Explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by US consumers

Motivated by recent policy intervention into payments markets, we develop and estimate a structural model of adoption and use of payment instruments by U.S. consumers. Our structural model differentiates between the adoption and use of payment instruments. We evaluate substitution among payment instruments and welfare implications. Cash is the most significant substitute to debit cards in retail settings, whereas checks are the most significant in bill‐pay settings. Furthermore, low income consumers lose proportionally more than high income consumers when debit cards become more expensive, whereas the reverse is true when credit cards do.     

Price incentives and consumer payment behaviour

In this paper we estimate the effect of particular price incentives on consumer payment patterns using transaction-level data. We find that participation in a loyalty program and access to an interest-free period tend to increase credit card use at the expense of alternative payment methods, such as debit cards and cash. Interestingly though, the pattern of substitution from cash and debit cards differs according to the price incentive. An implication of the findings is that the Reserve Bank reforms of the Australian payments system are likely to have influenced observed payment patterns.     

Payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice

By using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers’ attitudes toward each payment method, we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods. Our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity. We find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types. Our policy experiments suggest that for the sub-population who hold both credit and debit cards, removing rewards would increase their share of paper-based payment methods (i.e., cash and checks), measured in terms of in-store transactions, by no more than 4 percentage points.     

Consumer payment choice: Merchant card acceptance versus pricing incentives

Using transaction-level data from a three-day shopping diary, we estimate a model of consumer payment instrument choice that disentangles the effect of merchant card acceptance from credit card pricing incentives (rewards) at the point-of-sale. The lack of merchant card acceptance plays a large role in the use of cash, especially for low-value transactions (less than 25 dollars). Participation in a credit card rewards program induces a shift toward credit card usage at the expense of both debit cards and cash. In contrast, changes in the amount of rewards (ad valorem) has a small or inelastic effect on the probability of paying with credit cards. Our findings highlight the importance of the two-sided nature of retail payment systems and provide key insights into consumer and merchant behaviour.     

Why are (some) consumers (finally) writing fewer checks? The role of payment characteristics

Since the mid-1990s, the US payment system has undergone a transformation featuring a significant decline in the use of paper checks that is quite uneven across consumers and not well understood. This paper shows that characteristics of payment instruments are the most important determinants of instrument use by estimating econometric models of consumers’ adoption (extensive margin) and use (intensive margin) of checks plus six other payment instruments with a comprehensive new data source. Changes in the relative convenience and cost of checks can explain directly about 34% and 11%, respectively, of the 8.4 percentage point decline in check share from 2003 to 2006. Changes in the relative characteristics of substitute payment instruments also likely contributed indirectly to the decline in check use through an increase in the number of payment instruments per consumer, but the exact magnitude of this indirect channel cannot be identified with available data.     

Consumers' Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences, and Price Response

Debit card use at the point of sale has grown dramatically in recent years in the United States and now exceeds the number of credit card transactions. However, many questions remain regarding patterns of debit card use, consumer preferences when using debit, and how consumers might respond to explicit pricing of card transactions. Using a new nationally representative consumer survey, this paper describes the current use of debit cards by U.S. consumers, including how demographics affect use. In addition, consumers' stated reasons for using debit cards are used to analyze how consumers substitute between debit and other payment instruments. We also examine the relationship between household financial conditions and payment choice. Finally, we use a key variable on bank-imposed transaction fees to analyze price sensitivity of card use, and find a 12% decline in overall use in reaction to a mean 1.8% fee charged on certain debit card transactions; we believe this represents the first microeconomic evidence in the United States on price sensitivity for a card payment at the point of sale.     

Why Do Shoppers Use Cash? Evidence from Shopping Diary Data

Recent studies find that cash remains the dominant payment choice for small‐value transactions despite the prevalence of alternative payment methods such as debit and credit cards. An important policy question is whether consumers truly prefer using cash or merchants restrict card usage. Using unique shopping diary data, we estimate a payment choice model with individual heterogeneity, controlling for merchants' acceptance of cards. Based on a policy simulation imposing universal card acceptance among merchants, we find that overall cash usage would decrease by only 8.0 percentage points, implying that cash usage in small‐value transactions is driven mainly by consumer preferences.     

