Managerial ownership,diversification, and firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market

Numerous existing studies have explored the impact of corporate diversification on firm performance, whereas considerably less research has investigated the inter-relationships among managerial ownership, diversification, and firm performance. This paper develops several hypotheses based on the agency theory self-interest perspective and tests the relationships among managerial ownership, corporate diversification, and firm performance using a sample of 98 emerging market firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The results show a U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and corporate diversification, similar to that found in prior studies. However, the inflection point is 33.17%, which is lower than that found in previous studies. Moreover, in contrast to prior results, corporate diversification is found to be positively associated with short-term firm performance and bears no relationship with mid-term firm performance, while firms engaged in unrelated diversification outperform those engaged in related diversification. This paper concludes with theoretical implications and suggestions for future research.     

Small Business Borrowing and the Owner–Manager Agency Costs: Evidence on Finnish Data

This study investigates the impact that managerial ownership has on loan availability and credit terms. We find that managerial ownership is common in a sample of small and medium‐sized Finnish firms. Our results suggest that an increase in managerial ownership decreases loan availability. The results on loan interest rates suggest that though an increase in managerial ownership initially increases interest rates, the effect is reversed at higher levels of ownership. Collateral requirements increase monotonically with managerial ownership. Overall, the results suggest that banks view that there are agency costs involved with managerial ownership even in small and medium‐sized firms and that this is taken into account when lending to these firms.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Financing Decisions: Evidence from Stock Market Liberalization

We analyze the impact of firm‐specific stock market liberalization events on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms from emerging market economies. We differentiate between firms based on their ownership structures at the time of liberalization and analyze their post‐liberalization behavior regarding corporate financing decisions. Our empirical results show that single–class‐share firms (typically with stronger corporate governance and better information environments) respond differently to their dual–class‐share counterparts. Liberalization results in lower debt reliance for the former group while the latter lengthen the maturity of their debt portfolios. Jel Classification: F30; G15; G32.     

Housing boom,real estate diversification,and capital structure: Evidence from China

By exploiting the unique situation in China that numbers of listed firms diversified into the real estate industry during the recent housing boom period, we find that firms' real estate diversification positively influences their subsequent leverage ratios. Further investigations suggest that such an increase in leverage mainly comes from short-term debt instead of long-term debt. We also find that housing price growth and state ownership are underlying mechanisms through which real estate diversification stimulates leverage. Last, we find that firms with real estate diversification enjoy less financing cost deterioration and less market value deterioration when they raise more debt.     

Founding Family Controlled Firms: Performance, Risk, and Value

An agency theory framework is used to test the effects of founding family control on firm performance, capital structure, and value. Both the finance and management literatures regarding the relationship between firm control and firm value are explored. Controlling for size, industry, and managerial ownership, the results suggest that firms controlled by the founding family have greater value, are operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than other firms.     

How may the nature of family firms explain the decisions concerning international diversification?

This study explores how the ownership structure of family firms gives these organizations a distinctive nature in terms of international diversification. We argue that the heterogeneity of family firms may cause variations in the degree of international diversification among these types of businesses. We have studied three factors related to ownership structure: the degree of family ownership and the type and degree of ownership of the second largest shareholder (another family or a financial company). The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of European and Asian family firms (2004–2008). Our results show that the degree of family ownership has a negative impact on the degree of international diversification. However, the presence and ownership share of a financial company as the second largest shareholder in a family firm favor this diversification. This study also reveals the importance of the financial company as a second owner in the preference family firms show for growth in international markets.     

The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

Do family ties shape the performance consequences of diversification? Evidence from the European Union

This paper examines the moderating effect of family involvement in ownership and control on the relationship between diversification strategies – both product and international diversification – and corporate performance. We argue that this moderating effect is related to the distinctive characteristics of family firms compared to non-family firms. The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of firms from the European Union during the 2005–2009 time period. Our results found that family firms are more profitable than non-family firms when they engage in joint product and international diversification.     

Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control

This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006. The study finds that debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms when the founder or one of his heirs acts as manager, but trends higher as the firm ages. When family involvement derives from direct and indirect ownership, the family–debt relationship is positive, consistent with the idea that external supervision accompanies higher debt levels and reduces the risk of losing control. When families are present on the board of directors (but are not in management), debt levels tend to be lower, suggesting that family directors are more risk-averse. The results stress the tradeoff between two distinct motivations that determine the capital structure of family firms: risk aversion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to finance growth without losing control makes family firms to prefer higher debt levels.     

The influence of family ownership dispersion on debt level in privately held firms

The aim of this article is to investigate the financing behavior of privately held firms along the dispersion of family ownership. Drawing on the socio-emotional wealth perspective, we argue that debt levels are contingent on the degree of ownership dispersion among family members. Based on a sample of 2451 observations, in a 10-year time frame, our results reveal the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between debt level and intra-family ownership dispersion. We demonstrate that this relationship is moderated by the generational involvement that inverts it in later generations.     

The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese firms

Building on information-processing perspectives and the Japanese contextual factors, this study investigates the relationships between firm strategy and executive bonus pay as well as the moderating role of foreign ownership on the strategy-compensation relationship in Japanese firms. We focus on R&D investment and product diversification as strategy variables and investigate their direct effects on executive bonus pay. Further, we examine the moderating effects of foreign ownership on the strategy-pay sensitivity. The results, based on a sample of the 148 largest industrial firms in Japan for the 1990-1997 period, show that both R&D investment and product diversification are positively related to executive bonus pay. Our findings also indicate that foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationships between the strategy variables and executive compensation, suggesting that foreign investors play an active monitoring role, reducing cash bonus payments when their invested firms choose to increase R&D or pursue diversification strategy.     

The value impact of international and industrial diversifications on public‐listed firms in Malaysia

This study examines the relationship between firm value and both international and industrial diversification involvements for a sample of 267 listed firms in Malaysia over 2001–2009. We find no evidence that international diversification has any significant impact on the firm value but industry diversification locally slightly increases firm value, even after controlling for the degree of ownership concentration. Our research further indicates that without any diversification involvement, family ownership presents lower value than foreign and government ownerships; and with industrial diversification family ownership presents significant higher value than foreign and government ownerships.     

Foreign vs domestic ownership on debt reduction: An investigation of acquisition targets in Italy and Spain

This paper examines the role of foreign versus domestic ownership in reducing the debt levels of acquired firms in Italy and Spain over the period 2002–2010. Acknowledging that lower debt levels can mitigate the risk of failure and thus enhance the chances for a positive post-acquisition performance and survival, we particularly examine the causal effect of foreign and domestic acquisitions on two firm-level debt measures: gearing and short-term leverage. To estimate causal relationships, we control for selection bias by applying propensity score matching techniques. Our results indicate that foreign acquisition leads to a significant and steady reduction in the debt ratios of the target companies. In contrast, the relationship between domestic acquisition and debt reduction appears to be smaller and statistically less robust.     

Government ownership and the cost of debt for Chinese listed corporations

This study investigates the impact of government controlling ownership on the cost of debt of Chinese listed corporations. We find that corporations under government control have a lower cost of debt compared to corporations under private control, and that government ownership is most beneficial when firms exhibit financial distress, have high excess shareholder control, or operate in provinces with low institutional development. Our evidence that government ownership plays an important role in reducing Chinese firms' cost of debt may help explain why government involvement in business corporations remains prevalent in China after decades of economic reform.     

How does Financial Distress Affect Small Firms’ Financial Structure?

This paper provides new evidence on the financial structure of small firms by emphasizing the role played by financial distress. We specify a model of debt adjustments that allows us to investigate the specific nature of the adjustment process towards target debt levels in small firms, which is then extended to account for the effect of financial distress on financial structure decisions. Our models were estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments on a data panel of small Portuguese firms during a period of recession, in which a substantial proportion of the companies analyzed faced a financial distress situation. We find that small firms do adjust their debt ratios towards target levels, the speed of adjustment being faster in the shorter term. Our results also indicate that there are major differences in the determinants of long-term and short-term debt, highlighting the role played by debt maturity in explaining a firm’s financial structure. Finally, random behavior is observed in financially distressed firms, who seem to be disoriented when making their financial structure decisions.     

