技术模仿、技术创新的战略选择模型和经济增长

一国技术水平程度的高低在很大程度上影响和决定了该国经济发展的水平和经济增长的速度,技术水平提高的途径主要有两种:技术模仿和技术创新.但技术创新并不只是发达国家的"专利",技术创新除了与人均资本存量和人均人力资本水平有关外,也与总体的人均资本存量和人力资本水平有关.本文将国家技术发展战略分为四类,并给出了各种不同技术发展战略的情景条件.     

Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets

This paper features a simple static Cournot-Nash model of an exchange economy with two productive sectors at flexible prices and wages. The traders in the atomless sector are price-takers, while the atoms behave strategically. We focus on the consequences of strategic interactions on the market outcome. Firstly, strategic interactions create underemployment on the labor market. Secondly, when the number of atoms increases without limit, the CWE coincides with the competitive equilibrium. Thirdly, we compare the welfare reached by traders at both equilibria. Fourthly, we consider the implementation of a tax levied on strategic supplies. Finally, we compare the approach retained with the monopolistic competition framework.     

Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty

Shin (J. Econom. Theory 64 (1994) 253–264) showed that a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to exist in persuasion games when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party's payoff-relevant information. By explicitly integrating higher-order uncertainty into the information structure, this note shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff-relevant state space.     

Evaluating the impact of inequality constraints and parameter uncertainty on optimal portfolio choice

We present new analytical results for the impact of portfolio weight constraints on an investor’s optimal portfolio when parameter uncertainty is taken into account. While it is well known that parameter uncertainty and imposing weight constraints results in reduced certainty equivalent returns, in the general case, there are no analytical results. In a special case, commonly used in the funds management literature, we derive analytical expression for the certainty equivalent loss that does not depend on the risk aversion parameter. We illustrate our theoretical results using hedge fund data, from the perspective of a fund-of-fund manager. Our contribution is to formalize the framework to investigate this problem, as well as providing tractable analytical solutions that can be implemented using either simulated or asset manager returns.     

Strategic market games with a finite horizon and incomplete markets

Summary. We study a strategic market game associated to an intertemporal economy with a finite horizon and incomplete markets. We demonstrate that generically, for any finite number of players, every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free stream of allocations can be approximated by a full subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a consequence, imperfect competition may Pareto-dominate perfect competition when markets are incomplete. Moreover - and this contrasts with the main message conveyed by the market games literature - there exists a large open set of initial endowments for which full subgame-perfect equilibria do not converge to -efficient allocations when the number of players tends to infinity. Finally, strategic speculative bubbles may survive at full subgame-perfect equilibria.Received: 24 January 2002, Revised: 21 February 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D52. Correspondence to: Gaël GiraudWe thank Tim Van Zandt for his comments.     

Policy choice for end-of-pipe abatement technology adoption under technological uncertainty

Regulators have increasingly become concerned about end-of-pipe abatement technologies because they not only play a crucial role in air pollution control but also ensure the achievement of the deep carbon emissions reduction target. This paper investigates the effect of emission taxes and standards on the adoption of end-of-pipe abatement technology when the arrival time and degree of improvement of the new emissions abatement technology are uncertain. We find that the ranking of emission taxes and standards in terms of motivating early adoption depends on the policy stringency. More specifically, for high levels of environmental stringency, standards induce an earlier technology adoption than taxes, while the opposite conclusion holds for low levels of environmental stringency. The sensitivity analysis shows that these findings are robust to various relevant crucial parameters. Finally, the implications for the choice of environmental policy have been provided.     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

环境规制对企业绿色创新的影响机理研究 ——战略柔性与区域差异性的双调节作用

企业绿色创新既需要环境规制政策引导,又需要有较强战略柔性与之相协调。引入战略柔性、区域差异性的调节作用,并采用分组回归检验环境规制对企业绿色创新的区域差异性影响,探索环境规制对企业绿色创新的双元影响机制。结果显示：环境规制对企业绿色技术创新和企业绿色管理创新均具有显著正向影响,且对前者的积极影响更显著;战略柔性正向调节环境规制与企业绿色技术创新、企业绿色管理创新间的关系,且对后者的调节作用更大;环境规制对企业绿色创新的影响呈现“东、中部各领风骚,西部较弱”的区域差异性特征：环境规制对企业绿色技术创新、企业绿色管理创新的促进作用在中部、东部地区较强,在西部地区较弱。     

