Skinner's “Interpretation Panel”— A Means to Balance “Power”

The rules versus principles debate and the vital importance of context ‐ the circumstances‐specific nature of judgment ‐ are at the heart of Ross Skinner's suggestion for an “interpretation panel". International considerations and developments involving governance and regulation have created imbalances in power, expertise, and impartiality, increasing the importance of and need for such a panel. This analysis considers the nature of the problem, how professional judgment has been characterized, and why a panel would be appropriate to address, among other concerns, the audit committee's dilemma when accounting disputes arise. Evidence is provided that management turnover is higher in cases involving multiple restatements, governance problems, or regulators' sanctions. Although, intuitively, management turnover is likely to be associated with widely publicized restatements, some patterns suggest that it is a function of entity size, scope of management changes considered, and the manner in which the restatement was identified. Specifically, an identifiable source of discovery, as well as external involvement, is associated with a greater propensity for management change. In contrast, restatements linked to changes in available guidance from regulators are less likely to result in such turnover. One implication is that effective control design and monitoring to facilitate internal discovery of errors can decrease the likelihood of multiple restatements and reduce fault finding that leads to management change. The judgmental nature of restatements suggests that an infrastructure supporting “right‐mindedness” does have merit. An interpretation panel would increase the feasibility of principles‐based standards, facilitating timely resolution of accounting‐associated disputes and thereby enhancing the information environment underlying the allocation of capital.     

On the Myth of “Anglo-Saxon” Financial Accounting

The term “Anglo-Saxon accounting” (ASA) is used by a number of academic writers on the subject of International Accounting to refer to an approach to financial accounting and reporting that is supposedly common to the UK and Ireland, the USA and other English-speaking countries including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While most of the writers we cite as using this term are continental Europeans, they also include an Englishman, J. Flower. The term is typically used to imply not just similar conceptual and technical approaches, but also a hegemonic alliance in the international politics of accounting regulation.This article seeks to establish that ASA in this sense is a myth. We do this first by critically examining four putative commonalities that are frequently attributed to the UK and USA approaches to financial accounting and that form the basis of the myth, and second by indicating the unfeasibility of such a hegemonic alliance within the IASC. A myth may have some factual foundations, but belief in it rests also on bases that are non-factual. So it is with ASA. In particular, analysis of the terms “true and fair view” (TFV) and “fair presentation (FP) in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)” shows that, far from their possessing a semantic equivalence that constitutes a commonality between UK and US financial reporting, their interpretation indicates a profound difference between the UK and US approaches. What UK and US financial reporting have historically shared is a micro- and capital market orientation that lends itself to international accounting regulation in a context of global capital markets. But with such an orientation now being generally accepted internationally, the differences between UK and US financial reporting are taking on an increased significance that this article seeks to highlight.     

The Effects of Monetary Policy “News” and “Surprises”

There is substantial agreement in the monetary policy literature over the effects of exogenous monetary policy shocks. The shocks that are investigated, however, almost exclusively represent unanticipated changes in policy, which surprise the private sector and which are typically found to have a delayed and sluggish effect on output. In this paper, we estimate a New Keynesian model that incorporates news about future policies to try to disentangle the anticipated and unanticipated components of policy shocks. The paper shows that the conventional estimates confound two distinct effects on output: an effect due to unanticipated or “surprise” shocks, which is smaller and more short‐lived than the response usually obtained in the literature, and a large, delayed, and persistent effect due to anticipated policy shocks or “news.” News shocks play a larger role in influencing the business cycle than unanticipated policy shocks, although the overall fraction of economic fluctuations that can be attributed to monetary policy remains limited.     