Capital Structure,Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis

This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.     

High ownership concentration and exporting of emerging market firms: evidence from Peru

Despite the extraordinarily high ownership concentration widely observed in emerging market firms as a result of institutional voids, there is little research on how this high ownership concentration affects the exporting behavior of emerging market firms. From principal–agent and institutional perspectives, we hypothesize that high ownership concentration has a negative relationship with export intensity, because, in emerging markets, highly concentrated ownership bridges the interests of owners (principals) and managers (agents) so that principals must be prudent in exploring risky international markets. Moreover, we hypothesize that export country diversification strengthens the relationship between ownership concentration and export intensity, because broad geographic dispersion increases risk exposure and principal-agent problems. Empirical analysis based on a panel dataset for publicly listed firms in Peru from 2005 to 2014 supports the hypotheses. The study highlights the risk aversion attitude activated by ownership concentration, an attitude that protects emerging market firms from overconfidently exploring international business opportunities. The study extends the conventional literature on the interface between ownership concentration and international business in an emerging market context. We also discuss the generalizability of the findings to other emerging markets, e.g. China.     

Corporate governance,globalization and firm productivity

We examine the relationship between globalization, corporate governance and firm productivity. The results, using longitudinal data from Korea, indicate that the positive effect of liberalising equity ownership on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) was reinforced by indirect managerial effects when a firm improved its corporate governance. Our findings also confirm that the interaction of the managerial effect with increased foreign equity ownership is more significant than interaction with exports, suggesting that liberalising foreign investment in the host market is more effective in capitalising on the potential benefits of corporate governance reform than increasing exports to overseas markets, reflected in learning by exporting.     

Diversification patterns and survival as firms mature

We focus on the relationship between age and diversification patterns of German machine tool manufacturers in the post-war era. We distinguish between ‘minor diversification’ (adding a new product variation within a familiar submarket) and ‘major diversification’ (expanding the product portfolio into new submarkets). Our analysis reveals four main insights. First, we observe that firms have lower diversification rates as they grow older, and that eventually diversification rates even turn negative for old firms on average (where negative diversification corresponds to exit from certain product lines). Second, we find that product portfolios of larger firms tend to be more diversified. Third, with respect to consecutive diversification activities, quantile autoregression plots show that firms experiencing diversification in one period are unlikely to repeat this behavior in the following year. Fourth, survival estimations reveal that diversification activities reduce the risk of exit in general and to a varying degree at different ages. These results are interpreted using Penrosean growth theory.     

Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration

The separation of ownership and control can lead to managerial entrenchment and a convergence of decision making and decision control. Decision-making refers to management's authority to make strategic and operating decisions while decision control refers to the ratification and monitoring of management decisions. Managers that possess decision control may behave in a risk-reducing manner relative to the behavior of owner managers because of management's desire to maximize job security Amihud and Lev 1981, McEachern 1975. For example, the managers of such firms may choose to diversify the firm into a wide variety of industries in an attempt to smooth revenues and earnings and avoid a series of peaks and valleys in the company's financial performance. These managers may believe that stable earnings will be viewed positively by shareholders and should help lessen the risk of stockholder action to replace upper-level management. Managers that possess both decision-making and decision-control capabilities may pursue a variety of risk-reducing strategies in addition to broad diversification.The existence of large outside investors has been shown to result in management becoming less risk-averse; management is more willing to adopt a wide range of strategies that present greater risk, but offer greater returns to shareholders. Hill and Snell (1988) found a significant, positive correlation between stock concentration and R&D intensity, indicating that large outside beneficial owners or dominant stockholders can influence management to pursue higher risk-higher return strategies. R&D intensity is used as a proxy for innovation and is generally operationalized as a firm's industry-adjusted R&D expenditures as a percentage of its sales. Findings of other studies also suggest that large investors are associated with decreased risk aversion by management. When controlling for the effects of time, previous R&D spending, liquidity, market share, diversification, market concentration, industry, and leverage, Hansen and Hill (1992) found a mild positive correlation between institutional stock concentration and R&D spending.This paper examines management's ability to utilize employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to facilitate managerial decision control or the capability to ratify and monitor decisions and subsequently adopt greater risk-reducing behavior. It is possible that management may adopt an ESOP to enhance entrenchment by placing a large block of the company's shares under the control of company managers and employees that are under the supervision of management. As a result, some ESOPs may not be effective alignment mechanisms since participants may find it difficult to organize a vote against management proposals or generate adequate enthusiasm and momentum to replace top-level managers. The paper anticipates that a positive relationship exists between the degree of ESOP stock concentration and the reduced risk-taking behavior of management. Specifically, the study argues that as ESOP stock concentration increases, management will likely behave in a risk-reducing manner and decrease its commitment to innovation, as measured by R&D intensity.Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are qualified retirement plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and are treated similarly under the Act to other qualified pension plans with the exception of portfolio diversification. Employee stock ownership plans consist only of shares of the employer's stock and the performance of an ESOP-based retirement fund hinges with the market performance of that single stock. An agency theory framework would suggest that ESOPs that control large blocks of outstanding shares have an effect on management similar to that of other large investors and act to encourage management to craft and implement strategies that will yield superior financial and market performance. As ESOP stock concentration increases, agency theory proposes that ESOP participants would readily act to protect their interests and the interests of other shareholders. However, some previous research suggests that large ESOPs are not alignment mechanisms, but further entrench current management into their positions.Gordon and Pound (1990) found that management can use large ESOPs to increase effective insider ownership to protect against unwanted changes in corporate control. The authors suggested that ESOPs were less effective than other types of large investors at monitoring management decisions since ESOPs are unilaterally undertaken by management, ESOP shares are held only by incumbent managerial and non-managerial employees, and ESOP trustees are frequently appointed by management. The market has been shown to view an ESOP as a management entrenchment mechanism when the ESOP was adopted as a possible takeover defense Chang 1990, Dhillon and Ramirez 1994. The market reacts more favorably to an ESOP adoption when other large outside shareholders are present who have the capability to offset the influence of inefficient managers who might choose to use the ESOP to further entrench themselves into their positions (Park and Song 1995).The results of this study find that after the implementation of an ESOP, R&D intensity decreases as ESOP stock concentration increases. A significant negative relationship exists between ESOP stock concentration and change in industry-adjusted R&D intensity at the 0.05 level when controlling for firm size and change in profitability. The sample included firms where ESOP stock concentration represented as little as 3% of the employer's outstanding shares and as much as 67% of all outstanding employer stock. The sampled firms with the greatest ESOP stock concentration were associated with the greatest decreases in industry-adjusted R&D intensity after the implementation of the ESOP. The results suggest that management of high ESOP stock concentration firms became more risk-averse in regard to commitment to innovation after implementation of the ESOP.Agency theory adequately explains the effect of large outside stockholders on management's choice of strategy. Hill and Snell (1988) and Hansen and Hill (1992) have found that as stock concentration increases, incentive alignment becomes increasingly likely. The independent nature of large outside blockholders contributes to a separation of decision making from decision control, a reduction in agency costs, and a minimization of managerial risk-reducing behavior. As highly independent blockholder size decreases, decision making and decision control converge, and management entrenchment is more probable.Agency theory fails to adequately explain the effect of employee stock ownership on managerial risk-reducing behavior. Employee stock ownership does have the capability to align shareholder and employee interests under the proper conditions. However, ESOPs lack independence from managerial influence and are much less likely than outside institutional investors to monitor management decision-making and pressure management to adopt strategies that incorporate greater risk and an opportunity for greater returns. The study found that increased ESOP stock concentration was associated with greater managerial risk-reducing behavior. The results suggest that agency effects are more likely in firms with modest ESOP stock concentration since the ESOP does provide incentives for an alignment of interests, but does not provide management with a mechanism to block the actions of other large blockholders. ESOPs with higher levels of stock concentration are likely to facilitate management entrenchment by preventing some large percentage of shares from aligning with other large shareholders to challenge management decision-making. If other investors lack the capability to put full pressure on management, the monitoring and ratification of management decisions has been yielded to management. Therefore, a managerial entrenchment hypothesis is better suited than agency theory in explaining the effect of large ESOPs on management's risk-reducing behavior.