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1.
    
I adopt Hotelling's model with two firms. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and possesses a certain level of category‐specific knowledge. When a firm offers customization, consumers must interact with the firm to create their products. Consumers familiar with the brand can do this seamlessly, whereas consumers unfamiliar with the brand have difficulty expressing their individual needs (the difficulty decreases with consumers' knowledge). The firms first simultaneously decide whether to customize, then engage in price competition. Although customization makes the products less differentiated, the frictions caused by consumer co‐design activities relax price competition. Customization by one of the firms occurs in equilibrium.  相似文献   

2.
    
This note explores a vertical differentiation model with a continuous non-uniform consumers' distribution. First, a result concerning the finiteness property obtained with uniform consumers' distribution is generalized. Second, we prove an existence result of price equilibrium when the distribution is concave. Finally, we exhibit a counter-example to the existence of price equilibrium to show that the concavity assumption is not superfluous.  相似文献   

3.
Free Trade or Protection? Belgian Textile and Clothing Firms' Trade Preferences. -This paper examines the positions of Belgian textile and clothing firms on trade policies. Observations on positions are generated by a survey. Along the lines of the political economy of protection and anti-protection we test whether firm-specific characteristics influence textile and clothing firms' trade policy preferences. The results show that international competition and having foreign establishments significantly determine firms' positions, but that product differentiation does not. A Chow test indicates no significant difference between firms' sensitivities in the textile and clothing industries. This suggests that the two professional organizations should co-operate on trade issues.  相似文献   

4.
Since the early 1960s, the Pan‐Pacific coal trade has underpinned East Asia's industrial development. While the genesis of this trade lay in investment decisions by United States‐based companies that pioneered exports from Australian and western Canadian mines, its development was largely shaped by the strategies of the Japanese steel mills who acted as a buying cartel. By the early 1980s, this cartel had engineered an oversupplied market characterised by constantly falling prices. By 2001, however, this strategy proved counterproductive, as exports of coking coal in particular were concentrated in the hands of an oligopoly of super‐efficient producers that drove up prices.  相似文献   

5.
Collusive Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities. — A homogenous-goods Cournot model with two countries and two firms is analyzed. Firms may collude by monopolizing their domestic markets, but they may also engage in collusive intra-industry trade. It turns out that, though such trade is costly because of transportation costs, firms might indeed trade since this enlarges the scope of successful collusion. Hence, intra-industry trade in homogenous goods is not a reliable indicator of competition.  相似文献   

6.
    
A “collusion puzzle” exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential toward an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects.  相似文献   

7.
    
We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play. We examine two methodological questions which affect many studies of communication in games, particularly those studying the relationship between communication and cooperation in supergames. We show that making it easier for subjects to reach an agreement (by allowing more rounds of communication) does not increase cooperation with a limited message space treatment. Thus, limited message space treatments are not a good substitute for the use of chat. Making the game longer, thereby making the connection between the first period and the continuation game more obvious, also has little impact on cooperation. For both the two‐ and three‐period versions of our game we find substantial amounts of contingent play. This implies that use of a finitely repeated game, which has a number of methodological advantages, maintains the main properties of the underlying supergame.  相似文献   

8.
    
In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In the present paper, we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002), defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.  相似文献   

9.
    
We report the results of duopoly market experiments where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices. The theoretical literature pertaining to these duopoly models suggests that the way residual demand is rationed is fundamental to the character of equilibrium outcomes when capacity costs are sufficiently low. The experiments test this prediction by varying capacity cost and demand‐rationing schemes. We find that residual demand rationing does not significantly impact the capacity choices of experimental subjects, although it does affect pricing. Regardless of rationing scheme, the Cournot outcome is common with high capacity costs and rare with low capacity costs.  相似文献   

10.
    
The Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game, but less so in later stages. We show that a new model, coarse grid Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space, explains the data better.  相似文献   

11.
    
This study aims to describe the evolution of the organisational structure of raw agricultural product markets in West African countries (the supply may be regarded as fixed) using microeconomic models to assess the evolution of the farm gate price; and focusing on the impact of the vertical integration of some firms on the producer price. This paper shows that the evolution of the commercial organisational structure of agricultural products has led to a gradual improvement in the producer price. It also shows that whatever the degree of vertical integration on these markets, it has a positive impact on the farm gate price. However, even if vertical integration also improves the price of agricultural input on the intermediary market, the intermediary firms undergo a deteriorating situation.  相似文献   

12.
    