战略性新兴产业技术创新研究综述

突破性技术创新是战略性新兴产业产生的必要条件,战略性新兴产业的意义在于能够引领技术创新走向。在战略性新兴产业技术创新研究文献的基础上,探讨了战略性新兴产业的技术范式、技术轨道以及技术创新治理模式,并对目前该领域的研究趋势进行了展望。     

战略性新兴产业军民融合式发展的产业融合分析——以核能产业为例

基于产业融合分析框架,战略性新兴产业军民融合式发展可视为包括技术融合、需求融合、企业融合和制度融合在内的产业融合的特殊表现形式。其中,技术融合是起点,企业融合是实现途径,需求融合是重要拉动力,制度融合是外部推动力。以战略性新兴产业军民融合式发展的典型产业——核能产业为研究对象,从技术融合、企业融合、需求融合和制度融合等方面,分析核能产业军民融合式发展现状与问题,提出了夯实技术基础、打造军民融合产业园、建立需求拉动机制以及完善军民融合制度建设等一些列促进战略性新兴产业军民融合深度发展的建议。     

Preference uncertainty in contingent valuation

In this paper, the results of empirical studies that applied two widely used methods - numerical certainty scale (NCS) and polychotmous choice (PC) - for estimating preference uncertainty adjusted willingness to pay (WTP) in contingent valuation (CV), are summarized. For this review, a number of conclusions are reached. First, there is a lack of consensus about which method is more appropriate for measuring preference uncertainty. Second, although preference uncertainty information has been found useful in detecting the incidence of hypothetical bias in CV studies, a consensus about a standard certainty threshold (or treatment mechanism) at which hypothetical behaviour converges to real behaviour is yet to emerge. Third, insufficient empirical evidence exists about the causal relationship between preference uncertainty scores and the theoretically expected explanatory variables. Finally, the preference uncertainty adjusted PC and NCS models fail to provide a consistent and more efficient welfare estimate compared to the conventional dichotomous choice certainty model.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

Economic policy uncertainty and demand for money in Australia

The demand for money has received a great deal of attention in the empirical literature. This literature, however, has emphasized factors such as interest rate, income, inflation rate and exchange rate as the primary determinants of money demand. Although an emerging strand of literature examines uncertainty as a potential determinant of money demand, findings have been mixed. Using a news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index and Australian quarterly data from 1998 to 2017, we study the impact of policy uncertainty on demand for money. Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) results show that the economic policy uncertainty measure has a negative short-run effect on the demand for money, suggesting the wider public hedge against future expected inflation, and positive long-run effect, whereby the broader public hold more cash to stay liquid during times of economic uncertainty. Also, introducing nonlinearity into the money demand equation, we find an asymmetric effect, more in favour of currency appreciations, supporting the expectations effect of further appreciations in exchange rate movements.     

The impact of economic and monetary uncertainty on the demand for money in emerging economies

By introducing uncertainty, monetary volatility and economic volatility are said to make the public cautious, hence increase their cash holdings or their demand for money. On the other hand, because of monetary and economic uncertainty if the public seek safer assets than money, they may hold less cash. In the absence of any paper testing for the impact of economic and monetary uncertainty on the demand for money in emerging economies, this article fills the gap by considering the experiences of six Central and Eastern European emerging economies and four other emerging economies. We found that the impact is transitory in most countries. Moreover, money demand is found correctly specified and stable in most countries, suggesting that policy based on monetary targeting could still be effective despite significant output and monetary uncertainty.     

The choice of technology in economic development

The impact of capital accumulation on job creation is an important and interesting issue in economic development. This model provides a general-equilibrium framework for studying technology choice with unemployment in a developing economy based on micro-foundations. Unemployment in the urban sector results from the existence of efficiency wages. Manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies to maximise profits. A more advanced technology uses more capital and less labour. In the steady state, an increase in the amount of capital induces firms to choose more advanced technologies and the wage rate increases. While a higher capital stock always induces firms to choose more advanced technologies, urban unemployment rate may decrease and agricultural sector employment may increase.     

