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1.
We compare emissions taxes and quotas when a (strategic) regulator and (non-strategic) firms have asymmetric information about
abatement costs, and all agents use Markov perfect decision rules. Firms make investment decisions that affect their future
abatement costs. For general functional forms, firms’ investment policy is information-constrained efficient when the regulator
uses a quota, but not when the regulator uses an emissions tax. This advantage of quotas over emissions taxes has not previously
been recognized. For a special functional form (linear–quadratic) both policies are constrained efficient. Using numerical
methods, we find that a tax has some advantages in this case. 相似文献
2.
Andrew J. Yates 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2012,51(4):583-598
We extend the tax versus permits literature by considering permit supply functions and pollution tax functions that are generalizations
of the usual constant permit supply and constant pollution tax rate. In our model, pollution is not uniformly mixed and the
regulator is uncertain about the polluting firms’ abatement costs. We determine the optimal permit supply functions and the
optimal pollution tax functions. Using these functions, we show that permits lead unambiguously to lower total expected costs
than taxes. We analyze the magnitude of this difference for a simple model of climate change. By relating the optimal permit
supply functions to Weitzman (Am Econ Rev 68:683–691, 1978) we provide a new interpretation of his results. 相似文献
3.
Pietro F. Peretto 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,39(2):113-138
This paper studies the effects of effluent taxes on firms’ allocation of resources to cost-reducing and emission-reducing
R&D, and on entrepreneurs’ decisions to develop new goods and enter the market. A tax set at an exogenous rate that does not
depend on the state of technology reduces growth, the level of consumption of each good, and raises the number of firms. The
induced increase in the variety of goods is a benefit not considered in previous analyses. In terms of environmental benefits,
the tax induces a positive rate of pollution abatement that offsets the “dirty” side of economic growth. A tax set at an endogenous
rate that holds constant the tax burden per unit of output, in contrast, has ambiguous effects on growth, the scale of activity
of each firm and the number of firms. Besides being novel, the potential positive growth effect of this type of effluent tax
is precisely what makes this instrument effective for welfare-maximizing purposes. The socially optimal policy, in fact, requires
the tax burden per unit of output to equal the marginal rate of substitution between the growth rate of consumption and abatement.
Moreover, a tax/subsidy on entry is needed, depending on whether the contribution of product variety to pollution dominates
consumers’ love of variety.
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4.
Pedro Mendi 《Journal of Economics》2009,96(2):95-112
This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model
is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal
costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount
factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented
by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production
towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that
posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream
firms’ costs.
相似文献
5.
Chao-Ning Liao 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2009,35(2):135-153
By using a newly proposed tradable permit system built under the current air pollution fee regulation for the control of Total
Suspended Particulates in Taiwan as an example, a mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimizes the total regulatory
costs of firms is applied to investigate how different permit trading ratios and the design of banking might affect firms’
technology adoption decisions and permit trading behavior. By incorporating binary variables in the model to represent firms’
decisions as to whether or not to install new control equipment, the results show that when the unit air pollution fee rate
is higher than the firms’ abatement costs, the design of banking causes many firms to install new control equipment that results
in an over-reduction of emissions. If no air pollution fee is imposed, the trading ratio plays a more important role than
the reservation rate for banking in determining the firms’ emission reduction strategies under a pure permit trading scheme.
While the conclusion from this study that uses a non-uniformly mixed pollutant as an example may hold only when certain conditions
are met, the framework can be applied to other uniformly mixed pollutants through parameter changes without any limitation.
In addition, the modeling technique presented here offers policy-makers a very convenient approach to empirical analysis.
相似文献
6.
Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired
level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective,
firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the
tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which
charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual
firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions. 相似文献
7.
John K. Stranlund 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,38(1):99-117
This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs. This last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty. In fact, the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty, and can actually be lower. Finally, tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms’ abatement costs. 相似文献
8.
This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital. 相似文献
9.
