EMU, MAASTRICHT, AND THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

This paper presents various economic approaches to achieving monetary union, particularly in the context of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as envisaged in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. It evaluates the implications of Maastricht, given the economic convergence criteria embodied in the Treaty, in terms of economic policy for individual Member States and for the European Union (EU) as a whole. The paper assesses the EU's options for amending the Maastricht Treaty at its scheduled inter-governmental conference (IGC).     

Selected transition and Mediterranean countries: an institutional primer on EMU and EU accession

The paper examines the institutional channels through which Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the European Union (EU) can affect the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and three Mediterranean countries that aspire to join the EU.
After describing the current institutional framework for relations between the EU and these countries, the paper considers two categories of institutional implications of EMU. The first stems from the need to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria before joining the euro area. Although the Maastricht criteria are not accession criteria, many of the countries reviewed are already formulating their macroeconomic policies in a way that will facilitate convergence toward the Maastricht targets. The second implication stems from the need to adopt the EU's institutional and legal provisions in the area of EMU, such as those referring to the establishment of independent central banks, the prohibition of central bank financing of the government and the liberalization of capital movements. Finally, the paper discusses some of the key policy issues that EMU raises for the countries reviewed, in particular regarding exchange rate policy, capital account liberalization and the possible conflict between growth-enhancing measures and the Maastricht criteria.     

The impact of the European Union fiscal rules on economic growth

This paper analyses whether Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules have affected growth in the European Union negatively. A growth equation is specified for a group of 15 European Union countries (and 8 OECD countries) over the period 1970-2005 to analyse this issue. Panel estimations using fixed-effects, pooled mean group and system-GMM estimators show that the institutional changes that occurred in the European Union after 1992 were not harmful to growth. Moreover, results show that growth is slightly higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed, i.e. after 1997.     

THE POLITICS OF MAASTRICHT

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) treaty signed at Maastricht does not guarantee the recreation of German-style economic policies and outcomes at the European Community (EC) level. Membership was not limited to countries that mimic the German commitment to price stability. National representatives may outvote inflation-averse EC central bankers in monetary policy decisions. The Council of Ministers has the power to set exchange rate policy vis-à-vis third currencies. The treaty does not provide binding constraints against fiscal profligacy in member states. The German government agreed to this suboptimal outcome because in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and German unification it had broader political interests in maintaining the pace of European integration at Maastricht. The Bundesbank's policy of high interest rates in 1992, however, has effectively guaranteed a two-speed monetary union, in which the first group of members will be limited to a narrow deutschemark zone. Given the waning enthusiasm for integration across the EC, the German government has no incentive to alter this outcome.     

Market mechanisms for policy decisions: Tools for the European Union

The success of an enlarged European Union will require transparent and subtle mechanisms for policy coordination. A common policy is a public good, and economists have developed many schemes for the efficient provision of public goods. The European Union offers a promising soil for such schemes, but they must be simple and tailored to its specific needs. The paper discusses two possible examples: A system of tradable deficit permits implementing the fiscal constraints of the Maastricht treaty; and a rule allowing country representatives to shift their own votes intertemporally when deliberations are taken in periodic committee meetings.     

Exchange rate policy during transition to the European Monetary Union: The option of euroization

Countries of central eastern Europe which are candidates for accession to the European Union face fundamental challenges in the conduct of macroeconomic policies. These countries are characterized by growth rates faster than those of EU countries, along with large current account deficits and an equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate. In such a context, an early adoption of the euro may be beneficial to central eastern European countries, while the ERM‐II system and the Maastricht criterion on inflation may give rise to serious drawbacks for candidate countries. JEL classification: F15, F41     

Monetary integration,soft budget constraints,and the EMU sovereign debt crises

One possible explanation for the European sovereign debt crises is that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) gave rise to consolidation fatigue or even deliberate over‐borrowing. This paper explores the validity of this explanation by studying how three decisive stages in the history of the EMU affected public borrowing in EU member states: the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of the Euro, and the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The methodology relies on difference‐in‐difference regressions for 26 OECD countries over the 1975–2009 period. The findings indicate that the Maastricht treaty reduced deficits especially in traditionally high‐deficit countries. In contrast, the introduction of the Euro and the watering down of the original SGP led on average to higher borrowing. These results indicate that the introduction of the Euro and the suspension of the SGP led to soft budget constraints in the EMU.     

