The Cost of Capital of Cross‐listed Firms

This paper analyses the cost of capital of firms with foreign equity listings. Our purpose is to shed light on the question whether international and domestic asset pricing models yield a different estimate of the cost of capital for cross‐listed stocks. We distinguish between (i) the multifactor ICAPM of Solnik (1979) and Sercu (1980) including both the global market portfolio and exchange rate risk premia and (ii) the single factor domestic CAPM. We test for the significance of the cost of capital differential in a sample of 336 cross‐listed stocks from nine countries in the period 1980–99. Our hypothesis is that the cost of capital differential is substantial for firms with international listings, as these are often large multinationals with a strong international orientation. We find that the asset pricing models yield a significantly different estimate of the cost of capital for only 12% of the cross‐listed companies. The size of the cost of capital differential is around 50 basis points for the US, 80 basis points for the UK and 100 basis points for France.     

Types of investor uncertainty and the cost of equity capital

We jointly test the effects of two types of investor uncertainty, one related to future firm performance and unrelated to accruals (cash flow uncertainty) and one directly related to accrual estimation errors (accounting quality uncertainty). Distinct from prior studies, our uncertainty estimates are based on a matched‐firm design that minimizes the mechanical relationship between the two uncertainty variables. We find a strong negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and multiple estimates of the cost of equity capital. With respect to accounting quality uncertainty, we find a strong positive association with both expected stock returns and implied costs of equity, but only in settings that control for cash flow uncertainty. Collectively, our results suggest the need to consider different types of investor uncertainty when examining how investor uncertainty affects the cost of equity capital.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

Tax avoidance and ex ante cost of capital

This study examines the association between tax avoidance and ex ante cost of equity capital. Based on prior research, we develop two proxies for investors’ expectations of tax avoidance and explore whether deviations from those expectations result in higher ex ante cost of equity capital. We find that the ex ante cost of equity capital increases with tax avoidance that is either below or above investor expectations and that the increase is larger for tax avoidance that exceeds investors’ expectations. We then examine whether firms that alter their future tax avoidance exhibit a lowering of their ex ante cost of equity capital and find that tax avoidance decreases (increases) from the prior year for firms that were above (below) investors’ expectations in the prior year. These results are consistent with the trade‐off suggested by the Scholes and Wolfson framework and reinforce the notion that balancing tax benefits and non‐tax costs is an important feature of firms’ tax planning.     

THE COST OF CAPITAL,MACAULAY'S DURATION,AND TOBIN'S q

It is shown empirically that the cost of equity capital estimated from the dividend discount model and Tobin's q are negatively related. The theoretical relationship between these variables is exploited to determine alternative estimates of the cost of equity capital and Macaulay's duration without having to estimate the growth rate g in the conventional manner. This new approach can readily be implemented for large firms reporting SFAS No. 33 data.     

Segment Disclosure and Cost of Capital

We investigate whether segment disclosure influences cost of capital. Improved segment reporting is expected to decrease cost of capital by reducing estimation risk. However, in a competitive environment segment disclosure may also generate uncertainties about future prospects and lead to a larger cost of capital. Asset‐pricing tests confirm that segment disclosure is a priced risk factor. Also, segment disclosure reduces ex‐ante estimates of cost of equity capital and other measures connected to risk. These results suggest a negative relation between segment disclosure and cost of capital. Our results also show that competition reduces, but does not eliminate, the previous relationship.     

CONTRACTING FOR VALUE: EVA AND THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATIONS

EVA becomes more difficult to apply the farther down in the company you go, especially in organizations with more traditional “functional” designs. Because centralized functions are not independent self-contained entities with direct control over their own revenues, costs, and capital, the performance measures used to evaluate them are necessarily incomplete; they reveal only part of the picture. For example, Marketing may increase sales and operating income—the measures on which it is evaluated—but at the same time drive excessive use of capital in the Manufacturing plants. Manufacturing may reduce unit cost through long production runs, thereby minimizing changeovers and setups, but create excess inventory in the process. Costreducing measures could also lead to declining quality and customer satisfaction, ultimately eroding the company's reputation. In short, each critical function influences results in other parts of the company, and focusing only on activities under a manager's direct control can result in myopic and misleading measures of performance. In organizing key processes as internal EVA Centers, joint costs and benefits shared by different corporate functions or business units can be built into financial measures in a way that encourages collaboration. As one example, a firm can attempt to replicate market forces internally by requiring each marketing region to contract for capacity with the internal manufacturing group. In a traditional management system, Marketing reserves (and relinquishes) manufacturing capacity at no cost; the consequence is excessive demand for resources. An internal pricing mechanism that requires Marketing to pay a fee for capacity will force its managers to assess trade-offs as if it were contracting with an outside party. Such a system effectively requires that functional managers take a more company-wide view of their responsibilities. By including the cost of capital, it forces managers to define costs more carefully. By including the impacts on other functions, it also forces a broader definition of costs. And by using multi-year contracts among different divisions, the framework extends the time horizon over which costs and benefits matter.     

Excess Control, Corporate Governance and Implied Cost of Equity: International Evidence

We investigate whether the separation between ownership and control rights can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of capital-raising costs. Using estimates of the cost of equity capital implied by analyst earnings forecasts and growth rate for a sample of 1,207 firms from nine Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find strong, robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in excess control, while controlling for other firm-level characteristics. This core finding persists after controlling for legal institutions variables.     

Political rights and equity pricing

We examine the influence of political rights on the implied cost of equity capital using a sample of firms from 44 countries. We find that firms' equity financing costs are lower when political rights are stronger. We further find that political institutions' direct impact on the cost of equity capital is incremental to that of legal institutions. Economically, our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in political rights is associated with a 38 basis point decrease in corporate cost of equity capital. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political rights on equity pricing is more pronounced in countries with weak legal institutions.     

Fama's Ratio and the Effect of Operating Leverage on the Cost of Capital Under CAPM

The firm's operating leverage is its ratio of fixed to variable costs. It is widely understood that production settings with higher fixed costs and lower variable costs are high risk. Well-rehearsed CAPM arguments show how the firm's beta and cost of capital is higher when its proportion of fixed costs is higher. Importantly, that generalization holds under CAPM if expected total costs are constant and merely re-apportioned between fixed and variable, but does not hold if expected total costs change. In actual business contexts, higher fixed costs are intended to bring lower unit variable costs and often lower expected total costs. Allowing for such efficiency gains, the firm's risk-adjusted cost of capital might typically fall despite the higher operating leverage. Formal proof follows directly from the payoffs or ‘certainty equivalent’ expression of CAPM. The CAPM insights and new CAPM equations brought to light in this proof are surprising and useful.     

Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion

We examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting discretion, focusing on whether the impact varies with institutions' cost of acquiring monitoring information. Using geographic distance between the firm and the institutional investor as a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information, we find that corporate managers are less likely to use financial reporting discretion in the presence of local monitoring institutions than distant monitoring institutions. We also find that the impact of monitoring institutions on financial reporting discretion varies with the costs and benefits of financial reporting discretion.     

Does Anticipated Information Impose a Cost on Risk‐Averse Investors? A Test of the Hirshleifer Effect

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk‐averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk‐sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short‐term capital gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Motives for and Effects of Asset Revaluation: An Examination of South Korean Data

Examining a sample of South Korean firms, of which 201 revalued assets and 899 did not during the period 2008–2009, we find that the average debt cost, equity cost, and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) are higher among the firms that revalued. Firms with higher equity costs and leverage are more likely to revalue and the propensity has a negative relationship with profitability, cash flow, and Tobin’s q. Firms that engage in revaluation experience reductions in all capital costs from year ?1 to +1, comparable to those among firms that did not revalue. Our results support both the information hypothesis and the debt-cost hypothesis.     

