Prosecutorial Discretion at the EPA: Some Evidence on Litigation Strategy

This paper examines the determinants of the EPAs litigation strategy between 1977 and 1996 focusing on the tenure of Ann Gorsuch. Two hypotheses about this period are tested: (1) that changes in the EPAs litigation strategy were in fact an effort to reduce the expected penalty for violating environmental laws or (2) that the changes made in litigation strategy were consistent with efforts to reduce transaction cost. Contrary to previous research, I find no conclusive evidence of an overall shift toward business interests in EPA prosecutions. There is, however, clear evidence of shifts in the EPAs litigation strategy across administrations.     

The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry into Long Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets

One of the most important and most contentious issues for regulation and competition raised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act is when to authorize the regional Bell companies to offer long-distance services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted a standard requiring that a Bells local market must first be irreversibly open to competition. This paper analyzes the competitive benefits and costs of authorizing Bell entry, explains the DOJs standard, and argues that the incentives created by this standard will help achieve the Acts competitive goals more efficiently and rapidly than other standards, ultimately reducing the need for intrusive regulation.     

The joint exploitation of a productive asset: a game-theoretic approach

Summary In the present paper we explore the set of equilibria in a game-theoretic model in which players can jointly exploit a productive asset. As in repeated games, we find that under certain circumstances there may be efficient as well as inefficient equilibria. In the model we study, efficient trigger-strategy equilibria may exist from some starting states (stocks of assets) but not others. More precisely, there is a stock level, sayy, such that an efficient trigger-strategy equilibrium exists from starting stocks greater than or equal toy, but not from those strictly less thany. (This statement is meant to include the cases in whichy is zero or infinite.) Under some circumstances, there may exist a new kind of equilibrium, which we call aswitching equilibrium. We show that, in our model, whenever y is positive (and finite), there is an open intervalI with upper endpoint y such that, from any starting stock inI there is an equilibrium of the dynamic game with the following structure: the players follow an inefficient but growing path until the stock reaches the levely, and then follow an (efficient) trigger strategy after that. The use of a continuous-time model enables us to conveniently decouple the delay of information from the time interval between decisions.We thank the C. V. Starr Center at New York University for research support. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of AT&T Bell Laboratories.     

Measuring the welfare effects of tax changes using the LES: An application to a carbon tax

This paper explores the use of a parametric approach to the measurement of compensating and equivalent variations resulting from price changes. The approach is based on the application of the Linear Expenditure System (LES) to each of a range of household income groups, rather than being based on a representative consumer. The method is then used to examine the distributional effects of a carbon tax, designed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The price changes resulting from a carbon tax depend on the carbon intensities of each good, which depend in turn on the nature of inter-industry transactions (the input-output matrix). The use of transfer payments to compensate for adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax is investigated, using social welfare functions based on equivalent incomes.     

Biological Adaptation in Human Societies: a ‘Basic Needs’ Approach

The groundzero premise (so to speak) of the biological sciences is that survival and reproduction is the basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; life is at bottom a survival enterprise. It follows that survival is the paradigmatic problem for human societies as well; it is a prerequisite for any other, more exalted objectives. Although the term adaptation is also familiar to social scientists, until recently it has been used only selectively, and often very imprecisely. Here a more rigorous and systematic approach to the concept of adaptation is proposed in terms of basic needs. The concept of basic human needs has a venerable history – tracing back at least to Plato and Aristotle. Yet the development of a formal theory of basic needs has lagged far behind. The reason is that the concept of objective, measurable needs is inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions that have dominated economic and social theory for most of this century, namely, valuerelativism and cultural determinism. Nevertheless, there have been a number of efforts over the past 30 years to develop more universalistic criteria for basic needs, both for use in monitoring social wellbeing (social indicators) and for public policy formulation. Here I will advance a strictly biological approach to perationalizing the concept of basic needs. It is argued that much of our economic and social life (and the motivations behind our revealed preferences and subjective utility assessments), not to mention the actions of modern governments, are either directly or indirectly related to the meeting of our basic survival needs. Furthermore, these needs can be specified to a first approximation and supported empirically to varying degrees, with the obvious caveat that there are major individual and contextual variations in their application. Equally important, complex human societies generate an array of instrumental needs which, as the term implies, serve as intermediaries between our primary needs and the specific economic, cultural and political contexts within which these needs must be satisfied. An explicit framework of Survival Indicators, including a profile of Personal Fitness and an aggregate index of Population Fitness, is briefly elucidated. Finally, it is suggested that a basic needs paradigm could provide an analytical tool (a biologic) for examining more closely the relationship between our social, economic and political behaviors and institutions and their survival consequences, as well as providing a predictive tool of some value.     

