Entry and the accumulation of capital: A two state variable extension to the Ramsey model

In this paper we consider the entry and exit of firms in a dynamic general equilibrium model with capital. At the firm level, there is a fixed cost combined with increasing marginal cost, which gives a standard U‐shaped cost curve with optimal firm size. Entry is determined by a free entry condition such that the cost of entry is equal to the present value of incumbent firms. The cost of entry (exit) depends on the flow of entry (exit). Equilibrium is saddle‐point stable and the stable manifold is two‐dimensional. Transitional dynamics can, under certain circumstances, be non‐monotonic.     

The dynamics of outsourcing: From labor cost‐saving to preference‐based outsourcing

Jones's (2000) celebrated book has inspired a generation of work devoted to understanding the causes and consequences of outsourcing. While much of this work has focused on the outsourcing versus domestic production decision of the firm, with labor cost‐saving as the key driver for outsourcing, we further explore how preference‐based outsourcing may arise in a dynamic world equilibrium. We address this problem in a North–South model in which the outsourcing decision depends not only on labor costs but also on information about local preferences that arise with outsourcing. As the South develops, demand for manufactured goods becomes more important, so identifying specific tastes of Southern consumers matters more. As a result, preference‐based outsourcing displaces cost‐saving outsourcing. Our quantitative analysis indicates that, as both agricultural and manufacturing technologies grow over time, the dynamic world equilibrium switches from the export regime to the cost‐saving outsourcing regime, and eventually to the preference‐based outsourcing regime.     

中国导游服务规范化过程的三方动态博弈分析

导游服务质量的管理和提升是一个系统工程,需要旅游主管部门和旅游业各大主体之间相互管理、相互监督、相互促进,进行长期的动态博弈。以旅游主管部门、旅游企业、导游人员为博弈主体,构建导游服务规范化过程的三方动态博弈模型。通过博弈树和支付矩阵来分析博弈过程中各方的收益,并在此基础上得出该三方博弈的混合策略纳什均衡,然后对博弈的均衡解进行分析,为导游服务规范化提供建议。     

A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations

We consider a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union. Governments (fiscal policies) pursue national goals while the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objectives. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank. We consider conflicting (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) and coordinated policy-making (cooperative Pareto solutions). We show that there is a trade-off between the deviations of instruments and targets from desired paths; the volatility of output and inflation increases when private agents react more strongly to changes in actual inflation.     

游戏产业发展趋势的演化博弈分析

以单机游戏及网络游戏为主要研究对象,通过探讨电脑游戏市场的两种竞争产品,若其一具有网络效应,而另一不具网络效应时,分析游戏厂商在选择所要开发产品时的动态均衡,以此来探讨我国游戏产业的发展趋势。     

银行卡收费问题的博弈分析与对策建议

文章首先从完全且完美信息动态博弈假设出发给出了银行卡收费博弈模型,并运用逆推归纳法得出不同前提条件下的博弈均衡状态,然后采用有限理性和进化博弈对银行卡收费的合理性进行分析,得出以下基本结论：银行卡收费是有限理性的银行通过长期反复博弈、学习和调整策略的结果,所有的银行最终都会进行银行卡收费;目前一些中小银行为了追求规模经济效益实施免费只是短期的行为,从长期发展的角度看银行卡收费将是必然选择。     

国有住宅用地“双限”拍卖的竞价博弈模型

本文把国有住宅用地的“双限”拍卖构造成不完全信息竞价博弈模型,把房地产开发企业的资金机会成本和资金效率作为企业的类型。在一般效用函数形式下,本文求解了这个博弈的Bayesian Nash均衡。在均衡条件下,竞价企业的策略是企业类型参数的单调函数。     

领导任职期限设置的经济解释--激励与效率损失的权衡

领导任职期限制度能激励个人在管理技能培养上进行投入,这有利于增加社会总剩余;然而,任职期限制度在提供激励的同时,也造成了潜在效率的损失。领导任职期限的设置是这二者之间权衡的结果。本文通过一个两阶段博弈的分析框架,利用动态的局部均衡权衡模型,从个人收益最大化和社会总剩余最大化的相互作用中,推导出了社会最优的领导任职期限。在我们的动态的局部均衡权衡模型中,个人投入水平是任职期限制度的内生产物。     

Communication and Cooperation: A Methodological Study

We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play. We examine two methodological questions which affect many studies of communication in games, particularly those studying the relationship between communication and cooperation in supergames. We show that making it easier for subjects to reach an agreement (by allowing more rounds of communication) does not increase cooperation with a limited message space treatment. Thus, limited message space treatments are not a good substitute for the use of chat. Making the game longer, thereby making the connection between the first period and the continuation game more obvious, also has little impact on cooperation. For both the two‐ and three‐period versions of our game we find substantial amounts of contingent play. This implies that use of a finitely repeated game, which has a number of methodological advantages, maintains the main properties of the underlying supergame.     

Intertemporally dependent preferences and optimal dynamic behavior

We study a model of optimal dynamic behavior in which the intertemoral preferences preserve the time additively separable framework of Ramsey models, while exhibiting Edgeworth–Pareto complementarity between consumption in adjacent periods. We identify economic environments in which global optimal dynamics under intertemporal complementarity exhibits persistent fluctuations even though the misspecified Ramsey-type theory, under the intertemporal independence assumption, predicts monotone convergence.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

An approach to intertemporal equilibrium with production

Conclusion This paper is devoted to considering the implications of intertemporal economic equilibrium in a model with production. To this end, a differential game with a Leontief technology is formulated. In the two-person zero-sum game, it was found that an intertemporal equilibrium is feasible. Furthermore, it was found to be decentralizable, with a required informational exchange mechanism no more onerous than in other decentralized procedures, including the tatonnement processes.In the non-zero-sum case decentralization is impossible for closed loop solutions. The interaction of the strategy sets introduces externalities even when production technology is convex. Finally, while a Nash solution is guaranteed, Pareto optimality requires a two-stage optimization approach.This paper was presented at the International Conference of the Atlantic Economic Society held in Vienna, Austria, May 10–18, 1979.     

Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game model of two identical countries. Policy-makers of both countries have quadratic intertemporal objective functions and want to stabilize domestic output, domestic inflation, and the real rate of exchange. We present different analytical and numerical solutions for this policy game. Noncooperative open-loop equilibria are interpreted as requiring unilateral commitment and policy-makers' credibility. Potential gains from cooperation are present, as the noncooperative equilibrium solutions are not Pareto-optimal. Under an information pattern that admits memory strategies, the possibility of obtaining cooperative results without coordination and commitment arises.     

Indeterminacy and Pollution Haven Hypothesis in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper develops a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which production activities are accompanied by pollution emissions that have a negative effect on welfare. It is shown that the dynamic equilibrium may display indeterminacy (i.e., continuum of dynamic equilibrium paths converging to a common steady state), depending on (i) the relationship between capital intensity and pollution intensity, (ii) the property of households’ discount rate as a function of total pollution, and (iii) the pollution-consumption relationship in instantaneous utility. In addition, the effect of environmental policy on the economy’s comparative advantage and its relation to indeterminacy are examined.     

Variety,Globalization, and Social Efficiency

The standard formal presentation of the Dixit‐Stiglitz‐Krugman (DSK) model of monopolistic competition with a constant‐elasticity‐of‐substitution (CES) utility function supposes a sufficient number of firms so that the elasticity of demand facing each variety is approximated by a constant elasticity of substitution. Such a formulation forces economies of scale to be frozen so that firm size never changes. We use a Bertrand‐Nash interpretation of the equilibrium that allows the elasticity of demand facing each variety to depend on the number of varieties, thus allowing the gains from globalization to reflect both the increase in variety and the exploitation of economies of scale. We also develop a precise expression for per capita real income with any number of sectors and examine the age‐old question of the socially optimal number of varieties.     

城乡统一建设用地市场形成的动力机制研究

"土地城镇化"模式下城乡土地利益结构失衡问题日趋严重,强制性构建城乡统一建设用地市场的目标在短期内较难实现,而在诱致性制度变迁的推动下,由农民自发组成、得到政府支持、有限度的城乡统一建设用地市场是可能的。文章从制度变迁的博弈均衡视角出发,结合地方政府与中央政府、开发商、农村基层政权和农民四组博弈,探讨推动城乡统一建设用地市场形成的动力机制,为其破除制度障碍和减少改革阻力提供理论基础。     

Pass or Run: An Empirical Test of the Matching Pennies Game Using Data from the National Football League

This article examines play calling in the National Football League (NFL). It finds that a mixed strategy equilibrium game explains NFL play calling better than standard optimization techniques. When a quarterback is injured and replaced with a less capable backup, standard optimization theory suggests that the offense will run more often, passing less. Our game theoretic model predicts that the offense will not change its play calling because the defense will play against the run more often. Using every first half play from the 11 teams that had a starting quarterback miss action because of injury in the 2006 season, we find that the injury did not alter the likelihood that the offense would pass. We also find that coaches randomly mix passing and running plays, as the mixed strategy games predict.     

Sustainability with endogenous discounting

We construct a dynamic competitive model with a stock of human‐made capital and several stocks of natural resources and ask under what conditions consumption will be constant if infinitesimal households with heterogeneous preferences and endowments discount their utility at an endogenous rate that depends on some macroeconomic variables. We show that for consumption to be constant, this function must be the marginal product of capital function. We demonstrate that Hartwick's rule holds in a modified form that takes account of natural growth of resource stocks.     

供求冲击与人民币汇率的波动：基于DSGE两国模型的模拟分析

为分析人民币汇率的波动,本文应用当前新开放经济学主流的动态随机一般均衡两国模型的研究方法,通过引入垄断竞争的市场结构和粘性的价格调整方式,模拟了在以技术冲击为代表的供给冲击和以货币冲击为代表的需求冲击下汇率的波动,进而用来拟合人民币汇率的波动。结果表明相对于需求冲击,供给冲击对人民币汇率波动的拟合比较好,这表明“巴拉萨-萨缪尔森”效应是解释和预测人民币汇率波动的合理途径,也给我国的人民币汇率稳定政策提供了明确的导向。     

What Drives Ireland’s Housing Market? A Bayesian DSGE Approach

We study the drivers of fluctuations in the Irish housing market by developing and estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of Ireland as a member of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU). We estimate the model with Bayesian methods using time series for both Ireland and the rest of the EMU for the period from 1997:Q1 to 2008:Q2. We find that housing preference and technology shocks are the main drivers of fluctuations in house prices and residential investment. A standard regression analysis shows that a good part of the variation of housing preference shocks can be explained by unmodeled demand factors that have been considered in the empirical literature as important determinants of Irish house prices.