Taxpayers' responsiveness to tax rate changes and implications for the cost of taxation in Sweden

Historically, labor supply elasticities have been used to evaluate tax policy and predict tax revenue effects. They are likely to underestimate taxpayers' response to tax rate changes, and hence to underestimate changes in potential tax revenues, however, because they measure only how taxpayers alter hours worked. Taxpayers can also respond to tax rate changes by altering, for instance, their work effort and form of compensation. An alternative measure that accounts for these responses as well as hours worked is the elasticity of taxable income. This paper estimates the elasticity of earned taxable income for Swedish taxpayers using two different approaches and a number of control variables and the 1990/1991 tax reform as a “natural experiment”. The preferred elasticity estimates fall in the range of 0.4–0.5, comparable with recent estimates for the U.S. and larger than most of the labor supply elasticity estimates used to evaluate tax policy in Scandinavia previously, which suggests that deadweight losses are two to three times higher than previously thought. JEL Classification H21 · H24 · H31 · J22     

Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.      

Valuation before and after tax in the discrete time, finite state no arbitrage model

We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear taxation system to be neutral—within the multi-period discrete time “no arbitrage” model—in the sense that valuation is invariant to the exact sequence of tax rates, realization dates as well as immune to timing options attempting to twist the time profile of taxable income through wash sale transactions.

“In the study of investments, taxes are largely a source of embarrassment to financial economists.” (Introduction to Dybvig and Ross 1986) “Accordingly, my approach in this chapter is to examine the restrictions on the income measurement rules applicable to financial instruments implied by the requirement that the rules be linear. . . . Linearity is a desideratum of a tidy tax system.” (Bradford 2000, p. 373–374)

     

Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.      

A positive analysis of labor-market institutions and tax reforms

In this paper, we investigate the structure of the “Laffer curve” for taxes on labor and other factors of production, under different institutional frameworks of the labor market. Using a Cobb–Douglas production technology allows us to characterize important properties of the “Laffer curve” in terms of the wage share for a competitive labor market, the monopoly union model, the right-to-manage approach, the insider-dominated union, and efficient Nash bargains simultaneously. In this way, we are able to highlight the menu of factor tax systems, and thus of potential tax reforms available to a government, without perfect knowledge of the mechanism of the labor market. In particular, we show that the employment-maximizing tax system features a constant energy tax, while the energy mini-/maximizing tax system features a constant labor tax. We also illuminate to what extent these results must be modified if we either employ a CES production function, or if we allow for an endogenous reservation wage.     

Economic Growth and Inequality: Why It Matters and What's Coming Next

This article makes the case that the recent rise in income inequality in OECD countries reflects profound changes in the economic model that previously resulted in growth, prosperity, and social progress during the second half of the last century. The author begins by citing French economist Thomas Piketty's identification of the key driver of rising income inequality as the recent sharp increase in the share of national income going to capital (defined as interest, dividends and other investment returns) and the accompanying decline in the share going to labor (in the form of wages, salaries, pension, and other work‐related benefits). For most of the last 100 years, a successful balance was struck in a majority of OECD countries between the returns to capital and labor. Within the framework of nationally defined economies, labor could effectively advocate for its share of the productivity gains by capital, and governments had the ability to constrain the free movement of capital, set labor compensation standards, and redistribute income through progressive taxation. The author explores how two developments—globalization and the rise of machine intelligence—are disrupting this social contract and reshaping our economy and society. The combination of these two developments, by accelerating the flow of income to capital and away from labor, is eroding the historical relationship between capital, labor, and governments that has long prevailed in most OECD countries. As this happens, we are seeing rising income inequality and the erosion of the middle class, which had been the driver of economic growth for most of the past century. Indeed, the thesis of Piketty's book, Capital in the Twenty‐First Century, is that such an effect may well be taking us back to the pre‐20th century norm of high income inequality and low economic growth. In his closing arguments, the author suggests that avoiding this scenario will be more complicated than simply raising taxes on capital, as proposed by Piketty. It may well require a fundamental rethinking of the role of employment as the primary mechanism for income distribution in society and how we prepare our workforce for an economy and society in which the concept of work will be radically redefined.     

Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment

This paper concerns redistribution via nonlinear income taxation in an overlapping generations model with two ability-types. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by involuntary unemployment. We show that the policy instruments that are used to calculate the marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type give rise to intertemporal tax base effects. In addition, since the relationship between the employment and the capital stock implies intertemporal production inefficiency at the second best optimum, imperfect competition in the labor market may itself justify capital income taxation.      

Is sin always a sin? The interaction effect of social norms and financial incentives on market participants’ behavior

Using alcohol, tobacco, and gaming consumption data and people’s attitudes toward these sin products to proxy for social norm acceptance levels, we show a strong interaction effect between social norms and financial incentives, which significantly influence the behavior of market participants. Specifically, institutional investors’ shareholdings and analyst coverage of sin companies increase with the degree of social norm acceptance. The association between shareholdings/coverage and social norm acceptance is less pronounced for firms with higher future expected performance. Our results show that social norms and financial incentives have a powerful interaction effect in determining the behavior of market participants, suggesting that social norms can be crossed when motive and opportunity exist.     

The Impact of Financial Arrangements and Institutional Form on Housing Prices

Dwellings in housing cooperatives constitute 15% of the Norwegian housing property market. The price paid for such dwellings consists of two elements: An equity price and a share of the mutual debt held by the cooperative. The interest rate paid on the housing cooperative’s mutual debt is in Norway lower than the interest rate paid on private loans. This gives rise to an “interest discount effect”. We find convincing empirical support for the interest discount effect, which contributes to a higher equity price for dwellings in housing cooperatives than for self-owned dwellings. On the other hand, we also find empirical support for a co-op discount of 9.3%. The co-op discount work in the direction of making cooperative dwellings more affordable.     

The Shadow Margins of Labor Market Slack

We use a mix of new and existing data to develop the Aggregate Hours Gap (AHG), a novel measure of labor market underutilization. Our measure differentiates individuals by detailed categories of labor market participation and uses data on their desired work hours as a measure of their potential labor supply. We show that desired hours vary widely by demographics and detailed labor force status, and that the gap between desired and actual work hours is strongly positively correlated with reported search effort. The AHG suggests a more sluggish labor market recovery since the Great Recession than either the official unemployment rate or alternative measures of labor market underutilization. Modest amounts of underutilization among the part-time employed and a substantial degree of underutilization among those out of the labor force account for the disparity. The AHG also does well in accounting for wage movements over our sample period.     

Risk-neutral compatibility with option prices

A common problem is to choose a “risk-neutral” measure in an incomplete market in asset pricing models. We show in this paper that in some circumstances it is possible to choose a unique “equivalent local martingale measure” by completing the market with option prices. We do this by modeling the behavior of the stock price X, together with the behavior of the option prices for a relevant family of options which are (or can theoretically be) effectively traded. In doing so, we need to ensure a kind of “compatibility” between X and the prices of our options, and this poses some significant mathematical difficulties.     

Unequal wages for equal utilities

When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. Resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a “cake” as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxation. In this paper, we put forward another reason to push for regressive education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability but to the property that welfare may be a convex function of an individual’s wage. For simplicity, we assume a linear education technology and a given education budget. To give the equal wage outcome the best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is always preferable to wage equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains valid in the second-best when the feasible degree of wage differentiation is sufficiently large. This is in spite of the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any need for distortionary income taxation.     

