Deliberation,learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings

Institutional change entails institutional design, assessment, and modification, which necessarily take place within the constraints and opportunities afforded by existing institutional arrangements. Viktor Vanberg has made major contributions to our understanding of how institutions evolve. We wish to contribute to this symposium in honor of Vanberg by analyzing how institutions for the management of water institutions in Southern California evolved primarily through the use of the courts as settings for deliberation, learning and institutional change.

Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience

The fall of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in July 2000 marked a milestone in Mexico’s political history. Throughout its 71 years of incumbency, the PRI had incarnated the set of social, political and economic institutions of the country to the extent of becoming synonymous with governance and stability. Using a simple model in which institutional change is the result of the strategic interaction between citizens, an incumbent ruler and a potential new ruler or entrant, we provide a systematic interpretation of this experience emphasizing the role of evolutionary factors such as history, uncertainty, learning and experimentation.

Technological change and institutional inertia: a game-theoretic approach

In this paper, we study a co-evolutionary model of economic change at two hierarchical levels. At the lower level, institutions are given and the focus is on how resources are allocated and innovation produced in response to the pay-off structure induced by prevailing institutions. At the higher level, it is the institutions themselves that change as the outcome of a process of social bargaining. The main objective of the paper is to study the interaction between these two levels of change, attempting to provide some insight on issues like technological/institutional divergence, technological dead-end, institutional inertia, etc.It appears that evolutionary economics must be the theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by the economic interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in the terms of the process itself. Thorstein Veblen (1898, p. 393).This work was undertaken while the author was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.     

The institutional change under lobbying and the distribution of power

In this paper, we develop a model of institutional change of land property right in China, which include the influences of lobbying and the political power division in 1978. The model illustrates how extra gains are produced under different institutions and how lobbying and political power division can affect the change. It is clear that the institutional innovation has something to do with the leaders’ legal income, the cost of institutional change and the conversion rate. Given the pattern of leader’s power division, it is the best way for the people in rural areas to change their institutional framework, and it is efficient to mix local and central governmental policies. And lobbying and leading power division can affect the direction and the course of institutional changes that would lead different result among different areas. __________ Translated from Nankai jingji yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Research), 2007, (6): 17–32     

新制度经济学的新发展:历史比较制度分析

新制度经济学在完全理性与有限理性之间左右摇摆,限制了制度理论的发展。以格雷夫为代表的历史比较制度分析,在有限理性前提下,通过大量案例研究,提出了自己关于制度及其变迁的真知灼见:(1)克服两个“两分法”,发展了统一的制度概念;(2)将制度理解为博弈均衡,重点解释古典博弈论成为制度分析有用工具的条件;(2)研究制度在变化的环境中如何存续、内生的制度变迁以及过去制度影响后续制度的原因和作用机制;(3)提出了独具特色的互动的特定历史情景分析,将重复博弈理论与特定历史情景结合起来去识别制度,解释其出现、存续和变迁。     

税制、制度变迁与企业并购的关系研究

随着我国企业并购交易活动的日益活跃和不断发展壮大,我国现行并购税制的完善建设问题也日渐凸出,从理论上对企业并购与并购税制之间的关系进行解析,是探究完善我国企业并购税制的逻辑起点。通常而言,企业并购交易是效率的选择,课于该交易的税收应保持中性,并购税制的变迁及优化完善依赖于税制结构、税种、税率、税基、税收优惠政策及税收征管办法等要素的设计选择。企业并购税制安排应着重从所得税设计、免税并购及免税并购适用条件的设定和完善并购制的时机选择等三个方面考虑。     

Transition as a process of large-scale institutional change

After several years of transition experience the theory is very poorly developed except in regard to macroeconomtc stabilization. Another key dimension of transition is institutional change to provide the organizational infrastructure for a market economy. Such issues are analysed here through a series of models focusing on: uncertainty of outcomes, complementarities and interactions between reforms, and political constraints. The choice between “big bang” and more gradualist strategies is studied under various conditions and the paper also examines specific incentive and allocative aspects of the transition from socialism to capitalism.     

