Monetary union and the Maastricht inflation criterion: The accession countries*

We model an accession country facing a Maastricht‐type inflation criterion that specifies an inflation ceiling. In addition to deciding whether or not to satisfy this criterion, the country must decide how much costly economic reform to undertake. If the country puts enough weight on the future that it can credibly meet the inflation criterion no matter what the ceiling is, then the inflation criterion benefits the country but lowers reform. If the country puts less weight on the future, then a criterion with a properly chosen inflation ceiling can increase reform. We derive the inflation ceilings that maximize the country's welfare and its reform.     

The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?

The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.     

The EU attitude to unilateral euroization: Misunderstandings,real concerns and sub‐optimal admission criteria

European Union objections to unilateral euroization by applicant countries are categorized as either a misunderstanding of what euroization entails or as justified concern, which should be alleviated by candidates wishing to euroize. Some ways in which candidates can alleviate concerns are discussed, as well as possible adjustments to the Maastricht criteria which might better protect both sides' interests. The paper concludes that the EU would benefit if it accepted unilateral euroization by applicants. JEL classification: E42, F33, F42, P24.     

The fiscal theory of the price level and initial government debt

It is widely believed that the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) does not work in an environment in which initial government debt is zero. This paper demonstrates that this view is incorrect when the government issues a set of financial assets restricted to standard nominal debt contracts and money. In particular, it is possible to define a non-Ricardian fiscal policy for which the set of equilibrium price sequences under non-Ricardian fiscal policy is a proper subset of the set of equilibrium price sequences under Ricardian fiscal policy.     

Persistence of initial debt in the long-term employment dynamics of new firms

Abstract.  This paper investigates whether a firm's future growth is independent of its initial debt structure. The non-parametric test consists of determining whether the conditional size distribution for firms surviving through early years of life depends upon debt-to-asset ratio at birth. Initially, I test for initial size dependence in the growth process by applying Pakes and Ericson (1998) procedure. I then test the hypothesis that initial debt-to-asset ratios are irrelevant to growth of ten-year old manufacturing firms. I reject the null of independence, and find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between age ten conditional size and the initial debt-to-asset ratio.     

The economic constitution of the European community: From Rome to Maastricht

The present paper analyzes the changes in the economic constitution of the European Community since its foundation in 1958. In order to identify the various changes, we start by developing a frame of reference. Our proposition is that theconstitutional charter of the European Economic Community (EEC)—the EEC Treaty—came closest to this frame of reference, being an economic constitution for a market system, whereas the subsequentprocess of European integration—including several modifications of the Treaty—was largely based on the introduction of non-market elements. Our argument is that as far as the economic constitution is concerned, the Treaty of Maastricht is dominated by traits which are characteristic of modern welfare states.     

The price of the euro: evidence from sovereign debt markets

The objective of this article is to ascertain how the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has affected its members’ long-term government bond yields. In order to estimate the effect, this article utilizes a synthetic control approach. The main finding is that the majority of the member countries did not receive economic gains from the EMU in sovereign debt markets. Synthetic counterfactual analysis finds strong evidence that Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands have paid a positive and substantial euro-premium in their 10-year government bonds since the adoption of the single currency. After the most recent financial crisis, government bond yields have been higher in all member countries compared to the situation that would have occurred without the monetary unification. This article concludes that from the viewpoint of sovereign borrowing, it would be beneficial for a country to maintain its own currency and monetary policy.     

制定《内部管理控制规范》的价值与整体构思

本文从制定<内部管理控制规范>的背景、制定<内部管理控制规范>的价值以及制定<内部管理控制规范>的整体构思三个方面,对制定<内部管理控制规范>问题进行了全面、系统地论证.文章对完善我国内部控制理论及内部管理控制理论,指导内部管理控制实践与操作,都具有重要意义.     

The Elasticity of Poverty with respect to Sectoral Growth in Africa

The African continent has grown by more than 4 percent yearly on average during the past decade. However, the link between this remarkable growth rate and poverty reduction is neither obvious nor simple. This paper focuses on the elasticity of poverty with respect to GDP growth at the sectoral level and takes into account the fact that economic growth may affect poverty directly as well as indirectly through sectoral labor share intensity. It develops a methodology that sheds light on the contribution of sectoral growth to poverty reduction country‐by‐country in Africa, guiding policy recommendations. As the composition of growth matters at least as much as its overall intensity, it is key to identify the sectors that have the strongest impact on poverty reduction and unleash their potential; if growth happens to concentrate in sectors with scarce pro‐poor potential, like commodity‐driven growth, redistributive strategies are necessary to compensate the weak effect on poverty.     

The debt hangover: Renegotiation with noncontractible investment

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a levered company to undertake noncontractible investments. This noncontrability is shown to seriously impede the efficiency of any renegotiation process in the debt overhang problems. Conditions for obtaining a fully efficient level of investment choice are derived.     

Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point

We investigate whether the best known solutions to the bargaining problem respond appropriately to certain changes in the disagreement point d, for a fixed feasible set. If d_i increases, while for each j ≠ i, d_j remains constant, then these solutions recommend an increase in agent i's payoff, in agreement with intuition. However, the stronger requirement that agent i be the only one to gain is not generally met.     

Italian households’ debt: the participation to the debt market and the size of the loan

This paper analyses Italian households’ participation to the debt market, separating the probability of demanding a loan from the probability of being rationed by lenders; on the supply side of the market specific attention is paid to enforcement costs of the loan contract when customers default. A new result is that the age of the household head acts essentially as a demand factor, rather than a variable influencing the lender’s choice. Both current and future households’ income increase the demand for loans and reduce credit rationing. Self-employed workers are more rationed by lenders. Credit constraints are also linked to the area where the household lives, partly because of different enforcement costs. The final part of the paper analyses the equilibrium quantity of the loan, for households who have a loan and are not constrained. The loan size is positively linked to household net wealth and income profile. An important contribution of this paper is the finding that, not only the participation to the debt market, but also the loan size is negatively affected by enforcement costs.      

Using inflation to erode the US public debt

Projections indicate the US Federal debt held by the public may exceed 70–100% of GDP within 10 years. In many respects, the temptation to inflate away some of this debt burden is similar to that at the end of World War II. In 1946, the debt ratio was 108.6%. Inflation reduced this ratio by more than a third within a decade. Yet there are some important differences – shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate, while the larger share of debt held by foreigners increases it. This paper lays out an analytical framework for determining the impact of a large nominal debt overhang on the temptation to inflate. It suggests that when economic growth is stalled, the US debt overhang may induce an increase in inflation of about 5% for several years that could significantly reduce the debt ratio.     

The optimal control of emissions and renewable resource harvesting under uncertainty

A model of a renewable resource is developed where the growth and quality of the resource are reduced by pollution. Ambient pollution concentrations and the renewable resource stock are modeled as stochastic processes. Conditions for the optimal harvest plan and the optimal emissions rate are derived. The effect of stochastic variations on the optimal management of the resource is analyzed. The steady-state joint probability distribution of the resource and pollution stocks is shown to exist under certain conditions.     

The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle

Summary We prove that in the class of weighted voting systems the Borda Count maximizes the probability that a Condorcet candidate is ranked first in a group election. A direct result is that the Borda Count maximizes the probability that a transitive, binary ranking of the candidates is preserved in a group election. A preliminary result, but one of independent interest, is that the Borda Count maximizes the probability that a majority outcome betweenany two candidates is reflected by the group election. All theorems are valid when there is a uniform probability distribution on the voter profiles and can be generalized to other uniform-like probability distributions. This work extends previous results of Fishburn and Gehrlein from three candidates to any number of candidates.This work is a portion of my doctoral dissertation The Geometric Investigation of Voting Techniques: A Comparison of Approval Voting, Positional Voting Techniques and the Borda Count written under Don Saari at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.     

On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.     

The consequences of an unknown debt target

Several proposals to reduce U.S. debt reveal large differences in their targets. We examine how an unknown debt target affects economic activity using a real business cycle model in which Bayesian households learn about a state-dependent debt target in an endogenous tax rule. Recent papers use stochastic volatility shocks to study fiscal uncertainty. In our setup, the fiscal rule is time-varying due to unknown changes in the debt target. Households infer the current debt target from a noisy tax rule and jointly estimate the transition probabilities. Three key findings emerge from our analysis: (1) limited information about the debt target amplifies the effect of tax shocks through changes in expected tax rates; (2) the welfare losses are an order of magnitude larger when both the debt target state and transition matrix are unknown than when only the debt target state is unknown to households; (3) an unknown debt target likely reduced the stimulative effect of the ARRA and uncertainty about the sunset provision in the Bush tax cuts may have slowed the recovery and led to welfare losses.     

International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries

This paper examines the impact of cross-border financial externalities on moral hazards of the banking sector, and an international policy coordination mechanism to reduce the moral hazards of the banking sector considering cross-border financial externalities. We demonstrate that the moral hazard of banking, such as reducing the monitoring efforts, is aggravated by cross-border financial externalities, while the introduction of an international policy coordination mechanism might reduce the moral hazard caused by these externalities. Moreover, international policy coordination is less likely to be sustained when the policy maker is short-sighted and the banking sector has greater political influence. However, when the distortionary cost of a liquidity aids policy is lower with high administrative transparency, and cross-border financial externality is greater, the coordination mechanism is more likely to be sustained. The results imply that efforts to launch an effective international financial coordination mechanism should start with countries with higher administrative transparency, more political stability, and enhanced financial integration.