Which Firms are More Sensitive to Public Disclosure Schemes for Pollution Control? Evidence from Indonesia’s PROPER Program 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Jorge H. García Shakeb Afsah Thomas Sterner 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2009,42(2):151-168
This paper analyzes differences in firms’ responsiveness to PROPER, Indonesia’s public disclosure program for industrial pollution
control. The overall effectiveness of this program at achieving emissions reductions and its low regulatory costs have earned
it a good reputation around the world. PROPER had no deterrents or incentives other than those that arose indirectly from
publicly disclosing information about the environmental performances of firms. We analyzed plant-level data to relate short-
and longer-term environmental responses to facility characteristics. The results revealed that foreign-owned firms were consistently
more likely to respond to the environmental rating scheme, compared to private domestic firms. This is a clear and important
insight with consequences for a number of issues, such as understanding the pollution haven debate. Also, firms located in
densely populated regions, particularly in Java, responded more positively to the public disclosure of PROPER ratings. The
main observed effect was however given by the initial level of environmental performance of firms. Those firms that had bad
environmental performance records felt pressure to improve, but if the initial abatement steps had already been taken, the
incentives to improve further appeared to diminish. 相似文献
10.
Clemens Heuson 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2010,47(3):349-369
Studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted
that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets. By introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of
Weitzman (Rev Econ Stud 41:477–491, 1974), this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric Cournot oligopoly that Weitzman’s
policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market
power. Since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price, their total abatement effort, including
the restriction of output, is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price-taking firms. Consequently,
the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes. In a further step, the provided policy recommendations
are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric. 相似文献
11.
Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Karl-Martin Ehrhart Christian Hoppe Ralf Löschel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,41(3):347-361
In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product
markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based
mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish
output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority
of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’
surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should
not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options
in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.
相似文献
12.
We study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when (i) the regulator does not know the firms’ abatement costs, (ii) penalties for tax evasion are limited, and (iii) monitoring of pollution is costly. We show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms’ incentives to over-estimate their abatement costs. In particular, depending on the firms’ abatement costs, the optimal policy may involve over or under-deterrence compared to the full information outcome. We then investigate the properties of a pollution standard. We show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered. 相似文献
13.
Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly 总被引:7,自引:4,他引:3
R. David Simpson 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1995,6(4):359-369
It is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution. It has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage. In this paper, I derive the optimal pollution tax for a Cournot duopoly. If firms have different production costs, the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage. This is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm. It is also shown that, if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level. 相似文献
14.
In a standard static setup, optimal environmental taxes are increasing in expected pollution damage. With irreversible investments
and new information about environmental damage becoming available over time, we show that this result also holds if damage
in the high-damage scenario rises or the probability of high damage increases. However, if damage in the low-damage scenario
increases, current environmental taxes should decrease if firms face sufficiently similar abatement costs. 相似文献
15.
Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and environmental damage depends on pollution stock. An increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. An increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage. Taxes dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses. 相似文献
16.
Sule Celik 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(4):1710-1715
In this paper, we use a game theoretic model to analyze the trade-off between the attractiveness of FDI and the environmental damage caused by production under asymmetric information. In the first stage, the domestic developing country reveals the level of import tariff and pollution tax under information uncertainty about the environmental damage that the foreign firm can cause. The foreign firm from a developed country decides where to locate afterwards with complete information about its own damage. Results show that the developing country can be better off encouraging FDI if and only if the marginal damage of pollution is sufficiently low. The optimal level of pollution taxes attracting FDI is higher than the marginal damage of pollution. However, the optimal pollution tax without FDI can be lower than the marginal damage of pollution with sufficiently high demand in the developing country. 相似文献
17.
This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms
sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both
markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one
negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that
depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets
is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding
to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.
相似文献
18.
Halvor Briseid Storrøsten 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2014,59(2):275-293
Technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change, depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain. While it is well-known that price- and quantity-based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels, the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention. This paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms’ technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty. I show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent, even in terms of expected values. Moreover, a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance, compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced. Finally, the firms’ technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits, but not under an emissions tax. 相似文献
19.
Klaus Conrad 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2001,19(4):361-381
The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future. 相似文献
20.
This paper analyzes a two-period setup in which firms differ with respect to costs of care and may use care-taking to signal
type to consumers, who are able to observe precaution taken only ex post. Applying the refinement of the intuitive criterion
to the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we establish a unique separating equilibrium for every share of harm borne
by firms. For low levels of victim compensation, we show that (i) firms choose weakly higher care in a setting in which customers
do not know the firms’ type than in a setting in which they do, and (ii) the deviation in precaution taken due to asymmetric
information on firm type is welfare-improving. 相似文献