非对称信息下电子产品逆向供应链激励机制研究

本文针对废旧电子产品市场中由再制造商和回收商组成的逆向供应链， 研究了在回收商的回收能力和回收努力程度均为私有信息时， 再制造商如何甄别回收商的真实能力并实施有效激励的激励机制设计问题。运用博弈论和激励理论， 构建了双重信息不对称情况下且回收商的回收能力为连续类型时的激励模型， 并与单一信息不对称的情况进行对比， 最后通过数值仿真验证。结果表明： 考虑双重信息不对称时， 再制造商期望收益减少， 回收商的回收努力程度降低而期望收益减少， 系统绩效降低； 针对不同类型的回收商设计差异化的激励机制， 不仅能够实现信息甄别， 而且可以诱导回收商提高回收努力程度     

产品设计作为竞争策略的PRO 供应链生产决策研究

对于大多数无力自建WEEE 回收体系的生产企业选择加入PRO 是明智的选择。本文基于行业PRO 运作模式,构建了由两制造商和回收商联盟组成的供应链模型,将与市场增长挂钩的产品设计作为其中一制造商的竞争策略,研究了产品设计和回收双责任要求下供应链各主体的生产决策问题。研究发现：（1）当产品设计成本较低和市场增量较高时,以产品设计作为竞争策略的在位制造商可以淘汰竞争制造商;（2）当产品设计成本低于市场增量时,在位制造商的生产决策优于竞争制造商。一定条件下,竞争制造商存在“搭便车”行为;（3）产品设计降低了处理成本,但损害了回收商经济效益,回收商抵制过度产品设计,并通过转移价格实现供应链主体的利润配置。当经济驱动下回收商自愿回收时,更高的政府回收率会导致整个供应链经济效益变好;（4）存在一个三方共赢局面使三者经济效益都更优,存在一个双赢局面使回收商和在位制造商更优。     

不完全信息下的逆向供应链中的信号博弈研究

本文旨在分析逆向供应链在现实市场条件下的运用问题.为此首先分析了基于完全信息假设下,制造商与回收商在逆向供应链中构成的staclelberg博弈模型.然后,又构建了不完全信息条件下制造商为主、回收商为从的信号博弈,分析了信号博弈的精炼贝叶斯均衡,推导出分离均衡、混同均衡、准分离均衡存在的条件,最后进行算例分析.     

信息不对称下的供应商创新激励机制研究

本文从委托代理的角度探究了制造商对供应商质量创新的激励机制设计,分析了信息不对称以及供应商的公平偏好对激励机制的影响。结果表明,信息对称时两部定价合同能够实现供应链协调以及最优的创新水平;而当信息不对称时,制造商需要用较高的批发价激励供应商的质量创新投入。随着信息不对称的加剧,创新投入水平将不断降低,尤其是在需求对质量很敏感时。如果供应商存在公平偏好,制造商为了保障供应商的创新水平会不得不提高激励水平。     

不对称信息下供应链节点企业激励契约设计

针对信息不对称条件下,供应链上下游企业的委托--代理问题,本文采用斯塔克博格(Stackelberg)的博弈模型,从在供应链中制造商和代理商同时存在着道德风险和逆向选择问题来讨论最优契约的设计,同时也从委托--代理理论角度来分析契约中的参数是如何影响最优契约的形成.分析的结果显示,在同时存在着道德风险和逆向选择的情况下,制造商采用甄别契约比采用混同契约对供应链中交易双方更有效率.     

基于碳排放的闭环供应链政府奖惩机制研究

温室气体的排放问题已成为国际社会亟待解决的问题,解决这一问题的必由之路就是通过降低产品碳排量实现从源头上减排。本文研究由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的逆向供应链系统,建立了政府实施回收奖惩机制的动态博弈模型,比较分析了有无政府回收奖惩机制两种情形下零售商的回收比例、供应链参与方的期望利润和产品的碳排放总量。研究结果表明,政府回收奖惩机制提高了回收比例和碳减排水平;当再制造减排程度较小时,政府回收奖惩机制降低了碳排放总量;基于消费者低碳偏好的政府回收奖惩机制提高了制造商和零售商的利润,更大程度的降低了产品总碳排放量;政府回收奖惩机制下较小的目标回收率能够最大化零售商利润。     

