Private Sector Involvement in Infrastructure Projects

There has been little systematic discussion of the issues associated with private involvement in infrastructure. Analysis of the relative performance of the private and public sector in different phases of infrastructure provision suggests that, in most cases, the private sector will be most efficient in the construction phase but the public sector will be best equipped to handle the risks associated with ownership. The situation is less clear-cut with respect to operation—a mixture in which core operations are undertaken by the public sector owner with peripheral operations being contracted out may be optimal in many cases.     

The Impact of Public Infrastructure on the Productivity of the Chilean Economy

The aim of this study is to assess the effect of the change in infrastructure capital on the cost structure of the Chilean economy, and thereby on productivity, differentiating between two key institutional periods. A further aim is to establish the extent to which infrastructure capital formation affects private capital. The authors use an econometric estimation of the cost elasticity of infrastructure. Conclusions indicate that an increased infrastructure capital reduces the production cost of the economy, thereby increasing productivity, mostly in the second period. In turn, especially in this latter period, infrastructure capital formation appears to assert both a positive cost‐share effect on private capital and a negative cost‐share effect on labor. These effects can be explained to a large extent by the significant differences between the institutional structures of the two consecutive periods studied.     

中国公共部门劳动生产效率实证研究

借鉴Karras(2007)的实证模型,本文利用中国1988-2007年30个省、市、自治区的面板数据,对公共部门的劳动生产效率进行实证分析,结果显示:(1)中国公共部门的劳动产出弹性为0.008;(2)中国公共部门的劳动边际产出高于非公共部门;(3)中国公共部门劳动人员的显性工资存在低估。虽然中国公共部门的劳动边际产出相对于非公共部门高,但其产出弹性仍处于较低水平。本文的政策含义是:加大劳动密集型公共品供给力度,有利于提高中国整个经济的产出水平;中国非公共部门需要改变劳动力粗放投入模式,地方政府应鼓励私人部门为员工提供多元化的职业培训与技能教育,以提高其边际产出。同时,优化公务员薪酬结构,将隐性收入逐步纳入正规货币工资范围之中。     

私人部门进入降低了城市供水行业成本吗?

私人部门进入在一定程度上降低了城市供水行业的成本,但不同城市、不同私人部门之间存在一定的差异。其中,私人部门进入对地级市供水行业成本的降低效应比县级市更为显著;与国际资本进入相比,国内民营资本进入对城市供水行业成本的降低效应更为显著;私人部门进入显著降低了中西部城市供水行业的成本,但对东部城市供水行业成本的降低效应并不显著。研究结论表明,应继续坚持产权多元化的改革思路,同时与东部地区、县级市相比,更应该引导国内民营资本和国际资本进入中西部地区、地级市。     

公共基础设施投资与全要素生产率:基于异质企业家模型的理论分析

本文构建一个异质性企业家模型,以中国现实数据为基础,利用数值模拟深入考察公共基础设施投资对全要素生产率(TFP)的影响机理,同时考虑金融摩擦、劳动摩擦和其他财税政策对公共基础设施投资TFP效应的抑制作用。研究表明,公共基础设施投资对TFP具有明显的倒U型影响,即存在TFP最大化的公共基础设施投资规模。这源于公共基础设施投资影响企业家的财富积累,即自融资机制,对企业间要素配置的重要影响。信贷约束对公共基础设施投资的TFP效应影响显著(企业家面临的信贷约束越严重,公共基础设施投资对TFP的影响越大)。存贷利差的影响则较弱。减少劳动摩擦可增强公共基础设施投资的TFP效应,较大的有效基础设施服务、企业间差异性和公共消费性支出也具有类似影响,利用消费税融资可更好地发挥公共基础设施投资对TFP的促进作用。     

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Health Sector when There is a Private Alternative to Public Treatment

In health economics, cost-effectiveness is defined as maximizedhealth benefits for a given health budget. When there is a privatealternative to public treatments, care must be taken when usingcost-effectiveness analysis to decide what types of treatmentsshould be included in the public program. The correct benefitmeasure is in this case the sum of health benefits to thosewho would not be treated without the public alternative andthe cost savings to those who would otherwise choose privatetreatment. In the socially optimal ranking of treatments tobe included in the public health program, treatments shouldbe given higher priority the higher are costs per treatmentfor a given ratio of gross heath benefits to costs. (JEL: H42,H51, I18)     

集聚经济、公共基础设施与劳动生产率——来自中国城市动态面板数据的证据

文章采用2001-2007年中国城市面板数据实证检验了集聚经济、公共基础设施与城市非农劳动生产率的关系。结果表明:在控制住其他影响因素后,一个地区的就业密度和公共基础设施对其非农劳动生产率都有着显著为正的影响,但在忽略城市公共基础设施的情况下,集聚经济的估计值明显偏高了。     

