Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice

We study the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule.     

Greenwashing Revisited: In Search of a Typology and Accusation‐Based Definition Incorporating Legitimacy Strategies

Is greenwashing a concept describing companies using misleading communication or is it co‐constructed in the eye of the beholder? By discussing the literature, we find that existing definitions of greenwashing overemphasize the strategic intention to mislead and do not incorporate unjust allegations. Then, by combining signaling theory with legitimacy theory, we frame the communication process of the greenwashing accusation and the emergence of a negative narrative caused by the accusation and its effect on legitimacy. Hence, in this paper we argue that greenwashing epistemologically is constituted in the eye of the beholder , depending on an external accusation. Following this view, the greenwashing accusation is understood as a distortion factor altering the signal reliability of green messages. Based on our conceptual analysis, we provide a conceptual framework introducing a new typology of case‐based greenwashing (greenwashing , false greenwashing , potential greenwashing and no greenwashing ) and the effects of these types on corporate legitimacy. Finally, we propose a revised definition of greenwashing as co‐creation of an external accusation toward an organization with regard to presenting a misleading green message. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model

Risk‐neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk‐neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes relatively more likely to arise from desirable than from undesirable actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after acquiring information provides an additional reason to those in the classic principal‐agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived.     

Sustainable Retailing – Influencing Consumer Behaviour on Food Waste

The aim of this research was to examine the influence of a UK national retailer on its customers' food waste behaviour. Using six communication channels (in‐store magazine, e‐newsletter, Facebook site, product stickers and in‐store demonstrations), Asda presented standard food waste reduction messages to its customers during two time limited periods in 2014 and 2015. Six national surveys over 21 months tracked customers' self‐reported food waste. Our results showed that the combined communication channels and repeated messages over time had a significant effect on reducing food waste of customers. Surprisingly, customers who said they did not recall seeing the messages also reduced their food waste, showing the wider influence of interventions. Those who saw a food waste reduction message saved an estimated £81 annually from reducing food waste. The main conclusion of this paper is that retailers can influence the pro‐environmental behaviour of customers using conventional communication channels; however, repeat messages are needed in order to have a long‐term impact. © 2017 The Authors. Business Strategy and the Environment published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd     

Inter‐Team Coordination Patterns and Outcomes in Multi‐Team Projects

We examine what kinds of patterns of mechanisms can be applied in the coordination of several inter‐related project teams. We identify three distinct coordination schemes; namely: centralized coordination, decentralized coordination, and balanced coordination. In addition, we compare individuals' perceptions on communication, coordination effectiveness, project efficiency, learning, task analyzability, and task uncertainty between the three identified coordination schemes. The results of our study extend to both theoretical and practical understanding of coordination in multi‐team projects and its relation to communication, coordination effectiveness, project performance, and learning.     

Learning quality through prices and word‐of‐mouth communication

This paper studies the effect of word‐of‐mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word‐of‐mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high‐quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low‐quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high‐quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low‐quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word‐of‐mouth communication improves consumer welfare.     

Tacit Collusion in a One‐Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints

This paper analyzes price competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two‐stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short‐term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game, that is, the unique payoff‐dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on price competition and that of the convex cost function.     

Corporate social responsibility,durable‐goods and firm profitability

Utilizing a two‐period durable‐goods framework, we show that in uncommitted sales markets a firm may earn higher profits as it increases its level of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that this occurs even though CSR has no direct impact other than increasing the durable‐goods firm's manufacturing costs. We show that in sales markets, CSR may allow the firm to credibly commit itself to lower production in the future. This, in turn, can enhance their profits even though the CSR activities are costly and provide no direct demand or marketing benefit in our model. This is important because it provides another, hereto unexplored, strategic rationale for the willingness of profit‐maximizing firms to undertake costly CSR activities. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial contracts as coordination device

We study the use of financial contracts as bid‐coordinating device in multi‐unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the “volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.     

The efficacy of anti‐smoking advertisements: the role of source,message, and individual characteristics

• This research investigates the effects of direct and indirect sources of anti‐smoking messages. Specifically, it examines the direct influence of advertised messages and the indirect effect of the subsequent discussion.
• Two studies examine the role of: (i) Source characteristics (i.e., messages disseminated through mass media and subsequently via discussion by friends or strangers); (ii) Message characteristics (i.e., messages that induce either low or high fear); (iii) Individual characteristics (i.e., gender based differences within the target audience) in attitude formation towards smokers, the act of smoking, propensity to smoke, and the likelihood of being influenced.
• Message efficacy is found to vary by gender, type of ad appeal, as well as group membership of ad discussants. Implications for design of anti‐smoking campaigns are derived.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Three‐period,two‐treatment crossover design under long‐term carryover effect

The paper describes non‐parametric approach for analysis of a three‐period, two‐treatment, four‐sequence crossover design in which test procedure for interchangeability of the treatment effects is obtained. The proposed procedure is based on a non‐parametric model, which incorporates, along with the direct treatment effects and the usual carryover effects, the long‐term carryover effects. Relevant competitors are obtained. Related asymptotic results are given. By performing simulation study, we compared the procedures with respect to type I error rate and power. Furthermore, confidence intervals for treatment differences are studied. The procedures are illustrated with a data study.     