Mean-variance optimization using forward-looking return estimates

Despite its theoretical appeal, Markowitz mean-variance portfolio optimization is plagued by practical issues. It is especially difficult to obtain reliable estimates of a stock’s expected return. Recent research has therefore focused on minimum volatility portfolio optimization, which implicitly assumes that expected returns for all assets are equal. We argue that investors are better off using the implied cost of capital based on analysts’ earnings forecasts as a forward-looking return estimate. Correcting for predictable analyst forecast errors, we demonstrate that mean-variance optimized portfolios based on these estimates outperform on both an absolute and a risk-adjusted basis the minimum volatility portfolio as well as naive benchmarks, such as the value-weighted and equally-weighted market portfolio. The results continue to hold when extending the sample to international markets, using different methods for estimating the forward-looking return, including transaction costs, and using different optimization constraints.

     

Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand‐collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003–2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrower's cost of debt.     

Dividend change announcements,ROE, and the cost of equity capital

We hypothesize and present strong evidence that dividend increases (decreases) result in a general decrease (increase) in the opportunity cost of equity capital (K_e), measured by the discount rate implicit in analysts' forecasts. Estimates of K_e obtained from analyst forecast data likely capture priced information risk that is not reflected in cost of equity capital estimates customarily obtained from empirical excess returns data. In the presence of a full menu of control variables, our measured changes in the cost of equity capital are shown to provide high explanatory power for the market reaction to dividend change announcements. We also hypothesize and demonstrate that the impact of dividend changes on the cost of equity is conditional on how preannouncement K_e relates to preannouncement return on equity (ROE). Specifically, dividend increases result in a reduction in the cost of equity capital only when currently experienced ROE < K_e. This is consistent with shareholders preferring earnings to be reinvested by managers to earn a higher rate than their opportunity rate. When ROE > K_e, on the other hand, the cost of equity capital actually increases. For dividend decreases, the cost of equity capital increases only when ROE > K_e, consistent with firms currently experiencing positive economic income using dividend cuts to signal anticipated permanent earnings declines. Together with extensive robustness tests, our results indicate that dividend changes significantly affect shareholder value, contrary to the longstanding dividend irrelevance argument.     

Valuation in Emerging Markets: A Simulation Approach

Most of the foundations of valuation theory have been designed for use in developed markets. Because of the greater, and in some cases different, risks associated with emerging markets (although recent experience might suggest otherwise), investors and corporate managers are often uncomfortable using traditional methods. The typical way of capturing emerging-market risks is to increase the discount rate in the standard valuation model. But, as the authors argue, such adjustments have the effect of undermining some of the basic assumptions of the CAPM-based discounted cash flow model. The standard theory of capital budgeting suggests that estimates of unconditional expected cash flows should be discounted at CAPM discount rates (or betas) that reflect only “systematic,” or “nondiversifiable,” market-wide risks. In practice, however, analysts tend to take what are really estimates of “conditional” expected cash flows—that is, conditional on the firm or its country avoiding a crisis—and discount them at higher rates that reflect not only systematic risks, but diversifiable risks that typically involve a higher probability of crisis-driven costs of default. But there is almost no basis in theory for the size of the increases in discount rates. In this article, the authors propose that analysts in emerging markets avoid this discount rate problem by using simulation techniques to capture emerging-market risks in their estimates of unconditional expected cash flows—in other words, estimates that directly incorporate the possibility of an emerging-market crisis and its consequences. Having produced such estimates, analysts can then discount them using the standard Global CAPM.     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.     

Voluntary disclosure,mandatory disclosure and the cost of capital

We examine the association between a firm's cost of capital and its voluntary and mandatory disclosures. We include two types of mandatory disclosure: those that are a function of periodic reports that are realizations of ex‐ante reporting systems and those that arise due to specific corporate events. To capture a firm's voluntary and event‐driven mandatory disclosures, we use information the firm provides via 8K filings. To capture periodic mandatory disclosures, we use earnings quality measures derived from the literature. Consistent with endogenous relations predicted by theory, we find that voluntary disclosure and both types of mandatory disclosure are correlated, although only event‐driven mandatory disclosures are significant in models that explain voluntary disclosure. We also find that the cost of capital is generally influenced by each of these disclosure types. We also find that controlling for periodic mandatory disclosure does not affect the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital, while controlling for event‐driven mandatory disclosure sometimes affects the relationship depending on the measures used. Our study suggests that a firm's disclosure environment includes the three types of disclosure examined, although the inclusion of mandatory disclosures does not affect the measured association between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital.