Bid–Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market-Makers

This paper studies the effect of asymmetric information on the price formation process in a quote-driven market. One market-maker receives private information on the value of the quoted asset and repeatedly competes with market-makers who are uninformed. We show that despite the fact that the informed market-maker's quotes are public, the market is never strong-form efficient with certainty until the last stage. We characterize a reputational equilibrium in which the informed market-maker influences and possibly misleads the uninformed market-makers' beliefs. At this equilibrium, a price leadership effect arises, the informed market-maker's expected pay-off is positive and the rate of price discovery increases in the last stages of trade.     

英文摘要

LI Cheng, LI Ke-jun, MA Wen-tao （School of Economics and Finance, Xi＇an Jiaotong University, Xi＇an 710061, China） Abstract： This paper applies the simulation method on the basis of Dynamic Stochastic G...     

Business Cycles: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications

This paper looks at recent advances in the study of aggregate fluctuations. The emphasis is on three prominent areas of research: the stochastic growth model, economies which exhibit macroeconomic complementarities and models that emphasize heterogeneity. Each section of the paper outlines the theory, examines relevant empirical evidence and then discusses some policy implications of the analysis.     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

动态购买力平价理论:概念、证据与运用

本文探索性地建立动态购买力平价(PPP)理论的分析框架,通过模型化国民经济市场化和开放化以及国际经济一体化的结构性因素,描述实际汇率对传统PPP理论平价水平的系统偏离及其动态演化特征。本文依据国际横截面数据进行动态PPP理论的计量分析,取得动态PPP理论的结构方程和可计算形式,进而情景预测2006—2010年间人民币实际汇率升值趋势,为未来时期人民币汇率的均衡调整提供数值参考。     

股东利益至上的全球银行业最大并购案——荷兰银行被收购案分析

本文描述了荷兰银行收购案的始末,分析了苏格兰皇家银行牵头的财团以分拆收购的方式战胜巴克莱银行的整体收购策略的原因,客观地评价了此次收购战中各参与方的损益,为收购的法律完善提供了建议和支持。并剖析了这项由我国国家开发银行间接参与的收购案对于我国银行业乃至全球银行业参与全球金融的多方面指导意义。     

价格离散、信息搜寻与团购行为

团购行为是当今消费行为学中的一个重要现象,源自市场和产品信息不对称的双重因素是导致消费者行为变化的根本原因。基于产品信息的价格函数模型,分析团购有利于消费者实现信息共享,减少搜寻成本,降低与企业间的信息不对称,减少消费行为的不确定性,从而获得更大的消费效用的结论。     

卖空机制、股价信息含量与暴跌风险--基于融资融券交易的经验证据

文章利用我国逐步推出融资融券交易的自然实验机会,运用双重差分的研究设计,考察了卖空机制对股价反映负面消息效率的影响。文章以2007-2012年的数据为样本研究发现：相对于非标的股票,融资融券标的股票在成为标的之后,其股价对市场的向下波动及时做出了调整,使得股价对市场正负向波动反应之间的不对称性显著降低,表明标的股票更加及时和充分地吸收了有关公司价值的负面信息;同时,相对于非标的股票,融资融券标的标的股票在成为标的之后,其股价暴跌风险显著降低。文章结果表明,我国股市推出融资融券交易后,卖空机制提高了市场对标的股票负面消息的定价效率。     

Latent Multilateral Trade Resistance Indices: Theory and Evidence

Anderson and van Wincoop (American Economic Review (2003), 69 :106) make a convincing argument that traditional gravity equation estimates are biased by the omission of multilateral resistance terms. They show that these multilateral resistance terms are implicitly defined by a system of non‐linear equations involving all regions' GDP shares and a global interdependence structure involving trade costs. We show how linearizing the system of non‐linear relationships around a free trade world leads to an interdependence structure that can be used as a Bayesian prior to produce statistical estimates of the inward and outward multilateral resistance indices. This reflects a statistical approach that has advantages over the non‐stochastic numerical approach used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to solve for these indices.     

FDI与政府规模、支出结构：理论及证据

随着我国开放程度的加速,FDI不断的引入,地方政府为了本地区的经济增长水平的最大化,会逐渐提高经济建设支出比重,以配合资本进行生产。本文利用中国县级1999年到2003五年数据,进行两部分的经验研究,第一部分研究FDI和政府规模之间的关系,发现随着FDI占GDP比重的增加,政府规模不断扩大。第二部分对FDI和政府支出结构之间关系进行研究,并且得到稳健的结论：随着FDI的增加,会导致地方政府经济建设支出比重不断上升。     

人力资本、财务资本与资本结构：理论和实证

当今社会已经从工业经济迈进知识经济时代，现有以财务资本为研究对象的资本结构理论在解释咨询、高新技术等人力资本较为密集的公司时难免会捉襟见肘。视企业为财务资本与人力资本共同的投资组合是现代资本结构理论研究刻不容缓的任务。本文以现有财务资本结构的研究为基础，通过引入人力资本变量拓宽现代资本结构的内涵，构造债务、股权和人力资本三者之间相互关系和作用的数理模型，结合对我国计算机应用服务业的实证分析，得出结论和启示。     

价值理论与公允价值

微观经济理论研究的重点是寻找隐藏在价格之后的商品的真实价值,均衡价格理论认为,商品的真实价值是供求双方在交换过程中形成的均衡价格,实际交易价格环绕均衡价格上下波动并不断地向其靠近。公允价值是现实条件下所能找到的最理想的交易价格,因而是最贴近商品的真实价值的交易价格,以公允价值作为会计的计价基础,可以如实反映资产的真实价值,进而提高会计信息的决策相关性和可靠性。     

非对称信息下IPO抑价理论实证研究

中国A股市场新股发行一直处于高抑价和低长期回报状态,出现了IPO初始报酬率高、上市首日换手率高和超募融资比例高等特征,造成了中国A股市场特有的"圈钱市"、"投机市"的怪象。中国A股市场的IPO高抑价现象是近年来国内外学者研究的重点和难点,研究表明中国A股市场新股的抑价程度远远高于国外证券市场。针对IPO抑价现象在国外己经有很多成熟的理论,很有必要对这些理论在中国A股市场的适用性进行验证。基于非对称信息下对IPO抑价理论在中国A股市场的适用性进行实证检验,选取从1990年12月到2012年6月在中国A股市场上市的共2032只股票作为研究对象,通过逐步回归分析及显著性检验表明:胜利者诅咒理论、信息传递理论在中国A股市场显著适用,代理委托理论显著不适用,而承销商声誉理论适用性不明显。     

财政与规制管理竞争——理论与实证

经济竞争并不仅仅是私营经济部门的主要特征:政府自身同样积极参与竞争以吸引新的商业投资、就业和收入以鼓励经济发展。此外,这是一个有争议的重大问题。某些观察家把这种竞争看作是一种导致实力削弱的“竞相向下限造就”的破坏性力量,结果造成伴有公众     

Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence

Privatization has been a key component of structural reformprograms in both developed and developing economies. The aimof such programs is to achieve higher microeconomic efficiencyand foster economic growth, as well as reduce public sectorborrowing requirements through the elimination of unnecessarysubsidies. Microeconomic theory tells us that incentive andcontracting problems create inefficiencies due to public ownership,given that managers of state-owned enterprises pursue objectivesthat differ from those of private firms (political view) andface less monitoring (management view). Not only are the managers'objectives distorted, but the budget constraints they face arealso softened. The soft-budget constraint emerges from the factthat bankruptcy is not a credible threat to public managers,for it is in the central government's own interest to bail themout in case of financial distress. Empirical evidence showsa robust corroboration of theoretical implications: privatizationincreases profitability and efficiency in both competitive andmonopolistic sectors. Full privatization has a greater impactthan partial privatization and monopolistic sectors show anincrease in profitability that is above the component explainedby increases in productivity, which reflects their market power.From the macroeconomic perspective, no conclusive evidence canbe drawn, but the trends are favorable. (JEL D21, D61, D62,E65)     

信息选择与经验价格

本从信息经济学的角度,分析了食盐市场,高档汽车市场,彩电市场的价格制定与形成,指出价格围绕价值的波动是该市场的主要参与朴素博弈的结果。价格博弈的实质是信息博弈,谁拥有的私人信息多,谁就能在博弈中取得主动,根据上述分析,提出了“经验价格”,“经验成本”的系列新概念,认为市场价格之和或商品价值与买经验价格之关构成的。经验价格源于买或卖的私人信息,是对其为搜寻信息所付出成本的奖励效用。经验成本则是当事人以当时经验认为的付出。     

中国可持续增长的机制:证据、理论和政策

本报告在企业生产函数中引入政府支持系数,该系数是通过一个政府福利模型而得。在突破贫困陷阱阶段,政府与企业目标高度一致,政府集中一切资源支持企业发展,政府支持系数大,企业享受了低税、低资源价格等有利因素;在进入中等收入阶段,随着城市化快速提高,政府转向福利支出目标,福利刚性不断加大,政企目标冲突,政府支持系数下降甚至出现惩罚,政企在新的发展阶段都面临转型,转型失败可能会落入"中等收入陷阱"。确定中国未来的新增长机制,政府转型是关键,限制政府利益刚性,明确政府福利支出与企业发展能力相匹配,而不是靠债务融资推动福利和增长,更多地让市场发挥激励创新和优化配置资源的功能,以促进经济的可持续增长。     

信息能力与我国财政执法

财政分权体制下,中央对地方政府财政政策执行与绩效等信息的掌握是实现地方"为增长而激励"的前提。"警察巡逻式"和"火险警报式"作为代理人行动与绩效信息获取的两种基本模式,在适用条件和制度效率等方面存在很大不同。中央政府需要依据不同的制度环境综合运用两种模式,以实现地方政府信息获取模式的最优解。