Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

An Institutionalist Framework for a Consistent Financial Regulation

Abstract:

In the light of recurrent systemic crises that financialized market economies have been experiencing since the 1980s, this article seeks to determine the conditions required for a regulatory framework apt to ensure financial stability. Drawing upon an Institutionalist Minskyian endogenous financial instability approach, the article studies the fragilities of liberalized finance and points to some policy alternatives able to lead to an alternative financial regulatory model that is consistent with macroeconomic stability. It argues that in a weak regulatory environment financial markets naturally generate instabilities that could turn into systemic crises. The analysis maintains that in order to deal with such crises, a tight supervision should be framed under the aegis of public authorities and suggests some rules to develop a relevant regulatory system through an open and democratic decision process. Two points then deserve particular attention: a macro-prudential approach that regards instability as a systemic (non-individual) issue, and a preventive approach that aims at preventing systemic-risk generating activities from taking control over the markets.     

金融发展、资本账户开放与金融不稳定——来自中国的证据

文章建立一个由金融发展程度、资本账户开放与金融不稳定指标组成的向量自回归(VAR)模型,利用中国1982~2005年的年度数据对这些变量的长期协整关系和短期的调整动力学进行相关的时间序列分析。模型的估计结果显示,对于中国来说,金融发展程度、资本账户开放和金融不稳定之间存在着长期的协整关系,但三者之间的影响程度和方向各不相同。所有结果均显示,无论从短期和长期看,金融发展程度对一国的金融稳定具有显著影响,对资本账户开放的进程也具有重要的影响。     

The Institutionalist Roots of Macroprudential Ideas: Veblen and Galbraith on Regulation,Policy Success and Overconfidence

One consequence of the global financial crisis has been to prompt debate over macroprudential regulation – meant to limit private risk-taking that threatens systemic stability. In this paper, we stress the roots of macroprudential ideas in the Institutionalist economics of Veblen and Galbraith in a way that highlights both unrecognised policy possibilities and underappreciated impediments to policy effectiveness, arguing in particular that regulatory success can breed overconfidence. First, we argue that while Veblen's views anticipated macroprudential arguments, they also obscured tensions between the technocratic acumen of policy ‘engineers’ and popular legitimacy. Second, we argue that while Galbraith's views similarly shaped the postwar Keynesian policy mix, they also echoed Veblen in underrating the potential for populist resentment of an intellectual ‘technostructure’. We conclude that while this analysis can be seen as highlighting an overlooked century of macroprudential debate, it also demonstrates the potential for technocratic overconfidence – which can eventually undermine policy legitimacy and effectiveness.     

Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

分业经营向混业经营转变条件下的金融监管

面对国外混业经营金融机构的大举进入及国内的竞争压力,国内金融机构纷纷进行金融创新,不断突破原有的业务界限,逐渐走上了金融混业经营之路。但与此同时我们也发现,我国原有的适应分业经营的监管体制不能适应这一挑战,出现了很多问题。以分业经营向混业经营转变条件下的金融监管机制为研究对象,阐述了金融监管的理论基础,论述了不同时期的金融监管理论,及金融监管的发展变化趋势。     

Marx and Resource Scarcity: An Institutionalist Approach

Turkey has recently reshaped its own institutional structure by establishing Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). However, the political authority has not desired to delegate the political property rights to IRAs. Although IRAs is de jure established, the political conflicts occuring during the evolution of the traditional-patrimonial state to the regulatory state de facto impede IRAs to institutionalize. This paper observes recent policy changes during the transition and lessons from the energy regulation in Turkey. So, the paper reveals whether the change in the regulatory institutional structure of Turkey is an effective policy in terms of transition to the institutions of capitalism.     

美国金融监管改革法案及其对中国的启示

2010年7月,美国出台了意在重塑其金融监管体系、重振其金融竞争力的金融监管改革法案,这将是影响全球金融体系重构的重要变革。该法案对美国金融业和监管架构及全球金融监管改革方向都将产生深远影响。该法案对中国金融监管的启示是:应寻求金融监管与市场力量的动态平衡,在重视防范系统性金融风险的同时,构建宏观审慎监管与微观审慎监管相结合的监管体系,加强对金融消费者的保护,并以客观审慎的态度开展金融综合经营。     

The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

金融危机对资本充足率监管与银行风险承担激励的影响：基于我国上市银行的实证比较

运用局部调整模型和三阶最小二乘法（3SLS）,分析了金融危机如何影响资本充足率监管与商业银行的风险承担激励之间的关系,并首次分析了金融危机发生前后我国上市银行在面临资本监管压力下资本水平与风险水平的调整。结果表明,金融危机强化了银行的资本充足率监管效果,但也增强了银行的风险承担激励,这与监管当局试图通过资本充足率监管达到维持银行系统稳定性的初衷相违背。此外,金融危机的发生没有显著影响银行资本调整与风险调整之间的关系。     