The paper investigates the optimal research and development (R&D) policy in a vertically differentiated market with managerial delegation. We consider not only discriminatory R&D policy but uniform R&D policy as well. It shows that R&D policy can vary depending on the regulator's objective: social welfare, consumer surplus or producer surplus; however, the outcomes are invariant to the nature of market competition. Undoubtedly, the relative‐performance contract plays a crucial role for elaborating policy effects. The government prefers discriminatory R&D policy to uniform policy under a consumer‐oriented objective. On the contrary, under a producer‐oriented objective, the government would prefer to choose uniform R&D policy rather than discriminatory policy.  相似文献   

13.
    
We analyze the optimal pricing choice of an incumbent firm that sells a good with network externalities and is threatened by the entry of a higher intrinsic quality variant. In the framework of a vertical differentiation model, we find a necessary and sufficient condition under which intrinsic quality improvement occurs as a result of this competition.  相似文献   

14.
    
This paper investigates the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. A Cournot model of firm behavior is used in which prices adjust according to a partial adjustment mechanism. The model is applied to panel data of the Indonesian food and beverages industry over the period 1995–2006. The results suggest that industrial concentration has a positive effect on percentage price changes. Furthermore, the speed of price adjustment is higher when the per unit cost of production rises.  相似文献   

15.
Unlike other colonial economies, Korea industrialised rapidly during its colonial period, which past scholars attributed to the industrialisation policy directed by the Japanese colonial government between 1930 and 1945. Our analysis of factory labour productivity from 1913 to 1937 suggests significant revisions to this claim. Factory labour productivity as well as total production grew rapidly before the active intervention of the colonial government. In addition, Korean entrepreneurs invested heavily in their firms and successfully competed with Japanese entrepreneurs. We conjecture that the pre-war experience of Korean entrepreneurs provided a critical foundation for the post-colonial economic growth.  相似文献   

16.
    
This article examines recent claims about the necessity of integrity in agency relationships by putting agents with preferences that reflect integrity in an evolutionary competition with opportunistic agents. Corporate culture is modeled through a process of assortative matching between principal and agent types (via industry or group effects). This leads to a characterization of corporate governance where integrity is linked with value creation.  相似文献   

17.
    
Multinational firms are increasingly sending their innovative tasks abroad. This article examines whether offshoring research and development, design, and engineering activities provides any gains in terms of firm‐level innovation output. The effects of trade in innovative tasks on the probability of firms being innovative and the share of innovative product sales in total turnover are examined using an instrumental variable approach. The data in use come from a recent survey, which provides cross‐section observations for more than 14,750 firms in seven European countries. The results suggest that those firms that offshore their innovative activities are 60% more likely to successfully innovate. Also, offshoring innovative activities increases the share of innovative product sales in total turnover up to 35%. Furthermore, firms in this sample appear to gain from trade in innovative tasks when such trade is in product innovation but not when such trade is in process innovation.  相似文献   

18.
    
This note is a comment to Wang (2008)'s contribution in the SAJE (Vol. 76 (3)). We show that when firms' strategic variables are prices and not quantities, Wang's findings are largely reversed. In particular, the foreign government levies an export tax on its producer as opposed to an export subsidy. Further, both the “optimal tax” and the domestic welfare are non‐monotonic in the degree of product differentiation.  相似文献   

19.
    
In this paper we reconsider existence of Bertrand equilibrium in a symmetric‐cost, homogenous‐product oligopoly. We prove the following main results. (a) If the cost function is strictly superadditive on [0, ∞) then there exists a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium. Such Bertrand equilibria are necessarily non‐unique. (b) If the cost function is strictly subadditive on [0, ∞) then there exists no Bertrand equilibrium, either in pure strategies or in mixed strategies.  相似文献   

20.
This paper investigates aggregate price shocks on financial stability in the United Kingdom. We construct an annual index of UK financial conditions for 1790-1999 and use a dynamic probit model to estimate the effect of shocks on the index. We find evidence that price level shocks contributed significantly to financial instability during 1820-1931 and that inflation rate shocks contributed to instability during 1931-1999. While affecting the stability of the financial system, both the nature of aggregate price shocks and their impact depend on the existing monetary and financial regime.  相似文献   

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