Pricing of payment cards, competition, and efficiency: a possible guide for SEPA

This paper analyzes equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare consequences of payment card competition. In particular, we model competition between debit and credit cards. The paper argues that optimal consumer and merchant fees must take safety, income uncertainty, default risk, and the merchant’s handling cost of cash into account. Market segmentation where debit and credit cards serve different merchant segments yields a preferred “payment mix”. However, when markets are segmented, payment card fees do not necessarily reach their socially efficient levels. Hence, thoughtful regulatory intervention regarding merchant fees may still be necessary to raise total surplus.     

Lottery Payment Cards: A Study of Mental Accounting

This study analyses the difficulties of using stored-value cards for noncash payment adoption and payment framing behaviour development. This study applies the Rasch model via mental accounting theory to identify unobservable and latent difficulties in adopting noncash payment instruments for lottery participation. Anonymity, a reduction in cash carrying, and convenient purchases have discouraged noncash payment adoptions. However, consumers prefer stored-value cards because they are easy to carry and reduce payment time and long waits. Consumers also develop payment framing behaviour difficulties from crediting up to the maximum stored value and fear of insufficient cash, with preferences for period purchases. Lower income significantly discourages noncash payment adoption and payment framing behaviour development, whereas being of a younger age causes significant payment framing difficulties. Regional variations differ in convenience, anonymity, stored value, balance checking, and indirect donations. The moderating effect between income and age also positively significantly influences noncash payment adoption and payment framing behaviour. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incentives at the counter: An empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the Netherlands

In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments. However, such rules are prohibited in the Netherlands. Dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use. This setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice. Based on consumer and retailer survey data, our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash. Half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect. Removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than EUR 50 million in the long run.     

The future of cash: falling legal use and implications for government policy

As legal use of cash falls with the expansion of privately-issued payment cards, governments lose seigniorage benefits and revenues will be needed to redeem currency. To address this issue, one country is considering replacing cash with government-issued smart cards. The first step in assessing the need for such a policy lies in determining a county’s trend in cash use and its forecast for the future. As no country regularly collects data on cash use, this has to be estimated. We provide an econometric model that determines the share of cash in consumer transactions and illustrate how this information can be used to estimate illegal use as well. Applied to Norway, the share of cash in consumer transactions fell from 81% in 1990 to around 54% in 2000 and may fall to 25% by 2010. Cash used in illegal activities was 7.5% of GDP in 2000.     

Choosing how to pay: The influence of foreign backgrounds

Is having a foreign background a relevant factor in choosing between payment instruments in consumer point-of-sale transactions after migration? We analyze this question using a unique diary survey in which both participants with a Dutch and a foreign background documented their daily purchases. We present several pieces of evidence suggesting that foreign backgrounds still influence the choice between payment instruments after migration to the Netherlands. For instance, we find that first-generation migrants from a number of countries that can be seen as cash-oriented are more likely to use cash in the Netherlands. At the same time, second-generation migrants have similar payment habits as individuals with a Dutch background. This finding suggests that payment behavior is not passed on between generations, but affected by host country payment habits. Finally, we suggest that, in this context, special information campaigns to increase debit card usage will not have clear net social benefits.     

Optimal pricing of payment services

Payments are increasingly being made with payment cards despite the fact that the cost of clearing a card payment usually exceeds the cost of transferring cash. We examine this puzzle through the lens of monetary theory. We consider the design of an optimal card-based payment system when cash is available as an alternative means of payment. We find that a feature akin to the controversial “no-surcharge rule” may be necessary to ensure the viability of the card payment system. This rule states that merchants cannot charge a customer who pays by card more than a customer who pays by cash.     