制造商创新决策下的零售商信息共享策略

本文通过构建由单个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链， 研究了信息不对称条件下的零售商信息共享和制造商产品创新策略， 并分析了横向信息泄露和创新的纵向溢出效应对零售商信息共享决策的综合影响。 发现在一定条件下， 制造商进行产品创新能够激励零售商自发共享市场需求信息， 尤其当制造商的创新能力较强时， 两零售商即使在信息泄露的情况下也有动机向制造商共享市场需求信号，并实现供应链各成员期望收益的 Pareto 改进。 当零售商没有动机自发共享信息时， 制造商可以通过一定范围内的补贴进行激励， 实现双方期望收益的提升。     

基于博弈论的逆向供应链合作利润分配研究

逆向供应链成员的合作与否的博弈是以追求利润最大化为目的的,且又能够合理分配增加的总体利润,这样成员之间才能保持长久稳定的合作关系.本文基于单一制造商和单一第三方回收商的逆向供应链,运用博弈理论,分析了逆向供应链上制造商和第三方回收商在不同博弈结构下的利润,得出非合作博弈的均衡解和合作博弈的均衡解,在此基础上,得出双方合作会带来更多的整体利润和合作双方是基于贡献来分配增加利润的结论.     

考虑跨国公司公平偏好的激励监督机制研究

为解决东道国政府和跨国公司因信息不对称和利益不一致造成的委托代理问题, 本文在HM委托代理模型中引入监督机制, 建立了完全理性和有限理性两种情形下的东道国政府——跨国公司的激励监督模型, 并对模型的均衡解进行了算例分析。 研究发现： 同时建立激励机制和监督机制能更好地约束和规范跨国公司行为, 跨国公司的最优努力水平与东道国的激励水平、 监督水平正相关; 当跨国公司具有追求公平偏好的动机时, 东道国政府牺牲部分利益可以换得跨国公司额外的努力, 在一定条件下, 双方的效用均得到改善。     

回收质量不确定下的竞争性闭环供应链政策机制研究

本文主要探讨了回收质量不确定下的竞争性闭环供应链的政府政策机制,建立了4种情形下的竞争性闭环供应链分散式决策模型,研究了3种政策机制对闭环供应链回收率、总碳排放量和制造商利润的影响,模型由两个制造商和一个第三方回收商构成。结果表明：回收率和制造商利润受到回收质量的影响,存在最佳回收质量系数使回收率最高以及制造商总利润最高,最佳回收质量系数受到碳税的影响;补贴与碳税相结合机制更能有效的引导回收、降低总碳排放量以及激励一般制造商进行再制造。最后,通过算例分析进行了验证。     

奖惩机制下回收投资成本分担对闭环供应链决策的影响研究

为了探讨奖惩机制下制造商与回收商分担固定回收投资成本对闭环供应链决策的影响,利用博弈论建立了由制造商、回收商和消费者构成的闭环供应链模型。通过对比分析及仿真得出各决策变量基于制造商分担比例及奖惩力度的变化。研究表明：仅考虑制造商分担回收投资成本、奖惩机制下制造商分担回收投资成本均能有效提高回收率,降低零售价,提高产品需求量,且第二种机制作用效果更佳。适当的分担比例和奖惩力度可以提高制造商和零售商的利润。因此,在合理的奖惩力度下制造商分担一定的回收投资成本时,闭环供应链各成员能实现互利共赢。     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Disagreement and informal delegation in organizations

To investigate delegation decisions within organizations, we develop a principal-agent model in which the principal can only informally delegate authority to the agent and the parties openly disagree with each other in the sense of differing prior beliefs about the optimal course of action. Our analysis shows that the degree of disagreement determines what kind of delegation policy the principal can commit to and this, in turn, alters the agent’s effort for information acquisition. Notably, at moderate degrees of disagreement, conditional delegation may arise in equilibrium, whereby the principal credibly commits to allowing the agent to exercise his authority only if he generates additional information about the optimal action. Further, we discuss two extensions in which the principal undertakes an investment that reduces the agent’s cost of acquiring information, and the agent discloses his private information strategically.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

