Boards,takeover protection,and real earnings management

We investigate the effect of board governance and takeover protection on real earnings management. Four types of real earnings management are considered: sales manipulation, overproduction, the abnormal reduction of research and development (R&D) expenses, and the abnormal reduction of other discretionary expenditures. Using panel data from US public firms in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act period, we find that the level of real earnings management (sales manipulation, abnormal declines in R&D expenses, and other discretionary expenses) increases with better board governance and decreases with higher takeover protection. These two governance factors generally have no significant effect on overproduction. We further find that firms substitute accrual-based earnings management with sales manipulation and abnormal cuts in discretionary expenses, and the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms with stronger board governance. Overall, our findings indicate that the level of real earnings management is higher when a firm is faced with tough board monitoring, and that takeover protection may reduce managerial incentives for real earnings management.     

Earnings forecast disclosure regulation and earnings management: evidence from Taiwan IPO firms

This study examines whether the Taiwanese regulation requiring disclosure of earnings forecasts in the IPOs resulted in disclosure of more optimistic earnings forecasts and whether the forecast error was reduced more by manipulating the reported earnings rather than revising the earnings forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. The study is based on 759 forecasts issued by the Taiwanese IPO firms from 1994 to 2001, i.e. 8-year period after the regulation was modified to increase the forecast error threshold to 20%. The findings show that the disclosure regulation resulted in more optimistic forecasts than conservative forecasts, especially for firms expecting better performance in the forecast year compared to the previous year. Firms disclosing optimistic earnings forecasts engaged more in manipulation of reported earnings than revision of forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. These findings thus suggest that the disclosure regulation resulted in earnings manipulation, which reduced the quality of reported earnings. We received valuable comments at the 2003 American Accounting Association and 2004 Euorpean Accounting Association annual meetings. We also thank the participants at the research seminars at Rutgers University, City University of Hong Kong, and Pace University, for their insightful comments. Picheng Lee especially thanks Pace University for 2003 summer research grant.     

Analyst earnings forecast precision and local advantage: evidence from American depositary receipt firms

Prior research has documented a finding that local analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts than nonlocal analysts in many settings. However, little is known about local and nonlocal analysts’ relative earnings forecast abilities for ADR stocks. In this study, we find that the local advantage disappears for ADR stocks and that nonlocal analysts in fact outperform local ones in this case. We investigate the source of this ‘local disadvantage’ and find evidence against hypotheses based on accounting standards and exchange rates. We document that the local advantage decreases with increased investor interest in foreign firms, consistent with our nonlocal investors’ interest hypothesis.     

Investor protection and price informativeness about future earnings: international evidence

This study draws on the investor protection literature to identify structural factors in a country’s information environment that are likely to explain cross-country differences in the extent to which future earnings information is capitalized in current stock returns. Using a sample of 55,900 firm-years from 32 countries, we find that greater financial disclosure, higher quality earnings, and greater information dissemination through news media are associated with stock prices that are more informative about future earnings, whereas strong enforcement of insider trading laws is associated with stock prices that are less informative about future earnings. We also find that, on average, price informativeness about future earnings is greater in countries with strong investor protection. Our results illuminate the importance of structural factors constituting a country’s information environment in explaining cross-country variation in price informativeness about future earnings.     

Longitudinal value relevance of earnings and intangible assets: Evidence from Australian firms

Recent U.S. studies report that earnings value relevance has declined over time. Some authors suggest non-recognition of intangible assets in the U.S. is a major reason for declining earnings value relevance. However, the evidence is mixed on the effect of non-recognition of intangible assets. To examine this conjecture, this paper examines earnings value relevance for Australian firms since Australian GAAP has not prohibited intangible asset recognition. Using a variety of established models and specifications, our results indicate that for the average firm, there is weak evidence of decline in earnings value relevance. However, firms that capitalize intangibles have increasing earnings value relevance. Further, the magnitude of the difference in earnings value relevance between capitalizing firms and non-capitalizing firms is most pronounced in the latter part of the 1990s and this difference is increasing.     

CFO gender and earnings management: evidence from China

We study the effect of chief financial officer (CFO) gender on earnings management (EM) in China’s listed firms from 1999 to 2011. In the cross-sectional analysis, we find that female CFO firm-years exhibit significantly lower discretionary accruals, lower total accruals, lower abnormal production costs, and higher abnormal discretionary expenditures, than the male CFO firm-years. We further examine the relation between CFO gender and EM surrounding CFO transitions. We find that the departing male CFOs are more aggressive than the departing female CFOs in managing up earnings during their last year with the firm and the newly appointed male CFOs are more aggressive than the new female CFOs in managing down earnings during their first year on the job. The evidence surrounding CFO transitions suggests that male CFOs are more aggressive than female CFOs in manipulating earnings, either in the last attempt to save their jobs or to take bigger credit for any future performance gains. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that female CFOs engage in less EM and are more conservative in financial reporting than their male counterparts.     

