Creating Value Through Best‐In‐Class Capital Allocation1

With the economy showing signs of recovery, companies are shifting their focus from liquidity and balance sheet concerns back towards capital allocation and value creation. This article provides a comprehensive framework to examine shareholder value creation through capital allocation, and discusses important capital allocation lessons that have re‐emerged over the last few years. Notable among the key lessons are the following:

• ? Growth alone does not guarantee value creation, which suggests that companies should allocate capital based on the economic value of each investment opportunity.
• ? The limits of diversification in a financial crisis should be considered when allocating capital and managing liquidity.
• ? Companies should be conservative with base‐case cash flow projections and incorporate the possibility of downside scenarios into their projections.
• ? It is important to incorporate all forms of capital when managing liquidity.
• ? Whether using a long‐term or current‐market approach, companies should be consistent throughout the cycle in their cost of capital methodology.
• ? Companies should continually rethink investments and allocate capital in an attempt to maintain a competitive advantage.
• ? Evaluate returns relative to risk and cost of capital, and not against the company's average ROIC.
• ? Comparing the IRR of share repurchases to new investments is not an apples‐to‐apples comparison.

Finally, companies should concentrate on the strategic uses and value of particular assets and not allow their decisions to be driven by the value they might receive relative to their initial cost.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable* Reforming the OTC Derivatives Markets

In investigations of the causes of the crisis, a major focus has been the role of derivative securities, particularly credit-default swaps (CDS). Despite widespread claims to the contrary, however, the 51 economists who signed this statement begin by asserting that CDS and other derivatives contracts were not a primary cause of the financial crisis. At the same time, derivatives markets are said to play an important economic role by shifting risks from businesses and individual investors to parties more willing (and generally better able) to bear them. But, as illustrated during the crisis, derivatives also can be used to transmit risk in ways that have the potential to pervade the entire financial system. With the aim of limiting systemic risk associated with the use of derivatives, the statement recommends the following:

• • measures that encourage migration of more derivatives transactions to central-clearing facilities, including higher capital requirements and stricter criteria (including segregation) for the collateralization of positions that are not cleared;
• • data reporting and repository requirements designed to help regulators and market participants to understand systemic risk exposures in the financial system;
• • post-trade price transparency for all sufficiently standardized OTC products;
• • continued migration of trading in actively traded OTC products to exchanges.

Finally, although the economists support regulations against market manipulation, they oppose potential restrictions on speculative trading, including the holding of “naked” CDS, while affirming that both hedging and speculation are important and socially beneficial activities in our financial system.     

The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Accomplishments and Limitations*

The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is widely described as the most ambitious and far‐reaching overhaul of financial regulation in the United States since the 1930s. Together with other regulatory reforms introduced by regulatory agencies globally, the Act aims to put an end to the too‐big‐to‐fail problem and is expected to alter the structure of financial markets in profound ways. This article provides an overall assessment of the Act in three different ways: first, in light of first economic principles, or how theory suggests we should regulate the financial sector, given the systemic risk externality each financial firm imposes on other firms and the rest of the economy; second, from a comparative perspective that views the proposed reforms in relation to those undertaken in the 1930s following the Great Depression; and, finally, in the form of an assessment of how the proposed reforms would have fared in preventing and dealing with the crisis of 2007–2009 had they been in place at the time. The article also highlights key areas that are left wholly or partly unaddressed by the Dodd‐Frank Act—notably, the pricing of explicit and implicit government guarantees; dealing with inevitable opportunities for the financial sector to engage in regulatory arbitrage; and containing the systemic risk arising from collections of small institutions and markets such as money market funds and repo contracts.     

Clearing and Collateral Mandates: A New Liquidity Trap?

All too often, legislative solutions to some financial crisis have serious consequences that are both unwanted and unintended. The author of this article foresees several possible negative consequences arising from Title VII of the Dodd‐Frank Act, which mandates that eligible derivatives be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs) that require initial and variation margin. The new legislation also requires that the remaining non‐cleared derivatives that are traded by some market participants be more heavily collateralized. The Act's authors have argued that derivatives pose uniquely dangerous systemic risks because of the leverage and counterparty risk associated with them. Increased collateralization, their thinking goes, would reduce derivatives‐related leverage and the systemic risk to the financial system associated with such leverage. The author argues that these hopes are unduly optimistic because they fail to recognize how market participants can substitute other forms of leverage, such as bank lines of credit or collateral transformation trades, for the leverage derivatives provided previously. The author also believes that the larger collateral mandates and frequent marking‐to‐market will make the financial system more vulnerable since margin requirements tend to be “pro‐cyclical.” And more rigid collateralization mechanisms can restrict the supply of funding liquidity, and lead to spikes in funding liquidity demand that can reduce the liquidity of traded instruments and generate destabilizing feedback loops. The fragmentation of CCPs across jurisdictions and products will lead to greater demand for CCP‐eligible collateral to maintain the same level of hedging transactions. This demand will likely be met by using riskier assets as collateral and encourage the shadow banking system to create new assets that can be posted as collateral (for example, via collateral transformation services). In sum, although the Dodd‐Frank rules are intended to reduce systemic risk, their expected impact on liquidity makes it a very open question as to whether they will achieve this goal. Although they may reduce some risks, they will simply shift others while possibly creating new ones.     

Liquidity operations during the financial crisis 2008/09: evidence from the relations between Korean won onshore and offshore markets

This paper addresses the interrelation of onshore and offshore markets before and after the Bank of Korea intervened in 2008/09. During the financial crisis, Korea faced a liquidity crunch and leveraged its high level of reserves to conduct swap agreements in late 2008. To analyse how the reforms affected the mean and volatility spillover in between the spot and NDF markets, an extended GARCH model is used. The main findings of this paper are that prior to the financial crisis, the spot market dominated the offshore market. This changed after South Korea addressed the won’s liquidity crunch at the height of the crisis. Mean and volatility spillover between the markets diminished and the price gap narrowed. In addition to the empirical results, the paper also underlines the significance of liquidity and robust capital requirements for central banks.     

COVID-19 as a stress test: Assessing the bank regulatory framework

The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable on the International Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets

The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation issued an Interim Report (known as the “Paulson Report”) near the end of 2006 that concluded that the U.S. “is losing its leading competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers abroad.” This report was quickly followed by a study, which reached similar conclusions, that was commissioned by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer and prepared by McKinsey & Co. At its July 2007 annual meeting, the Financial Economists Roundtable (FER) — a group of senior financial economists at universities and other organizations recognized as having made significant contributions to the finance literature—discussed the issues raised by the Report and decided to publish its own report. The report makes the following four policy recommendations:

• 1 Securities class action suits —Abolish enterprise liability under rule 10b‐5 in situations arising out of security purchases and sales in the secondary trading market among outside shareholders, while retaining managerial and firm liability where the company itself or its insiders (officers and directors) transact to their own benefit. Imposing massive liability on a company that is not a party to the securities transactions and does not benefit from the fraud does not serve a deterrence function since it is the continuing shareholders of the corporation who bear the burden of what the company must pay if found guilty, either directly or indirectly through insurance premiums.
• 2 Shareholder rights—Require all corporations to obtain shareholder approval to adopt a poison pill, regardless of whether a company has a staggered board. This requirement would conform to the broad principle that the board of any company should not be able to deny its shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover bid, and it would help restore the market for corporate control as an effective disciplinary mechanism for poorly performing boards and managers.
• 3 Compliance costs associated with SOX §404—Adopt a statutory amendment that makes it optional for a company to adopt the §404 procedures for a management assessment and auditor attestation of the effectiveness of its internal controls, with the requirement that if the company chooses not to comply it must explain why in its financial statements. Thus, in effect, the FER effectively recommends that the market be allowed to determine the value of §404 compliance. If a company chooses not to comply, the market will assess its explanation for non‐compliance and will value the company accordingly.
• 4 Maintaining open markets—Allow both foreign and U.S. firms to choose to report in conformity with either IFRS or U.S. GAAP. The FER recognizes both IFRS and U.S. GAAP as high‐quality accounting standards that provide reasonable foundations for financial reporting for investors. Allowing both foreign and U.S. firms to adopt whichever of these standards they believe to be the most cost‐effective provides an opportunity for the market and investors themselves to sort out which reporting standard best serves their interests.

     

Private Equity: Boom and Bust?

