信贷约束、再分配及不平等对增长的影响

当信贷对那些禀赋较少的当事人是完全可获取时,再分配对长期增长无影响.当信贷不可得时,再分配可以促进经济增长.富人与穷人之间的不平等程度越高,越容易刺激穷人掠夺富人的财富,并牺牲了总的投资与增长.恰当的再分配政策设计可以有利于禀赋少者并促进总的产出,并使社会朝着增长与和谐的方向努力.     

中国社会福利和收入再分配：1988-2007年

基于中国居民收入分配课题组（CHIPs）1988-2007年的住户调查数据,本文分析了中国福利体系的大小、结构及其再分配性质。本文发现,中国的福利体系仍然存在巨大的城乡分割,城市居民的社会福利更全面,福利收入更丰厚,其福利水平接近于一些西方发达国家;而农村的福利制度则不完善,福利收入非常微薄。同时,城市的福利收入体系尽管近几年的再分配作用有所减弱,但总体而言是累进的,有效降低了收入不平等。而农村的福利体系几乎对收入差距的缩小没有影响,但从2007年的结果来看,农村累退的福利体系开始向累进的方向转变。农民工的社会福利收入在2002-2007年间大幅度增加,并发挥了巨大的再分配作用。     

收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配政策

本文构建的理论模型探讨了收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配之间的关系。模型显示:政策偏向是收入不平等与财政再分配恶性循环的决定因素。当政策偏向于穷人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是提高税率,扩大对穷人的转移支付;当政策偏向于富人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是降低税率,减少对穷人的转移支付。依据中国数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国收入不平等不断恶化,针对恶化的不平等而采取的财政再分配政策效果差,没能扭转不平等恶化趋势,政策偏向严重。(2)税收再分配政策偏向富人,使富人税负相对轻于穷人,居民收入不平等加剧;偏向于穷人的转移支付多为消费券(物),导致越扶越贫。为此,需要从调整所得税和转移支付政策等方面采取相关对策。     

论我国社会再分配的制度完善

在我国收入再分配实践中,由于存在不到位或扭曲现象,致使其未能起到应有的作用,甚至发生逆调节效应.本文针对我国再分配领域的实际,就再分配制度建设应着重注意的问题,提出一些对策和建议.     

转型背景下的居民主观收入不平等与再分配偏好——基于CGSS数据的经验分析

公平、合理的收入分配格局是构建和谐社会的基石,引起社会普遍不满和对社会稳定构成实质威胁的是居民主观层面所不认可的收入分配格局。本文尝试考察我国居民的主观收入不平等对再分配偏好的影响。在将主观收入不平等合理分解为认可的不平等和不认可的不平等基础上,利用中国综合社会调查数据(CGSS),本文进行了实证检验,研究结果显示,居民认可的收入不平等与再分配偏好显著负相关,而不认可的收入不平等与再分配偏好显著正相关。此外,公平认知对居民的主观收入不平等具有显著影响。因此,当前政府的改革应该从消除体制性障碍入手,特别是要消除行业垄断、城乡有别的户籍制度等,创造一个机会均等、公平竞争的社会环境,为形成合理的收入分配格局提供制度保障。     

国外关于收入分配研究的最新进展

与国内研究不同,国外关于收入分配的研究往往是笼统的,不区分“初次分配”和“再分配”。但从国外研究的具体内容来看,初次分配和再分配都有所涉及,相对来说,再分配的研究要远远多于初次分配。鉴于对国外再分配研究的介绍相对较多,本文侧重于对国外初次分配研究的关注。梳理国外最新收入分配方面的研究,可以发现,他们的研究可以归结为以下几个方面。     

我国收入再分配规模估算

近年来,随着我国收入差距不断扩大,尤其是城市贫困人群的数量增加,收入再分配问题被广泛关注,加强收入再分配的呼声也越来越高。目前,我国收入再分配的范围和规模有多大?收入再分配过程中存在哪些问题?本文拟就这些问题进行初步探讨。     

收入分配与乘数效应

传统的乘数理论忽视了收入分配因素，因此在宏观经济政策分析中有很大局限性。论文以我国城镇居民微观消费行为的分析为基础，建立了引入收入分配因素的乘数效应模型，并根据我国近年来的统计数据作了验证，证实它与我国的经验是一致的。由此可以得出收入再分配政策与财政政策，货币政策在方向上具有一致性的政策结论。     

免征额与个人所得税的收入再分配效应

免征额一直以来都是个人所得税改革与研究的重点领域。本文通过构建个人所得税的税制模拟模型,证明了免征额的大小与单一税率以及多级累进税率个人所得税的平均有效税率大小呈反比,与累进性的大小成正比,并且随着免征额的增大,单一税率以及多级累进税率个人所得税的收入再分配效应呈先上升后下降的倒U字型分布。这对于完善个人所得税税制设计的理论体系,以及指导个人所得税改革实践均具有重要意义,为我国现阶段的工薪所得税与未来综合征收的个人所得税更好地发挥调节收入分配差距的作用提供了重要依据。     