Contemporaneous verification of language: evidence from management earnings forecasts

Research documents that linguistic tone is incrementally informative about stock returns. What remains a puzzle is the mechanism by which investors can assess its credibility. We examine whether contemporaneous information in management earnings forecasts serves as a timely alternative to ex post verification. We document that ex post verifiable quantitative news in unbundled forecasts, and characteristics of the linguistic tone itself, affect investors’ pricing of tone. Consistent with higher quality signals enhancing the credibility of contemporaneous lower quality signals, we find that quantitative news verifies the associated linguistic tone; when the two signals have the same sign, the price effect of tone is stronger. Furthermore, the pricing attenuation of tone is increasing in the imprecision of the quantitative forecast, suggesting that lower forecast quality compromises the quantitative signal’s credibility enhancement. Managerial incentives to inflate tone lead to the verification effect being greater for optimistic language, while management’s use of hyperbole results in attenuation of the tone’s pricing.     

Unconditional and conditional takeover offers: experimental evidence

This article compares the predictions of finite-shareholdermodels of conditional and unconditional takeover offers withthe outcomes of laboratory experiments. In addition to differentiatingbetween types of offers, the experimental designs span smalland large firms as well as different levels of offer premiums.It is found that in unconditional offers to large groups ofsubjects (28-40), the symmetric Nash equilibrium predicts observedtendering frequencies quite accurately. For other experimentaldesigns, the results are mixed. The analysis of shareholdertendering strategies from the experiment yields insights into(I) the effects of takeover offer designs, (ii) the appropriatenessof finite-shareholder models for research, and (iii) the costsof free riding when shareholders are nonatomistic.     

The real earnings management of cross-listing firms

We examine the existence of real and accrual-based earnings management before and after cross-listings on the U.S. market. The results indicate that firms actively manage their earnings around cross-listing events, using both accrual and real earnings management, but real earnings management is dominant. American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) cross-listed at Level 1 and sponsored ADRs show the largest increase in real earnings management from before to after the listing. Firms that have adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) display lower increases than firms under domestic GAAP. Finally, our results confirm a significant negative relationship between long-run performance and real earnings management before and after major corporate events.     

The incremental information content of non-US GAAP earnings disclosures: Evidence from UK firms

This paper examines price and trading volume responses in the US equity market to the preliminary earnings announcements (PEAs) in the UK of UK firms listed on US exchanges (e.g., NYSE and AMEX). The inquiry focuses on whether the return forecast error (absolute and squared values) and volume residual (standardized and unstandardized) for each day were significantly different from the average on the day of the earnings announcements (PEA). The most significantly unexpected return occurred the day prior to the Financial Times (FT) announcement. The results suggest prompt volume and price responses to the UK PEAs in the US security market. Excess trading volume occurred the day prior to and the day of the FT release price response occurred on the day subsequent to the PEAs. This may suggests that investors possess differential prior beliefs or likelihood functions in evaluating public disclosure. Consistent with Frost and Pownall [Frost, C., & Pownall, G. (1996), Interdependencies in the global markets for capital and information: The case of Smithkline Beecham plc. Accounting Horizons, 1, 38-57], US investors seem not to be confused by US/UK generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) differences, and in fact use information about UK GAAP earnings in their valuations and trading decisions. This implies that traders correctly use UK accounting output to the determination of values in setting security prices and arriving at trading decisions. Broadly, these findings support the assumption that disclosures by UK-listed firms in their domestic market influence share liquidity and trading in the US market.     

Central supervision and earnings management: Quasi-experimental evidence from China

Earnings management is costly to society because it decreases the informativeness of earnings and hence distorts capital market efficiency. Drawing upon a natural experiment generated by the staggered random on-site inspection programme initiated by China's central government between 2013 and 2017, this paper finds that highly intensive central supervision significantly decreases local firms' earnings management behaviours. Moreover, the effect of central supervision is found to be more pronounced in provinces with severe GDP exaggeration, provinces with local governors facing impending promotion, and firms controlled by the government. These findings suggest that on-site inspections by the central government may alleviate local officials' political incentives and ability to pressure local firms to engage in earnings management. However, the estimation results of timing tests indicate that this monitoring effect is short-lived, calling for a more comprehensive strategy to enhance the supervision of local officials and consequently improve the reliability of firms' financial reporting quality. These findings highlight the importance of addressing the agency problem between central and local governments in curbing firms' earnings manipulation to improve the capital market efficiency of economies characterized by strong government intervention.     