Discrete choice model analysis of mobile telephone service demand in Japan

This paper analyzes the demand for mobile telephones including second generation (2G) and third generation (3G) by using a discrete choice model called a mixed logit model. First, we examine the substitution patterns of the demand for mobile telephones and show that demand substitutability among alternatives is stronger within the provider nest category than within the standard nest category in mobile telephone services. The closest substitute for NTT’s 3G service is NTT’s 2G service, rather than KDDI’s 3G service, for example. Second, we investigate the elasticities of demand for various functions including e-mail, Web browsing, and moving picture delivery. Consequently, we cannot observe marked differences between 2G and 3G services based on these calculated elasticities, indicating that it takes time for 3G subscribers to gain proficiency with such new services.      

Respondent uncertainty in a contingent market for carbon offsets

The main objective of this paper is to provide additional empirical evidence of what explains respondent uncertainty in contingent valuation (CV) and how this in turn affects stated willingness to pay (WTP). Air travelers asked to pay a carbon travel tax to offset carbon emissions from flying were asked how likely it is that they will actually pay if the tax is voluntary. When changing the market compliance imperative from a mandatory carbon tax to a voluntary contribution, a third of all air travelers consider it unlikely they will actually pay their stated WTP amount. An ordered probit estimation approach is applied to identify the sources of respondent uncertainty. Besides the bid price, respondent sense of responsibility and belief in the effectiveness of the voluntary carbon market are among the main reasons for the experienced uncertainty.     

Determinants of demand for technology in relationships with complementary assets among Japanese firms

ABSTRACT

There has been growing interest in open innovation by firms creating new value by combining internal and external ideas. Technology insourcing, however, has not been satisfactorily investigated compared to technology outsourcing in empirical literature. In this paper, we examine the determinants of external technology sourcing by types of the counterpart in new product development (NPD). We use a novel dataset at the product level, conducted by RIETI in 2011. We highlight cases in which a technology partner is also a business partner, such as a supplier or customer, from those where this is not the case. In contrast, in cases when a technology partner is not a business partner, patents play an important role in moderating transaction costs in partnerships. In contrast, in cases when a technology partner is also a business partner, we found a pattern of co-specialization of managerial resources with the partner firm.

Abbreviations: B2B: Business to business; NPD: New product development; RBV: Resource-based view     

Preference uncertainty in stated preference studies: facts and artefacts

The ordinal scale and polychotomous choice methods are two widely used techniques for estimating preference uncertainty in stated preference studies. This article presents the results of two experiments that apply these estimation techniques. The first experiment was designed to compare and contrast the scores of the ordinal scale and polychotomous choice method. The second experiment was conducted to test a scale that combines verbal expressions with numerical and graphical interpretations: a composite scale. The results of the study can be summarized in three key findings. First, the polychotomous choice method generates a higher proportion of ‘yes’ responses than the conventional dichotomous choice elicitation format. Second, the composite scale generates a significantly higher proportion of certain responses. Finally, the ordinal scale performs poorly on the ground of construct validity.     

产业技术创新联盟防“道德风险”激励机制设计

产业技术创新联盟是中国近年来新出现的一种合作创新组织,其本质是一个合伙型自主工作团队,成员之间互为委托代理关系。运用合作博弈模型,从利益分配角度设计产业技术创新联盟防风险厌恶型成员“道德风险”的相互激励机制。可得出结论：提高联盟产出基数、降低联盟运行成本基数、提高成员产出分享比例,可激励其更加积极努力地投入联盟技术创新活动中。成员的努力程度提高,其个体效用和联盟总福利呈先增后减的趋势,其努力程度会保持在一个适当水平。而针对具有不同风险规避度的联盟成员,其个体效用和联盟总福利则会随着产出分享比例不同而呈现不同的变化趋势。对于风险规避度越高的成员,增加产出分享比例对其效用的边际贡献越小。