中国社会保障收入再分配效应研究——以社会保险为例

社会保障是调节收入分配的重要工具。社会保障的收入再分配作用需要在客观调查的基础上充分考察社会公众的主观评价。中国社会科学院课题组2012年在四川、黑龙江、湖南、山西、江苏、海南等省采用经验分层和非严格随机抽样的方法进行了城乡入户问卷调查,对社会保障的收入再分配效应进行了宏观理论分析和实证分析,包括了社会保障收入再分配效应的客观测量与主观评价。本研究表明,我国社会保障收入已经成为城乡居民收入的重要组成部分,社会保障在调节收入分配方面发挥的作用日益显著。从总体上看,社会保障制度是缩小收入差距的,但是的确存在一些扩大收入差距的制度安排。由于多方面的原因,我国社会保障制度调节收入分配方面的效果还存在若干急需解决的重要问题。     

Income Redistribution Effect Of Public Pensions Between Dynastic Families

This paper investigates income transfers between dynastic families caused by a public pension system. Using Japanese data, we present simulation results based on a model in which intergenerational altruism works, and income distribution exists between and within generations. The growth rates of income and population, as well as the formulation for the determination of the contribution rate and the payment rate, are crucial to determine both the qualitative and quantitative effects. Especially, under negative income growth over generations, pay–as–you–go public pensions can cause negative income redistribution.     

Income Distribution and Redistribution

Abstract:

It seems that some observable structural trends in recent decades such as globalization, skills-biased technological advances and level of unionization all over the world have been affected by income distribution, in addition to other economic variables. The latest trends in the 2000s exhibited a widening gap between the rich and the poor not only in some of the already high inequality countries, but also in traditionally low inequality countries. In order to mitigate inequality, many countries have followed redistribution policies (taxes and transfers). In this article, we will mainly focus on the effects of redistribution policies consisting of income taxes and social transfers on income inequality using the micro data in Turkey. Additionally, since financial crises have been becoming more important with increasing frequency of crises all over the world, we also search for the effects of crises on inequality and the degree of mitigation of redistributive policies, especially during the Global Recession.     

Collective Annuities and Redistribution

This paper studies the role of alternative pension systems that offer collective annuities. The defining characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individual's survival probabilities. We show that such a system may be welfare improving (with a utilitarian social welfare function) even when private annuity markets are perfect and when life expectancy and earning abilities are positively correlated (i.e., in a setting that is  a priori  biased against collective annuities). We first concentrate on linear pension systems and contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a flat rate (Beveridgean) pension. We show that the case for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a flat pension system. Then we analyze nonlinear pension schemes. We show that the solution can be implemented by a pension scheme associated with annuities that reflect some degree of "collectiveness." Unlike under pure collective annuities, benefits do depend on life expectancy but to a lesser degree than with actuarially fair private annuities. In other words, the impact of survival probabilities is mitigated rather than completely neutralized.     

Redistribution and constitutional political economy

Economists since Pareto have sought to demonstrate that governmental redistribution to assist the poor increases overall welfare in society. This paper addresses the general issue of redistribution but focuses on two recent efforts to justify redistribution in the context of constitutional political economy. It is argued below that income insurance and other proposed rationale for redistribution overlook or minimize information and incentive problems endemic in all governmental programs to assist the poor. Two reasons for opposing legislated redistribution are discussed—the first rooted in pragmatic considerations, the other based on principle. The conclusions are twofold: (1) purported justifications for redistributive policies are inconsistent with methodological individualism, and (2) it is problematic as to whether imposing such an obligation on the public-at-large even at the constitutional level will improve the welfare of the poor and the non-poor.     

Strategic Political Participation and Redistribution

The purpose of this paper is to study formation of support and opposition to redistribution. We analyze a society with two groups of citizens and a government. The government distributes income from one group to the other in response to political pressure. The interaction between the groups is modeled as a two-stage game. In stage 1, the groups decide if they want to be politically active. In stage 2, the active group or groups seek influence on the direction and size of the transfer. We demonstrate that supporters of redistribution are always politically active but that opposition is often absent. Moreover, when opposition is absent there is a strong tendency for underdissipation of the transfer, while political competition typically leads to overdissipation.     

Intergenerational Redistribution and Fiscal Policy

This article argues that although the intergenerational stance of fiscal policy is hard to measure accurately, a goal of approximate generational balance is reasonable.     

The Effect of the Arab Spring on Preferences for Redistribution in Egypt

This paper investigates the effect of the revolution that occurred in January 2011 in Egypt on the demand for redistribution in that country, which has drastically increased since that period. This shock has been an important event, enhancing freedom and the political structure. In a first step, taking into account the main determinants of preferences for redistribution in the literature, our results differ, showing a positive impact of religion and a negative impact of altruistic attitudes. In a second step, we rely on a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the effect of the revolution, using three similar countries as a control group. We find that Egyptians became much more favorable to redistribution after the Arab Spring. Moreover, the revolution effect is stronger for the poorest people and those who are interested in politics.