H. G. J. as Biographer's Subject: Some Autobiographical Writings

In the last decade of his life, Harry Johnson (1923–1977) wrote a number of autobiographical pieces. He published three relating to his periods in Cambridge (1946–47 and 1949–55), but he did not publish two long autobiographical notes and a series of memoirs of his undergraduate career at the University of Toronto (1939–43), his first teaching job as the entire economics department at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia (1943–44) and his later period in England (1966–74). This material provides a number of clues as to the way Harry wished to be remembered and the paper develops some of the strongest autobiographical themes common to them.     

Homo Economicus Meets G. H. Mead: A Contribution to the Critique of Economic Theory

A bstract .   The relation between economic behavior and morality remains a live issue within economics and cognate disciplines. The standard view among economists themselves has been that while moral positions (understood broadly) may motivate our behavior, they do not capacitate or enable it. On this view the figure of Homo economicus , representing the how as against the why of our actions, must be understood as resolutely amoral. In this article, we attempt to recover the logic of this position, as well as those of critics who would modify the standard view in some way. Although also critical of the conventional economics-and-ethics divide, we argue that Homo economicus would benefit from a more fundamental rethinking, one that takes account of the theory of the self and its acts, as developed by the social psychologist G. H. Mead. On a Meadian view the economic actor would neither have to grow additional capacities in order to coordinate with his or her fellows, as the evolutionary games theorist's agent has to do, nor depart or deviate from purposeful behavior, as does Homo sociologicus . On a Meadian view, economic capacity has to be more richly endowed than standard Homo economicus in order to do what it is supposed to do, but it is recognizably still a single, purposeful capacity.     

Evaluating monetary policy of the euro area with cross-country heterogeneity: Evidence from a New Keynesian model

This paper empirically investigates the optimal monetary policy conduct for the euro area in the presence of heterogeneous economic conditions across member states. Based on the New Keynesian monetary framework, we compare welfare losses under the assumption that the central bank conducts monetary policy using area-wide aggregate data against the alternative assumption that the central bank exploits country-specific as opposed to area-wide data. Empirical results reveal a sizable gain in stabilization performance if the European Central Bank formulates monetary policy by explicitly taking into account cross-country heterogeneity within the euro area. The estimated gain is more pronounced in a hybrid variant than in the purely forward-looking version of the New Keynesian model.     

Credit contracts in the G.D.R.: Decentralized investment decisions in a planned economy

Conclusion In this paper we have described the process by which an industrial enterprise or kombinat negotiates a contract for credit with which it may finance investment projects as well as the administrative preconditions which are typically required for and the stipulations which are sometimes imposed by means of such contracts. We have shown these preconditions and stipulations serve to shape the material incentives of the enterprise management in favour of more efficient projects and in favour of efficient implementation of planned projects. Our analysis has pointed out that the interest rate cannot be used exclusively to fashion the correct incentive system, and that therefore these administrative controls may in many cases be optimal planning devices. This paper is therefore an important contribution to the western planning literature which has typically presumed that the interest rate should be the preferred rationing mechanism.Our explanation of the role which these preconditions and stipulations in credit contracts play can contribute as well to a deeper understanding of the historical development of the planning system in the GDR. The history of investment financing exhibits a gradual development of the role of enterprise responsibility for initiating and designing projects and this has been parallelled by the development of the system for negotiating credit contracts between economic agents such as bank branches and enterprises and the use of more intricate incentive systems in such negotiations. Socialist authors have emphasized the importance of the development of contracting as a component of the planning system; we have shown in this paper how this development has been used to make the system of investment planning more effective. At the same time, we have identified some of the real bounds against which such a system of administrative incentive structures operate within a socialist economy: the history of the enterprise contribution to financing investment projects has been identified as an important subject for a case study in the history of socialist nations attempting to identify this boundary.I would like to thank the faculty of the Economics Section at Humboldt University in Berlin for the generous assistance which they gave to me during my research visit there in the Autumn of 1983. I am especially grateful to Professor Karlheinz Tannert for the many hours of discussions which guided me in my studies and without whose assistance this work could not have been completed. My thanks extend as well to Professor Stoll and Dr Lemke of the Staatsbank for their co-operation, to the staff of the libraries at the Economics Section of Humboldt University, the Hochschule fur Okonomie—Bruno Leuschner, and the Staatsbibliothek, for their assistance, and to Dr Heidrich for his aid and friendship.This research was supported by a grant jointly funded through the Ministry of Higher Education in the German Democratic Republic and the International Research and Exchanges Board in New York     

Henry George and His Philosophy: He Sought Equality of Opportunity to Use the Earth's Resources as Well as the End of Land Monopoly

Abstract . The George scholars today appear to be interesting the academic community in re-evaluating Henry George and his ideas. George, the 19th century American economist and social philosopher, dedicated himself to ending poverty by giving everyone equal access to the earth and its resources. He believed that land monopoly could be ended by taking the economic rent of all land and natural resources to meet the costs of government in lieu of taxes on labor and capital. George's writings revived interest in the ethos of the early settlers a time when sight was being lost of Pioneer America's contribution to the world's march toward freedom.     

Unemployment and the business cycle in a small open economy: G.M.M. estimation and testing with French data

What is a relevant model for the European business cycle? In this paper, the empirical performances of three models are compared: a canonical Walrasian R.B.C. framework, its extension to the case of a small open economy, and a version of this model with search and wage bargaining on the labor market. Structural parameters of the models are estimated using G.M.M. and their abilities to reproduce the French business cycle, taken as representative of the European business cycle, are tested. Only the small open economy with unemployment is able to generate theoretical moments that match their empirical counterparts.     

Diversity and its management as a dialectical process: Encountering Sweden and the U.S.

This article approaches diversity and its management from a dialectical, socio-historical perspective. Two social–historical contexts are examined: the U.S., where social productions of ideas of diversity (management) first appeared; and Sweden, where some original ideas about diversity and its management relocated and were partly reinterpreted, creating new ideas about diversity. The article shows linkages between the development of the ideas and praxes of diversity in these contexts, drawing attention to different actors and milieus, and their often-conflicting ideas and interests, as well as unequal power relations. Like many other social phenomena, diversity and its management are mediated by socio-historical relationships that reflect their ongoing productions. Consequently these productions are not fixed realities immune to human intervention and change.     

The Making of the Institutional Theory of Social Costs: Discovering the K. W. Kapp and J. M. Clark Correspondence

This article reconstructs the making of the often “overlooked” institutional theory of social costs based on the unexploited correspondence between John Maurice Clark and Karl William Kapp. The reconstruction demonstrates that the institutional argument on social costs was developed as a critique of neoclassical economics and of post‐WWII neoliberalism.