Mixed oligopoly,endogenous timing and mergers

The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.     

R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location

Antidumping Jumping: Reciprocal Antidumping and Industrial Location. — Antidumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. The authors investigate the impact of antidumping rules on firms’ production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Antidumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. The authors therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through antidumping legislation. The analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.     

Trade and Tax Reforms in a Cash‐in‐Advance Economy

We examine the effects of both tariff‐only and coordinated trade‐tax reforms on market access, government revenue, and welfare for a small monetary economy, under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash held in advance. We show that if the cash requirement ratio in the exportable sector is greater than that in the importable, then, contrary to previous results, (i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access, (ii) tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged may be more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs, and (iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged may be welfare deteriorating.     

Industrial concentration, price-cost margins, and innovation

This paper explores a panel data set matching establishment-based production statistics from Japan's Census of Manufacturers with wholesale price indices from the Bank of Japan, and Herfindahl indices from the Japan Fair Trade Commission. The data include annual observations over the period 1961-1990, for 74 industries at the four-digit s.i.c. level. I estimate Cobb-Douglas production functions and Solow residuals for each industry and then use these estimates to further analyze the determinates of industrial concentration and innovation. The industries having great capital intensity and small employment of labor tend to be more concentrated. Cross-section estimates reveal a U-shaped mapping from concentration to innovation.     

Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

Sunk costs, firm size and internationalization

Sunk Costs, Firm Size, and Internationalization. — One strand of the industrial organization literature argues that outlays on sunk costs are endogenous in market expansion, implying an adaptive adjustment by firms to preserve their market share. A different view is taken in the literature on firms’ internationalization. Here it is argued that sunk costs in firm-specific assets, such as R&;D and marketing, are necessary in order to grow and gain market shares. The empirical analysis supports the internationalization hypothesis. In addition, we also provide evidence that even though larger firms incur higher sunk costs, they do so at a diminishing rate.     

Party Politics,Governors, and Economic Policy

In this article, we evaluate the role of elections in governors' state tax policy making. Does it matter for state taxes whether the governor is a Democrat or Republican and whether she is eligible for re‐election or faces a binding term limit? Using a Regression Discontinuity Design and a panel of U.S. states, we find that the manner in which governors of different parties implement different tax policies turns crucially on the incumbent's eligibility for re‐election. Re‐electable Democratic governors increase income taxes relative to similarly situated Republicans, yielding divergence between party policy positions. However, governors facing a binding term limit exhibit the reverse policy difference, resulting in a movement of policy back together.     

Childbearing Age,Family Allowances,and Social Security

Although the optimal public policy under an endogenous number of children has been widely studied, the optimal public intervention under an endogenous timing of births has remained largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy when the timing of births is chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility weakens future earnings. We analyze the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, under distinct informational environments. Endogenous childbearing ages is shown to affect the optimal policy through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the internalization of fertility externalities. Contrary to common practice, children benefits differentiated according to the age of parents can be part of the optimal family policy. Our results are robust to introducing: (i) children as durable “goods”; (ii) education choices; (iii) varying total fertility.     

Factor shares,inequality, and capital flows

I present an endogenous growth model where innovations are factor saving and model the choice of technologies in an Overlapping Generations framework. Markets are competitive and factor prices are determined by marginal productivity of factors; therefore, the income share of reproducible factors increases with the stage of development. Beyond the standard results of this type of model I find that (i) without bequests long‐run growth is not possible, (ii) if the economy presents long‐run growth then intrageneration inequality may last forever but if the economy does not present long‐run growth then in steady state, there is no intrageneration inequality, (iii) when the economy is open, the pattern of capital flows depends not only on the relative abundance of factors but also on the technologies and, for this reason, capital may not flow from rich to poor economies, and (iv) consistently, capital flows may not help to break poverty traps.     

Institutions, wages, and inequality: The case of Europe and its periphery (1500–1899)

This paper explores the long-run relationship between institutions and wage outcomes in Europe and its periphery. I find that cities that exercised stronger institutional protection of private property experienced: (i) higher levels of both skilled and unskilled real wages, as well as (ii) lower levels of inequality as measured by the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. While the first result corroborates existing work on the positive growth effects of better institutions, the second finding is more novel to the literature. Some explanations are proposed for how stronger institutions can cause an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers, thus lowering wage inequality.     