Production complementarities and flexibility in a model of entrepreneurship

The focus of this paper is the flexibility in working hours as a motive for entrepreneurship. The model exhibits inflexibilities for workers and entrepreneurs, which arise due to complementarities in production. In addition, it allows for volatile value of leisure to make flexibility in hours desirable. Differences in occupation-specific flexibility, disciplined with the observed patterns in hours (level, persistence, dispersion) and income (persistence, dispersion), can explain relatively low income levels of entrepreneurs in the US and the occupation-specific distributions of working hours and income. Policy relevance of the model features is discussed using experiments of workweek restrictions and income taxation.     

Targeted savings and labor supply

Substantial evidence suggests that savings behavior may depart from neoclassical optimization. This article examines the implications of raising the savings rate—whether through social security, retirement plans, or otherwise—for labor supply, where labor supply is determined by behavioral utility functions that reflect the non-neoclassical character of savings behavior. Under one formulation, raising the targeted savings rate increases labor supply regardless of the slope of the labor supply curve; under a second, raising the targeted savings rate has the same effect on labor supply as that of raising the labor income tax rate; and under a third, raising the targeted savings rate has no effect on labor supply. Effects on labor supply are particularly consequential because of the significant preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation.     

Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections

Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed as an inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor markets and the taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasons for taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints rendering any taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demand for labor; (iii) market power in the supply of labor if it increases with the employment of capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tied to net real wages. It is argued that the case for taxing capital is not particularly strong. By reinterpreting capital as energy the results are applicable to the discussion about ecological tax reforms.     

Balance,growth and diversity of financial markets

A financial market comprising of a certain number of distinct companies is considered, and the following statement is proved: either a specific agent will surely beat the whole market unconditionally in the long run, or (and this “or” is not exclusive) all the capital of the market will accumulate in one company. Thus, absence of any “free unbounded lunches relative to the total capital” opportunities lead to the most dramatic failure of diversity in the market: one company takes over all other until the end of time. In order to prove this, we introduce the notion of perfectly balanced markets, which is an equilibrium state in which the relative capitalization of each company is a martingale under the physical probability. Then, the weaker notion of balanced markets is discussed where the martingale property of the relative capitalizations holds only approximately, we show how these concepts relate to growth-optimality and efficiency of the market, as well as how we can infer a shadow interest rate that is implied in the economy in the absence of a bank.      

Reform of the regulations on marginal employment lacks cohesion

Conclusion If the federal government is concerned to avoid restricting labour market dynamics in the low-income segment, it should seek a solution that tears down the ‘wall’ represented by the ceiling on marginal employment. This is not achieved by the envisaged reform concept. In fact the way forward was set out in the new government’s coalition agreement. There the government’s intention is expressed to incorporate all forms of paid employment, i.e. including self-employed activities, into the social insurance system. This would tear down the wall consisting of a high marginal tax and contribution burden that still blocks the transition from marginal work to regular part-time employment. Yet this would also require the courage to abolish flat-rate taxation in favour of an extension of individual income taxation. It seems that such a reform—as is the case with a comprehensive concept for a re-regulation of the labour market and a reform of social security—cannot be implemented in the short run. Consequently, the reform of marginal employment should be placed on the agenda of the ‘Alliance for Jobs’: these tripartite talks between employers, unions and the government, that are to be chaired by the Chancellor personally, should serve not only to bring about a reduction in German unemployment in the short-term, but also to find new, sustainable regulations for the labour market and social security. One advantage, at least, of the proposed reform of marginal employment is that it is in fact so marginal that it will not constitute an obstacle to a more comprehensive reform.     

Optimal commodity taxation with duty-free shopping

International travellers are frequently offered the opportunity to purchase a certain quantity of goods duty-free. Individuals differ in their opportunities to benefit from duty-free shopping, and we focus on the implications of these differences for optimal commodity taxation within a version of the optimal tax model of Mirrlees (Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175–208, 1971). We show how duty-free alters the constraints on the use of commodity taxes to reduce the distortionary costs of income taxation or to reflect externalities. Beyond characterising optimal taxes in the duty-free regime, we discuss conditions under which allowing duty-free would increase or reduce social welfare.