The private equity or leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe and the U.S. has grown enormously over the last two decades, from $7.5 billion in 1991 to $500 billion in 2006. Much of the financing of recent transactions has come in the form of syndicated debt, which is dispersed after origination to many non‐bank financial institutions. This financing practice has two important possible consequences: First, bankers' incentives to engage in effective ex‐ante screening and ex‐post monitoring of deals have been weakened, which may have led to excessive lending while encouraging buyers to overpay. Consistent with this possibility, the authors provide new evidence that some recent transactions have occurred at very low EBITDA‐to‐capital ratios, financed with high levels of debt that recall those of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, there is a scarcity of information about the identity of the ultimate holders of the LBO debt; and as a consequence of the resulting uncertainty, a few defaults of major LBO deals could cause a drying up of new funding for financial institutions. The end result could be that the veil covering the repackaging of LBO debt converts a small shock to the LBO sector into a liquidity crisis for its financiers. Such liquidity problems could in turn affect not the financing and re‐financing of just LBO deals, but other as set classes as well, including lending by banks to public firms. The authors offer a number of suggestions for increasing the transparency of this market.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

The liquidity impact on firm values: The evidence of Taiwan's banking industry

Liquidity plays an important role in financial markets, especially during a financial crisis. New Basel III regulatory framework highlights the importance of liquidity risk management implemented by financial institutions. Moreover, updated International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require the improvements about fair value measurements and reinforce existing principles for disclosures about the liquidity risk associated with financial instruments. Using the liquidity discount model of Chen (2012), we are able to empirically classify Taiwan's financial institutions into three liquidity categories: safe, crisis contagious and vulnerable. Our findings can serve as an early warning signal for liquidity calamity. In addition, we investigate what factors affect firm-specific liquidity discounts for these institutions and conduct a sub-period analysis, which examines whether there is significant liquidity discounts changes before and after the 2008 financial crisis. We find that liquidity discounts change substantially during the financial crisis. Furthermore, we find that liquidity discounts can be attributed to some firm-specific performance.     

Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the euro area

This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014. We use novel data on interbank transactions derived from TARGET2, the main euro area payment system. To identify exogenous shocks to central bank liquidity, we exploit the timing of ECB liquidity operations and use a simple structural vector auto-regression framework. We argue that the ECB acted as a de facto lender-of-last-resort to the euro area banking system and identify two main effects of central bank liquidity provision on interbank markets. First, central bank liquidity replaces the demand for liquidity in the interbank market, especially during the financial crisis (2008–2010). Second, it increases the supply of liquidity in the interbank market in stressed countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis (2011–2013).     

金融稳定视角下的对冲基金监管框架研究

进入新世纪以来,在低利率环境下对冲基金规模、市场影响和行业特征发生了一系列重要变化。从金融稳定视角看,对冲基金既可以基于不受直接监管的特点,向市场注入流动性,充当系统性风险"缓释器",也可以因高杠杆、隐蔽的操作直接或间接触发市场危机。为趋利避害,在构建对冲基金监管框架时,应遵循如下原则,一是避免直接限制对冲基金投资活动和风险管理细节,防止对其像共同基金或银行那样实施监管;二是在把握对冲基金市场影响传导机制的基础上控制监督关键变量,提高预警能力;三是在多元治理视角下,努力引导加强市场纪律。     

Quantifying preferential trading in the e-MID interbank market

Interbank markets allow credit institutions to exchange capital for purposes of liquidity management. These markets are among the most liquid markets in the financial system. However, liquidity of interbank markets dropped during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and such a lack of liquidity influenced the entire economic system. In this paper, we analyse transaction data from the e-MID market which is the only electronic interbank market in the Euro Area and US, over a period of 11 years (1999–2009). We adapt a method developed to detect statistically validated links in a network, in order to reveal preferential trading in a directed network. Preferential trading between banks is detected by comparing empirically observed trading relationships with a null hypothesis that assumes random trading among banks doing a heterogeneous number of transactions. Preferential trading patterns are revealed at time windows of 3-maintenance periods. We show that preferential trading is observed throughout the whole period of analysis and that the number of preferential trading links does not show any significant trend in time, in spite of a decreasing trend in the number of pairs of banks making transactions. We observe that preferential trading connections typically involve large trading volumes. During the crisis, we also observe that transactions occurring between banks with a preferential connection occur at larger interest rates than the complement set—an effect that is not observed before the crisis.     

金融危机后的资产证券化法律监管

作为一种金融创新工具,资产证券化在金融危机中遭受质疑和约束。在相关国际金融组织及主要发达国家的努力下,资产证券化正在逐步得以恢复。要保障资产证券化的健康发展,就必须对资产证券化监管法律制度进行改革。对资产证券化监管的首要目标是维护金融安全,对金融效率、金融自由的追求必须符合维护金融安全的要求。相关国际组织及一些国家资产证券化监管法律制度改革的实践表明：金融安全是金融监管的逻辑起点。     

THE EFFECTS OF BANK CONSOLIDATION ON RISK CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We investigate the effects of financial market consolidation on the allocation of risk capital in a financial institution and the implications for market liquidity in dealership markets. An increase in financial market consolidation can increase liquidity in foreign exchange and government securities markets. We assume that financial institutions use risk‐management tools in the allocation of risk capital and that capital is determined at the firm level and allocated among separate business lines or divisions. The ability of market makers to supply liquidity is influenced by their risk‐bearing capacity, which is directly related to the amount of risk capital allocated to this activity.     

