基于报酬合约的经理人羊群行为研究

本文在信息不对称和经理人有限理性的背景下,以经理人风险厌恶及报酬与其相对业绩相关性为假设前提,基于经理人安全理性原则,构造了一个二元经理人的羊群行为模型,证明了经理人决策过程的相互影响关系,以及经理人为谋求个人效用的最大化,不得不考虑竞争对手的行为选择;并将模型扩展到n个经理人,进一步发现了经理人羊群行为发生的内在经济逻辑。文章贡献在于用模型化方法证明了经理人经营决策羊群行为的存在性,且羊群行为的显著程度与经理人的报酬结构（收入系数和股权比例等）相关。对上市公司的实证研究也支持这一结论。     

高新技术企业经理人股权激励与传统激励的比较

文章基于委托——代理理论模型,根据高新技术企业的特点,通过构建新的经理人努力与企业业绩关系模型,证明了以下结论:在保证经理人目标和股东利益一致的基础上,我国高新技术企业目前三种主要报酬形式不能激励经理人为企业的长远利益和发展而努力;由于股票期权将经理人的报酬和企业的未来业绩联系了起来,故能激励经理人为提高企业长远业绩而努力。     

“羊群行为”的理性视角——社会学习理论综述

羊群行为通常被认为是盲目的、非理性的,而从社会学习角度看,我们发现即使是完全理性的经济个体也会陷入到"非理性"的羊群中去。因此,社会学习理论为我们深入理解和认识羊群行为提供了一个崭新的视角。文章首先以投资者的投资决策为例,从社会学习理论经典模型出发对理性羊群行为的产生做出解释,然后介绍影响理性羊群行为的因素和社会学习理论的发展,最后指出社会学习理论未来的研究方向。     

我国上市公司经理人激励的业绩基础选择性实证研究

以我国上市公司为样本对经理人激励的业绩基础选择问题进行了实证检验。研究发现目前我国上市公司经理人报酬契约只倚重会计业绩指标,而将市场业绩指标和相对业绩指标排除在报酬契约之外,这极易导致经理人行为的短期化,提高代理成本,降低上市公司的运作效率。因此,必须调整上市公司经理人的报酬结构,建立基于会计业绩的短期激励与基于市场业绩的长期激励相结合的经理人报酬激励机制。     

中小企业信贷融资困境的羊群行为分析

国内外学者从信息不对称角度对中小企业信贷融资困境进行了比较深入的研究,也提出了许多有深度的建议与对策。利用行为金融理论来分析中小企业贷款困难的本质原因,通过构建银行经理人效用函数模型,说明银行贷款经理人信贷决策羊群行为是造成中小企业融资困境的内在机理,为中小企业信贷融资困境提供新的理论解释。     

内部控制与高管薪酬之间的关系

内部控制的有效实施在一定程度上约束了经理人的自利行为,降低了代理成本,有利于提升公司的业绩,然而理性的经理人必然会提出将其薪酬与公司的业绩挂钩以实现对自身报酬的弥补。对此,本文实证检验了新疆地区上市公司内部控制的质量与高管薪酬之间的关系,结果发现,公司的内部控制质量越高,其管理层薪酬的规模也越大。     

市场竞争、经理人激励与上市公司舞弊行为——来自中国证监会处罚公告的经验证据

中国上市公司控制权市场、经理人市场和经理人激励对舞弊行为影响的检验结果表明,在控制权市场竞争中只有第二大股东的制衡力量对舞弊行为起到显著的抑制作用,经理人市场的竞争程度与公司舞弊行为显著负相关,不成熟的经理人市场使得经理人的声誉机制和报酬激励机制都难以发挥抑制舞弊行为的作用。治理上市公司舞弊行为的更好路径是优化经理人的选任机制和竞争机制,而不是仅仅强化其激励。     

基金羊群行为的博弈分析

本文从博弈角度对信息不完全和声誉报酬型羊群行为的生成机理进行了剖析,最后从博弈均衡解出发,给出了弱化羊群行为的对策.     

基金羊群行为的博弈分析

本文从博弈角度对信息不完全和声誉报酬型羊群行为的生成机理进行了剖析，最后从博弈均衡解出发，给出了弱化羊群行为的对策。     

家族企业引入外部经理人的博弈分析

在家族企业主为理性经济人的假设前提下,运用经济博弈理论分析得出：在短期中家族成员对外部经理人存在信任缺失,经理人在长期中依然可能出现“败德”行为;只要由于其“败德”行为给企业带来的损失小于由于其经营给企业带来的收益,家族企业主更偏好于企业的长远发展,就应引入外部经理人;在理论上能够设计一种报酬激励机制实现“激励相容”,而在现实中完全的“激励相容”难以实现,只能尽可能地去接近;在内部控制制度不健全或无效时,不应给予外部经理人充分的实际控制权。     

European banks’ executive remuneration under the new European Union regulation

We review how the new European regulation of bank executive compensation could affect the future of banking in Europe. Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the relation between bank executive remuneration and the financial crisis, authorities have intensively regulated the compensation of bank managers to eliminate risk-taking incentives in the financial industry. However, the new regulation could have unintended consequences of creating an adverse selection problem at European banks, reducing the number of best-performing managers available for European banks, and motivating an excessive increase in fixed remuneration over total remuneration, altering the way incentive systems work.     

Endogenous order and information aggregation

Privately informed experts with heterogeneous expertise decide when to give advice and what advice to give. Each expert’s utility depends upon that expert’s own message as well as those of the other experts. Under different forms of payoff externalities, we find varying results for the optimal order in which messages are sent and the existence of herd behavior. Under negative payoff externalities, all experts send a message together without any delay and a herd never arises. This leads to truthful revealing of all private information. Without forcing any order of speech, we obtain a result similar to the ‘anti-seniority rule’. This, however, goes in the opposite direction when positive payoff externalities are induced. An incentive structure with positive payoff externalities gives rise to a herd led by the most precise expert with a delay in the disclosure of information. Next, we test for the nature of payoff externalities in the remuneration of forecasters listed with I/B/E/S. We find that the underlying payoff externalities are negative, i.e. the benefit from making dissimilar forecasts is higher than that from making similar ones.     

The relationship between job satisfaction and managerial remuneration in small and medium-sized enterprises: an empirical test of ‘comparison income’ and ‘equity theory’ hypotheses

The relationship between job satisfaction levels and the remuneration of non-owner managers employed by a sample of 97 UK small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is investigated. The main empirical findings are that relative remuneration levels appear to be largely explained by differences in human capital and job/firm characteristics and that job satisfaction is positively related to deviations from these estimated comparison-income levels. Moreover, the equity theory expectation that individuals with the least prospect of redressing payment inequities will have the greatest incentives to respond to payment inequities by congitive adjustment is also supported. The results indicate that job satisfaction levels for individuals expecting to remain in their current post are not significantly affected by current payment inequities. For those managers who expect to move firms, the amount of payment inequity has a significantly positive effect upon their job satisfaction.     

Managerial talent,motivation, and self-selection into public management

The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always higher in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.     

Pension Fund Herding and the Influence of Management Style

In this article, we study the herding phenomenon in Spanish equity pension funds with European investment locations from 2002 to 2012, considering whether the development of different investment strategies by the managers results in herding. In addition, we analyze the performance-herding relationship, observing whether pension fund performance decreases or increases when pension funds herd. Using the herding measure of Lakonishok et al. [1992], we do not find strong imitation behavior, although herding in the market and book-to-market styles are higher. Those pension funds that do not herd or that follow distinctive strategies do not present significant differences in performance with respect to herding funds.     

关于股份公司经理层薪酬构成的思考

在现代股份公司中,随着股东结构的日趋分散,经理层已在相当大的程度上拥有了公司的实质性控制权,在这种格局下,股东财富最大化目标的实现,越来越取决于经理层的素质与能力。随着知识产权资本化,经理层在公司中同时拥有双重身份——知识资本所有者兼高级别雇员,这种双重身份决定了经理层的薪酬应由雇员薪金和知识资本报酬两方面构成,其中雇员薪金又可细分为生活保障薪金和风险薪金两部分。     

金融市场中的从众行为与信息传播

目前,很多的理论和实证研究发现,从众现象是导致金融市场剧烈波动的重要原因之一。因此,认识从众行为的演变发展过程,分析产生从众现象的原因,并提出一些防范措施是非常有意义的工作。从众现象非常复杂,从信息传播的角度分析从众行为。     

公司治理与银行风险承担行为——基于我国上市商业银行的研究

以我国13家上市商业银行为样本,利用2001--2012年的半年度数据,采用非平衡面板模型对我国上市商业银行公司治理与风险承担行为之间的关系进行实证研究。结果表明,股权集中度与银行风险承担呈显著的倒u型关系;第一大股东的政府性质能够约束商业银行的冒险行为;高管人员薪酬越高时,银行的风险承担越小;而董事会规模和董事会独立性等董事会治理因素并没有对银行的风险承担行为产生显著影响。     

Directors'' remuneration in the theory of the firm: Specification and testing of the null hypothesis

One basis for the managerial theories has been the strong correlation between firm size and executive remuneration. This may, however, simply reflect variations in managerial quality across firms. We also show that the absence of a correlation between profitability and remuneration is not evidence in favour of the managerial theories. In this paper we follow the rewards to individual U.K. managers over time, thereby controlling for quality variation. We conclude that growth is highly rewarded and involvement in mergers and takeovers attracts an extra premium. This may explain the continued popularity of mergers despite knowledge of their general unprofitability.     

中国证券市场机构投资者的羊群行为研究

“羊群行为”是金融市场上一个令人困惑的现象,长期以来,投资者的羊群行为一直被认为是导致股票市场剧烈波动和引发市场系统风险的一个重要原因。以往对美国金融市场的研究表明,机构投资者在进行投资时存在典型的羊群效应,而研究表明我国证券市场中机构投资者的羊群行为更加典型。对这个问题作一个文献综述,并在此基础上进一步作理论研究和政策分析。