The greenhouse effect: Damages,costs and abatement

The buildup of so-called greenhouse gases in the atmosphere — CO₂ in particular-appears to be having an adverse impact on the global climate. This paper briefly reviews current expectations with regard to physical and biological effects, their potential costs to society, and likely costs of abatement. For a worst case scenario it is impossible to assess, in economic terms, the full range of possible non-linear synergistic effects. In the most favorable (although not necessarily likely) case (of slow-paced climate change), however, it seems likely that the impacts are within the affordable range, at least in the industrialized countries of the world. In the third world the notion of affordability is of doubtful relevance, making the problem of quantitative evaluation almost impossible. We tentatively assess the lower limit of quantifiable climate-induced damages at $30 to $35 per ton of CO₂ equivalent, worldwide, with the major damages being concentrated in regions most adversely affected by sea-level rise. The non-quantifiable environmental damages are also significant and should by no means be disregarded.The costs and benefits of (1) reducing CFC use and (2) reducing fossil fuel consumption, as a means of abatement, are considered in some detail. This strategy has remarkably high indirect benefits in terms of reduced air pollution damage and even direct cost savings to consumers. The indirect benefits of reduced air pollution and its associated health and environmental effects from fossil-fuel combustion in the industrialized countries range from $20 to $60 per ton of CO₂ eliminated. In addition, there is good evidence that modest (e.g. 25%) reductions in CO₂ emissions may be achievable by the U.S. (and, by implication, for other countries) by a combination of increased energy efficiency and restructuring that would permit simultaneous direct economic benefits (savings) to energy consumers of the order of $50 per ton of CO₂ saved. A higher level of overall emissions reduction — possibly approaching 50% — could probably be achieved, at little or not net cost, by taking advantage of these savings.We suggest the use of taxes on fossil fuel extraction (or a carbon tax) as a reasonable way of inducing the structural changes that would be required to achieve significant reduction in energy use and CO₂ emissions. To minimize the economic burden (and create a political constituency in support of the approach) we suggest the substitution of resource-based taxes in general for other types of taxes (on labor, income, real estate, or trade) that are now the main sources of government revenue. While it is conceded that it would be difficult to calculate the optimal tax on extractive resources, we do not think this is a necessary prerequisite to policy-making. In fact, we note that the existing tax system has never been optimized according to theoretical principles, and is far from optimal by any reasonable criteria.During the academic year 1989–90 Dr. Ayres was at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria.During the summer of 1989 Mr. Walter was a member of the Young Scientists' Summer Program at IIASA.     

Implementation of college admission rules

Summary We consider both Nash and strong Nash implementation of various matching rules for college admissions problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these rules the lower bound stable rule is implementable in both senses. The upper bound Pareto and individually rational rule is strong Nash implementable yet it is not Nash implementable. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational, and the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his efforts in supervision as well as his useful suggestions. We are grateful to the participants in his reading class, workshops at Bilkent University, University of Rochester, and in particular Jeffrey Banks, Stephen Ching, Bhaskar Dutta, Rangarajan Sundaram and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

Environmental market creation: saviour or oversell?

In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the notion of market creation for the conservation of environmental assets. Market creation establishes a market in the external benefit or cost in question (e.g. biodiversity or pollution reduction) and leaves the relevant parties to adjust their behaviour accordingly. While most attention has been paid to market creation through tradable permits and taxes (the polluter-pays), it is less easy to secure a perspective on beneficiary-pays initiatives. Both polluter-pays and beneficiary-pays initiatives are examples of modified Coaseian bargains in which governments intervene in the bargains to lower transactions costs, establish property rights, deal with public goods issues, or act on behalf of disadvantaged groups. This paper reviews four major initiatives in this respect - debt-for-nature swaps, bioprospecting and the Global Environment Facility at the global level, and the Costa Rican Forest Law at the local level. It finds that while there is much to applaud in initiatives in these new markets, serious questions remain about the modest flows of funds associated with such global bargains, and the extent to which they secure environmental improvements relative to the baseline of business-as-usual.JEL Classification: D49, D62, H41, O19, Q57, Q2I am indebted to members of the Wildlife Conservation Research Unit at Oxford University and to David Simpson of Resources for the Future and University College London for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are entirely my responsibility.     

Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria

Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.Table of notation Agents' characteristics space ( ) - A Action space of each agent (aA) - Y Y = x A - Aggregate distribution on agents' characteristics - (X) Space of probability measures onX - C(X) Space of continuous functions onX - _X Family of Borel sets ofX - State space of aggregate uncertainty ( ) - x _t=1 aggregate uncertainty for the infinite game - = (₁,₂,...,_t,...) - ^{t t} (₁, ₂,..., _t) - L₁(^t,C ×A),v _t Normed space of measurable functions from ^t toC( x A) - 8o(^t,( x A)) Space of measurable functions from ^tto( x A) - X^t X^t= x _s=1 ^t X - _X ^t Borel field onX ^t - v Distribution on - v_t Marginal distribution of v on ^t - v(^t)((¦^t)) Conditional distribution on given ^t - v^t(^s)(v_t(¦^s)) Conditional distribution on ^t given ^s (wheres) - _t Periodt distributional strategy - Distributional strategy for all periods =(₁,₂,...,_t,...) - _t Transition process for agents' types - ( _t,^t,y)(P _t+1(, _t , ^t ,y)) Transition function associated with _t - u _t Utility function - V _t (, a, , ^t) Value function for each collection (, a, , ^t ) - W _t (, , ^t ) Value function given optimal action a - C() Consistency correspondence. Distributions consistent with and characteristics transition functions - B() Best response correspondence (which also satisfy consistency) - E Set of equilibrium distributional strategies - x _t=1 ( ^t , (x A)) - S Expanded state space for Markov construction - (, a, ) Value function for Markov construction - P( _t ^* , _t y)(P(, _t ^* , _t , _y )) Invariant characteristics transition function for Markov game We wish to acknowledge very helpful conversations with C. d'Aspremont, B. Lipman, A. McLennan and J-F. Mertens. The financial support of the SSHRCC and the ARC at Queen's University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was begun while the first author visited CORE. The financial support of CORE and the excellent research environment is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Does International Harmonization of Environmental Policy Instruments Make Economic Sense?

Harmonization of the instruments used in environmental policy has beenconsidered necessary to guarantee fair competition in internationalmarkets. We examine the economic costs of harmonizing paper recyclingstandards in countries where the urgency of the waste disposal problemsdiffer. Using data of seven European countries we estimate thetechnologically feasible input combinations of pulp and waste paper forpaper production. Short-term effects of two environmental policy measures,minimum content requirement and utilization rate target, are analyzed. Bytranslating the two administrative instruments into taxes and subsidies, weshow that the shadow costs of the harmonization vary considerably betweencountries. The difference in the domestic availability of waste may explainthe variation, and a modification of the policy measures to incorporate thisaspect is suggested.     

The End of Transition: An Institutional Interpretation of Energy Sector Reform in Eastern Europe and the CIS

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the growing institutional divergence of systemic transformation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Based upon the institutional theory of economic and legal systemic change, we empirically analyse reforms in a sector where the transformation process proved to be particularly tough: the energy sector. We test to what extent reforms reflect the ideal types seen in Western contexts (e.g. Anglo-Saxon and French), and to what extent new models have emerged. By generalising the results from the energy sector, one key finding emerges: starting from similar reform projects, transition in Eastern Europe has led to fundamentally different outcomes, of which we identify three ideal types: i) the reforming Central/Eastern European market economy; ii) the post-Soviet mixed economy; and iii) the Caspian state economy.     

Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations

The word coordination has two meanings, and thesemeanings are often conflated. One meaning, associated with ThomasSchelling, is seen in situations like choosing whether to driveon the left or the right; the drivers must coordinate to eachother's behavior. The other meaning, associated with FriedrichHayek, means that a concatenation of activities is arranged soas to produce good results. Along with the Schelling sense ofcoordination comes the notion of convention, such as drivingon the right. Some conventions are consciously designed; othersemerge without design (or are emergent). Along with the Hayeksense of coordination comes the notion of social order. Somesocial orders, such as the skeleton of activities within thefirm or within the hypothetical socialist economy, are consciouslyplanned. Other social orders, such as the catallaxy of the freesociety, function without central planning (or are spontaneous).Distinguishing between the two coordinations (and, in parallelfashion, between convention and social order) clarifies thinkingand resolves some confusions that have arisen in discussionsof coordination and spontaneous order. The key distinctionsare discussed in the context of the thought of, on the one hand,Menger, Schelling, David Lewis, and the recent path-dependencetheorists, and, on the other hand, Smith, Hayek, Polanyi, Coase,and the modern Austrian economists. The paper concludes witha typology that encompasses the several distinctions.     

Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection

Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.Notation ={ ₁,..., _k } set of outcomes - : ₊ generic contract or lottery - A = () ; - A_o A{, where denotes the null contract or no trade - S={1,...,¦S¦} set of seller types - L(s) number of type-s sellers - M number of buyers - u: × S seller's utility function, which can be extended toA× S by puttingu(, s) ; - v. × S buyer's utility function, which can be extended toA × S by puttingv(, s) ; - f:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of sellers - g:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of buyers - A ₊ sellers' trading function - :A ×S ₊ buyers' trading function This paper has had a long gestation period, during which I have been influenced by helpful conversations with many persons, by their work, or both. Among those who deserve special mention are Martin Hellwig, Roger Myerson, Edward Prescott, Robert Townsend and Yves Younés. Earlier versions were presented to the NBER/CEME Conference on Decentralization at the University of Toronto and the NBER Conference on General Equilibrium at Brown University. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos, Walter Heller, Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Peters, Michel Poitevin, Lloyd Shapley, John Wooders, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and especially Robert Rosenthal for his careful reading of two drafts. The financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 912202 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons

The paper relates John. R. Commons view on the roleof human design in institutional evolution to the views thathave been advanced on this matter by F. A. Hayek, in German ordo-liberalism,and in constitutional political economy. It is argued that Commonsconcept of purposeful selection points in the direction ofa theoretical perspective that consistently integrates the notionsof institutional evolution and constitutional design.     

Efficient Environmental Taxation Under Worker-Firm Bargaining

We study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm-worker bargaining over each firm's surplus, and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments. An uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment, implying a tradeoff between the two. When tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms' hiring or investments, employment may also increase, creating a double dividend from the pollution tax. A pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy, and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm. We show that the (hypothetical) pollution tax implementing the first-best solution exceeds the Pigouvian tax. The second-best tax exceeds this first-best tax when we have a double dividend, and is below it when we do not.     

Nachfragesysteme für österreich

Summary This paper gives an empirical reexamination of the Linear-Expenditure-hypothesis for Austria. It starts with a brief theoretical discussion of the principal properties and restrictions of the Linear-Expenditure-System (LES). To obtain empirical estimates of the parameters of the LES two different estimation procedures are applied, i.e. the original method used byStone and a simplified version of the Systems-Least-Squares-approach (following theMarquardt-algorithm). There are no essential differences between these estimates. They all seem plausible and satisfy the theoretical restrictions.Usually the stability (i.e. time-invariance) of the parameters is accepted without proof. Using the Moving-Window-Regression-technique, however, most of the estimates vary significantly in time. To obtain a direct proof of the time-dependence of the parameters the LES is reestimated now including trend-factors. Especially results considering time-dependent marginal-budget-shares are considerably better than the static-model results.The conclusion of this paper is that the static version of the LES does not explain the consumer behaviour in Austria and that much more effort should be spent on the estimation of dynamic demand systems.     

Die Komponenten des Rückganges der Ausländerbeschäftigung

Summary During the crisis of 1974/75 the number of foreign workers in Western European countries has been reduced. This has caused a new discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of the employment of foreign workers. Whatever the attitude towards this problem may be, it is useful to decompose the reduction of foreign labour into categories. First of all a certain amount of foreign labour will be reduced due to a general decrease of overall employment. This influence may be called proportionality effect. The share of foreign workers in the different branches of the economy allows the calculation of a structural effect. Both of them measure influences, which concern foreigners as well as nationals. Only the remaining influence is specific to foreigners. It may again be split into a reduction effect and a substitution effect. The former ist concerned with that part of total reduction of foreign workers, which corresponds to the decrease of employment, i.e. employment reduction by dismissal of foreign workers. The latter pertains to that part of reduction, which exceeds the decrease of employment, i.e. by this magnitude domestic labour has been substituted for foreign labour.The application of this model to the years 1974 and 1975 shows no proportionality effect (1974 it is even positive), a limited structural effect, but a high reduction effect. The substitution effect is considerable in 1974 but of minor importance in 1975. So foreign labour in Austria served actually as cyclical buffer but mainly by reduction and only partly by substitution.     

Volatility in the knowledge economy

Summary. We seek to explain the economic volatility of the last 6 years, in particular the rapid expansion and contraction of the knowledge sectors. Our hypothesis is that these sectors amplify the business cycle due to their increasing returns to scale, growing faster than others in an upswing and contracting faster in a downswing. To test this hypothesis we postulate a general equilibrium model with two sectors: one with increasing returns that are external to the firm and endogenously determined - the knowledge sector - and the other with constant returns to scale. We introduce a new measure of volatility of output, a real beta, and derive a resolving equation, from which we prove that the increasing return sectors exhibit more volatility then other sectors. We validate the main results on US macro economic data of real GDP by industry (2-3 digits SIC codes) of the 1977-2001 period, and provide policy conclusions.Received: 18 March 2002, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D5, D58, E10, L50, L52, O38, O51.Correspondence to: Graciela Chichilnisky     

Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51