Disclosure “Bunching”

This paper studies managers' preferences among information acquisition and disclosure policies when their firms are required to engage in “real‐time” or “continuous” financial reporting. The paper predicts that for many, but not all, processes describing the distribution of their firms' cash flows, when subject to such reporting requirements, managers will engage in disclosure “bunching,” that is, they will bunch the discretionary component of the information they acquire and disclose into a single point in time rather than spread the acquisition and disclosure of that information over time. We show that managers' preferred bunching period depends on managers' strategy for trading in their firms' shares, managers' risk aversion, the risk premium the capital market attaches to firms' shares, and the size of managers' initial ownership stakes in their firms. We also study and characterize how the equilibrium prices of firms' shares vary over time and also how managers' optimal trading strategies vary with their most preferred “bunching” strategies. Several extensions confirm the robustness of the optimality of disclosure “bunching.”     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Examining “The quantified customer”

Accounting has not escaped The Customer's influence in contemporary organizations. Calls have been made for a quantitative knowledge that installs a new calculable space in the name of The Customer. In an organizational setting, a UK sudsidiary of Unilever, the paper traces first the introduction of this quantitative knowledge. The paper examines the order of “The Quantified Customer”, its effects on organizational action, and its disciplinary implications. But this enquiry also uncovers a rival knowledge of The Customer. The resistant local knowledge is mobilized against the new calculable space—changing the trajectory of events.     

“Lucas” in the Laboratory

We study the Lucas asset pricing model in a controlled setting. Participants trade two long‐lived securities in a continuous open‐book system. The experimental design emulates the stationary, infinite‐horizon setting of the model and incentivizes participants to smooth consumption across periods. Consistent with the model, prices align with consumption betas and comove with aggregate dividends, particularly so when risk premia are higher. Trading significantly increases consumption smoothing compared to autarky. Nevertheless, as in field markets, prices are excessively volatile. The noise corrupts traditional generalized method of moment tests. Choices display substantial heterogeneity, with no subject representative for pricing.     

The accounting of “The Meeting”: Examining calculability within a “Fluid” local space

This study traces events in an empirical setting where a key local space, “The Meeting”, was made calculable. Building on field data from interviews and documentary sources at ABB Industry/Finland, the study theorizes in the interpretive genre, elaborating on the notion of the calculable space. It argues the following: Accounting can be extended into un-formalized and more elusive local spaces – into “fluid” spaces which are not clearly mapped within the organizational hierarchy, and which lie beyond recognized responsibility units or physically distinct cells at the factory floor. By opening visibility into the discretion of these “fluid” local spaces, a tighter alignment between programmatic ideals and real action at the organizational grass-root can be achieved. Self-devised non-financial measurement, mediating local tensions and the interests of “autonomous” actors, becomes the technology of government in this process of normalization – which is, however, not to be acknowledged as being unproblematic.     

“Informing” technologies and the World Bank

The current study examines how the World Bank uses an assemblage of information generation and reporting practices, bounded by accounting/financial expertises, to attempt to influence the practices associated with administering education in Latin America. Starting from the premise that these “informing” technologies make the objects of governance knowable in terms of accounting and financial expertises, we consider how accounting practices embedded within lending agreements enable, translate and regulate behaviour. Focusing on the institutional field(s) of basic education, the study offers an in-depth analysis of 15 World Bank loan agreements from across the region, plus 25 interviews with field participants from a single Latin American country. We examine how the World Bank lending agreements install a variety of informing technologies across a network of agents in Latin America. We propose that such agreements can be viewed as technologies of governance in that they diffuse financial technologies to distant fields, re-structure the habitus of these fields, and serve to reaffirm the expertise of the Bank within these fields. In this way, the World Bank increases its legitimacy with other potential borrower countries and ensures its continuing influence.