How Not to Write a Constitution—The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties

The member states of the European Union have negotiated two treaties intended to advance political union—Maastricht in 1992 and Amsterdam in 1997. This article critiques both treaties for their failures on both procedural and institutional questions. It suggests that the costs for member states of reaching a constitutional bargain can be reduced by emphasising decentralised arrangements for Europe and that a constitutional opportunity remains.     

Restrictive Macroeconomic Policies and Unemployment in the European Union

This paper looks at the impact the European integration process has had on the unemployment level of European Union member countries. While the persistence of relatively high unemployment in Europe is often attributed to supply-side factors, such as the rigidities of the labour market, this study contends that the major cause for the rise of unemployment in the EU has been the very macroeconomic policies of the EU itself. The paper argues that the continuous pursuit of deflationary policies and the macroeconomic constraint imposed first by the membership of the European Monetary System and, secondly, by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, have been the real impediments to reducing unemployment.     

论中国现阶段的赤字率和债务率及其警戒线

论证和说明中国现阶段的赤字率和债务率及其警戒线 ,是本文展开分析的主题。围绕这个主题 ,作者首先分析和阐明了“三部门”经济条件下的债务—赤字模型 ;然后对中国均衡的和动态均衡赤字率和债务率的决定进行了理论分析 ;最后 ,在债务—赤字模型基础上 ,借鉴欧盟经验 ,通过实证分析 ,论证和揭示了与中国现阶段国民经济发展相适应的赤字率和债务率及其警戒线     

Time-varying effects of fiscal policy in Spain: a Markov-switching approach

How have the effects of Spanish fiscal policy varied over time? Given this starting point, in this article we analyse the regime dependence of fiscal policy in Spain by estimating a vector autoregressive model within a Markov-switching framework. Our results indicate that Spain’s membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the most likely source of time variation in the fiscal outcomes. Accordingly, increases in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio do not succeed in stimulating economic activity in the first regime; rather, unexpected upsurges in the primary deficit harm economic activity (non-Keynesian effect) in the second regime, which prevails since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.     

Euro introduction: Has there been a structural change? Study on 10 European Union countries

The introduction of the Euro in January 1999 consecrated the achievement of a single currency system within most of the European Union. Despite the dramatic change in the macroeconomic dynamics that this event is likely to have caused, the literature has paid little attention to testing for the existence of such a break and establishing its qualitative characteristics.This empirical study, based on the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology for seven countries having adopted the Euro currency and three members of the European Union which have preserved their own currencies reveals:

• i)very significant breaks for the Euro countries around 1992 – the year of adoption of the Maastricht Treaty – and 2000, not shared by the three non-Euro countries.
• ii)an increase in the influence of supply shocks on the dynamics of output, unemployment and the interest rate after the breaks for the Euro countries, along with an increase of the part played by monetary disturbances within total demand at long horizons. These conclusions do not generally hold for the three non-Euro countries.

     

FISCAL POLICY AND OPTIMAL TAXATION: EVIDENCE FROM A TAX SMOOTHING EXERCISE

Testing the tax smoothing hypothesis for the EU‐15, we hypothesise that the introduction of the 3%‐deficit rule of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 may have inhibited tax smoothing as European Union (EU)‐member states are no longer capable of letting the deficit grow as much as implied by expected decreases in government expenditure. Our results show that for some countries this fiscal rule may have indeed changed the validity of the tax smoothing hypothesis, thus implying that EU accession has caused welfare losses.     

The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint

The state can be conceived as an organization to protect personal freedom and to provide public goods. Consequently, we expect a constitution to consist of two different sets of rules; rules on personal freedom and rules for making collective decisions on public goods (mostly budgetary rules). The constitution of the European Union as laid down in the treaty of Maastricht (1992) provides both types of rules, but the emphasis is mainly on the former rules. This paper investigates budgetary rules, in particular the welfare economic logic of deficit spending.     