环境规制、金融资源配置与绿色发展效率

环境规制强度的提高,是否提高了地区绿色发展效率是我国发展环境友好型经济过程中面临的重要问题。采用Super-SBM模型估计了2000—2015年中国省级行政区绿色发展效率,考察了环境规制对地区绿色发展效率的影响及作用机制。研究结果表明:我国绿色发展效率总体呈现先降后升再平稳的趋势,且东部地区绿色发展效率明显高于中部、西部地区;环境规制强度提高显著降低了地区绿色发展效率,且这一影响随着时间的推移逐渐减弱;影响机制检验表明,环境规制的加强通过促使金融资源向第二产业配置从而降低了绿色发展效率。     

中国资本账户开放及金融稳定

本文针对中国资本账户开放及金融现状进行分析.结论提示,目前,中国资本账户的开放步伐会渐进加速;中国的金融发展程度在逐渐提高的大背景下,这几年会出现一定程度的回调;中国金融体系中存在着大量的不稳定因素,从2002年开始,金融稳定状况开始出现一定程度的恶化,但目前发生系统性金融危机的可能性还较小.     

西部地区金融改革的路径选择与制度创新

中国金融深化改革与西部金融相关配套制度供给不足是造成西部金融抑制的主要原因。打破区域金融的非均衡发展和消除西部金融对经济的抑制,应重点发展政策性银行,组建区域性政策融资机构,探索建立区域性、小型民营金融机构,提高直接融资比例,建立西部基金,实行区域化的金融政策,尽快构建符合西部经济发展的金融体制与组织制度。     

美国金融危机下金融监管模式的缺陷及对我国的启示

随着经济全球化的发展,国际金融的运行格局发生了巨大的变化,国际金融监管也出现了新的发展趋势。特别是2007年3月以来,美国的次贷危机引起了国际金融市场的大动荡,诱发了百年不遇的全球性金融危机。国际金融环境趋于恶劣,我国不可避免地受到了来自国际金融危机的影响,我国银行业能否抵抗这次金融危机的冲击,需要更深层次的慎思和积极应对。因此,我国需要从中吸取教训,防范金融风险,加强金融监管,弥补监管"缝隙",维护金融稳定。     

关于丽水市农村金融改革和发展的建议

中国农村金融存在的两大难题是:三农需求大,融资难;城乡差距大、普惠难。解决银行信用采集以及有效担保物缺失问题来缓解融资困境,而在降低成本的情况下在各乡镇布置金融网点有利于金融普惠的推广。通过对丽水农村金融改革的背景以及现状的介绍,分析改革过程中存在金融主体缺位、金融服务弱化、信贷制度不够健全以及金融生态环境不佳等不足。从降低金融服务成本,提高金融服务质量和改善金融环境三个方面对未来农村金融改革提出建议。     

论财务管理目标理论的框架结构

财务管理目标理论是研究在一定社会经济环境下财务管理目标的形成、表现和实现的理论。它包括财务管理目标和实现目标的观念要求两个方面的内容,后者又包括财务管理假设、财务管理观念、财务管理原则等理论要素。     

中国金融发展对经济增长内在传导渠道研究——基于内生增长理论的实证比较

文章基于内生增长理论,结合中国经济增长的典型事例,确定了经济增长的影响因子,并将其与金融发展的指标变量建立回归模型组,探讨了金融发展对经济增长的内在传导机制。研究结果表明,资本存量、人力资本以及制度因素是中国金融发展与经济增长之间三条显著的传导渠道,资本积累是金融发展对中国经济增长最主要的传导渠道;技术进步并不是显著的传导渠道;同为金融发展作用于经济增长的传导主体,金融中介的作用明显要大于金融市场。     

Assessing the Legitimacy of Stem Cell Research: An Instrumental Valuation Principle Approach

Research on embryonic stem cells has elicited much public and political debate. By promoting the use of the Instrumental Valuation Principle, it is argued here that institutionalists can offer a framework for policy analysis that ensures that the debate on stem cell research is informed by the instrumental use of knowledge and that it is not controlled by upper-level hegemonic powers. Our contention is that the first decade following the initial harvesting of human embryonic stem cells (1998-2008) in the United States was characterized by institutional and policy responses that created a non-deliberative environment that hindered the process of instrumental valuation of stem cell research. This paper concludes that the current conditions of limited corporate involvement are favorable toward a democratic discussion of the legitimacy of stem cell research, but this will require overt challenges to political elites' attempts to control the creation and flow of instrumental knowledge on stem cell research.     

Public Knowledge and Financial Regulation: Two Post Crisis Periods

Abstract:

Since at least the days of Adam Smith there has been the recognition of essentially two forms of capitalism: in their theoretical extremes, one in which private companies determine the conditions of the social provisioning of credit and money, and one in which the State representing the general interest does. As we argue, the zeitgeist of the 1930s was a high water mark in the popular understanding of money and banking and its relationship with society. In contrast, today the general population is woefully ignorant on these points. As we argue, the relationship between financial governance and those governed hinges on the knowledge of the latter. Today’s public discourse reveals a widespread ignorance over financial matters that must accompany a likewise extreme moment of private control over nations’ money and credit. As we argue, the first steps towards a capitalism at the service of humanity and under public control, the first priority is publicly diffused knowledge.