MBO制度边界与范围分析

制度的作用在于规制人们的行为,对于中国特色的管理层收购而言,并不是所有公司都适宜MBO,它必须有严格的界定条件.管理层收购在多大范围内进行?它的制度边界在哪里?这需要我们进行理论分析.     

关于奥地利学派制度变迁理论方法论的初步分析

奥地利学派的制度变迁理论其方法论主要有三大"基石"构成,即,主观主义、方法论个人主义、演进理性主义。它对于其学派的制度变迁理论的渲化具有特殊意义。     

Medical Dominance and Institutional Change in the Delivery of Health Care Services

This paper puts the theory of medical dominance, as it understood as a sociological theory of historical change, into a broader theory of institutional change of the delivery of medical care. The application of medical dominance theory to three institutional contexts (Australia, USA, and Canada) is reviewed. The possibility of progressive institutional change in the delivery of medical care is addressed, as well as the type of technological innovation that might accompany such institutional change. The concept of medical dominance is useful to explain the dominant characteristics supporting the institution of medical practice. However, an explanatory theory of the evolution of health care delivery should be linked to the instrumentally warranted standards for medical care. These standards are then discussed.

Institutional Resource Regimes: Towards sustainability through the combination of property-rights theory and policy analysis

Although the concept of sustainable development is gaining increasing political acknowledgement, despite the implementation of environmental policies specifically intended to solve problems in this area, environmental degradation resulting from the recurrent problems associated with the over-exploitation of natural resources remains an important concern for most countries. How can this situation be explained? This article postulates that a combination of approaches from the political sciences (in particular policy analysis) and institutional economics would enable the identification of the most relevant regulatory dimensions which can explain the (un)sustainable uses of resources. Based on this starting point, it develops an innovative theoretical framework, i.e. that of the Institutional Resource Regime (IRR).The adopted approach facilitates the analysis of the regulatory measures and resource management practices associated with complex and competitive heterogeneous use situations from a perspective of sustainability. Indeed, the two dimensions of “extent” and “coherence” enable the definition and categorization of the IRR of a given resource. The extent of an IRR refers to the total number of goods and services in use that are actually regulated by the regime at a given time, while the coherence measures the degree of coordination of the various user-actors within the regime. One of the major contributions of the IRR framework is its ability to describe the different configurations of regimes, both theoretically and empirically, and to predict their effect on the sustainability of a resource based on the hypothesis that high levels of regime extent and coherence are necessary preconditions for sustainability.By doing this, the IRR framework also enables the analysis of the actual use rights to the goods and services provided by resources as the result of the political strategies of actors who mobilize different legal provisions, which stem either from formal property rights to resources or from policies that regulate the use and protection of these resources.Having developed the central research hypotheses and the empirical research procedure, we present the lessons drawn from the first campaign of field research which was mainly conducted in Switzerland from 1999. Based on the evidence from these initial findings, it is suggested that the scope of the IRR framework could be far broader than evidenced by its application in the case of Switzerland where it was initially developed.     

社会保障制度风险：以新型农村养老保险为例

社会保障制度是一个复杂的系统,具有制度风险。新农保制度具有较为坚实的事实依据和价值基础,但制度仍处于起步阶段,具有保障无效风险、制度分割风险、城乡断裂风险、激励扭曲风险、动态失衡风险和政治刚性风险。为规避制度风险,新农保制度建设必须兼顾各种养老利益,渐进整合农村各类养老制度,逐步实现城乡统筹,不断明晰各方责任,调整激励机制与再分配机制。     