CARE/CEASA Roundtable on: Liquidity and Capital Management

Five distinguished banking and accounting scholars explore the role of liquidity at not only the “macro” level of the economy, but also at the level of individual companies. The first of the four main speakers, who is the author of the preceding article, restates his argument that the stability of financial systems can be increased by directing bank regulators and executives to find the optimal combination of liquidity and capital requirements. The second of the four speakers shifts the focus to liquidity management by non‐financial companies, with particular emphasis on their use of lines of credit and their role in helping companies weather the financial crisis. The third speaker places liquidity in the context of capital markets, and presents suggestive evidence that improvements in corporate disclosure and transparency have beneficial effects on both the level and volatility of liquidity in those markets. The panel is rounded out by a discussion of liquidity in corporate bond markets and the proposal of a new way to measure such liquidity.     

The Creditor Channel of Liquidity Crises

This paper presents a model to study the transmission of liquidity shocks across financial institutions through the creditor channel. In the model, a borrower institution obtains funds from a large institutional lender and small investors. When the large lender's asset market is hit by a liquidity shock, it might decide to withdraw funding extended to the borrower. The potential withdrawal by the large lender causes small investors to panic and to close positions even if the large lender does not. Facing funding problems, the borrower has to cut its activities, contributing to further shocks to the supply of market liquidity. The original shock is exacerbated, which reinforces withdrawals by all creditors. The model helps explain how the spreading of liquidity shocks from the broker–dealer sector to the hedge fund sector and the feedback contribute to a systemic crisis.     

What drives investment bank performance? The role of risk,liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis

This paper examines factors that affect the performance of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland. In particular, we focus on the role of risk, liquidity and investment banking fees. Panel analysis shows that those variables significantly impact upon performance as derived from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Given our sample also comprises the financial crisis, we further test for regime switches using dynamic panel threshold analysis. Results show different underlying regimes, in particular over the financial crisis. In addition, a strong positive effect of Z-Score on performance for banks in the regime of low default risk is reported, while fee-income ratio has also a positive impact for banks with low level of fees. On the other hand, liquidity exerts a negative impact. Notably, there is a clear trend of mobility of banks across the two identified threshold regimes with regard to risk a year before the financial crisis. Our results provide evidence that recent regulation reforms regarding capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are on the right track and could enhance performance.     

美国资产支持证券市场结构与次按危机解析

美国次按危机不仅给世界多家金融巨擎造成巨大损失,甚至险些在世界范围内酿成了一场全面的流动性危机。文章从信贷资产证券化发起机构、CDO发起流程、信用评级的制定及下调原理,流动性危机的成因这一逻辑顺序全面回顾了美国资产支持证券市场的运作机制以及次贷危机产生的根源,以期为深入研究次级债问题提供参考。     

The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons*

The author argues that the root cause of the recent crisis was a housing bubble whose origins can be traced to loose monetary policy and a government housing policy that continually pushed for lower lending standards to increase home ownership. The negative consequences of such policies were amplified when transmitted throughout the financial system by financial institutions through the process of securitization. In attempting to assess culpability for the crisis and identify possible reforms, the author focuses on three categories:

• 1 Defects in Financial Products: Without criticizing derivatives and the process of securitization, the author identifies the sheer complexity of the securities as a major source of the problem—for which the solution is a simpler security design combined with greater disclosure about the underlying assets being securitized.
• 2 Defects in Risk Management: Thanks in large part to agency and other incentive problems, there was universal underestimation of risks by mortgage originators and financial institutions throughout the securitization chain. Changing incentive pay structures is part of the solution, and so are better accounting rules for SPEs. But more effective regulatory oversight and ending “too big to fail” may well be the only way to curb excessive private risk-taking.
• 3 Defects in Government Policy and Regulation: While acknowledging the need for more effective oversight, the author argues that there was ample existing authority for U.S. regulators to have addressed these issues. Lack of power and authority to regulate was not at the heart of the problem—the real problem was lack of foresight and judgment about the unexpected. After expressing doubt that regulators can prevent major financial failures, the author recommends greater attention to devising better methods of resolving such failures when they occur. One of the main goals is to ensure that losses are borne not by taxpayers but by private investors in a way that maintains incentives for market discipline while limiting spillover costs to the entire system.