GDP growth incentives and earnings management: evidence from China

Review of Accounting Studies - Using data from China, we examine whether and how the incentive to boost GDP growth at the government level affects earnings management at the firm level. We find...     

Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relation between discretionary accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The analyses also show that firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items. In particular, evidence shows that negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment. Finally, the research indicates that the association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. This study contributes to the literature on earnings management from an international comparative perspective since most previous studies on earnings management and executive compensation have focused on U.S. firms.     

Takeover protection and managerial myopia: Evidence from real earnings management

We examine whether takeover protection exacerbates or mitigates real earnings management (i.e., using abnormal real activities to meet near-term earnings targets). Consistent with Stein’s (1988) prediction that takeover pressure induces managerial myopia, we find that less-protected firms are associated with higher levels of real earnings management. We further disentangle the value-destroying and signaling effects of real earnings management by finding that although abnormal real activities in general are associated with lower future performance, abnormal real activities intended to just meet earnings targets are associated with higher future performance, consistent with real earnings management conveying a signal of superior future performance in addition to a general value-destroying effect. Taken together, our evidence suggests that takeover protection reduces managers’ pressure to resort to real earnings management as a costly means of signaling better future performance.     

Non-executive directorship importance and takeover hostility: Australian evidence

This study investigates the importance of the target firm directorship to target firm non-executive directors during takeovers. Using Australian data and a size-based measure of directorship importance, we find a positive association between takeover hostility and directorship importance after controlling for takeover premiums and target firm size. Further analysis reveals that directorship importance leads to a greater likelihood of offer price revisions following initial rejection of a takeover bid, but not the likelihood of bid success. Our findings are consistent with target firm non-executive directors exhibiting self-serving behaviour at directorships which they consider more important to their reputation.     

The role of defensive strategies and ownership structure of target firms: Evidence from UK hostile takeover bids

The outcome of a hostile takeover bid hinges on an interplay of the defensive strategies of targets and the offensive strategies of bidders. This study examines the determinants of outcome for a sample of 205 hostile bids for UK public company targets over the period 1983–1989. the impact of a number of defensive strategies adopted by the targets, their ownership structure which could aid or hinder the deployment of those strategies, and the method of payment selected by bidders is investigated using multivariate logit methodology. the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in the UK and its influence on the choice of defensive and offensive strategies is described. the study finds outcome in hostile bids in the UK is significantly influenced by the use of certain defensive strategies, the presence of large institutional shareholders in targets, the size of targets and the method of payment chosen by the bidder. the results of this study are useful in devising effective strategies to frustrate or prosecute hostile bids.     

Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management?

We investigate the extent to which Australian firms that report small profits and/or small increases in earnings (i.e. benchmark beaters) have done so by the upward manipulation of these earnings. Although evidence of an unusually large number of firms managing to just beat such earnings benchmarks has been interpreted as evidence of earnings management, this approach fails to identify those firms that are the manipulators from those where unbiased earnings fall naturally into the benchmark beating group. Our results suggest that caution is required in interpreting benchmark beating as an indicator of the extent of earnings management. Using several methods for estimating the unexpected accrual component of earnings, we show that although benchmark beaters have larger positive unexpected accruals than other firms, a similar result holds when firms with small losses or earnings declines (i.e. ‘just miss’ firms) are compared with other firms. Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference between unexpected accruals for the benchmark beating and just miss groups. At a minimum, we reject the joint hypothesis that unexpected accruals capture earnings management and that an unusual kink around zero in the distribution of earnings levels or earnings changes is caused by earnings management.     

Determinants of tax haven utilization: evidence from Australian firms

This paper examines the major determinants of tax haven utilization based on a sample of 200 publicly listed Australian firms, over the 2006–2010 period (1,000 firm‐years). Our regression results show that variables relating to transfer pricing, intangible assets, an interaction term between transfer pricing and intangible assets, withholding taxes, performance‐based management remuneration and multinationality are positively associated with tax haven utilization. We also find that corporate governance structures are negatively associated with tax haven utilization. The magnitude and significance of the regression coefficients indicate that transfer pricing, withholding taxes, intangible assets, an interaction term between transfer pricing and intangible assets, corporate governance and multinationality are the most important drivers of tax haven utilization.     

Herding in analyst earnings forecasts: evidence from the United Kingdom

We present an empirical analysis of herding behavior in analyst forecasts of earnings-per-share. Herding is defined as 'excessive agreement' among analyst predictions, i.e., a surprising degree of consensus relative to the predictability of corporate earnings. The data are for U.K. companies between 1986 and 1997. We examine the effects of forecast horizon and analyst coverage on forecast accuracy and dispersion. The evidence supports overoptimism, overreaction, and herding in analyst forecasts.
G1, G14