Predatory mortgage lending

Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders attenuates predatory lending. We use our model to analyze the effects of legislative interventions.     

Posted rates and mortgage lending activity

In many metropolitan areas (MSAs) newspapers post mortgage terms for lenders in a manner designed to permit an easy comparison of discount points and note rates. Using these advertised rates for 73 lenders in three MSAs we examine 1) how applicants respond to short-run changes in relative rates, and 2) the relationship between the services provided and quality of applications received by lenders and their long-term market positions. We find that applicant flows increase when lenders lower their rates. We also find that persistent cross-lender differences in rates are associated with differences in product quality reflected in processing times, loan sales, and FHA/VA lending; and that high-risk borrowers tend to apply to lenders posting above-average rates.     

The real consequences of bank mortgage lending standards

We examine the real effects of changes in bank mortgage loan underwriting standards by combining responses to the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, application information from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and local housing market measures over 1990 to 2013. Tightened standards are associated with a 1 percentage point increase in denial rates and a 5% fall in loan issuance, controlling for applicant pool changes, but no change for predominantly-securitizing banks. In areas with more exposure to banks that have tightened standards, mortgage delinquency rates, house prices, new home sales, and residential construction employment fall substantially.     

Political influence and banks: Evidence from mortgage lending

We show that banks expand mortgage lending in the home states of Senate Banking Committee chairs, and the effect is more pronounced in counties where the incumbent senator faces a competitive re-election race. Banks strategically target politically active borrowers. Consequently, banks’ profitability increases after favoring the incumbent politicians’ constituents, but they suffer a deterioration in mortgage asset quality in the long run. Our findings imply that political power could distort private capital allocation beyond conventional political contribution channels.     

Nonlinear incentives and mortgage officers’ decisions

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, banks should ensure that their incentive compensation policies appropriately balance long-term risk with short-term rewards. Using daily output data from mortgage officers in a US commercial bank, we test the notion that nonlinear contracts create time-varying incentives for the employees and impose costs on the firm. We provide empirical evidence that mortgage officers greatly increase their output toward the end of each month, when the minimum monthly quota is assessed. This occurs through a combination of reducing the processing time and approving some marginal applications. We also find that mortgages originated on the last working day of the month have a higher likelihood of delinquency.     

The new Capital Accord and banks’ lending decisions

Capital requirements (‘pillar one’ of the new Capital Accord) rising with the increase in borrowers’ PDs were thought as being likely: (i) to have a serious impact on the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (usually riskier than large corporates) and (ii) to increase the procyclicality of the supply of credit.

The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evaluation of the possible impact of the new Accord proposals on the lending policies of Italian banks. We compare the interest rate charged to a large set of Italian firms with the cost brought about by the change in the calculation of capital requirements. Since the two variables move together in response to an increase in borrowers’ PDs, we conclude that the new regulatory approach to measuring capital adequacy appears consistent with banks’ own risk evaluations. This result is supported by a ‘stress testing’ exercise: the relationship also holds in a distressed economic scenario, which replicates the financial conditions of the Italian corporate sector in the 1993–1994 recession.     

Option compensation,risky mortgage lending,and the financial crisis

We examine how option compensation affects banks' risky mortgage origination and sale decisions before the financial crisis in 2008. We find that, in the period immediately before the financial crisis, option compensation has little impact on the riskiness of mortgages originated and is negatively associated with mortgage lenders' propensity to sell risky mortgages. The results are consistent with banks' incentives to maximize revenues from origination and servicing fees while managing risk exposure by adjusting the sale of risky mortgages. For identification, we use bank-year fixed effects and matched loan applications to control for both supply- and demand-side factors of mortgage lending. We find similar results when using the variation in option compensation generated by the implementation of FAS 123R.     

The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior

We test a new hypothesis that may help explain the procyclicality of bank lending. The institutional memory hypothesis is driven by deterioration in the ability of loan officers over the bank's lending cycle that results in an easing of credit standards. We test this hypothesis using data from individual US banks over 1980–2000: over 200,000 bank-level observations on commercial loan growth, over 2,000,000 loan-level observations on interest rate premiums, and over 2000 bank-level observations on credit standards and loan spreads from bank management survey responses. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis, although there are differences by bank size class.     

Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China

This study investigates whether and how banks’ lending incentives influence firms’ investment behaviors in China. First, empirical results show that loans granted to politically connected firms are less influenced by those firms’ profitability and tangibility. Second, political connection is a violation factor in debt markets, and our study finds that firms with political ties invest less efficiently than firms without political ties when they can access abnormal debt. Finally, we find that regional development with regard to market development and government quality improvement reduces the negative impact of politically connected lending on firms’ investment efficiency.     

Bias in estimates of discrimination and default in mortgage lending: The effects of simultaneity and self-selection

The common practices of estimating single-equation models of mortgage rejection to test for discrimination in mortgage markets or single-equation ex ante mortgage default equations to validate underwriting criteria produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This is due to problems of simultaneous equations bias which arise because, in a world of imperfect information, mortgage terms are not exogenous to the rejection or default decision. In addition, mortgage default estimates are also subject to selection bias. Monte Carlo experiments are used to study the nature and extent of likely bias in single-equation estimation results. We find that rejection equation estimates indicate discrimination when none exists and that estimated coefficients of mortgage terms, such as the loan-to-value ratio, are also subject to significant bias in both rejection and default equations.     

Country risk,portfolio decisions and regulation in international bank lending

This paper examines the concept of ‘country risk’ and relates it to the construction of efficient loan portfolios in international banking. Applicability of conventional portfolio-theoretic concepts to the management of country lending exposure is examined, as are the requisites of country review systems for national exposure management. The issue of international banking regulation is assessed in this context, focusing on the dangers inherent in national and international regulatory initiatives for optimum global capital allocation.     

