a tenfold increase in the dollar amount of the first gift at sign‐up (e.g., from $10 to $100) predicted only 4% decrease in the lapse likelihood in subsequent years. Insights from this research may help to build better practices of supporter base management in “low‐touch” fundraising programs for attracting, building relationships with, and sending appeals to supporters.

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing Practices of Resellers in the Airline Industry: Posted Price vs. Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Models

I find that when a reseller with market power serves an airline company and only linear contracts are feasible, the airline prefers that the reseller utilizes the Name‐Your‐Own‐Price (NYOP) (a la Priceline) instead of the Posted Price (PP) (a la Hotwire) model. Essentially, the airline can better extract the surplus of the reseller if power over pricing is in the hands of numerous consumers, each bidding according to her preferences, instead of being concentrated in the hands of the reseller. Introducing two part tariff contracts or competition among resellers eliminates the distinction between the two pricing models. Either form of pricing generates the same outcome as vertical integration of the airline with the downstream market of resellers.     

GMM Estimation with Non‐causal Instruments*

This note provides a warning against careless use of the generalized method of moments (GMM) with time series data. We show that if time series follow non‐causal autoregressive processes, their lags are not valid instruments, and the GMM estimator is inconsistent. Moreover, endogeneity of the instruments may not be revealed by the J‐test of overidentifying restrictions that may be inconsistent and has, in general, low finite‐sample power. Our explicit results pertain to a simple linear regression, but they can easily be generalized. Our empirical results indicate that non‐causality is quite common among economic variables, making these problems highly relevant.     

Price Discrimination in Two‐Sided Markets

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination (PD) in two‐sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one‐sided models and uniform prices in two‐sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect PD, relative to uniform prices in a two‐sided market. The conventional wisdom from one‐sided horizontally differentiated markets is that PD hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that PD, in a two‐sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that PD is good for competition based on one‐sided markets may not carry over to two‐sided markets.     

The Identification of a Mixture of First‐Order Binary Markov Chains*

Let S be the number of components in a finite discrete mixing distribution. We prove that the number of waves of panel being greater than or equal to 2S is a sufficient condition for global identification of a dynamic binary choice model in which all the parameters are heterogeneous. This model results in a mixture of S binary first‐order Markov Chains.     

Estimation in monotone single‐index models

Single‐index models are popular regression models that are more flexible than linear models and still maintain more structure than purely nonparametric models. We consider the problem of estimating the regression parameters under a monotonicity constraint on the unknown link function. In contrast to the standard approach of using smoothing techniques, we review different “non‐smooth” estimators that avoid the difficult smoothing parameter selection. For about 30 years, one has had the conjecture that the profile least squares estimator is an ‐consistent estimator of the regression parameter, but the only non‐smooth argmin/argmax estimators that are actually known to achieve this ‐rate are not based on the nonparametric least squares estimator of the link function. However, solving a score equation corresponding to the least squares approach results in ‐consistent estimators. We illustrate the good behavior of the score approach via simulations. The connection with the binary choice and current status linear regression models is also discussed.     

GMM Estimation with Non‐causal Instruments under Rational Expectations*

Lanne and Saikkonen [Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (2011a) Vol. 73, pp. 581–592], show that the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is inconsistent, when the instruments are lags of variables that admit a non‐causal autoregressive representation. This article argues that this inconsistency depends on distributional assumptions, that do not always hold. In particular under rational expectations, the GMM estimator is found to be consistent. This result is derived in a linear context and illustrated by simulation of a nonlinear asset pricing model.     

Correcting Standard Errors in Two‐stage Estimation Procedures with Generated Regressands*

Feenstra and Hanson [NBER Working Paper No. 6052 (1997)] propose a procedure to correct the standard errors in a two‐stage regression with generated dependent variables. Their method has subsequently been used in two‐stage mandated wage models [Feenstra and Hanson, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1999) Vol. 114, pp. 907–940; Haskel and Slaughter, The Economic Journal (2001) Vol. 111, pp. 163–187; Review of International Economics (2003) Vol. 11, pp. 630–650] and for the estimation of the sector bias of skill‐biased technological change [Haskel and Slaughter, European Economic Review (2002) Vol. 46, pp. 1757–1783]. Unfortunately, the proposed correction is negatively biased (sometimes even resulting in negative estimated variances) and therefore leads to overestimation of the inferred significance. We present an unbiased correction procedure and apply it to the models reported by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Haskel and Slaughter (2002) .     

Tacit Collusion in a One‐Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints

This paper analyzes price competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two‐stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short‐term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game, that is, the unique payoff‐dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on price competition and that of the convex cost function.     

Estimation of linear dynamic panel data models with time‐invariant regressors

We present a sequential approach to estimating a dynamic Hausman–Taylor model. We first estimate the coefficients of the time‐varying regressors and subsequently regress the first‐stage residuals on the time‐invariant regressors. In comparison to estimating all coefficients simultaneously, this two‐stage procedure is more robust against model misspecification, allows for a flexible choice of the first‐stage estimator, and enables simple testing of the overidentifying restrictions. For correct inference, we derive analytical standard error adjustments. We evaluate the finite‐sample properties with Monte Carlo simulations and apply the approach to a dynamic gravity equation for US outward foreign direct investment.     

Bayesian Estimation of Willingness‐to‐pay Where Respondents Mis‐report Their Preferences*

We introduce a modified conditional logit model that takes account of uncertainty associated with mis‐reporting in revealed preference experiments estimating willingness‐to‐pay (WTP). Like Hausman et al. [Journal of Econometrics (1988) Vol. 87, pp. 239–269], our model captures the extent and direction of uncertainty by respondents. Using a Bayesian methodology, we apply our model to a choice modelling (CM) data set examining UK consumer preferences for non‐pesticide food. We compare the results of our model with the Hausman model. WTP estimates are produced for different groups of consumers and we find that modified estimates of WTP, that take account of mis‐reporting, are substantially revised downwards. We find a significant proportion of respondents mis‐reporting in favour of the non‐pesticide option. Finally, with this data set, Bayes factors suggest that our model is preferred to the Hausman model.     

Instability of the Inflation–Output Trade‐Off and Time‐Varying Price Rigidity

This paper studies the time instability of the Phillips curve by paying particular attention to the inflation environment and price stickiness. We identify various inflation episodes and investigate the changing nature of the curve across these periods for five advanced countries over 1960–2013. We show that the mean inflation, the slope of the curve and the threshold mean inflation that erodes price rigidity are time varying. The inflation environment is a key determinant of the inflation–output relationship, rejecting the evidence of a flat curve and restoring the inflation–output trade‐off above certain inflation thresholds.     

Estimation and testing of crossing‐points in fixed design regression

Many phenomena in the life sciences can be analyzed by using a fixed design regression model with a regression function m that exhibits a crossing‐point in the following sense: the regression function runs below or above its mean level, respectively, according as the input variable lies to the left or to the right of that crossing‐point, or vice versa. We propose a non‐parametric estimator and show weak and strong consistency as long as the crossing‐point is unique. It is defined as maximizing point arg max of a certain marked empirical process. For testing the hypothesis H₀ that the regression function m actually is constant (no crossing‐point), a decision rule is designed for the specific alternative H₁ that m possesses a crossing‐point. The pertaining test‐statistic is the ratio max/argmax of the maximum value and the maximizing point of the marked empirical process. Under the hypothesis the ratio converges in distribution to the corresponding ratio of a reflected Brownian bridge, for which we derive the distribution function. The test is consistent on the whole alternative and superior to the corresponding Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, which is based only on the maximal value max. Some practical examples of possible applications are given where a certain study about dental phobia is discussed in more detail.