Trade and Specialisation in Pollution Intensive Industries: North–South Evidence

Abstract

The pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) and the capital-labour hypothesis (KLH) state that the relative level of a country's environmental regulations and capital and labour endowments determines its comparative advantage respectively. Since these hypotheses lead to conflicting predictions as to whether the North or the South will specialise in pollution-intensive production, this paper examines whether changes in trade and specialisation patterns allow us to distinguish between pollution haven and factor endowment effects. We employ a methodology that enables us to present North-South trade patterns over time and to identify those periods when trade patterns were consistent with either the PHH and/or the KLH as a foundation for undertaking more detailed econometric studies.     

International trade and directed search unemployment in general equilibrium

We develop an open economy general equilibrium model, with auction‐based directed search unemployment, to study the interactions of trade and unemployment. The theory ascribes all outcomes purely to the fundamentals of technology and endowment. If countries differ by endowment, trade makes both the unemployment rate and the rental in the capital‐(labour‐) abundant country rise (decline) but does not lead to equalization. If, alternatively, countries differ by technology, trade increases (decreases) the unemployment rate in the country whose technology is relatively superior (inferior) for producing the capital‐intensive good.     

Real exchange rate and productivity in a specific-factor model with skilled and unskilled labour

The present study develops a two-sector specific factor model in which capital is mobile between sectors. We assume that the traded (non-traded) sector uses skilled (unskilled) labour for production. The theoretical model reveals that the real exchange rate (RER) response to a productivity shock depends on the countries’ relative abundance of skilled labour: a rise in traded productivity leads to a higher RER appreciation in a country whose relative skilled labour rate is high. Using panel data, structural break tests confirm that the skilled versus unskilled labour ratio may be a significant splitting variable. In the long run, the relationship between productivity and RER may be positive or negative, as suggested by the theoretical model, depending on the country’s relative abundance of skilled labour.     

Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition

Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.     

The effects of labour unions on international capital tax competition

Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital.     

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYING

Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong.     

Rigid labour markets with trade and capital mobility: theory and evidence

Abstract We develop a multi‐country model with imperfect labour markets to study the effect of labour market frictions on bilateral trade flows. We use a framework that allows for goods trade and capital mobility and show that labour market imperfections exert opposite effects in the absence of capital mobility (the short run) and its presence (the long run), respectively. In the short run, a higher degree of labour market rigidity decreases the value of total trade, but increases the share of intra‐industry trade for a country that is larger than its trading partner. The reverse effects are observed when capital is allowed to cross country borders. Using data on unemployment and income distribution for 23 OECD countries, we compute the central parameter in our theoretical model that describes the degree of labour market rigidity. We use this new empirical concept to provide evidence for our theoretical findings by means of reduced‐form regressions as well as simulation results of a calibrated general equilibrium model.     

TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK†

This paper synthesizes a body of work in trade theory and commercial policy. A common theme unifies this literature: The prospect of protection, institutionalized in the policy formation process and the rules for administered protection, can induce real changes in economic activity independent of whether actual barriers to trade have been imposed. These changes are designed to indirectly manage policy outcomes by either encouraging or defusing protectionist pressures. Thus firm conduct may be distorted by incentives to optimize on a politically-determined margin and the evolution of protectionist events may be shaped by more than the direct lobbying efforts of interest groups.     

Credit market imperfection,lack of entrepreneurship and capital outflow from a developing economy

This paper explores the impact of credit market imperfection on lack of demand for capital, trade, and capital flows in an economy with wealth heterogeneity. In particular, we look at the implications of wealth heterogeneity. We show that the low return of capital and lower output of credit-intensive output in autarky may reflect lack of entrepreneurship and demand for credit due to wealth heterogeneity and eventually may lead to capital outflow from a capital-scarce country. This is a different way of echoing the sentiment of the well–known Lucas paradox, which suggests that capital might flow from the poor to the rich countries. We also show the possibility of trade and capital flow being complements and not substitutes, as is usual in standard trade models driven by factor abundance.     

Endogenous Trade Policies in a Developing Economy

This paper examines the formation of trade policy for a small open developing economy where lobbying activities may be carried out to influence policy‐making decisions. The paper presents a three‐sector economy in which the manufacturing sector can lobby policymakers for favorable policies. Under some plausible conditions, it is demonstrated that lobbying activities carried out by the owners of the specific factor in the manufacturing sector would secure a protectionist trade policy through either an import tariff or an export subsidy. The government also imposes a consumption tax on agricultural products, which further strengthens the protectionist measure applied to the manufacturing sector. In general equilibrium, there will be a movement of labor to the manufacturing sector, an output expansion in the manufacturing sector, and an output contraction in the agricultural sector, exactly as suggested by factual evidence.     

How does the flow of remittances affect the trade balance of the Middle East and North Africa?

ABSTRACT

The Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) economies have one of the highest degrees of dependency on received remittances worldwide. In this study, we have examined the role of remittances in the trade balance of 11 labour abundant MENA countries. Our panel regression analysis showed that the inflow of remittances has fostered the trade deficit. We also found that the final effect of remittances depends on the level of domestic capital formation. The results are robust after controlling for other drivers of trade deficit such as income, inflation, exchange rate and institutions as well as country and year fixed effects.     

