The bright side and dark side of trust: The mediating effect of franchisor trust on performance

Previous literature has not examined the dual role of trust in franchise relationships. We extend the franchise and relational governance literature by showing that trust has both a “bright side” and a “dark side” in franchisor–franchisee relationships. Based on transaction cost and knowledge-based reasoning, we argue that intangible knowledge assets and environmental uncertainty have an indirect effect on performance via trust, due to its relational risk and knowledge exchange effect. Using data from the franchise sector in Germany, we show that trust positively mediates the impact of intangible knowledge assets and negatively mediates the impact of environmental uncertainty on franchisor performance. The first effect refers to the “bright side” of trust showing that intangible brand name assets increase trust which, in turn, has a positive effect on performance. Conversely, the second effect refers to the “dark side” of trust highlighting that environmental uncertainty diminishes trust resulting in a negative effect on performance.     

Outlet ownership in franchising systems: an agency based approach

Building on prior agency theoretic explanations of the franchisor–franchisee relationship, this paper introduces the franchise system manager in the traditional dyadic channel. This allows us to link the franchisors internal agency problems of providing incentives to managers to their external agency problems of acquiring and extracting rents from franchisees. I find preliminary empirical support for this approach in a structural equations model estimated on a franchise system data set. I then develop and analyze an agency‐theoretic model with agency tradeoffs. An explicit rationale for mixed ownership in franchising emerges from the model, where the share of company owned outlets is endogenously determined as the tradeoff between franchisee rents and managerial compensation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of brand-related and market signals on franchisees’ entrepreneurial decisions: a multi-country panel data analysis

This paper analyses the influence of market and brand-related signals on franchisees’ decisions when choosing a franchise brand with which to open an outlet for the first time. Panel data methodology was used to analyse a sample of 1277 chains operating in Spain, Mexico and Peru between 2004 and 2013. The results show that market signals prevail over brand-related signals. Within brand-related signals, franchisees first seek information relating to the brand’s sector and then seek information relating to the brand’s value. Franchisors should match the content of the signals they send to the market to the true characteristics of the franchise. Franchisors should also endeavour to ensure the country where they operate has general and franchise-specific legislation that fosters business activity by both franchisor and franchisee. The use of institutional quality as a signal in a multi-country study represents a significant contribution to the literature on franchising.

     

Time will tell: interaction effects of franchising percentages and age on franchisor mortality rates

Drawing from franchising and organizational ecology literatures, we hypothesize that franchising provides benefits to franchisors by addressing issues of adverse selection, moral hazard, holdup, obsolescence, and senescence. We assert that, over time, these benefits increase such that the more a franchise chain utilizes franchisees rather than company-owned outlets, the greater the franchising benefits accrue to the franchisor. We test our propositions by studying the mortality rates of 393 franchise organizations in the U.S. automotive products and services sector over the 21-year time period 1985–2005, using proportional hazard analysis. We find that older franchise chains with higher percentages of franchised units have lower mortality rates than older franchise chains with lower percentages of franchised units. We also find that younger franchise chains with higher percentages of franchised units have higher mortality rates than younger franchise chains with lower percentages of franchised units.     

Preliminary evidence on the appointment of institutional solutions to franchisor moral hazard—the case of franchisee councils

Besides franchisee opportunistic behavior, franchisor moral hazard is a central concern in franchise chains. Economic literature thus far focused on the sharing of franchisee revenues as an incentive for curbing franchisor malfeasance. In this paper, we ask whether and how the obligations of chains may be enforced through institutional arrangements like franchisee councils. Consistent with expectations, the appointment of a council empirically turned out to be more likely as decision rights—a proxy for the scope of moral hazard—were increasingly allocated to companies' management. We found this relationship to be negatively moderated by the contractual share parameter. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

To be entrepreneurial,or not to be entrepreneurial? Explaining differences in franchisee entrepreneurial behavior within a franchise system

Although franchising scholars largely acknowledge that franchisees may behave like entrepreneurs, little is known about whether and why franchisees differ in their entrepreneurial behaviors. Franchisees are semi-autonomous entrepreneurs running geographically dispersed units within established organizations. We therefore use corporate entrepreneurship (CE) literature to define and measure franchisee entrepreneurial behavior, and we build on an entrepreneurial motivation framework to develop an integrative set of hypotheses that explain differences in franchisee entrepreneurial behavior. We test these hypotheses using survey data on 119 franchisees within a single Dutch franchise system. Our results show that the extent of franchisee entrepreneurial behavior varies considerably, even within a single franchise system. The differences in franchisees’ entrepreneurial behaviors can be explained by differences in franchisees’ intrinsic goals, relational satisfaction and local competition.     