基于超产权理论对公司管理层收购的思考

产权理论把产权归属作为企业效率的决定因素，无疑有失偏颇。超产权理论则认为：企业的效益主要是与市场竞争程度有关，利用利润激励去驱动经理人提高努力水平要以市场竞争为前提，市场竞争有放大利润激励的作用。基于超产权理论的思想，本文认为对产权拥有所形成的利润激励得以有效发挥的关键，在于经理人必须持有足够大比例的股权；大中型国有及国有控股企业和上市公司实施MBO后，由于经理人所购股权比例不大，使得产权激励不够大，而竞争激励又大幅下降，导致经理人的能力和努力水平下降，MBO将严重影响其业绩的提高。因而，MBO不是其改革的途径；小企业实施MBO是利大于弊，MBO不失为其改革的途径之一，但从长期发展的角度来看，MBO只不过是一个权宜之计。     

THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT*

We study the relationship between the precision of information about the performance of an agent in a market, and the incentives this agent has for exerting effort to produce high quality. We show that this relationship can be nonmonotonic. There exists an efficient plausible equilibrium that induces a threshold beyond which any further improvement in the precision of information weakens the agent's incentive to produce high quality. Accordingly, both very accurate and very inaccurate signals about the agent's performance may destroy its incentive to exert effort. A few applications of this result are discussed.     

Assessing the impact of food policy research: rice trade policies in Viet Nam

The economic impact of marketing and trade policy research in Viet Nam conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is assessed using a novel benefit–cost framework. It measures the economic value of the time saved in hastening the policy responses of the Government of Vietnam. Extensive interviews with partners and stakeholders in the research clearly indicated that the time saving was a legitimate measure of the influence of IFPRI on decision-making. Linking a spatial equilibrium model with income distribution analysis based on national household surveys, allowed IFPRI to satisfy policymakers that relaxing rice export quotas and internal trade restrictions on rice would not adversely impact on regional disparities and food security, and would have beneficial effects on farm prices and poverty. These were major concerns of policymakers prior to the IFPRI research project. The research on these and other policy options gave a degree of confidence to policymakers that relaxing the controls would be in Viet Nam’s national interest. They made these decisions earlier than would have been the case without the IFPRI research. The policy assessment framework is used to measure the economic impact of the policy changes themselves, and in particular, the contribution of IFPRI’s work with Viet Nam on the policies from 1995 to 1997. The relaxation of rice export quotas and internal restrictions on rice trade made by the Government of Viet Nam in 1995–97 are estimated to have had a present (1995) value to Viet Nam using a 5% discount rate of $222 million by 2000, rising to $966 million by 2020. For an incremental research investment of less than US$1 million, a conservative estimate of the benefit to Viet Nam of the IFPRI contribution to the policy changes effected in Viet Nam from the reduction in the policy implementation lag indicates a present value in 1995 terms of US$45 million. This represents a benefit–cost ratio of 56. A more optimistic assessment is that the present value is US$91 million with a benefit–cost ratio of 114. In addition to the welfare gains to Viet Nam, there were sizeable gains to the rest of the world from IFPRI’s contribution. Inclusion of these benefits increases present value and benefit–cost estimates by 34 to 84%. Around 38% of the contribution of IFPRI is estimated to have accrued to the rest of the world, as Viet Nam is now a major player in world rice trade.     

The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry

This paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability. When goods are imperfect substitutes, both Cournot and Bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit-maximizing firm. Overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes. Similarly, Cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than Bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low, and a weaker incentive if this degree is high.     

Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option

This paper considers a two-stage sequential investment problem where the principal wishes to cancel the project if it fails in the first stage. Suppose that only the first-stage agent can observe the outcome in the first stage. There are two organizational forms to choose from: integration, where a single agent is in charge of investments in two stages; and separation, where two different agents are in charge of the two stages. Integration gives rise to a smaller wage cost of inducing high effort in both stages; however, in order to obtain the correct information to cancel the project, separation may have some advantage in terms of saving the information rent. We show that when the effort cost in the first stage is sufficiently small, the principal prefers separation because the first-stage agent has less incentive to lie about the outcome.     

Moral hazard in strategic decision making

This paper develops a theory of moral hazard in which the agent takes the role of strategic decision-maker. Career concerns give rise to preferences over risk, which in turn create an incentive for the agent to manipulate the project’s risk-return tradeoff to the disadvantage of the principal. The resultant moral hazard can be ameliorated by an incentive contract. The optimal non-decreasing wage involves granting ‘in-the-money’ options. In the context of academic tenure, the optimal tenure standard requires the agent to exceed expectations, and lies within one standard deviation of the expected outcome.