长沙市公立与民办高校人力资源成本比较研究

随着市场经济的不断发展,高校人力资源成本问题不仅关系到高校的发展,而且关系到整个国家和社会的发展。本文通过分析长沙市公立与民办高校人力资源成本现状,并进行实证研究,对公立和民办高校人力资源成本进行比较,得出公立高校人力资源成本的最主要影响因素为人力资源使用成本,而民办高校人力资源成本的最主要影响因素为人力资源保障成本和人力资源使用成本,公立和民办高校的人力资源成本构成不尽相同的结论。并从人力流动机制和人力资源成本角度提出了降低高校人力资源成本的政策建议。     

浅议私营企业财务管理

在市场经济的不断完善中,私营企业得到了前所未有的发展,它们不但成为各地经济增长的主力军,而且在创造税收、增加就业等方面发挥着积极作用。然而私营企业在发展过程中,仍有相当一部分企业处于“高出生与高死亡率”的状态。由于财务管理水平是影响私营企业发展的一个重要因素,因此将针对中国私营企业财务管理的有关问题进行研究,希望能有助于中国私营企业的健康发展。     

一个中国私营部门发展模型

为讨论民营化、市场化对中国私营部门发展的影响,本文根据中国企业行为模式建立了一个简单经济数学模型。该文认为,由于中国的国有企业、私营企业和其他经济实体具有偏离利润最大化的多重目标,与单纯追求利润最大化的企业比较,它们倾向于利用更多的劳动力和资本生产更多的产品,但是,它们却只能获得更低的利润甚至亏损。这是中国经济高增长低效率的原因。本文还讨论了非利润目标和“准入成本”对企业数量和规模的影响。另外,模型分析表明,企业的管理能力和企业规模之间存在匹配问题,是中国的渐进式改革成功与俄罗斯大爆炸式改革失败的部分原因     

“民有资本民营化”与“民有资本官营化”——论农村信用社法人治理结构特征的演变

农村信用社的产权制度决定其法人治理结构应体现"民有资本民营化"的要求,但在现行管理体制下,由于省级联社行业管理行政化倾向明显,农村信用社法人治理结构呈现"民有资本官营化"特征,省级联社将农村信用社改组为以省(市)为单位统一法人的改革趋向会进一步强化这一特征.这将不利于实现增强支农服务功能这一改革的首要目标,需要建立健全政策扶持体系,引导农村信用社加强和改善农村金融服务.     

中国保险业全要素生产率研究

基于非参数的Malmquist指数方法,本文对我国1999～2006年间保险业的全要素生产率变化状况进行了动态分析,针对众多的研究方法都存在决策单元规模报酬不变假定,以及决策单元向生产前沿面逼近路径只能选择径向,即仅考虑投入或产出变化情况的缺陷,本文提出修正的Malmquist指数模型.实证发现,中国保险业全要素生产率在1999～2006年问有所提高,其中"追赶效应"较为明显而"增长效应"还未完全显现,这说明保险机构更加注重提高自身技术效率水平而非创新能力提高生产的有效性,依然没有处理好效率进步与技术进步的关系,保险机构需要进一步提升技术创新的能力.     

Cost Savings and Productivity in the Railroad Industry

Railroad deregulation has had tremendous effects on the level of costs and productivity gains. I use an unbalanced panel of railroads from 1978 through 1989 to estimate a translog cost function. I find that initially cost savings from partial deregulation were modest. However, by 1989, I find that cost savings were tremendous, with costs being up to 40 percent lower than they would have been under regulation. I also find that while initial effects of deregulation on productivity gains were large, these effects have fallen through time, and currently are comparable to pre-deregulation levels.     

定向增发与公开增发新股融资股东财富效应的实证研究

公开增发新股和定向增发新股是上市公司增发新股融资的两种方式。研究发现,我国上市公司公开增发新股后1～3年股东获得的长期超额收益率均为负,而定向增发新股后两年股东获得的长期超额收益率均为正,表明我国上市公司宣告公开增发新股股东获得负的股东财富效应,而宣告定向增发新股股东能获得正的股东财富效应。从保护投资者长期利益的视角看,本文的研究结果表明在股权分置改革之后证券管理部门推出的定向增发新股融资方式和上市公司青睐定向增发新股融资方式具备其适时性和合理性。     

On the Cost of Opportunistic Behavior in the Public Sector: A General‐Equilibrium Approach

This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between opportunistic behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill. In particular, public officials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. A simple extraction technology in the government administration is introduced in a standard real‐business‐cycle setup augmented with detailed public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the period 1970–2007. The main findings are: (i) the model performs well vis‐à‐vis the data; (ii) due to the existence of a significant public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent in opportunistic activities, which, in turn, leads to significant losses in terms of output; and (iii) the model‐based loss measures obtained for the EU‐12 countries are highly correlated to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency.     

The Welfare and Employment Effects of Centralized Public Sector Wage Bargaining

In many countries, the government pays almost identical nominal wages to workers living in regions with notable economic disparities. By developing a two‐region general equilibrium model with endogenous migration and search frictions in the labor market, I study the differences in terms of unemployment, real wages, and welfare between a regional wage bargaining process and a national one in the public sector. Adopting the latter makes residents in the poorer region better off and residents of the richer region worse off. Private sector employment decreases in the poorer region and it increases in the richer one. Under some conditions, the unemployment rate in the poorer region soars.