Entrepreneurial global franchise ventures: US and European franchisee failure strategic and empirical perspectives

Rapid United States and European franchise growth offers potential benefits for stakeholders and host counties, as well as the potential for failure. Franchisee failure research is a complex area confounded by varying failure definitions, approaches, an event-focus, and single-year data. This paper includes a strategic franchisee failure perspective that views franchisee failure as a multi-stage process rather than an event; new longitudinal data from the United States for over 780 franchise systems and 292,000 franchise units and United Kingdom franchisee failure data for over 700 franchise systems and 31,000 franchisee units; and estimates of current European business-format franchise market size, including selected Central and Eastern European countries. Understanding and mitigating franchisee failure provide potential lessons for franchisors and franchisees. Franchisee failure and the strategic implications for franchise entrepreneurial ventures is a significant research area that merits further study and analysis.     

特许经营的契约性质

特许经营的契约是一组无形资产"捆绑"在一起融入某种商品交易中的复合契约;契约中交易的收入条款往往没有直接确定无形资产的独立价格,而是确定为一个基数加上某种商品交易收入的分成;契约中交易的使用条款通常包含特许人对受许人生产经营过程的"干预"、"指挥"和"协调"方面的规定。契约实质是一组无形资产的间接定价机制。     

The use of initial fees and royalties in business-format franchising

This paper provides an explanation of franchising's fee structure, drawing on principal agency and labor economics theory. The predictive framework includes constructs such as channel control, franchisor services, franchisee risk and the franchisor's capital constraints. The empirical investigation of a representative sample of franchise chains indicates that channel control is the major factor influencing the payment design. The results are used to test managerial implications about the use of an optimal fee structure in the growth of chains.     

Recall of autobiographical memory: A longitudinal analysis of franchisee experts

In this longitudinal study, we investigate whether franchisees in their role as experts exhibit consistent recall of their perceptions of franchise value after a 3-year interval when a strong autobiographical instance association (i.e., the multiunit decision) is created. Paired-sample t tests and correlation analysis are used to examine recall accuracy. While the analysis reveals stability of recall for typical franchisee experts over both the recent and the distant past, the individual level data indicate that the precision of recall deteriorates over time. Implications for future research involving retrospective data are offered.     

The moderating influence of HR operational autonomy on the entrepreneurial orientation–performance link in franchise systems

This study investigates the concept of HR Operational Autonomy, i.e., the freedom a franchisor offers to franchisees throughout the system with regards to their creation of HR practices. It is shown to have a significant positive moderating effect on the EO-performance link among UK franchise systems, explaining over 20 % of the variance in performance outcomes. Implications and future research directions are discussed.     

多店特许文献综述

多店特许近期发展非常迅速,中外研究者识别了区域发展、主特许、区域代理、特许中介、顺序多店特许、合资特许等多店特许方式,从特许人与受许人动机、多店特许优缺点进行了实证研究,使用了代理理论、国际化理论、集体行为与社会选择等理论方法。国内有关研究强调主特许经营"三层两关系",指出法律不能也不应该对经营模式进行保护。这些研究绝大多数将国内与国际分开,存在局限性;且将多店特许与单店特许比较,而实质上多店特许更应该与特许体系分支机构对应。     

Family versus Non‐Family Firm Franchisors: Behavioural and Performance Differences

Drawing from resource‐based theory, we argue that family firm franchisors behave and perform differently compared to non‐family firm franchisors. Our theorizing suggests that compared to a non‐family firm franchisor, a family firm franchisor cultivates stronger relationships with franchisees and provides them with more training. Yet, we predict that a family firm franchisor achieves lower performance than a non‐family firm franchisor. We argue, however, that this performance relationship reverses itself when family firm franchisors are older and larger. We test our hypotheses with a longitudinal dataset including a matched‐pair sample of private U.S. family and non‐family firm franchisors.     

论特许经营的主体

我国原国内贸易部制定的《商业特许经营管理办法》对于特许经营中受许人和特许人有诸多限制,这与各国法律相比显得甚为苛刻,这种不合理的规定已经制约了我国特许经营事业的发展。无论是从经济、法律还是从实践方面分析,我国立法对于特许经营以主体不同区别对待,然后再决定是否准入的规定都应当早日予以废除,以充分调动社会资源,促进我国特许经营事业的发展。     

Best fit,best practice,or stuck in the middle? The impact of unit ownership on unit HR performance in franchise systems