SHIFT WORKING AND TRADE IN LABOUR SERVICES WITH TIME ZONE DIFFERENCES

Using a two‐factor (labour and capital), two‐good (shift‐working and non‐shift‐working commodities) model with two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labour services (via communications networks) on the comparative advantage of countries capable of such trade. It is shown that a comparative advantage in a shift‐working commodity is held by pairs of countries in different time zones and connected through a good communication network. Concerning factor prices, if the shift‐working commodity is capital (respectively, labour) intensive, the wage rate for day‐shift labour will decrease (respectively, increase) as a result of trade in labour services. It is also demonstrated that this labour service utilization is mutual: some of Home's day‐shift labour will be utilized for the Foreign night shift, and vice versa. Thus, periodic trade in labour services occurs across countries.     

Lobbying and the international fight against tax havens

Despite a variety of measures taken by high‐tax countries, the international fight against tax havens so far remains rather ineffective. This paper introduces offshore lobbying as a possible explanation for this observation. The author analyzes the international fight against tax havens in a two‐country model, in which the onshore country exerts pressure on domestic profit‐shifting firms and the tax haven's government lobbies against this measure. In this framework, he finds that pressure and lobbying are strategic substitutes and that there is an extensive margin incentive for offshore lobbying. Furthermore, when starting at initially high costs for profit shifting, a reduction in these costs leads to fewer profit‐shifting firms. Finally, when allowing for a second low‐tax jurisdiction, the overall level of lobbying increases, but less than proportionally.     

Country size,income level and intra-industry trade

This study investigates three testable hypotheses of intra-industry trade., It begins by developing a theoretical, two country model., The model explicitly includes two goods: differentiated products and homogeneous goods., Then three empirical hypotheses are derived as follows., The share of intra-industry trade will be large: (a) if the two economies are of similar size, (b) if the capital-labour endowment ratio of both countries is similar, and (c) if the total size of the two economies is large., From the cross-sectional analysis using 1970–1994 data, results are obtained that support the model., Furthermore, the results are confirmed using panel analysis on the pooled data.,     

Protectionary bias in agriculture: A pure economic argument

Empirical evidence suggests that the agricultural sector in the developed countries has enjoyed a greater degree of protection than the import-competing manufacturing sectors. Usually this is attributed to strong farm lobbies and hence on political factors. We provide a theoretical model and a possible explanation of this phenomenon based on purely economic arguments. Two importables are accommodated in a three-good three-factor model of trade and production, one is a labor-intensive manufacturing good and the other is an agricultural commodity. This captures the trade pattern of a typical industrialized country with an agricultural sector such as Europe and the USA. We show that uniform tariffs in agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing will definitely hurt the land owners in real terms and may reduce their absolute return. Hence, if there has to be protection, it has to be biased in favor of agriculture.     

Profit rate dynamics, income distribution, structural and technical change in Denmark, Finland and Italy

Under less restrictive assumptions than in previous contributions, this paper highlights various patterns of profit rate dynamics that are common to the countries under scrutiny. Without a substantial re-distribution of income in favour of profits, the profit rate declines. When labour productivity is weak the profits/wages ratio declines leading to a decline in the profit rate, also due to capital deepening. Developments in the capital-labour ratio tend to increase the organic composition of capital while those in the ratio between the capital price deflator and the average wage tend to decrease it. Falls in the profit rate took place in countries with a weak technological change with episodes of Marxian bias. Employment shifted from low to high capital intensity sectors, from low to high organic composition industries and from low to high productivity sectors. Rising strength of labour and realization failures tend to have a greater role than rising organic composition in cyclical profit rate dynamics. Over the cycle, the first mechanism is also the first one to show up, while the others tend to follow it. Theoretical and policy implications are offered.     

Trade and technological explanations for changes in sectoral labour demand in OECD economies

This paper sets out to establish the main determinants of variations in the demand for aggregate labour in manufacturing and service sectors (22) for a cross-section of OECD countries (14). A relatively new panel data set is employed in the analysis, the OECD's International Sectoral Data Base. Preliminary analysis revealed that the ‘within’ sector variation in the wage share dominated overall variation for most countries and time periods. A separate dynamic model was thus generated to explain the ‘within’ sector variation in the wage share. This model contained real wages, output, the capital stock, technological change (total factor productivity) and trade (the imports to value-added ratio) as independent variables. In addition the wage level was also interacted with these explanatory variables on the presumption that skill is positively correlated with the level of wages. Because of the potential for simultaneity bias, estimation was conducted by IV and OLS. The main findings were that the capital stock and technological change were the main determinants of shifts in labour demand. While some countries reported the trade variable as significant its influence was only of slight importance in most cases. The interaction terms proved to be significant in a large number of countries. Some evidence was found that capital and technological were complementary with skill. Overall it was found that broad agreement existed across countries in the factors which influence labour demand despite considerable differences in the cross-country nature of labour market institutions.     

LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.     

Trade theorems with search unemployment

Abstract We revisit the Heckscher‐Ohlin‐Samuelson model in the presence of labour market frictions à la Mortensen‐Pissarides. Relaxing the assumption of the one‐worker‐one‐firm matching rule, we show that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem may not hold in specific circumstances. We also demonstrate that the Factor Price Equalization theorem is valid only for capital and unemployed labour across countries, but not for employed labour. In equilibrium, trade patterns are determined by countries’ factor endowments and relative factor intensities in sectors (independent of factor intensities in production). Finally, our results suggest an additional explanation for the ‘missing trade’ phenomenon.