议价能力变化对家务劳动时间配置的影响——来自中国双收入家庭的经验证据

本文在纳什议价模型基础上,使用来自中国9个省的双收入家庭的调查数据,检验了议价能力变化对家务劳动时间配置的影响。结果发现,议价能力提高将减少本人的家务劳动时间和家务分担比例,并使本人家务劳动时间和家务分担比例对其他因素的弹性增大。议价能力的影响存在明显的性别差异,对男性的效果强于对女性的效果。本文拓展了已有的关于家庭内部时间配置的研究成果,对议价能力的定义和衡量方法做了探讨,并通过实证分析显示出议价能力在家务劳动时间配置上起着不可忽视的作用。     

Expenditure on children: A Rothbarth-type method consistent with scale economies and parents' bargaining

We suggest a new methodology to estimate the share of household income accruing to children. The household behavior is represented according to the collective approach. That is, each household member is characterized by specific preferences. Following the principle of the Rothbarth approach, the identification of the children's share requires the observation of adult-specific goods. Our method differs from this traditional approach in that it is compatible with economies of scale as well as with parents' bargaining. We illustrate the method with an application to the French Household Budget Survey.     

BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH

Entitlements have become an increasing component of total government spending in the United States over the last six decades. Using a political-economy model where parties bargain over taxes and entitlements, we argue that such dynamics can be explained by two factors: “unequal growth,” where top earners became richer while the income of the bottom 50% stagnated, and budget rules that provide bargaining power to low-income earners through a “status quo effect.” In a model calibrated to the United States, we show that sustained bargaining power by a party representing the poor results in a rising share of entitlements consistent with the data.     

Reconciling Household Surveys and National Accounts Data Using a Cross Entropy Estimation Method

This paper presents an approach to reconciling household surveys and national accounts data. The problem is how to use the information provided by the national accounts data to re-estimate the household weights used in the survey so that the survey results are consistent with the aggregate data. The estimation approach uses an estimation criterion based on an entropy measure of information. The survey household weights are treated as a prior. New weights are estimated that are close to the prior and that are also consistent with the additional information. This approach is implemented to reconcile household survey data and macro data for Madagascar. The results indicate that the approach is powerful and flexible, supporting the efficient use of information from a variety of sources to reconcile data at different levels of aggregation in a consistent framework.     

Does Gender have any Effect on Aggregate Saving? An empirical analysis

This study investigates the effects of gender on aggregate saving. We test the hypothesis that shifts in women's relative income, which can affect their bargaining power within the household, have a discernible impact on household saving and, by extension, gross domestic saving, due to differing saving propensities by gender. The empirical analysis is based on panel data for a set of semi-industrialised economies, covering the period 1975-95. The results indicate that, as some measures of women's relative income and bargaining power increase, gross domestic saving rates rise. The implied gender disparity in saving propensities may be linked to differences in saving motives based on gender roles, and well as divergent experiences of economic vulnerability. These findings suggest the importance of understanding gender differences in planning for savings mobilisation and in the formulation of financial and investment policies.     

SELF‐REPORTED ECONOMIC CONDITION AND HOME PRODUCTION: INTRA‐HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION IN ITALY

This paper applies a collective model of intra‐household welfare distribution using individual self‐reported data. The model accounts for household production, and self‐reported information on economic condition is used to identify the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the family. The theoretical framework implies a broad concept of full income, which includes household production as time allocated to domestic activities. We find that self‐reported data on economic status are useful in recovering individual shares of household income and that both wages and non‐strictly‐economic individual variables play an important role in the bargaining process determining the sharing rule in Italy.     

母以子贵:性别偏好与妇女的家庭地位-来自中国营养健康调查的证据

基于中国普遍存在的对男孩的性别偏好,本文采用所生育小孩的性别作为妇女家庭地位和议价能力的度量指标,研究该指标对家庭内部资源分配及后果的影响。中国健康营养调查数据中有关家庭耐用品消费决策的信息表明,第一胎性别对妇女在家庭中的地位有重要作用。本文发现,当妇女的家庭地位随着生育男孩而提高后,家庭中食物支出份额会增加,该妇女营养摄入增加,而她的身体健康状况会变好。     

A test of a unitary model on labour supply using the information of household decision-making systems

This article tests whether a unitary model is consistent with household behaviour using the data of two-earner couples. It focuses on the unitary model assuming that all family members have the same utility function. The analysis investigates the difference in a husband's and wife's labour supply between the household that determines the wife to be the main decision-maker and the household that selects a different decision-making system under the control of individual and household characteristics. The estimation employs a treatment effects model to consider the selectivity bias caused by unmeasured characteristics. Results show that the household with the wife as the main decision-maker increases the husband's working hours by 15% and decreases the wife's working hours by 59%, compared to the household that selects a different decision-making system. This implies that the unitary model is rejected. Additionally, the husband's wage rate, the husband's and wife's health status, and their gambling addiction determine the household decision-making system such as the variables that determine the reservation utility of not being married. The effect of the decision-making system on the labour supply and that of the determinant factors on the decision-making system are consistent with the implications obtained from Nash bargaining models and collective models.     

Rent-sharing and collective wage contracts–evidence from German establishment-level data

Using German establishment-level data, this article analyses whether wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions. The empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.     

Endogenous gender power,household labor supply and the demographic transition

We present a microeconomic model of the household in which there exists no difference in spousal preferences but childrearing is more time costly for women. Bargaining between the wife and the husband forms the basis of household decisions. Marital bargaining power is determined according to the incomes of the spouses, which in turn help to determine their reservation utility levels outside the marriage. The endogeneity of bargaining power introduces a non-cooperative element to the couples' decision-making problem because both the husbands and the wives take into account how their pre-marital education decisions affect their marital power and the share they extract from household resources in the future. The model predicts that wives invest more than is Pareto efficient in their education in order to increase their bargaining power in marriage. As a consequence, couples have fewer children and consume more when exogenous structural changes lead women to invest more in education. A corollary of the model is that empowering women directly through social reforms such as a lower gender wage gap leads to lower fertility and higher spousal consumption and leisure.     

Sunk capital,unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data

In this paper we study the hold-up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment. We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex-post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference-in-difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of OECD countries during the period 1980–2000. We find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries. We refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold-up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration, while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold-up problem. Our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power.     

Improving Assessments of Gender Bargaining Power: A Case Study from Bangladesh

Gender bargaining power has entered into mainstream economic theory and public policy. However, common empirical measures are only loosely related to the theoretical concept, and research has not produced consistent results regarding the causal chains underlying women’s empowerment. This study critically examines accepted measures of bargaining power, arguing that participation in specific household decisions is not directly associated with the theoretical concept of bargaining power. The study analyzes the relationship between measures of participation in household decisions and individual and household characteristics thought to contribute to bargaining power. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data on Bangladesh over the period 1999–2011, the study finds that despite the loose relationship of the survey questions to the theoretical construct bargaining power, the decision-making questions provide relatively consistent and theoretically supported measures of this unobservable characteristic. Simple changes in using the measures would contribute to more robust and consistent findings.     

UNIVERSALISM AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL POWER

Although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game‐theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed‐upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the “Bridge Bill Capital Budget” in 1992. I find that 16.73% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.     

HOW DO SPOUSES SHARE THEIR FULL INCOME? IDENTIFICATION OF THE SHARING RULE USING SELF‐REPORTED INCOME

The paper applies the collective model to the analysis of intra-household inequality using one of the subjective-qualitative questions available in the RLMS (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) data, and provides a test for its assumptions. Interpreting the individual answers as reported budget scales we assume a correspondence between the budget level that household members report and their true income sharing. We first show that this assumption is supported by the data, and then use couples who report the same level of budget to identify the full sharing rule for the whole sample.     

Gender Roles and the Division of Unpaid Work in Spanish Households

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the doing-gender hypothesis versus traditional models of the household in explaining how the woman's share of home labor varies with relative earnings. The findings, using the 2002–3 Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS; Spanish Statistical Office 2003), support the doing-gender hypothesis in the case of housework: a woman's relative share of housework fails to decrease with her relative earnings beyond the point where her earnings are the same as her husband's. In contrast, a woman's share of childcare time displays a flat pattern over the distribution of her spouse's relative earnings. This last result is neither consistent with traditional theories of the household, nor with the doing-gender hypothesis. It can, however, still be interpreted in light of social norms, whereby women specialize in this type of caring activity regardless of their relative productivity or bargaining power.     

Microfinance and gender empowerment

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of household production, bargaining and credit to analyse how access to microcredit affects intra-household decision-making and welfare, and identify conditions under which female household members are most likely to benefit. We show that, consistent with ethnographic accounts of the impact of microcredit programmes on poor households, access to loans can lead to a variety of outcomes for intra-household decision-making and welfare depending on initial conditions and that, in some instances, women borrowers may experience a decline in welfare. We identify two instances in which a woman is most likely to benefit: when there is scope for investing the loan profitably in a joint activity, and when a large share of the household budget is devoted to household public goods.     

THE DEGREE AND PATTERN OF INCOME IMMOBILITY IN SWEDEN

This paper studies immobility in the distribution of income using Swedish data. Tax data shows immobility in personal income to be a decreasing function of the length of the period over which it is studied and an increasing function of initial age. The results show immobility to be larger among males than among females. Based on a household income survey it is found that when the time period expands from one to two years, the Gini-coefficient of equivalent income per person decreases by five percent. A sample of males indicates that income immobility between generations in Sweden is low.     

Household bargaining over fertility: Theory and evidence from Malaysia

We develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible. The model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes. We show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage. If couples bargain with commitment, fertility outcomes take account of both spouses' fertility preferences and do not depend on the threat point in marital bargaining. If couples bargain without commitment, the influence of each spouse's fertility preference on fertility outcomes depends on the relevant threat point in marital bargaining, and the distribution of bargaining power. We test the models using household data from the Malaysia Family Life Survey. This data set contains information on each spouse's desired fertility level, as well as fertility outcomes. We exploit differences in threat points in marital bargaining across ethnic groups to help identify the underlying bargaining model. The evidence suggests couples bargain without commitment.     

Bargaining Over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy

In decentralized water management with earmarked budgets financed by user taxes and distributed back in the form of subsidies, net gains are often heterogeneous across user categories. This paper explores the role of negotiation over budget allocation and coalition formation in water boards, to provide an explanation for such user-specific gaps between tax payments and subsidies. We propose a bargaining model to represent the sequential nature of the negotiation process in water districts, in which stakeholder representatives may bargain upon a fraction of the budget only. The structural model of budget shares estimated from the data on French Water Agencies performs well as compared with reduced-form estimation. Empirical results confirm the two-stage bargaining process and provide evidence for systematic net gains from the system for agricultural water users.     

THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES

A common approach to the evaluation of the standard of living is based on a function of real income. In the United States this often takes the form of CPI-deflated mean household income. Material well-being is more appropriately evaluated using a consumption-based index. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys we find that real mean income provides an inaccurate representation of the level and trend of the standard of living relative to real per equivalent total expenditure in the postwar United States. The differences between real income and real total expenditure per household equivalent member are found at all levels of aggregation.