Overbuilding,real estate lending decisions,and the regional economic base

The primary purpose of this paper is to evaluate the causes of overbuilding in the context of economic base theory. A second and closely related purpose is to determine if the economic base multiplier effect is stronger in the long run. Construction decisions depend on the strength of the local economy. Since basic activity is highly cyclical, if there are significant lags in the multiplier process running from basic to nonbasic sectors, then growth in non-basic employment will continue when the basic sector slows or declines. Hence, overbuilding may be, in part, a result of false signals about future growth in the local economy to builders, developers and lenders at the time a project is conceived. In addition, one of the important sources of the lags in the multiplier process is the construction sector. Potential solutions to overbuilding are discussed in an economic base context. The implications for bank regulation, bank lending and feasibility analysis are discussed.     

Simultaneity bias in mortgage lending: A test of simultaneous equations models on bank-specific data

This study uses simultaneous equations models and single-equation models to test for simultaneity bias in mortgage refinance data compiled by a regional bank. The purpose of the study is to assess the claim that single-equation models of the lending decision produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of endogenous mortgage terms. Bank-specific data are analyzed to avoid bias resulting from uncontrolled policy, training, or underwriting differences across banks. Importantly, the data contain all variables the regional bank identified as important factors in explaining its loan disposition results. After controlling for applicants' debt, income, credit history, and requested loan term, I find that the race coefficient in single-equation models is biased upward, while the loan-to-value ratio coefficient is biased downward, although both biases are insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that simultaneous equations models are preferable to single-equation models in tests for discrimination, and can be used to determine the extent of race coefficient and loan-to-value ratio coefficient bias in single-equation models.     

A note on the impact of audit qualifications on lending and credit decisions

This paper examines the impact of certain types of qualified auditors' report on bank lending decisions and credit analysts' decisions in the United Kingdom. The research design involved sending a set of financial statements, which contained one of four different types of audit report, to a large sample of bankers and credit analysts. They were asked to state how much they would lend, or how much credit they would give, for each of the hour audit report situations. The mean loan-credit responses for each audit report type were then examined to see if there were any significant differences. It was found that two types of audit qualification, namely going concern problems and asset valuation problems, significantly affected decisions and that firms suffering these types of qualifications had their credit standing significantly impaired.     

Audit report information content and the provision of non-audit services: Evidence from Spanish lending decisions

This study examines whether auditor economic independence affects the information content of going concern audit reports in the European setting. We conduct an experiment where 80 experienced Spanish loan officers from the second largest European commercial bank review a loan request under two lending scenarios: (1) a potential borrower receiving an unqualified but modified going concern opinion, and (2) a potential borrower receiving a qualified going concern opinion. Auditor economic independence, measured by the provision of non-audit services (NAS), is manipulated (absence vs. presence of significant NAS). We find that a qualified going concern audit report is interpreted as a primary warning signal (death penalty). However, the provision of NAS acts as a second order mechanism that only activates loan officers’ professional skepticism in the case of an unqualified but modified going concern report scenario. Therefore, we find evidence suggesting that the potential negative impact of a perceived lack of auditor independence depends on the nature of the audit report. Our findings have important implications for the European regulator, which is currently considering establishing an auditor independence regulation framework similar to that in the United States of America.     

Economic policy uncertainty,credit risks and banks lending decisions: Evidence from Chinese commercial banks

Using data for Chinese commercial banks from 2000 to 2014, this paper examines the effects of economic policy uncertainty(EPU) on banks’ credit risks and lendin...     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

丹麦按揭系统稳健运作的经验

丹麦房贷市场是世界第三大抵押债券市场,其独特的按揭系统有着200多年的历史,是世界上最古老的、运行最稳定的房屋抵押贷款系统之一。丹麦模式以高透明度、低信贷风险和低借贷成本而闻名于世,在历次金融危机中稳如磐石,对社会经济的稳定发展发挥了重要作用。文章介绍了丹麦按揭系统稳健运作的成功经验,以期为我国房地产市场的长期稳定发展提供借鉴。     

Overseas bankers in the UK and their use of information for making lending decisions: Changes from 1985

This paper is concerned with the information used by one set of users, namely bankers, and the changes in their usage of information over time. The work replicates and revisits the work of Berry, A., Citron, D., Jarvis, R., 1985. Foreign banks operating in the UK—their information requirements, usage and suggested improvements to financial reporting, implications for the accounting profession. European Accounting Association Conference, Brussels. The population surveyed was drawn from the same source as that used for the earlier study although, as might be expected in a dynamic environment, the individual bankers making up that population were not identical. The results show that accounting information, as a whole, remains a very important source of information informing the bankers' decision-making processes but that the relative importance and usage of the components has changed. Some of these changes are positive in that they suggest that there have been improvements to the information content provided, for example in contrast to the findings of Bartlett, S.A., Chandler, R.A., 1997. The Corporate Report and the private shareholder: Lee and Tweedie twenty years on. British Accounting Review 29, 245–261, the cash flow statement is seen as more important than the profit and loss account or balance sheet. Other changes are perhaps of more concern to accounting standard setters as the results represent a decrease in the perceived importance of key components of financial statements, for example, the audit report and the statement of accounting policies. This supports the earlier findings of Bartlett and Chandler (1997) in respect of the audit report. There is also evidence to suggest that the mix and type of information these bankers are now using has changed since 1985. This may indicate a move toward a greater use of a going concern approach to lending decisions.