The no-arbitrage condition and financial markets with heterogeneous information

This paper examines the role of the no-arbitrage condition in financial markets with heterogeneous expectations. We consider a single-period, state-contingent claims model, withM risky securities andS states. There exist two types of heterogeneously informed investors, where the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to either the security payoff matrix, the state probability vector, or state partitions. When the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to either the security payoff matrix or state partitions, the no-arbitrage condition imposes a constraint on the dispersion of information between informed and uninformed investors. Further, the no-arbitrage condition is useful in ascertaining the patterns of heterogeneity among investors that are consistent with equilibrium. However, when the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to state probabilities, the role of the no-arbitrage condition is severely restricted. Finally, the no-arbitrage condition may have important implications for the (necessary and sufficient) conditions for the existence of an equilibrium price vector in financial markets with heterogeneous expectations.     

Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?

Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.     

Communication versus Information Transparency in One‐Shot Interactions: A Labor Market Experiment

This is an experimental study of communication and information transparency in one‐shot labor market relations with incomplete contracts. We find that communication in the form of non‐binding broadcast chat messages increases wages, effort levels, and overall efficiency regardless of the information regime. It serves as a negotiation platform and helps workers and firms learn how to cooperate. Communication outperforms information transparency in motivating trust and cooperative behavior in one‐shot interactions. Although transparency might be important in the long term, it does not improve any of the market outcomes in short‐term relations unless it is combined with communication. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing environmental advocacy: a study of 30 years of advertising in National Geographic Magazine

To compete with the flood of environmental messaging from corporations and industry groups, environmental advocacy groups must adopt the most effective communication strategies to connect with audiences and motivate their behaviors toward environmental issues. This study examines the framing of environmental messages by advocacy groups in contrast to messages by other organizations in 30 years of environmental advertising in National Geographic Magazine. It measures changes in the degree to which environmental actions were framed in terms of gain for the environment versus avoidance of ecological loss and in terms of impacting current generations versus future generation. In addition, the study examined behavioral frames of taking less (conservation) versus doing more (recycling, volunteering, etc.) in environmental advocacy groups' advertising to better understand the kinds of actions the organizations are promoting. The organizations' strategies to engage audience behavior were also measured through message focus on reader behavior versus organization behavior. Findings suggest that frames engaged by environmental advocacy organizations have remained fairly stable over time but may not represent the best practices for message creation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game’s payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals that inform them of each other’s private information. We show, that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. Even though the precisions of both signal types are exogenous, the precision with which agents forecast each other’s actions in equilibrium turns out to be endogenous. As a consequence, there exist multiple equilibria which differ with regard to the way that agents weight their private information to forecast each other’s actions.     

Little Firms and Big Patents: A Model of Small‐Firm Patent Signaling

Patent strategies of small technology‐intensive firms are difficult to explain with standard incentive arguments based on intellectual property rights. This paper develops a rationale for patent filing as a disclosure strategy. We develop a two‐sender signaling game to study patenting incentives of two technology start‐ups to file in a large‐scale patent system with the goal to attract a user firm. Both start‐ups may decide to invest in costly modification of their patent application before filing. The paper identifies a separating equilibrium in which the high‐quality inventor files and so separates from its technology competitor. Of particular interest is the study of pooling and semi‐separating equilibria, as well as the impact of subsidies. We find that a higher quality of a country's inventions, reflected in the possible innovative steps and thus in higher expected profits for foreign user firms, may increase the chance of the relatively lower‐quality inventor to enter international technology markets.     

Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes

We study an evolutionary model akin to the one studied in Anwar (2002) where a set of agents use myopic best response learning to i) determine their action in a 2 × 2 coordination game and ii) to choose on which of multiple islands to interact. We focus on the case where the number of agents maximally allowed on each islands is constrained. We extend Anwar’s original analysis by considering the case when there may be more than two islands. We find that if the constraints are such that one island may be empty, universal coordination on the payoff dominant action is possible in the long run. If the constraints are such that all islands will be full, then for relatively mild constraints, and apart from special cases, the coexistence of conventions will occur, with one island coordinating on the risk dominant action and all remaining islands coordinating on the payoff dominant action. For relatively stringent constraints all agents will play the risk dominant action.     

From fixed to state‐dependent duration in public‐private partnerships

A government delegates a build‐operate‐transfer project to a private firm. In the contracting stage, the operating cost is unknown. The firm can increase the likelihood of facing a low cost, rather than a high cost, by exerting costly effort when building the infrastructure. Once the infrastructure is in place, the firm learns the true cost and begins to operate. Under limited commitment, either partner may renege on the contract at any moment thereafter. The novelty with respect to incentive theory is that the contractual length is stipulated in the contract in such a way that it depends on the cost realization. Our main result is that, if the break‐up of the partnership is sufficiently costly to the government and/or adverse selection and moral hazard are sufficiently severe, then the efficient contract is not robust to renegotiation unless it has a longer duration when the realized cost is low. This result is at odds with the literature on flexible‐term contracts, which recommends a longer duration when operating conditions are unfavorable, yet, with regard to a different setting, where the demand is uncertain and the cash‐flow is exogenous.     

Exploring the interactive effects of brand use and gender on cause‐related marketing over time

Research has shown that men and women respond differently to cause‐related marketing (CRM) appeals with fictitious brands; however, few studies examine how CRM works for existing brands or measure long‐term effects. To fill these gaps, we explore the influence of sponsor brand use and gender on responses to a CRM campaign at three points in time (premessage, postmessage exposure, and 2‐week delay). We are the first study to identify the moderating effect of brand use on gendered responses to CRM messages. Nonbrand users increased their purchase intentions after CRM message exposure; this was especially true for men. Overall, our findings reinforce past research showing that CRM can positively influence short‐term purchase intentions. We reveal new insights that show CRM can work especially well among nonbrand buyers; however, no significant long‐term influence was found. Our results demonstrate the importance of segmenting the market by demographics and brand use as well as considering the long‐term implications of CRM persuasion.