关于员工持股计划风险分析——以OF员工持股计划为例

员工持股计划是指通过让员工持有本公司股票和期权而使其获得激励的一种长期绩效奖励计划。员工持股始于20世纪50年代,在70年代在美国逐渐流行,我国最早开始实施员工持股计划是股份制企业,其目的是为了更好地建立现代企业制度。自2014年6月证监会发布《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》,员工持股逐渐成为A股潮流,伴随着股票市场的繁荣,逾百家企业推出员工持股计划,本文在这一背景下企业实施员工持股计划的风险。     

基于SWOT范式的我国企业员工持股研究

推行企业员工持股计划是激发企业员工工作热情,实现企业和员工双赢十分重要的一项措施,它将“为企业工作”转变为“为企业和为自己”工作,使得员工在获得正常工资薪金的同时,还可以获得企业其他发展红利。当前,我国企业面临的发展机遇与挑战并存,本文借鉴既有的国内外企业员工持股经验,使用经典的SWOT管理范式,对我国企业员工持股进行研究,用图示方法得出简明扼要的研究结论,为加快和规范我国企业员工持股提供精准的对策。     

我国ESOP存在的问题及对策研究

员工持股计划起源于20世纪20年代的美国,兴盛于20世纪70年代至今。员工持股计划,是指企业员工持有本企业股份,以此分享企业利益,参与企业经营管理,并有条件地退出的一种股权激励制度。本文分析了我国员工持股沿革过程中发生的问题究其原因,结合中国特色社会主义市场经济的实际,探讨如何建立我国的员工持股制度,展望我国即将重启的员工持股计划。     

我国员工持股计划现状分析

员工持股计划是企业的一种激励措施,流行于世界各地,但我国企业目前的实施效果并不佳。为了企业的更好发展,在对员工持股计划的含义进行深度剖析的基础上,通过探讨我国实施员工持股计划的发展历程与失败,对其现状进行分析,为发挥员工持股计划的作用提供依据。     

我国企业员工持股制度探析

员工持股制度对于我国经济和社会发展有重大意义,我国企业推行员工持股的气候已经初步形成,我们应深入剖析我国员工持股制度存在的问题,总结经验,使我国的员工持股制度不断规范和发展。     

员工持股相关问题的研究

员工持股制度是企业内部职工按照一定的程序和要求,有条件地持有企业股份的制度。本文通过对部分上市公司和非上市公司的实证分析,以及对企业和员工持股的博弈分析论证了员工持股的必要性。并且对我国员工持股制度的模式进行了初步的构想,给出了一种持股利润的分配方式。     

我国企业员工持股计划研究

员工持股计划在欧美企业中颇为盛行且效果显著,但近年来在我国企业中推广实施时却遭遇了水土不服,收效甚微,我们应全面深入分析我国员工持股计划的各种利弊,不断改进和发展,建立和完善具有中国特色的员工持股计划。     

完善我国员工持股计划分析

21世纪,是知识资本和人力资本的时代,股权激励机制将成为最有效的企业激励措施,而员工持股计划作为其中的重要组成部分也在发挥着相应的作用。我国自上世纪80年代末,90年代初采用员工工资持股计划,随着我国企业产权制度改革的深入,员工持股这一制度得以迅速推广普及,但由于种种原因,尚存在许多问题。从我国员工持股计划的发展概况出发,分析目前我国员工持股计划存在的问题,提出制定与完善ESOP法律法规和结合企业实际,科学规划ESOP这两条建议。     

关于我国国有企业员工持股计划的思考

随着市场经济的发展,我国企业的外部市场竞争环境越来越严峻。基于此,我国国有企业为了增强其综合实力和竞争力,促进企业的长远发展,逐渐开始重视和实施员工持股计划,进而优化企业的产权结构,提高人才的利用率。为此,本文就国有企业实施员工持股计划的作用、我国国有企业实施员工持股计划存在的问题以及推进我国国有企业员工持股计划的思考建议等方面做了简单分析,希望对我国国有企业的发展有所启示和帮助。     

员工持股计划与现代企业制度

深化国有企业改革，必须建立与社会主义市场经济相吻合的企业产权制度。国内外企业制度改革实践表明，员工持股制度是构建与中国国情相适应又符合市场经济一般规则的现代企业制度的有效途径。文章回顾了员工持股制度的基本定义及其特点，论述了员工持股制度的重要现实意义，分析了我国员工持股制度存在的一些问题，在此基础上对员工持股制度进行了一些思考。     

试论ESOP在我国的具体运作

职工持股计划 (ESOP)是一种既能满足企业的融资需求 ,又能实现职工与企业利益高度一致性的新型企业财务组织方式 ,将职工持股计划 (ESOP)运用于具体的企业 ,是一项庞大的财务系统工程。文章针对我国在职工持股计划实施中出现的主要问题和难点 ,着重从ESOP的资金形成、管理模式、分配制度、股权变更形式、激励约束机制及会计信息披露等几个决定职工持股计划实施效果的主要方面 ,对其具体运作加以论述。     

Expatriates as influencers in global work arrangements: Their impact on foreign-subsidiary employees’ ESOP participation

Employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs) offered by multinational enterprises (MNEs) present an attractive investment for employees. Puzzlingly, participation rates are often low, raising the question what drives ESOP participation on a global scale. Grounded in the knowledge-based view of expatriate research, we build on the notion of expatriates as implicit knowledge transferors within MNEs. We hypothesize a positive effect of expatriate ESOP participation on subsidiary-employee ESOP participation, which is even higher when a subsidiary-employee’s distance toward the program and the firm is greater. Empirical results confirm our hypotheses suggesting that expatriates can be a mechanism to bridge the distance within MNEs.     

Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration

The separation of ownership and control can lead to managerial entrenchment and a convergence of decision making and decision control. Decision-making refers to management's authority to make strategic and operating decisions while decision control refers to the ratification and monitoring of management decisions. Managers that possess decision control may behave in a risk-reducing manner relative to the behavior of owner managers because of management's desire to maximize job security Amihud and Lev 1981, McEachern 1975. For example, the managers of such firms may choose to diversify the firm into a wide variety of industries in an attempt to smooth revenues and earnings and avoid a series of peaks and valleys in the company's financial performance. These managers may believe that stable earnings will be viewed positively by shareholders and should help lessen the risk of stockholder action to replace upper-level management. Managers that possess both decision-making and decision-control capabilities may pursue a variety of risk-reducing strategies in addition to broad diversification.The existence of large outside investors has been shown to result in management becoming less risk-averse; management is more willing to adopt a wide range of strategies that present greater risk, but offer greater returns to shareholders. Hill and Snell (1988) found a significant, positive correlation between stock concentration and R&D intensity, indicating that large outside beneficial owners or dominant stockholders can influence management to pursue higher risk-higher return strategies. R&D intensity is used as a proxy for innovation and is generally operationalized as a firm's industry-adjusted R&D expenditures as a percentage of its sales. Findings of other studies also suggest that large investors are associated with decreased risk aversion by management. When controlling for the effects of time, previous R&D spending, liquidity, market share, diversification, market concentration, industry, and leverage, Hansen and Hill (1992) found a mild positive correlation between institutional stock concentration and R&D spending.This paper examines management's ability to utilize employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to facilitate managerial decision control or the capability to ratify and monitor decisions and subsequently adopt greater risk-reducing behavior. It is possible that management may adopt an ESOP to enhance entrenchment by placing a large block of the company's shares under the control of company managers and employees that are under the supervision of management. As a result, some ESOPs may not be effective alignment mechanisms since participants may find it difficult to organize a vote against management proposals or generate adequate enthusiasm and momentum to replace top-level managers. The paper anticipates that a positive relationship exists between the degree of ESOP stock concentration and the reduced risk-taking behavior of management. Specifically, the study argues that as ESOP stock concentration increases, management will likely behave in a risk-reducing manner and decrease its commitment to innovation, as measured by R&D intensity.Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are qualified retirement plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and are treated similarly under the Act to other qualified pension plans with the exception of portfolio diversification. Employee stock ownership plans consist only of shares of the employer's stock and the performance of an ESOP-based retirement fund hinges with the market performance of that single stock. An agency theory framework would suggest that ESOPs that control large blocks of outstanding shares have an effect on management similar to that of other large investors and act to encourage management to craft and implement strategies that will yield superior financial and market performance. As ESOP stock concentration increases, agency theory proposes that ESOP participants would readily act to protect their interests and the interests of other shareholders. However, some previous research suggests that large ESOPs are not alignment mechanisms, but further entrench current management into their positions.Gordon and Pound (1990) found that management can use large ESOPs to increase effective insider ownership to protect against unwanted changes in corporate control. The authors suggested that ESOPs were less effective than other types of large investors at monitoring management decisions since ESOPs are unilaterally undertaken by management, ESOP shares are held only by incumbent managerial and non-managerial employees, and ESOP trustees are frequently appointed by management. The market has been shown to view an ESOP as a management entrenchment mechanism when the ESOP was adopted as a possible takeover defense Chang 1990, Dhillon and Ramirez 1994. The market reacts more favorably to an ESOP adoption when other large outside shareholders are present who have the capability to offset the influence of inefficient managers who might choose to use the ESOP to further entrench themselves into their positions (Park and Song 1995).The results of this study find that after the implementation of an ESOP, R&D intensity decreases as ESOP stock concentration increases. A significant negative relationship exists between ESOP stock concentration and change in industry-adjusted R&D intensity at the 0.05 level when controlling for firm size and change in profitability. The sample included firms where ESOP stock concentration represented as little as 3% of the employer's outstanding shares and as much as 67% of all outstanding employer stock. The sampled firms with the greatest ESOP stock concentration were associated with the greatest decreases in industry-adjusted R&D intensity after the implementation of the ESOP. The results suggest that management of high ESOP stock concentration firms became more risk-averse in regard to commitment to innovation after implementation of the ESOP.Agency theory adequately explains the effect of large outside stockholders on management's choice of strategy. Hill and Snell (1988) and Hansen and Hill (1992) have found that as stock concentration increases, incentive alignment becomes increasingly likely. The independent nature of large outside blockholders contributes to a separation of decision making from decision control, a reduction in agency costs, and a minimization of managerial risk-reducing behavior. As highly independent blockholder size decreases, decision making and decision control converge, and management entrenchment is more probable.Agency theory fails to adequately explain the effect of employee stock ownership on managerial risk-reducing behavior. Employee stock ownership does have the capability to align shareholder and employee interests under the proper conditions. However, ESOPs lack independence from managerial influence and are much less likely than outside institutional investors to monitor management decision-making and pressure management to adopt strategies that incorporate greater risk and an opportunity for greater returns. The study found that increased ESOP stock concentration was associated with greater managerial risk-reducing behavior. The results suggest that agency effects are more likely in firms with modest ESOP stock concentration since the ESOP does provide incentives for an alignment of interests, but does not provide management with a mechanism to block the actions of other large blockholders. ESOPs with higher levels of stock concentration are likely to facilitate management entrenchment by preventing some large percentage of shares from aligning with other large shareholders to challenge management decision-making. If other investors lack the capability to put full pressure on management, the monitoring and ratification of management decisions has been yielded to management. Therefore, a managerial entrenchment hypothesis is better suited than agency theory in explaining the effect of large ESOPs on management's risk-reducing behavior.     