Disclosure “Bunching”

This paper studies managers' preferences among information acquisition and disclosure policies when their firms are required to engage in “real‐time” or “continuous” financial reporting. The paper predicts that for many, but not all, processes describing the distribution of their firms' cash flows, when subject to such reporting requirements, managers will engage in disclosure “bunching,” that is, they will bunch the discretionary component of the information they acquire and disclose into a single point in time rather than spread the acquisition and disclosure of that information over time. We show that managers' preferred bunching period depends on managers' strategy for trading in their firms' shares, managers' risk aversion, the risk premium the capital market attaches to firms' shares, and the size of managers' initial ownership stakes in their firms. We also study and characterize how the equilibrium prices of firms' shares vary over time and also how managers' optimal trading strategies vary with their most preferred “bunching” strategies. Several extensions confirm the robustness of the optimality of disclosure “bunching.”     

Small Business Financial Distress and the “Phoenix Syndrome”—A Re‐evaluation

In a typical “phoenix syndrome” scenario, a small business entrepreneur who controls the financially distressed Company A registers Company B, to which the assets of Company A are transferred in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance. Company B serves as a vehicle through which the business is kept running, without the pressures of the business creditors. If necessary, the entrepreneur will also register Company C and repeat the process. The law usually considers the execution of a “phoenix syndrome” scheme (“phoenixizing”) to be fraud against Company A's unaware creditors. Two major problems undermine, however, the efficient regulation of “phoenix syndrome” schemes. First, although criminal sanctions are available, “phoenixizing” entrepreneurs are not regularly prosecuted and are usually only subject to monetary sanctions (e.g., personal civil liability to creditors). Because defrauders tend to be judgment proof, the result is sub‐optimal deterrence. Second, lawmakers have not considered a more sympathetic explanation to account for the “phoenix syndrome” phenomenon: an entrepreneur resorting to a “phoenix syndrome” scheme might actually be arranging for a last‐resort “home‐made” bankruptcy proceeding, that is, the entrepreneur might be mimicking the role of a formal bankruptcy stay on unsecured creditors' collection efforts, against the background of a cost prohibitive formal bankruptcy proceeding. Put simply, the “phoenix syndrome” scheme is, occasionally, “a poor man's” bankruptcy proceeding. Deterring a “phoenixizing” entrepreneur attempting to rescue a viable business is, of course, unwarranted, as the result is viable businesses being lost. These two problems of under‐deterrence and over‐deterrence mandate a re‐evaluation of the manner in which “phoenix syndrome” schemes are regulated. Obviously, the main question concerns implementation: How can “good” entrepreneurs, attempting to rescue a viable business, be separated from “bad” ones, who attempt to defraud or to rescue a non‐viable business? The paper discusses and evaluates several solutions. Copyright © 2012 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Discussion of “Information and Liquidity”

I discuss the model of asset liquidity by Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2011, this issue, Forthcoming) . I consider a model with bilateral matching and bargaining in which a perfectly divisible asset serves as means of payment. A recognizability problem is introduced by assuming that the asset can be counterfeited at a positive cost. In contrast to Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright , in equilibrium sellers always accept objects that they do not recognize. The private information problem manifests itself by smaller quantities traded in uninformed matches.     

“Lucas” in the Laboratory

We study the Lucas asset pricing model in a controlled setting. Participants trade two long‐lived securities in a continuous open‐book system. The experimental design emulates the stationary, infinite‐horizon setting of the model and incentivizes participants to smooth consumption across periods. Consistent with the model, prices align with consumption betas and comove with aggregate dividends, particularly so when risk premia are higher. Trading significantly increases consumption smoothing compared to autarky. Nevertheless, as in field markets, prices are excessively volatile. The noise corrupts traditional generalized method of moment tests. Choices display substantial heterogeneity, with no subject representative for pricing.     

Accounting for “negative salvage”

Many businesses are overlooking a current cost of operation which should be matched against current revenues. This cost, really a bundle of related cost items, is incurred at the end of an asset's useful life. In the public utility sector the general term ascribed to this cost element is “negative salvage”. In this note some current examples of negative salvage are identified and some of the causes of negative salvage are discussed. The introduction of negative salvage into the classroom discussion of depreciation provides an interesting new example of the matching/allocation problem.