Income and wealth distribution in a simple model of growth

Summary. This paper studies a deterministic one-sector growth model with a constant returns to scale production function and endogenous labor supply. It is shown that the distribution of capital among the agents has an effect on the level of per-capita output. There exists a continuum of stationary equilibria with different levels of per-capita output. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is large, a higher output level can be achieved when income inequality is great, that is, when the income distribution is strongly dispersed. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low, the reverse relation holds. The paper shows that countries with identical production technologies and identical preferences may have different GDP levels because wealth is distributed differently among their inhabitants. Received: January 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999     

Derived factor demand under monopoly

Summary. We generalize the formula provided by Maurice and Ferguson (1973) for derived factor demand in a monopoly by extending it to cross-price effects and taking into account other variables which may, within an general-equilibrium framework, affect demand, such as income. Hopefully, both features increase the applicability of this formula in general-equilibrium analyses. Received: April 5, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001     

Disaggregation of excess demand and comparative statics with incomplete markets and nominal assets

Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium prices to these parameters has also no structure. Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997     

Comment on “σ: The long and short of it”

I comment on some of the issues discussed by Robert Chirinko (Chirinko, R.S., 2008. σ: The long and short of it. Journal of Macroeconomics 30 (2), 671-686). I also offer some additional evidence and discuss the theoretical implications of the empirical findings regarding σ.     

Similarity of endowments and the factor price equalization condition

Summary. We give a geometric interpretation of the lens condition, proposed by Deardorff as a shortcut for checking the factor price equalization (FPE) condition. We identify the conditions under which the lens condition implies the FPE condition. If the FPE zone is not a neighborhood of the diagonal allocations, however, the lens condition is irrelevant despite the implication since the FPE condition (hence the lens condition) is unlikely to be satisfied in that case. We give precise conditions under which the lens condition is equivalent to the FPE condition and simultaneously, the FPE zone is a neighborhood of the diagonal allocations. Received: January 2, 2002; revised version: July 1, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Bruce Dieffenbach and Michael Jerison for helpful comments.     

技术进步实现机制和生产要素产出弹性理论假说——来自我国9个发达经济区的实证检验

按照管理、资本和劳动要素的产出弹性关系的新理论假说,利用我国9个发达地区2000—2006年的面板数据对要素产出弹性理论假说的检验,其结果表明,由于我国在技术进步中一直主要依靠技术引进和缺乏自主创新,从而使技术进步表现为资本增加型,理论假说前提的偏离导致实证分析结果和理论分析结果不一致。结论表明,在不同的工业化发展阶段,可以选择的技术进步方式不同,要素投入的组合方式也不同。当前我国应该改变资本投入过快增长的现状,强调管理要素和高素质劳动力投入,通过不断促进技术进步,提高要素的使用效率,实现经济平稳快速增长。     

The set of sunspot equilibria in economies with incomplete financial markets: variable asset prices

Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1). Moreover, the map from states o f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium. Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000     

Approximation by finite horizons of the undiscounted one-sector growth model

Summary. In this paper I give a method for finding long-run-average policies in the undiscounted economic growth problem using approximations by finite horizons. Required hypothesis is the strong interiority of T-horizon solutions. Received: March 25, 1996; revised version: July 29, 1997     

A comparison of Dodgson's method and the Borda count

Summary. In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's Method is designed to find the candidate that is “closest” to being a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we show that the winner from Dodgson's Method can occur at any position in the ranking obtained from the Borda Count, the plurality method, or any other positional voting procedure. In addition, we demonstrate that Dodgson's Method does not satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom. Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: June 7, 2001     

The equivalence of the Dekel–Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability

Summary. Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that a player believes that with small probability her opponents choose strategies that are irrational, or assuming that their is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if strategy perturbations are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and if there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243–267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Received: 10 December 1998; revised version: 26 April 1999     

Utility and entropy

Summary. In this paper we study an astonishing similarity between the utility representation problem in economics and the entropy representation problem in thermodynamics. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: October 16, 2000     

A difficulty with the address models of product differentiation

Summary. In models of product differentiation and location models it is implicitly assumed that consumers can afford to buy the differentiated goods in the market. I show that with income heterogeneity there are severe existence problems of a price equilibrium in models of horizontal product differentiation with unit demand because some consumers are income-constrained. The result generalizes to other models of product differentiation, search, and switching costs. I present an alternative specification of variable individual demand in which this kind of existence problem cannot arise. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: February 20, 1998     

Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information

Summary. This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer. Received: September 10, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I benefitted from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Holger Müller, and Roland Strausz, and from comments made by an anonymous referee.     

More on parametric characterizations of risk aversion and prudence

Summary. This note provides an alternative proof for the equivalence of decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) in the expected utility framework and in a two-parametric approach where utility is a function of the mean and the standard deviation. In addition, we elucidate that the equivalence of DAP and the concavity of utility as a function of mean and variance, which was shown to hold for normally distributed stochastics in Lajeri and Nielsen [4], cannot be generalized. Received: November 27, 2000; revised version: November 26, 2001 Correspondence to: T. Eichner     

Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

Summary. The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations. Received: March 15, 2000; revised version: August 24, 2000     

Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach

Summary. Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed bid procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe three algorithms that can be used to compute the inverse equilibrium bid functions. I then use the computational algorithms to compare competitive and collusive bidding. The algorithms are useful for structural estimation of auction models and for assessing the damages from bid-rigging. Received: January 14, 2000; revised version: February 28, 2001     

On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms

Summary.   In a situation where agents have private information, we investigate the stability of mechanisms with respect to coalitional deviations. In the cooperative tradition, we first extend the notion of Core, taking into account the information a coalition may have when it forms and the conjectures of outsiders. This leads us to propose a family of Cores rather than a single one. Secondly, we study the stability of Core mechanisms to secession proposals in simple noncooperative games. The two different stability analyses, normative and strategic, tend to give support to the more natural extension of the Core, called Statistical Core, only in situations where some strong form of increasing returns to coalition is met. Without this property, arguments for a concept of Core that is non empty in a reasonably large class of problems are less compelling. Applications to taxation and insurance are given. Received: September 6, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Equilibria in infinite-dimensional production economies with convexified coalitions

Summary. This paper deals with a private ownership production economy assuming that the commodity space is infinite-dimensional. It is first showed that the fuzzy core allocations, a concept that goes back to J.-P. Aubin, are in a one-to-one correspondence with certain core allocations of a continuum economy suitably defined. This result is obtained under convexity of preferences and production sets and separability of the commodity space. In the case of nonconvex preferences and production sets, the set of fuzzy coalitions can be enlarged in order to obtain that every allocation of the core accordingly defined is supported by a non zero price. The proof of the equivalence result when the positive cone of the commodity space has the empty interior, is obtained under assumptions of properness for preferences relations and production sets. Received: July 9, 1998; revised version: December 6, 1999     

Parametric characterizations of risk aversion and prudence

Summary. Our first main result says that whether one decision maker is more risk averse than another can be determined from their attitudes toward a given two-parameter family of risks. When all risks belong to this family, risk aversion can be compared even when initial wealth is random. Our second main result solves a long-standing problem in mean-variance analysis: what is the interpretation of the concavity of utility as a function of mean and variance? We show that in the case of normal distributions, this utility function is concave if and only if the agent has decreasing prudence. Received: July 29, 1996; revised: October 2, 1998