Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value

This paper introduces a new hand‐collected data set that tracks restrictions on shareholder rights at approximately 1,000 firms from 1978 to 1989. In conjunction with the 1990 to 2006 IRRC data, we track shareholder rights over 30 years. Most governance changes occurred during the 1980s. We find a robustly negative association between restrictions on shareholder rights (using G‐Index as a proxy) and Tobin's Q. The negative association only appears after judicial approval of antitakeover defenses in the 1985 landmark Delaware Supreme Court decision of Moran v. Household. This decision was an unanticipated exogenous shock that increased the importance of shareholder rights.     

农村金融改革发展三十年

中国经济改革从农村起步,30年来,中国农村经济社会发生翻天覆地的变化。伴随这一伟大的历史发展进程,农村金融改革走向深入,农村金融在农村经济社会发展中发挥了重要作用。在改革开放三十年之际,回颐总结历史经验,研究分析现实问题,对于加快推进现代农村金融制度建设,显著增强金融服务“三农”功能,促进社会主义新农村建设,全面实现小康社会建设目标,无疑具有重要意义。     

美国《社区再投资法》三十年变革的争论及启示

美国<社区再投资法>颁布实施30年来,随着社会经济条件的变化,经过了七次重大修改,为金融市场的健康发展做出了重大贡献.尽管有很多研究一直为CRA摇旗呐喊,但仍有很多批评者认为CRA扭曲了信贷市场,特别是在面对当前的次贷风暴时,<社区再投资法>又一次成为了经济学界争论的焦点.美国目前对<社区再投资法>下一步修改继续进行着广泛的讨论.结合中国实际,在中国工业化和城市化的大背景、大趋势下认识县域金融机构的信贷投放问题、中小企业融资困难的问题、以及金融服务三农的问题,有选择地借鉴CRA的经验、教训,改善县域、中小企业、三农的金融服务.     

中国会计研究发展:基于改革开放三十年视角

本文目的在于对改革开放三十年来的中国会计研究,做一综合认识和评价。以会计信息有用性为视角,文章分析了我国会计研究发展和演进的趋势及其影响因素,从总体上反映出了与国际接轨的研究特征。在历经初始起步、深入发展和创新发展的不同阶段,我国会计研究取得的丰硕研究成果令人瞩目,其学术影响力和国际地位日益凸显,可以说对国际会计学术研究做出了重要贡献。     

上市公司高管腐败问题与防治对策

近年来上市公司高管腐败现象愈演愈烈,其形成原因可以从人性层面、公司治理层面和外部环境层面来思考.为了有效遏制高管腐败引发的社会和经济问题,可很据其成因从源头预防和事后惩治两方面进行治理.     

十年“量变”话“从紧”

过去的一年，注定是不平凡的一年，这是一个让中国股民爱恨交织的年份，爱之涨；喜之快；恨之跌；忧之热。在诸多的跌宕起伏过后，中国经济又一次迎来了新的起点。     

改革开放 三十而立——30年宏观调控：在探索中前行

对于一个人来说，30岁，应该能坦然地面对一切困难了；对于一个国家来说，30年探索之路，已经让整个社会发生了巨大而深远的变化。     

BBC: Facing the future and financing it

Recent publicity on the single European market has concentrated our attention on the impact of Europe on the private sector. Potentially, however, the impact on the public sector will be equally significant. Public sector organisations will be drawn into the process of opening up markets, with consequences for their policy and management that few people yet appreciate.     

改革开放30年我国金融业发展成效回顾与改进建议

改革开放30年来,我国金融业逐步建立和完善金融调控与监管体制,构建了多元化的金融机构体系,建立和完善了多层次多功能的金融市场体系.但还存在不足之处,急需完善.本文介绍了我国金融业取得的成效,并提出加快金融业改革的对策建议.     

论我国居民金融资产变化与商业银行经营

改革开放20多年来，随着我国居民个人收入水平的提高，居民金融资产总量迅速增长，金融资产结构也发生了重大变化.应对这一变化进行深入分析，明确我国商业银行的经营取向.     

中国农村信用社体制改革六十年反思

我国农村信用社经过60年的发展变迁,虽然名义上是合作制,但实际上早已完全商业化。在这种情况下,农村信用社自下而上入股组建的省联社,却造成省联社对农村信用社的行政性控制。而且省联社管理体制没有合作制基础,政企不分,定位模糊。应认真总结60年来农村信用社体制改革的经验教训,尊重现实,按照市场原则、股份制方向,主要以地（市）为单位组建农村商业银行来进一步深化农村信用社改革。     

比较与启示:近十年我国会计信息披露形式的变迁

20世纪90年代以来 ,我国会计改革中关于财务报告制度出现了三次变迁.通过对会计报表、会计报表附注和财务情况说明书的比较,可以得到关于规范财务报告体系和列报制度的多方面启示.     

IMF改革正当时

各种能够生存下来的国际机构反映出了特定时期的历史需要,而各机构的强弱往往在于其适应和服务于变动的经济与政治力量的能力。国际货币基金组织(IMF)为决定20世纪下半叶的各种动态经济力量提供了很好的服务,但是现在,随着一系列新力量的出现,国际货币基金组织是时候根据当前需要而不是上个世纪的地缘优先政治原则进行自身的调整了。国际货币基金组织应该如何改革,以应付影响全球经济的新力量?本文设定了一个改革的日程,提议对国际货币基金组织的功能与管制同时进行改善。改革后的国际货币基金组织将鼓励经济合作,促进经济安全,并推动全球化,从而使所有人受益,而不仅仅是一个特定的地区或特定的国家受益。     

Managerial ownership and the disposition effect

This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund managers’ ownership and the disposition effect. Using recently disclosed managerial ownership data required by new SEC rules, we document that a significant number of mutual funds exhibit the disposition effect. Funds with managerial ownership exhibit significantly less disposition effect than those without, and the disposition measure decreases with managers’ percentage ownership. We also find that the disposition effect is negatively related to the degree of board independence and fund performance. Our findings suggest that the disposition effect is significantly affected by fund governance and higher managerial ownership may help mitigate the problem.     

Managerial entrenchment and the value of dividends

This study examines the effects of takeover defenses on the value implication of dividends. Using the framework of Fama and French in J Finance 53(3): 819–843 (1998), the paper shows that dividends paid by managers with strong managerial power resulting from takeover protection measures are more valued in the stock market. The results are consistent with the hypothesis of the agency costs of free cash flow built on by Jensen in Am Econ Rev 76(2): 323–329 (1986) in the sense that dividends are important to determine firm value by reducing the free cash flow that would otherwise be deployed for private benefits by entrenched managers. This paper also examines whether the incremental value effect of dividends in entrenched firms is attributable to a numerator effect (changes in the future cash flow) or a denominator effect (changes in the discount rate). The empirical results show that the dividend payout of such firms is more positively related to future performance and more negatively related to information risk, which supports both numerator and denominator effects.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Managerial Stock Options and the Hedging Premium

Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether hedging increases firm value. Some studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that when hedging is based upon incentives from managers' options, firm value decreases.