新制度经济学的边界——三种代表性观点及其比较

在新制度经济学的边界问题上,新制度经济学家(威廉姆森和芮切特)、旧制度经济学家(霍奇森)以及经济思想史家(卢瑟福)不仅边界刻画依据不完全相同,而且他们对新制度经济学智力成果的描述也存在着很大的差异。新制度经济学家认为,某种制度分析是否属于新制度经济学关键是看该理论是否假定环境存在着不确定性、人是否具有有限理性,是否明确地或隐含地以交易费用为正为前提。而新制度经济学的边界在旧制度经济学家和经济思想史家那里被进一步放宽。他们深入到本体论层面,认为某种制度分析只要坚持方法论个人主义,那么它就属于新制度经济学的内容。而新制度经济学家的边界刻画更能准确、客观地反映新制度经济学的智力成果。     

中国股票市场的制度供给与需求分析

在中国股票市场从传统的计划经济体制向现代市场经济体制的转变过程中 ,制度短缺成为一种普遍现象。在其制度变迁中 ,政府是中国股票市场制度供给的主体 ,而股票市场市场化和国际化则是制度需求的动力。分析中国股票市场的制度供给与创新 ,有助于我们探寻一种适合中国股票市场健康成长的强制性的制度变迁模型     

公司治理制度的失衡与失效及其改革新方向:新制度经济学视角考察

新制度经济学把制度分解为正式制度和非正式制度两大类,认为两类制度各具特色、相互依存、相互补充,构成了制度的整体实施框架。公司治理属于制度的范畴,其中的正式制度和非正式制度必须兼容互补方能发挥治理作用,然而公司治理中伦理机制的缺失几乎是全球性的普遍问题,造成公司治理制度的失衡与失效,进行企业伦理与公司治理制度的整合是当前形势下公司治理改革的方向。     

试论制度变迁的成因、启示和基本理论

所谓制度变迁,就是指制度的替代、转换与交易的过程。实质上,制度变迁就是一种更高效的制度对另一种更低效的制度的替代过程,即一种新的更有效率的制度的产生过程。因此,着重论述了制度变迁的成因、启示和基本理论。通过对制度变迁的成因、启示和基本理论进行明确的阐释,不仅有助于研究和分析有关和相关制度变迁方面的问题,而且也有益于更好地理解和运用制度变迁基本理论。     

利益相关者视角下开拓型制度创业机制研究

中国转型经济背景下,企业家通过开创一种从无到有的制度而形成的制度创业即被认为是开拓型制度创业,以阿里巴巴电商模式为典型代表的开拓型制度创业实践对于开拓型制度创业机制研究具有重要意义。以阿里巴巴为研究对象,从利益相关者视角出发,将阿里巴巴制度创业中利益相关者分为核心利益相关者、蛰伏利益相关者和边缘利益相关者3类。运用扎根理论方法,提炼出阿里巴巴制度创业面临来自利益相关者的制度创业约束、所使用的制度创业策略以及所获取的制度创业合法化,构建出阿里巴巴制度创业机制模型,最终提炼出开拓型制度创业一般机制模型。     

The institutional dynamics of early modern Eurasian trade: The commenda and the corporation

The focus of this article is on legal-economic institutions that organized early-modern Eurasian trade. It identifies two such institutions that had divergent dispersion patterns, the corporation and the commenda. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that did not migrate until the era of European colonization. The commenda that originated in Arabia migrated all the way to Western Europe and to China. The article explains their divergent dispersion based on differences in their institutional and geographical environments and on dynamic factors, claiming that institutional analysis errs when it ignores migration of institutions and providing building blocks for the modeling of institutional migration.     

层级结构合作博弈、帕累托改善悖论和中国经济制度变迁

以影响控制经济各个因素的作用的次序判断,1978年之前中国的经济制度为行政组织-法律道德因素-市场组织的层级结构,1984年为行政组织-市场组织-法律道德因素,2004年为市场组织-行政组织-法律道德因素,目前正向市场组织-法律道德因素-行政组织的层级结构变迁,且变迁的前两阶段为帕累托改善.但是经济制度变迁的层级结构合作博弈模型揭示:此利益结构变化平稳的变迁的难度将逐渐增大,并可能受到各种人为因素的扭曲、干扰和阻挠,陷入帕累托改善悖论.