Determinants of earnout as acquisition payment currency and bidder’s value gains

We examine the wealth effects of a comprehensive sample of UK bidders offering contingent payment, or earnout, as consideration for their acquisitions. We show that bidders using earnout generate significantly higher announcement and post-acquisition value gains than bidders using non-earnout currencies (such as cash, stock exchange, or mixed payments). We construct a logistic model to predict when it is optimal for a bidder to offer earnout. We show that bidders offering earnout optimally enjoy significantly higher announcement and post-acquisition gains than bidders offering non-earnout currencies, consistent with our model of the choice of the optimal method of payment. Overall, we provide robust evidence that earnout is an effective payment mechanism to mitigate valuation risk to acquirers, and also enhances acquirer value during the announcement and post-acquisition periods. Our paper contributes to the broader literature on how corporate acquirers use payment currency to manage information asymmetry and the attendant valuation risk.     

Credit ratings and the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions

This paper establishes that credit ratings affect the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions. We find that bidders holding a high rating level are more likely to use cash financing in a takeover. We attribute this finding to lower financial constraints and enhanced capability of highly rated firms to access public debt markets as implied by their higher credit quality. Our results are economically significant and robust to several firm- and deal-specific characteristics and are not sensitive to the method used to measure the likelihood of the payment choice or after controlling for potential endogeneity bias.     

Taking stock or cashing in? Shareholder style preferences,premiums and the method of payment

We develop and test hypotheses on the impact of target shareholders' investment style preferences on the method of payment and premiums in acquisitions. Stock offers (unlike cash offers) allow target shareholders to defer capital gains taxes. This deferral value, however, depends on target shareholders' willingness to retain acquirer stock. The empirical findings support our hypotheses. Bid premiums in stock offers are negatively and jointly related to target shareholder tax liabilities and to variables proxying for target shareholder willingness to hold acquirer stock. Moreover, the difference between predicted cash and stock premiums due to these factors significantly explains the method of payment choice.     

Why payment card fees are biased against retailers

I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two‐sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on both sides. The market failure arising is primarily a regulatory problem and does not raise any competition concerns.     

Are there Social Spillovers in Consumers’ Security Assessments of Payment Instruments?

Even though security of payments has long been identified as an important aspect of the consumer payment experience, recent literature fails to appropriately assess the extent of social spillovers among payment users. We test for the existence and importance of such spillovers by analyzing whether social influence affects consumers’ perceptions of the security of payment instruments. Based on a 2008–2014 annual panel data survey of consumers, we find strong evidence of social spillovers in payment markets: others’ perceptions of security of payment instruments exert a positive influence on one’s own payment security perceptions. The significant and robust results imply that a consumer’s assessments of security converge to his peers’ average assessment: a 10 percent change in the divergence between one’s own security rating and peers’ average rating will result in a 7 percent change in one’s own rating in the next period. The results are robust to many specifications and do not change when we control for actual fraud or crime data. Our results indicate that spillovers rather than reflection appear to be the cause, although separating the two causes is very difficult (Manski 1993). In particular, the spillovers are stronger for people who experience an exogenous shock to security perception, people who have more social interactions, and younger consumers, who are more likely to be influenced by social media. We also examine the effects of social spillovers on payment behavior (that is, on decisions regarding payment adoption and use). Our results indicate that social spillovers have a rather limited impact on payment behavior, as others’ perceptions seem to affect one’s own payment behavior mainly indirectly through the effect on one’s own perceptions.     

The Check's in the Mail: Why the United States Lags in the Adoption of Cost-Saving Electronic Payments

The United States payment system costs around $225 billion annually and checks account for 75% of all noncash payments. Other electronic payment methods (debit cards, automated clearing house direct deposits, and debits) cost only around one third to one half as much as a check. This paper outlines the main reasons why the shift from checks to cheaper electronic payments has been slow, much slower here than in other countries. We also forecast the future use of checks and electronic payments and end by discussing policy initiatives that may speed up this substitution process.     

欠发达农村地区布放自助金融服务机具的难点及对策

银行卡发展是一项利国利民的工程,对减少现金流通、降低交易成本具有重要意义。而在农村地区,银行卡的推广和使用受制于自助金融服务机具如ATM、POS机的布放。本文着重分析了欠发达农村地区布放自助金融服务机具的难点,并提出相应的对策建议。