Institutions and the rise of taxes on labour in the OECD

Institutions and the Rise of Taxes on Labour in the OECD. —The aim of this paper is to explain differences among OECD countries in the evolution of taxes on labour during the last two decades. Its main message is that these taxes are to an important extent structurally and institutionally determined. Tax rates on labour are shown to have risen more strongly in countries where: (i) government has been controlled mainly by leftist parties; (ii) taxes (in general) are decided and collected mainly by central government (fiscal centralization); (iii) coalition and minority governments are frequent; (iv) the partisan composition (political colour) of these coalitions is unstable; (v) the labour market is neither centralized nor decentralized.     

Sales and Firm Entry: The Case of Wal‐Mart

Temporary price reductions or “sales” have become increasingly important in the evolution of the price level. We present a model of repeated price competition to illustrate how entry causes incumbents to alternate between high and low prices. Using a six‐year panel of weekly observations from a grocery chain, we find that individual stores employ more sales as the distance to Wal‐Mart falls. Moreover, the increase in the frequency of sales was concentrated on the most popular products, suggesting the use of a loss‐leader strategy.     

Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states

We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor's party. In the states with the line‐item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line‐item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.     

Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The paper investigates the optimal research and development (R&D) policy in a vertically differentiated market with managerial delegation. We consider not only discriminatory R&D policy but uniform R&D policy as well. It shows that R&D policy can vary depending on the regulator's objective: social welfare, consumer surplus or producer surplus; however, the outcomes are invariant to the nature of market competition. Undoubtedly, the relative‐performance contract plays a crucial role for elaborating policy effects. The government prefers discriminatory R&D policy to uniform policy under a consumer‐oriented objective. On the contrary, under a producer‐oriented objective, the government would prefer to choose uniform R&D policy rather than discriminatory policy.     

Sustainability and comovement of government debt in EMU Countries: A panel data analysis

We investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 19 European Monetary Union (EMU) countries over the period 1970–2016. Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-section dependence show that the government debt series is stationary, indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for these countries. This confirms the effectiveness of the austerity measures implemented by these member states. Moreover, an unobserved common factor drives the comovement of government debt in the Eurozone.     

Product market competition, unemployment and income disparities

Product Market Competition, Unemployment and Income Disparities. — We discuss how promoting competition in product markets affects unemployment and wage differentials. We examine a general equilibrium model with real wage rigidities in labor markets and market power in product markets. We illustrate how more intense competition reduces unemployment. A decrease of markups would induce an increase of real wages if real wages were flexible. This enables the employment of more low-skilled people above a real reservation wage. More intensive competition, however, widens wage and income differences between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Differences of income distributions across countries could also be caused by differences in the intensity of product market competition.     

从CLM图分析信用危机

本文对企业商品广告与企业公共关系广告策略选择进行比较 ,阐述了在运用时应遵循的基本原则和要求。     

Fertility decline and the heights of children in Britain, 1886–1938

In this paper we argue that the fertility decline that began around 1880 had substantial positive effects on the health of children, as the quality–quantity trade-off would suggest. We use microdata from a unique survey from 1930s Britain to analyse the relationship at the household level between the standardised heights of children and the number of children in the family. Our results suggest that heights are influenced positively by family income per capita and negatively by the number of children or the degree of crowding in the household. The evidence suggests that family size affected the health of children through its influence on both nutrition and disease. Applying our results to long-term trends, we find that rising household income and falling family size contributed significantly to improving child health between 1886 and 1938. Between 1906 and 1938 these variables account for 40% of the increase in heights, and much of this effect is due to falling family size. We conclude that the fertility decline is a neglected source of the rapid improvement in health in the first half of the twentieth century.     

营销渠道一体化程度的选择——从渠道评价标准和交易成本角度分析

本文从生产制造企业的视角，对如何合理安排营销渠道结构进行研究。我们首先运用营销渠道评价标准评价不同一体化程度下渠道功能的表现，以此来说明一体化营销渠道的优劣势。然后，通过援引交易成本分析理论，更加精细的给出营销渠道不同程度一体化的选择条件。最后，给出交易成本分析与渠道评价标准的关系。