Employees' Attitudes towards Employee Ownership and Financial Participation in Croatia: Experiences and Cases

This paper analyzes specific situation in Croatia regarding role, development, and perspectives of employee participation in ownership and financial results. The model of enterprise privatization in Croatia resulted with a large involvement of employees in the enterprises' ownership. As the first phase of privatization in Croatia is approaching to its end, new, genuine mechanisms of development of the employee financial participation are beginning to emerge. Among them, ESOP plans and management and employee buyouts (MEBO) seem to be most appealing. Such practices can be found primarily in enterprises where a functional symbiosis between management and employees has been preserved or developed, where assets of the enterprise have also been preserved, and an organizational culture based on identification with enterprise and confidence with management has been developed. It seems that such a mutual reliance between employees and management can be very successful in assuring good operation and financial results of (especially large) enterprises during and after the process of transition.     

中小企业集群竞争力与地方政府能力关联度分析

企业集群竞争力越来越成为区域经济发展的源泉和推动力。各级地方政府想方设法寻求本地区企业集群及集群竞争力的形成。而中小企业集群是企业之间自发交往形成的,是资本渴求生存和发展的必然性,并不是地方政府主观创造出来的;但是这不表明地方政府对此无能为力,处于被动地位,它的以构建市场环境为基础的能力对企业集群形成同样重要.     

关于加强国有企业内部审计问题与浅析

目前,国有企业依然存在着经营管理效率低下、国有资产流失严重、财务信息失真、企业行为失控等问题。其原因是对内部审计的职能定位不准;内部审计在企业组织中地位较低;内部审计人员素质不高,内部审计手段和技术落后;企业组织对内部审计工作的认识程度尚处于较低的层次。解决好国有企业存在的问题,必须加强国有企业内部审计工作。国有企业必须进一步深化改革,真正建立起现代企业制度。在此基础上,摆正国有企业改革与企业内部审计的关系,健全国企内部审计制度,以确保国有企业的经营与改制有法可依,确保国有资产的安全和增值。     

SA8000认证对企业经营理念的影响分析

SA8000作为一项全新的国际性标准日益走近我国企业,这一覆盖社会道德、责任和工作环境等范围的标准正逐渐成为国际买家对供应商的一项重要的审核内容。SA8000标准的产生给我国企业即带来竞争优势,又给企业带来不利的影响。探讨SA8000如何影响我国企业的竞争优势,对推动企业管理由科学管理向文化管理的升级,使企业赢得新的竞争优势很有必要。     

小型家族企业非家族员工心理契约违背研究

小型家族企业作为中小企业的一种常见形态，在对待非家族员工问题上一直没有非常科学的方法。这对于企业成长极为不利。究其原因，心理契约违背是内在主要原因。而由于小型家族企业自身特殊性，使得其非家族员工心理契约违背呈现违背感强烈且涉及面广等特点。而小型家族企业的期望源的不真实性、兑现的不完全性、企业的人格化、契约重构能力的缺失又是心理契约违背产生的主因。正因如此，小型家族企业要从心理契约构建及维护两大方面入手优化与非家族员工的心理契约，从根源上解决小型家族企业的这一难题。     

基于生态位的企业竞争关系研究

本文借鉴生态学中生物物种的生态位理论,分析企业生态位重叠的原因、形态模型以及与企业竞争之间的关系,提出企业竞争的实质是生态位重叠并引发资源相对不足,进而阐述了共同进化是企业新型竞争关系构建的目标,探讨了新型竞争关系构建的途径:生态位的分离和新资源的扩充,并指明企业实现共同进化这一目标应具备的条件。     

企业集群与行政区域的制度创新

本文认为,企业集群是市场竞争锤炼出来的中小企业合作方式;是产权分立,各有独立利益的企业群体;是一个不断创新的系统;是一个以诚信为基础的企业群体;它的形成与地区资源禀赋没有直接关系。文章提出,企业集群是自然形成的,它的出现有其客观必然性,不能依靠行政手段人为安排;行政区域政府可做的是通过保护产权,提供质优价廉的公共产品,培育社会诚信,支持各种中介组织等措施,为促进企业集群的形成和健康发展创造良好的环境。