Franchising is an important form of entrepreneurial wealth creation in many retailing and service industries. Since Human Resource Management (HRM) is a critical factor in such industries, it is important to understand how franchisees—as semi-autonomous entrepreneurs—deal with HRM in their units and how this ultimately affects performance at the unit level. However, the very few studies linking franchisee HRM behaviors to performance have not included multi-unit franchising (MUF) as a type of unit ownership. Given the ever-increasing popularity of MUF and the unique characteristics of MUFs, this represents an important knowledge gap. We aim to fill this gap by building a theoretical framework on how the type of unit ownership affects unit HR performance within franchise systems. Building on agency, resource and entrepreneurship perspectives, we propose that units owned by single-unit franchisees (SUFs) and small MUFs (i.e., franchisees with a very small number of units) adopt a ‘best fit’ system regarding HRM, whereas company-owned units (COs) and units owned by larger MUFs (i.e., franchisees with a large number of units) typically adopt a ‘best practice’ system. Each system has its own advantages and disadvantages, which results in two contrasting propositions regarding their effects on unit performance. Moreover, we expect the units owned by medium-size MUFs to have the lowest performance since they are ‘stuck in the middle’ regarding their HRM system.     

Decaf or double shot? The strength of franchisor control over HRM in coffee franchises

The franchise relationship presents a unique composition of autonomy and control. Franchisee autonomy is located somewhere between employed managers and independent business owners, while the franchisor regulates core processes such as marketing and product development. While heavy franchisor control over certain functions is customary and in fact integral to the franchise model, the delineation of HRM responsibilities in the franchise relationship is less clear. Using qualitative data from three Australian coffee chains, we examine the role of the corporate HR and the degree to which HRM activities are centralised, and develop a typology of franchisor HRM control. We find substantial variation between cases and demonstrate that it is the franchisor's strategic decision to prioritise brand protection or liability avoidance that ultimately determines whether their control over HRM can be described as ‘decaf’ weak or ‘double shot’ strength.     

Franchise network restructuring: Pressures,constraints and mechanisms

Franchised businesses operate on the basis of granting individual franchisees trading rights to serve territories or market areas on either an exclusive or a non-exclusive basis. The design of these territories is generally undertaken during the roll-out phase of the franchise. However, these territories and market areas may become sub-optimal over time, necessitating restructuring. However, if the franchisor has granted exclusive rights to a territory then this is likely to involve a breach in the franchise contract. In cases where existing franchisees do not have exclusive territories they may nevertheless make a legal challenge to the creation of additional franchises on the grounds of encroachment. This paper – which is based on a study of 40 franchisors in the UK – examines how franchisors go about network restructuring in constrained and non-constrained situations. Franchisors typically did not act on their legal rights, echoing findings of earlier franchising studies which reveal a divergence between contractual rights and operational behaviour. This focus on network restructuring also provides new perspectives on the reasons for ownership reversion and the growth of multi-unit franchisees.     

The Contingent Effects of Social Network Sparseness and Centrality on Managerial Innovativeness

Prior research has highlighted that network sparseness and network centrality enhance innovativeness through access to information and influence, respectively. We advance this perspective by exploring the extent to which individual actions are needed to mobilize information and influence accessed through social networks, and whether such information and influence would mutually reinforce to enhance managerial innovativeness. Our findings found partial support for the idea that actions are needed to actualize potential resources embedded in social networks, as centrally positioned managers enjoy higher innovativeness when they engage in ambassador activities. We also found that advice network sparseness and advice network centrality had independent, not interactive relationships with managerial innovativeness, suggesting that they offer distinct routes to achieving managerial innovativeness. Overall, our research clarifies the relationships of two important social network attributes on managerial innovativeness, and also sheds new light on how managerial action matters in realizing social network advantages for innovative ends.     

Why Are Royalty Rates Higher in Service-type Franchises?

Royalty payments from a franchisee to a franchisor serve as incentive for the franchisor to provide appropriate levels of quality and brand, name investment. However, since they also distort the service provided by the franchisee, we should expect relatively lower royalty rates in franchises that are primarily service-oriented. Casual examination of royalty rates across product-oriented and service-oriented franchises shows that the opposite is true, with service-type franchises enjoying higher royalty rates. We resolve this apparent puzzle. The basic argument we put forth is that in product-type franchises, a franchisor can charge a wholesale price on goods transferred to the franchisee, thus using an alternative instrument that also serves as an incentive for the franchisor. Moreover, in general, a franchisor will use both wholesale price and royalty to minimize distortions in retail price and service at the retail level. We then test the predictions of our model on different industries and find confirmation for the same.     

Franchising and intellectual capital: A franchisee’s perspective

Various studies have focused on the reasons for franchising. Most studies have concentrated principally on the franchisors’ motivations for franchising, with only a few exploring franchising as a route to self-employment. This paper seeks to provide a conceptual framework which examines the value of franchising to franchisees, employing an intellectual capital perspective. It is suggested that the (perceived) value of the franchise system is unlikely to remain static over time, and that the perceived benefits of franchise systems will vary according to both system and franchisee attributes.