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE EMU PROCESS

European progress toward monetary union takes place within the highly institutionalized setting of the European Community (EC). This paper examines the ways in which formal institutions and decisionmaking procedures have constrained the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process. The EC's structure has both created demands for and facilitated cross-issue linkages, and these linkages characterize the successful bargaining on EMU. However, success also requires ratification. Domestic ratification procedures and changes in the EC's context of linkage have created challenges for the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. Ratification is also tied to concerns about democratic accountability, which arise from current legislative procedures and are the subject of ongoing institutional reform.     

The EU attitude to unilateral euroization: Misunderstandings,real concerns and sub‐optimal admission criteria

European Union objections to unilateral euroization by applicant countries are categorized as either a misunderstanding of what euroization entails or as justified concern, which should be alleviated by candidates wishing to euroize. Some ways in which candidates can alleviate concerns are discussed, as well as possible adjustments to the Maastricht criteria which might better protect both sides' interests. The paper concludes that the EU would benefit if it accepted unilateral euroization by applicants. JEL classification: E42, F33, F42, P24.     

The New Member States and the Process towards EMU

The authors apply two complementary empirical criteria to eight new member states (NMSs) of the European Union to assess how ready they are to adopt the euro. As a first step, they recover demand and supply shocks and calculate the social losses implied by the two relevant exchange rate regimes: flexible rates and currency board. As a second step, the authors calculate the real exchange rates variability that these countries are currently experiencing and compare it to that of three Mediterranean countries during a similar period before they joined the EMU. The combination of the results of both tests shows that Estonia and Slovenia are the only countries that seem ready to adopt the euro within the shortest period of time foreseen by the Maastricht criteria; that is, after the two mandatory years in the ERM2. The rest of the countries will probably still need some exchange rate flexibility to absorb external shocks in the coming years.     

Effects of the customs union with the European Union on the market structure and pricing behaviour of the Turkish manufacturing industry

Turkey established a Customs Union with the European Union in 1996. This study aims to analyse the effect of that Customs Union on the market structure and the pricing behaviour of the Turkish manufacturing industry for the period 1994 to 2000. To that end, the price cost mark-up equation of 12 manufacturing industry sectors is estimated using the import and export ratios with European Union countries together with control variables. A second equation is also estimated for the concentration ratio index, taking the trade ratios with European Union countries as explanatory variables. The estimation method is panel data covering eight years and 12 cross-section units. Estimation outcomes indicate that the export and import ratios of trade with European Union countries have a negative relation with the price cost mark-up in the manufacturing sector. It is concluded that increased imports with union countries have created a positive wealth and efficiency effect upon the Turkish manufacturing industry, due to falling price cost mark-ups. Similarly, the concentration ratio equation estimation outcomes indicate that increased imports with union countries have induced a decline in the concentration ratio for the manufacturing industry during the period in question.     

Some notes on inflation and employment: Incomes policy and the perspective of the European Monetary Union

In recent times, a new notion of incomes policy as an instrument aiming both at the control of inflation and at the defense of employment has come to supplant the original conception of incomes policy as the set of conditions which could make the growth of the economy compatible with price stability. The aim of the paper is to emphasize that the theoretical background of the former notion appears profoundly different from—and far less solid than—the one of the latter conception. The second aim is to emphasize that factual experience appears to confirm the role assigned to incomes policy in its original meaning. Wage moderation, important as it may be for the control of inflation, is not sufficient for the defense of employment. The third aim of the paper is to emphasize that the perspective of the European Monetary Union has made the defense of employment even more complex, thus calling for a careful reconsideration of a widely advertised relationship between "Maastricht" and employment. A procedural suggestion addressed to each one of the 15 members of the European Union concludes the paper. This article is published posthumously. His death is a great loss to the economic community.     

FISCAL INDULGENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE: LOSS OF THE EXTERNAL ANCHOR?

In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to European Union (EU) accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game‐theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes – allowing for regime shifts – depending on country characteristics and EU policies.